

# Rising Conflict in the Period of New Diaspora and Geo-Economic Transitions in the Middle East

40th Anniversary Commemorative International Conference

# Rising Conflict in the Period of New Diaspora and Geo-Economic Transitions in the Middle East

Dates: 22 (Fri.) ~ 24 (Sun.) November 2019

Venue: Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS) &  
Grand Ambassador Hotel, Seoul, Republic of Korea

Co-Hosted by KAMES(한국중동학회)  GCC 국가연구소

Co-Sponsored by



한국연구재단



**대외경제정책연구원**  
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy



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Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Republic of Korea

한국-아랍소사이어티  
Korea-Arab Society



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National Research Foundation of Korea

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# 2019 KAMES International Conference: Rising Conflict in the Period of New Diaspora and Geo-Economic Transitions in the Middle East

1. Dates: 22 (Fri.) ~ 24 (Sun.) November 2019
2. Venue: Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS) & Grand Ambassador Hotel, Seoul, Republic of Korea
3. Topics of Sessions

<b>Politics</b>	Structural Transition and Connectivity in the Era of New Diaspora: The New Possibilities and Their Limits
<b>Economics</b>	The Era of New Diaspora and the Transition of the Economic Environment in the Middle East
<b>Culture &amp; Society</b>	The Search for Coexistence in the Era of New Diaspora and Socio-Cultural Conflict
<b>Education, Language &amp; Literature</b>	Language Identity and Literary Change for Post-Colonialism in the Era of New Diaspora

## 4. Programme

### ❑ 22 November (Friday) / Grand Ambassador Hotel

Roundtable and Welcoming Dinner		Orchid Room (19F)
15:00-18:00	<b>Roundtable</b> "The Mutual Prosperity and Co-Existence in the Middle East in the Eco-Geopolitical Shift" <b>Co-Chair</b> LEE, In-Seop (President of KAMES) Shin YASUDA (Secretary-General of JAMES)	
18:00-20:00	<b>Welcoming Dinner</b>	

### ❑ 23 November (Saturday) / HUFS, International Building

09:00-09:30	<b>Registration</b>	
Opening Session		Aekyung Hall (2F)
09:30-10:30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <b>Opening Address</b> LEE, In-Seop (President of KAMES)</li> <li>○ <b>Welcoming Remarks</b> JANG, Se-Won (Director of GCC Institute, Dankook University)</li> <li>○ <b>Congratulatory Remarks</b> HONG, Jin Wook (Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK) Adel Mohammad ADAILEH (Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the ROK) Hidemitsu KUROKI (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)</li> <li>○ <b>Keynote Address</b> "The Contestation for power in the Middle East" Anoush EHTESHAMI (Professor, Durham University)</li> </ul>	
10:30-10:45	<b>Photo Session &amp; Coffee Break</b>	



Session I		
10:45-12:50	Session I-1: Politics	Aekyung Hall (2F)
	Chair Anoush EHTESHAMI (Durham University)	
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Güljanat <b>KURMANGALIYEVA ERCİLASUN</b> (Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Univ.)  "A Geo-Economic Approach to Turkey: Central Asian Relations"  <b>Discussant</b> LEE, Hyo bun (Incheon National University)</p> <p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Saleh A. <b>ALMANI</b> (King Saud University)  "Conflict in the Middle East: The Failed-state Hypothesis"  <b>Discussant</b> JUNG, Sang Ryul (Myongji University)</p> <p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Narayanappa <b>JANARDHAN</b> (Emirates Diplomatic Academy)  "Gulf-South Korea Ties: Special, Smart and Strategic"  <b>Discussant</b> KIM, Eunbee (Korea National Defense University)</p> <p>○ <b>Presenter</b> LEE, Changju (Ajou University) &amp; <b>PAIK</b>, Seunghoon (HUFS)  "The Middle East and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The Transition of International Geo-Economic Structure and the Connectivity Within"  <b>Discussant</b> LEE, Joosong (HUFS)</p> <p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Robert <b>LAWRENCE</b> (Dongduk Women's University)  "Threat Perception and Turkey-U.S. Relations"  <b>Discussant</b> Rovshan <b>IBRAHIMOV</b> (HUFS)</p>	
	Session I-2: Culture & Society	Room 503
	Chair OH, Chong Jin (HUFS)	
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Hidemitsu <b>KUROKI</b> (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)  "The Syrian Civil War in Comparison with Lebanese and Yugoslavian Civil Wars"  <b>Discussant</b> AHN, Jung kook (Myongji University)</p> <p>○ <b>Presenter</b> KIM, Suwan (HUFS)  "Perception of Islam and Muslim in Korean Media"  <b>Discussant</b> YUN, Eun-Kyeong (HUFS)</p> <p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Suna Timur <b>AGILDERE</b> (Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University)  &amp; Berna <b>DENGİZ</b> (Başkent University)  "University-Industry Cooperation in Turkey and its Impacts to the Middle East and North Africa"  <b>Discussant</b> YANG, Min Ji (HUFS)</p> <p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Mesut <b>IDRİZ</b> (Sharjah University)  "Peace and Extremism Redefined: The Case of the Middle East"  <b>Discussant</b> KIM, Kangsuk (Dankook University)</p>	
12:50-14:00	Luncheon	

Session II			
14:00-16:15	Session II-1: Economics		Room 503
	Chair LEE, Kwon Hyung (Korea Institute of International Economic Policy)		
	○ Presenter LEE, Mansokku (State University of New York at Geneseo) & SONG, Sang Hyun (Dankook University) "Labor Productivity, Total Factor Productivity, and Economic Growth in the GCC Countries" Discussant SON, Sung Hyun (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy)		
	○ Presenter JUNG, Jae Wook (Korea Institute of International Economic Policy) "Economic Impact of Women Empowerment Policy in Saudi Arabia" Discussant KIM, Byeongho (HUFS)		
	○ Presenter Jessie MORITZ (Australian National University) "The Shale Oil Revolution, Fiscal Pressure, and the Changing Rentier Social Contract in the GCC" Discussant RYOU, Kwang Ho (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy)		
	○ Presenter Moamen GOUDA (HUFS) & Shimaa HANAFY (HUFS) "Democratic Institutions and Islamic State Jihadists: An Empirical Investigation" Discussant Humaid Al-HAMMADI (Emirati-Korean Friendship Society)		
	Session II-2: Culture & Society		Room 101
	Chair SAH, Heeman (Chosun University)		
	○ Presenter KIM, Joong-Kwan (Dongguk University) "Governance Framework for Syrian Refugees in Italy: Social Integration and Cultural Assimilation" Discussant JEONG, Young-kyu (Hyupsung University)		
	○ Presenter EUM, Ikran (Dankook University) "Saudi Vision 2030, Nationalism and Women" Discussant LEE, Kyungsoo (HUFS)		
	○ Presenter Mohamed ELASKARY (HUFS) & YUN, Eun-Kyeong (HUFS) "Muslim Minority in China" Discussant KIM, Eunji (HUFS)		
	Session II-3: Education, Language & Literature		Room 606
	Chair CHO, Hee Sun (Myeongji University)		
	○ Presenter Hossein Samadi BAHRAMI (School of International Relations, MOFA, Iran) "Phonetic Features, Syntactic Structures and Transformational Rules of Colloquial Persian and Their Observance by Persian Language Learners" Discussant KWAK, Saera (HUFS)		
○ Presenter Laila FAMILIAR (New York University, Abu Dhabi) "What Can Arabic Literature Offer in Times of Conflict?" Discussant KIM, Jeong A (HUFS)			
○ Presenter Lama NASSIF (Williams College) "Integrating Colloquial Arabic in the Arabic Foreign Language Curriculum: Promoting Linguistic Awareness" Discussant SEO, Jungmin (HUFS)			
○ Presenter Faisal MUBARAK (Antasari State Islamic University) "Phrase in Arabic and Indonesian Language: A Contrastive" Discussant MUN, Ji-Young (HUFS)			
○ Presenter Akiko M. SUMI (Kyoto Notre Dame University) & Katsunori SUMI (Nagoya Institute of Technology) "The Effects of Basic Psychological Needs Satisfaction on Arabic language Acquisition in a Short-Term Intensive Arabic Camp" Discussant LEE, Kye Youn (HUFS)			
16:15-16:40	Coffee Break		



Session III		
16:40-18:20	Session III-1: Politics	Room 101
	Chair Rovshan IBRAHIMOV (HUFS)	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> CHOE, Young Chol (Sungkyunkwan University) "Mohammad bin Salman and Saudi Arabia's Next Kingship Succession" <b>Discussant</b> HONG, Mijung (Dankook University)</li> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> Sayed GHONEIM (Institute for Global Security &amp; Defense Affairs) "All Fingers Are on the Triggers and No One Wants War: US-Iranian Crisis and Possible Ramifications on East Asia" <b>Discussant</b> KIM, Aejung (HUFS)</li> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> Rahman SHAHHUSEYNLI (MOFA, Azerbaijan) "The Protracted Conflict at a Crossroad-Nagorno-Karabakh as a Policy Determinant for Azerbaijan: In the Context of Geopolitical Dynamism in the Middle East" <b>Discussant</b> KIM, Sang Cheol (HUFS)</li> </ul>	
	Session III-2: Culture & Society	Room 503
	Chair LEE Hee-Soo (Hanyang University)	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> Erina IWASAKI (Sophia University) "Groundwater Development in Dakhla Oasis in Western Desert (Egypt): History of Wells in Rashda Village" <b>Discussant</b> NAM, Ok-jeong (Dankook University)</li> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> Farrah SHEIKH (Konkuk University) "Korean Muslims: Shaping Islamic Discourse and Identities Online" <b>Discussant</b> SUNG, Il Kwang (Konkuk University)</li> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> JEONG, Jin Han (HUFS) "Tracing Wāqwāq: How Medieval Authors in the Islamic World Amalgamated Diverse Ancient and Medieval Geographies" <b>Discussant</b> SONG, Kyung Keun (Myongji University)</li> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> AHN, Sunghun (Gachon University) "Social Conflict and Controversy in Korean Society over the Yemeni Refugee Issue" <b>Discussant</b> Asmaiel MERSHAM (HUFS)</li> </ul>	
	Session III-3: Education, Language & Literature	Room 606
	Chair Salaheldin Abdelaziz Ali ELGEBILY (HUFS)	
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> Ghazi Khader Ali Alzanahreh (HUFS) "Derivation in Arabic, Linguistic Root and Origin of Derivatives" <b>Discussant</b> Nagwa Khalaf KHODIRI (Myongji University)</li> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> Sohyla Mohesni NEJAD (Imam Sadiq University) "The reality of teaching Arabic speaking skills to non-native speakers at the bachelor level from the point of view of students and methods of treatment in Arabic language departments" <b>Discussant</b> Ahmed Sayed Mohamed NOGODALLAH (Dankook University)</li> </ul>	
18:40-20:30	Dinner	

☐ 24 November (Sunday) / Grand Ambassador Hotel

Special Round Table and General Assembly		Orchid Room (19F)
14:30-16:30	<b>Roundtable: "The 40 years of Middle East Area Studies and Its Future"</b> <b>Chair</b> LEE, In-Seop (President of KAMES)	
16:30-17:00	Coffee Break	
17:00-18:00	General Assembly of KAMES	
18:00~	<b>Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs-KAMES UCC and Thesis Competition Awards Ceremony &amp; Dinner</b>	





# Opening Session

Aekyung Hall (2F)

09:30-10:30	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ Opening Address LEE, In-Seop (President of KAMES)</li><li>○ Welcoming Remarks JANG, Se-Won (Director of GCC Institute, Dankook University)</li><li>○ Congratulatory Remarks HONG, Jin Wook (Director-General, MOFA, ROK) Adel Mohammad ADAILEH (Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the ROK) Hidemitsu KUROKI (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)</li><li>○ Keynote Address "The Contestation for power in the Middle East" Anoush EHTESHAMI (Professor, Durham University)</li></ul>
10:30-10:45	Photo Session & Coffee Break



# Opening Address

LEE, In-Seop  
President of KAMES

It is an honor to welcome you this morning to the 40th commemorative international conference of KAMES.

On behalf of the KAMES members, let me thank His Excellency Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Dr. Adel Aladaileh, keynote speaker Prof. Anoush Ehteshami, Director of Middle East and African Affairs in Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hong, Jin Woo, representatives of JAMES, Prof. Hidemitsu Kuroki and Prof. Yasuda Shin, diplomatic missions from the Middle Eastern countries and our kind co-host, director of the GCC Institute at Dankook University, Prof. Jang Se-Won. I also want to thank our generous co-sponsors — KIEP, SK Innovation, S-oil and Korea-Arab Society (KAS) — as well as our many supporting partners, for helping us to organize this international conference a reality.

It is the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of KAMES. Ever since the establishment in 1979, the Korean Association of the Middle East Studies (KAMES) has operated as a non-profit association to encourage and promote the study of the Middle East in Korea. As the most prominent Middle East Studies association, we brought together researchers, diplomats, journalists, entrepreneurs, students, and others who deal professionally with the Middle East issues.

- 1) We have been successfully, broaden intellectual horizon for Middle Eastern Studies through interdisciplinary research and to lay the Foundation for Middle Eastern Studies in Korea.
- 2) and broaden our academic exchanges, both home and abroad, by building extensive academic networks with other associations, think-tanks, and universities.
- 3) And provide policy consultations to our government on Middle Eastern issues, as well as suggesting policy proposals
- 4) And last but not the least, we have encouraged public understanding of the region and its peoples through programs, publications and services



As the continuance of our traditions, We are here this week to learn, to share our experiences and insights, and most importantly, to collectively address critical challenges which are not only for Middle East but the whole world are facing; how to achieve the mutual prosperity, peace, economic transformation to the long influenced rentier statism and various of form of diaspora occurring in the region.

As many of you are aware, major Geo economic and environmental challenges are now driving new dynamics in the region not only in politics and economy but society and culture as whole.

Thus, under the title of “Rising Conflict in the Period of New Diaspora and Geo-Economic Transitions in the Middle East”. 2019 KAMES International Conference has gathered distinguished scholars, the experts and the government officials to discuss the current situation, challenges and advancements relating the transition of politics, geo economic and socio-cultural and linguistic dynamics in the Middle East. I am sure this conference will be a platform, to together, find ways to turn the unprecedented challenges facing the Middle East region into unprecedented opportunities.

Many thanks as well to the staff of KAMES IC Preparation Committee who have spent months organizing this event. And Let me conclude by saying I wish you all a successful conference of learning, sharing, and building a foundation for a better and prosperous future in the region.

Thank You.

LEE, In-Seop

President of KAMES

# Welcoming Remarks

**JANG, Se-Won**

Director of GCC Institute, Dankook University

- No material received -

# Congratulatory Remarks

**HONG, Jin Wook**

Director-General for Middle Eastern and African Affairs,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK

- Saturday, November 23, 2019, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies -

I am delighted to offer my wholehearted congratulations on the 2019 International Conference hosted by the Korean Association of Middle East Studies (KAMES).

This International Conference has, over the last 36 years, indeed developed into a leading occasion for discussions on key issues that matter to our two regions. This year's event, held in the year marking the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of KAMES, is particularly meaningful. And the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROK is delighted to sponsor this meaningful gathering.

With the ushering in of the 4th Industrial Revolution, the Korean Government has been diversifying economic partnerships with the Middle East. We are seeking to shape more future-oriented ties as we prepare for the post-oil era. Our collaboration has expanded in scope - moving beyond the traditional boundaries of the cooperation, the interaction spans such fields as information technology (IT), nuclear energy, renewable energy, as well as the health and medical industry.

The scope of our partnership has expanded from the relatively narrow confines of economic interests to much broader areas – these include cultural exchanges as well as consular cooperation to ensure the safety of our citizens. To give some examples, with wonderful cooperation extended by the governments of the Middle East countries, a Korean national who was kidnapped in western Libya was successfully rescued in May. Of particular note, the K-Pop boy band BTS performed at Riyadh's King Fahd International Stadium. As BTS were the first non-Arab musicians invited to perform in that concert hall this truly marked a milestone.

If our thriving partnership is to last, it needs to be firmly grounded. We are living in a world of intensified conflict. There is an imperative call to ease tensions in our regions – it is imperative, rather, to foster peace and stability. Indeed, in our interconnected world, the peace and stability of our respective regions are inextricably interlinked.

In this regard, I sincerely appreciate the efforts by KAMES, a trusted adviser to the Ministry, to provide a platform where we can engage in in-depth discussions on challenges Korea and the Middle East face. I look forward to today's event proving to be a great opportunity to pool our wisdom and gain constructive insights required for a brighter future of the two regions.

Thank you.

HONG, Jin Wook  
Director-General for Middle Eastern and African Affairs,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK

# Congratulatory Remarks

H.E. Adel Mohammad ADAILEH  
Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the ROK

Honorable President of the Korean Association for Middle East Studies, Mr. Lee, In-Seop,  
Director of the GCC Institute at Dankook University, Mr. Jang, Se-Won,  
Professor at Durham University, Mr. Anoush Ehteshami,  
Your Excellencies, Distinguished Guests,  
Ladies and Gentlemen,  
Annyang-haseyo, Good morning.

First of all, I would like to express my sincere appreciation to the Korean Association for Middle East Studies for the invitation to the 2019 KAMES International Conference. It is quite a privilege for me to address such Distinguished Guests with congratulatory remarks this morning.

The Korean Association for Middle East Studies is the most renowned academic society in Korea for the researches and studies on the Middle East and the Middle Eastern affairs. It plays an important role of being an advisor to the Korean government when it comes to making policies and decisions regarding the issues on the Middle East, while allowing invaluable opportunities for the highly-respected scholars and the notable real-world practitioners to get together and share insights on the issues regarding the Middle East to opt for better cooperation, as in this conference.

Ladies and Gentlemen,  
As you may all be very aware, the ancient Middle East gave rise to some of the greatest human civilizations and empires in human history, while the current Middle East presents itself with importance in the world with its geostrategic position and energy resources, with its control of most waterways and its possession of more than 75% of the world's oil and gas reserves.

In October 2013, I was the Director of the Asian Department at the Foreign Ministry of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, when His Excellency Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se was on an official visit to Jordan.

I remember His Excellency Minister Yun saying that Korea's relationship with the Middle Eastern region has changed from being an "option" to a "necessity", with more than 80% of Korea's oil supply and 50% of its gas supply coming from the Middle East and the Gulf States.

By 2012, for instance, Korea's trade with the region rose to more than US\$ 164 billion. Undeniably, there have been strong ties between the Middle East and Korea with more than a thousand years of cultural and civilizational exchanges, as well as commercial and trade interactions, the long shared history of which, I believe, many ordinary Arabs and Koreans are not aware of.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Taking this opportunity, however, I would like to point out that, unfortunately, the Korean media coverage on Korea's relations with the Middle East has been insufficient so far, and the unawareness and ignorance of the people on the aforementioned long shared history between the Middle East and Korea could be due to this.

I would also like to cautiously express my concern that despite all the great discussion and fruitful knowledge and opinion sharing at a conference as the 2019 KAMES International Conference, more effective media coverage and more active promotion and campaigns to the public might be needed to highlight the relations between the Middle East and Korea, as well as the historical, cultural and economic foundations shared in-between.

There are many misconceptions in Korea and among Koreans about the Middle East, Islam and its concepts, that calls for justice and tolerance, with the misrepresentation by the media.

However, I do not lose my hope in Korea and its people.

We all know Korea's physical and emotional capabilities, its international standing and potential to interact more with the world, in particular with the Middle Eastern region, through constant efforts made at such conferences and seminars, like this 2019 KAMES International Conference.



Ladies and Gentlemen,

I trust that in this era of globalization that we are all living in, one individual country or one region of the world cannot live by or on its own, without being influenced by or influencing the others.

This is not only applicable to the area of business and commerce, trade and investment, that exhibits physical connectivity, but also to the areas that call for political, economic, cultural, social, and people-to-people links and exchanges, as the world is becoming smaller, and each country is closely influenced by one another in co-existence.

And to reach such a goal to develop and sustain this connectivity and peaceful co-existence, the mutual understanding of each other is crucial.

In this regard, I would like to express my deep appreciation to the Korean Association for Middle East Studies, once again, to organize and to host this conference, where knowledge, experience and expertise of the academia and of the policy-makers, from the Middle East or related to the Middle East, are shared to promote a better understanding of the current issues in the Middle East, in this era of globalization and of New Diaspora.

I sincerely hope this conference be successful and play its role of covering the relevant issues under the theme of the “Rising Conflict in the Period of New Diaspora and Geo-Economic Transitions in the Middle East”, and possibly, take one step closer to discovering the paths towards the peaceful and fruitful co-existence between the Middle East and Korea.

Last but not least, I hope all of the Distinguished Guests who flew in from overseas will enjoy the warm hospitality of Korea during their stay here.

Thank you very much indeed.

Adel Mohammad ADAILEH  
Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the ROK

# Congratulatory Remarks

Hidemitsu **KUROKI**

Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

- No material received -

## Keynote Address: The Contestation for power in the Middle East

Prof Anoush Ehteshami

Durham University

History of the modern Middle East began in late nineteenth century, but only became recognisable in its current form in the wake of the rise of the territorial state across the regional system, and in phases, in the twentieth century. In this region, for historical, geopolitical and state structural reasons, power has been a fluid commodity, contested and often juxtaposed with legitimacy. Attainment of power has often followed a brutal struggle for control of the state, which in turn has led to the monopolisation of power in the hands of small elites and the inevitable further straining of elite interactions with society and social forces.

Power (its *form*, *access* to it, and its *levers*), the Middle East states' relations with each other, as well as those with the rest of the world, has arguably been shaped by the force of six sets of variables, each of which in turn leaving an indelible mark on the *shape* and *nature* of power in this region. These six forces can be identified as follows: nationalism, the Arab-Israeli conflict, oil, political Islam, war, and influence of external powers. In each case, the echo of history can be heard, but more profoundly, where history is contested in the end so too power has been. In a region shaped by powerful external forces and penetrated by external powers, challenging history directly challenges not only the legitimacy of power elites but also their control of the state. So, let's look at each of the six forces in play in turn.

### The Six Drivers of Power

#### *Nationalism*

Middle East nationalism (which took four forms: Arab, Iranian, Turkish and Zionist) grew in power from early twentieth century, but only patchily. What Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his reformist, modern-leaning and secularist 'Young Turks' accomplished in post-Ottoman Turkey in the 1920s was soon copied by others. Iran's first technocratic nationalist leader, Reza Khan, is a case in point. Not only did this young military officer actually modelled himself on Atatürk, his state policies and reforms also closely mirrored those of the new Turkish republic's. Arguably, these two leaders' nationalist drive, which was based on state-building and unashamed copying of Western practices, actually created the modern state in their respective countries. Many of the institutions and systems which they put into place still survive and flourish to this day. Indeed, their policies and plans are still influencing these two republics' destinies in the twenty first century. In Iran's case, although Reza Khan set out as a republican, he eventually chose to continue with the ancient Persian institution of the

monarchy and let himself be crowned the first king of his short-lived Pahlavi dynasty (1926-1979). In Turkey, Atatürk's vehement secularism remains a plank of the modern state and the basis of many of its policies, despite the assault of the Islamists on Turkish state institutions and Atatürkist political culture in recent decades.

Elsewhere in the region, nationalist sentiments, which had been awakened in late nineteenth century, were flamed by the Ottoman empire's demise in early twentieth century. In the 1920, 30s and 40s Syrian, Lebanese and Egyptian intellectuals were openly adopting nationalism as an ideology and a political tool. But it was not until 1952 in Egypt that Arab nationalism burst on the scene as a major political force. The 'Free Officers' overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy opened the way for the surge of Arab nationalist sentiments across the region. There were three primary driving forces of Arab nationalism. First, the perceptible decline in European power in the region. Nationalists saw European delinking from the Arab world as a historic opportunity. Second, the establishment, with Western help, of the state of Israel in Palestine in 1948 and the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli war – in which Arabs from across the region participated, including Egypt's Colonel Nasser and several of his associates. This event, more than any, radicalised the Arab youth of the 1950s and 1960s and pushed to the edge the precariously-placed pro-Western Arab regimes. Thirdly, the Arab masses and the impatient young officers were increasingly influenced by the spread of nationalist ideologies from non-Arab lands, liberation struggles elsewhere in the Third World, which were fanned by the Soviet Union and China, and a definite sense of anti-imperialism.

In 1954, when Colonel Gamal Abd al-Nasser finally took full charge of the new Egyptian republic, his reputation and popularity had reached every corner of the vast Arab region. Before too long, his message began to weaken the existing structures in other Arab states or territories and provided the hammer for the destruction of the ruling political elites. In Syria, a country which had been ready for revolution since the 1930s, Nasserist sympathisers took power in the late 1950s. In Iraq, the British-installed Hashemite monarch was overthrown in 1958 and a new radical republican regime emerged, keen to join hands with Syria and Egypt.

But it was the 1956 Suez campaign, a war waged on Egypt by the Anglo-French-Israeli trio, which acted as a major catalyst for the radicalisation of the Arab nationalists. It encouraged anti-imperialist sentiments in the Arab world, added pan-Arabism to the agenda and encouraged superpower interest in the context of the brewing Cold War.

The fourth nationalist wave was that of Zionism, which was born in Europe in late nineteenth century and enjoyed considerable following amongst Ashkenazi Jews across Europe. This new socialist-leaning force provided the ideology for the construction of a new Jewish state in Palestine, which became a reality in May 1948, after several bloody encounters between armed Jewish groups and the local Arab inhabitants of the area and Britain (which was mandated by the international community to look after Palestine). Like the Middle East's other nationalisms, Zionism was also a secular ideology, aspiring towards the creation of a

modern and Western-style state. Naturally, it too has played a major part in the region, on the one hand providing the necessary tools for Israel's founding fathers (David Ben-Gurion and company) to build a new Jewish state in the heart of the Arab and Muslim worlds, and on the other the logic for Israel's regional policy and outlook.

Thus, all four types of nationalism have played a major part in the shaping of the region and the behaviour of its state-actors. Although some of these nationalisms have become jaded with age, and their relevance superseded by events and the very histories that they created, they nonetheless provide a living reminder of nationalism as a fundamental force in the shaping of the Middle East region. Nationalism has articulated power in the MENA region and has shaped it.

### *The Arab-Israeli conflict*

The second decisive force in the modern history of the region has been the Arab-Israeli conflict, which grew from a localised conflict between Palestinian Arabs and settler Jewish groups in the 1930s to an inter-state war in 1948, making it the first war the Middle East after the start of the Cold War. From its birth until the early 1980s, Israel had fought five wars with one or more of its Arab neighbours (1949, 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982). To say that this conflict shaped the politics of the region for over fifty years is no exaggeration, for not only it determined the nature of the Israeli state and its rapid militarisation, it also dictated the pace of intra-Arab relations and dominated the domestic agenda in the majority of the Arab countries in the Levant. Causing major casualties across the board, changes to territory, and to economic vibrancy of the warring parties, the Arab-Israeli conflict was one arena in which the superpowers openly attached their colours to the mast of their allies and provided extensive material and diplomatic support for their own side.

Another significant aspect of the conflict was the way in which it gave birth to another specific nationalist movement in the region, that of Palestinian nationalism, which grew from a small revolutionary core in the mid-1960s to become the most important pan-Arab issue in the 1970s and 1980s. By 1987 secular Palestinian nationalism had more or less abandoned its violent anti-Israeli tactics of the previous two decades and begun developing roots in the 1967 Israeli-occupied Palestinian territories as a popular liberation movement, ushering in one of the most significant civil disobedience campaigns of post-War period. The 1987-91 period of Palestinian uprising in the Occupied Territories, the *Intifadah*, firmly established the Palestinian peoples' claims to national rights, such as sovereignty and territory, which formed the core of the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s. But Palestinian nationalism also gave birth to a new force amongst the Palestinian communities, that of political Islam.

The Arab-Israeli conflict in short had a dramatic political impact on regional relations on the distribution of power amongst Arab states.

## *War*

While the Arab-Israeli conflict was the Middle East's main zone of conflict between 1945 and the end of the Cold War, it was not by any means the only cause of major wars in the region. Indeed, by late-1970s, by which time Israel and Egypt had signed a peace treaty, the scope for another major Arab-Israeli war had been considerably reduced.

Over the years since the 1950s, however, war has erupted several times in the Middle East. In the early 1960s Egypt and Saudi Arabia conducted a proxy war in the Yemen; in the 1970s and 1980s, Lebanon, with the active involvement of some regional powers, tore itself apart; Sudan too has torn itself apart as the Muslim-dominated north struggled to fend off the challenge of a Christian-dominated southern coalition; and, last but not least, Iraq and Iran spent what effectively became the last decade of the Cold War engaged in a major war (1980-88), which became one of the longest wars of the twentieth century.

Collectively, these wars have been responsible for the raising of regional tensions and the redrawing of the strategic map of the region. What is most striking, however, about the region's only other major war outside the Arab-Israeli theatre during the Cold War – the Iran-Iraq war – is the fact that the superpowers did not line up behind the competing camps. For a range of reasons, neither superpower wanted revolutionary Islamic Iran to triumph in the war and spread its influence more widely. For fear of destabilising the strategic Persian Gulf sub-region, both superpowers refrained from fanning the conflict. Still, the war lasted for eight years, resulting in an estimated one million casualties and economic damage to the tune of \$900 billion. The greatest irony of this war was that by the time the parties accepted an UN-brokered cease-fire in July 1988, neither combatant could claim that it had achieved any of its declared war aims.

The no-victor no-vanquished situation provided the basis for further instabilities in the Persian Gulf, which finally manifested themselves in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the West's debilitating war against the occupying power between January and March 1991. This was the post-Cold War era's first major regional conflict. It provided the benchmark for the post-Cold War's 'New World Order'. By the end of the Operation Desert Storm, Kuwait had been liberated, certainly, but Iraq had effectively been destroyed as a major regional power. The Kuwait crisis provided the basis for the redefining of the MENA regional system, removing as a powerful variable the radical Arab pull, and finally freeing Arab regimes from the pressures of pan-Arabism and enabling them to base policy on their own, more narrowly defined, national interests without recrimination. This short-lived but region-shaping conflict also opened the way for dialogue between the main parties still engaged in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was, therefore, not surprising that the Kuwait war was soon followed by the ground-breaking Madrid talks in October and November 1991 on the Arab-Israeli peace process.



In a region where symbolism still matters, the Madrid talks were co-sponsored by both the US and the USSR. As history would have it, the Arab-Israeli peace talks of late 1991 were to be the last major international initiative in which the Soviet Union had taken part. The shape of power changed, one could argue, at both the global level and the regional in 1991!

### *Oil*

Much of the interest in the Middle East since the start of the twentieth century has been based on the presence of oil in abundant quantities in parts of the Persian Gulf and North Africa. As oil has been a strategic commodity from the outset no major power has been able to ignore its geopolitics. Thus, the main consumers of oil in the twentieth century, the Western powers, felt compelled to protect the Western-leaning oil producers of the region and to defend free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. Another reason, particularly since the early 1970s, for the 'free world' to have taken a stake in the stability of the oil states themselves has been the sheer amount of capital that oil exports have generated. To put the magnitude of oil-generated wealth in some perspective, while OPEC members' total income in 1973 was an impressive \$37,145 billion, it had gone up to \$143,017 billion in 1977, reaching a staggering \$285,921 billion in 1980.<sup>1</sup> In the Gulf, the states of the Arabian Peninsula, some of them very small in terms of population and size, reaped huge profits from their oil exports. Kuwait, for example, with fewer than one million inhabitants, increased the value of its oil exports from \$3,520 billion in 1973 to \$8,918 billion in 1974, peaking at \$18,935 billion in 1980. In 1980 Saudi Arabia, with a population of around 14 million, amassed nearly \$110 billion from its petroleum exports. This handful of Gulf monarchies continue to accumulate wealth and meet the energy demands of their traditional customers in the West, as well as their new and growing ones across Asia.

Oil, therefore, has provided one of the key defining contours of the MENA region, giving true meaning to power, shaping the political economy of many of its states since the late 1960s, pulling in the Western powers into the waters of the Persian Gulf, and, in a globalised economy, tying the fortunes of these so-called 'capital-surplus' oil-exporting countries to the economic performance of the main consumers. Oil for many MENA states remains the key to power – for keeping it and for fighting with it.

### *Political Islam*

The 1979 Iranian Islamic revolution was the high mark of a movement which had been growing across the region for the best part of the twentieth century. The Iranian revolution, which in terms of its ideology bucked the trend in twentieth century revolutions, ended the reign of a pro-Western and secular regime in a large, well-placed and strategically important Middle Eastern country. Inevitably, therefore, its ripples were to be felt across the region, despite the fact this revolution had occurred in a non-Arab and Shia-dominated country. Like other revolutionary regimes, Tehran was determined to encourage the growth of its brand of ideology and 'export' it wherever possible. Islamist movements in other Muslim lands began

receiving support from Iran's new revolutionaries and many Arab groups were to find sanctuary in Iran.

The forces of revolutionary Islam were also fanned by the Afghani resistance to the Soviet occupation of that country in late 1979. For ten years, Western military and security agencies trained and supplied these Islamic fundamentalists, helped in getting Muslim volunteers from the MENA region to the battlefields of Afghanistan, and turned a blind eye to the growth of a widely anti-secular and anti-Western network of radical Islamists across west Asia and North Africa.

Iran's revolution and the Afghan war, however, were manifestations of a long tradition of Islamist politics in the region, which, in the twentieth century, had begun in Egypt in the 1920s (with the rise of the famous Muslim Brotherhood movement) and had spread to every corner of the regional system by the late 1980s. In 1980, one group assassinated the Egyptian president (Anwar Sadat); in 1982 Syrian forces put down an Islamist challenge; in 1988 and 89 the Tunisian Islamist movement had been pushed underground for its anti-government activities; in the late 1980s Palestinian HAMAS and Islamic Jihad organisations unleashed terror on the Israeli population and took on the secular Palestinian groups; and, throughout the 1980s Lebanese Islamist groups attacked Western targets in that country, took Westerners hostage and started a military campaign against the Israeli occupation forces. By the end of the century, although some Islamist forces had managed to enter mainstream politics in some regional states (in Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Sudan, Turkey, Yemen), political Islam as a whole – the so-called revivalist movements – had not quite managed to shed their violent streak. In Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Palestine and Israel, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Yemen radical Islam continued to engage in violent activities. And al-Qaeda's attack on the United States, on 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, underlined the emergence of the radical jihadis in force and their bid to change the power dynamics of the region by targeting the region's dominant external actor. As Milton-Edwards suggested, however, there was also growing evidence that a new generation of Islamists were learning from the past mistakes of their leaders and were seeking 'to grapple and engage with the current global order'.<sup>2</sup> Their moment in the sun was to come in the 2010s in the wake of the Arab uprisings. They finally managed to bid for and acquire the levers of power, albeit in a limited way. Political Islam has left an imprint on power and on the political process, domestically and on the politics of the region as a whole.

### *Influence of external powers*

As mentioned at the outset, outside forces have played a major part in the birth and development of MENA states, as well as in shaping the environment in which these states operate. Since Napoleon's intervention in Egypt in late eighteenth century European powers have been an important part of the MENA's make-up – its politics, socio-economic development and orientation. It was the European powers who had taken control of

significant areas of the region from the nineteenth century; it was they who brought about the demise of the Ottoman empire and shared its spoils in early twentieth century; and it was the same set of European powers who carved new MENA states from territories under their control.

But in the second half of the twentieth century, the nature of outside intervention had changed. As a penetrated regional system, the MENA region, for all its active internal dynamics (nationalism, Arab-Israeli war, radical Islam, etc.), was by the 1950s subject to the influence of strategically-driven calculations made by the world's two superpowers. The superpowers' calculations and strategies not only directly affected the politics of the region, but also the environment in which the local forces were taking shape. For over a generation, the Cold War was the framework of the MENA regional system, from North Africa in the west to the borders of the Soviet Union in the Caucasus and Central Asia. It created a loose controlled environment for the regional actors to function within.

The Cold War, for all its inconsistencies and tensions, had at the very least given the region a degree of forced organisation, even 'organised chaos'. Its ending, exposed the Soviet allies to new pressures, threatened to remove the special privileges of the pro-US allies, and lifted the curtain on internal processes of the regional system. Thus, the sea-change in the international system, which followed the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet superpower, created the necessary conditions for a new period of dynamic change in the MENA region.

Power, for a long period, appeared to be a constant, authoritarian Arab regimes appeared to have a firm grip on power and were apparently 'secure', despite continuing internal and external pressures. This 'sea of authoritarian tranquillity' turned into a massive storm in December 2010.

### **Arab Uprisings and Power**

Regime collapse in succession in several Arab countries between 2010 and 2013 unhinged several 'established' Arab regimes and unhinged regional partnerships, those between Syria and Saudi Arabia, between Egypt and the GCC as a bloc until the return of the military to power, the Arab Maghreb Union, along the way. But the uprisings also strengthened some others, those between Iran and Syria, between Iran and Iraq, on the one hand and those between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and UAE, on the other. Power became fluid at home and between regional actors.

The uprisings also tested the limits of external powers' ability to shape outcomes and minimise the fall-out from the turmoil. By any measure, the Arab uprisings have proved to be the most important force reshaping the region in the post-Cold War period.<sup>3</sup> Established patterns of behaviour from the Cold War and the post-9/11 periods have been disrupted and no single, or group of countries, from within or outside of the region, has successfully managed to shape the transition. The prolongation of the region-wide crisis has dramatically

increased the sense of insecurity within states, further strengthening the grip of internal security institutions. As a consequence of the region's unpredictable security dynamics, the regional states' behaviour, in terms of defining orientation – orientation towards neighbours and great powers – and the subsystem as a whole has become harder to anticipate.

In addition, the circulation of elites, coupled with the growing role of 'citizen power' in the transition countries and beyond, has threatened to change the society-regime balance of power in favour of social forces – as evidenced in Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan in 2019 alone. The uprisings also posed serious challenges to wider interested parties, and countries such as Israel, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar all adjusted their foreign policies in response, becoming more proactive and responsive to the rapidly changing regional landscape, but with little or no guarantees of success.

Thus, the messy process of transition has had a direct and dramatic impact on power at home – who has it and how they wield it – as well as on the regional balance of power. The uprisings have brought regional powers in direct competition with each other:

Iran and Turkey compete in Iraq, Syria and Central Asia;

Iran and Saudi Arabia compete in the Persian Gulf, the Levant, and, as flag bearers of Islam, in other parts of the Muslim world too;

Iran and Israel project power into their respective hinterlands and compete at the strategic level as well (missile defence and also nuclear politics);

the smaller Gulf Arab states try and pursue an independent foreign policy, but with the exception of Qatar do not stray too far from Saudi Arabia. Policy in the transition countries, moreover – in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen – has been hostage to the given balance of post-authoritarian political forces and the uncertainty which has accompanied the drawing up of the new states' priorities, and of course the legitimizing principles driving its 'new' policies;

in Libya and Yemen, the absence of a credible central authority has continued to erode state structures and has made communal violence the norm. In both cases, moreover, interventions of other regional countries has poured more fuel on the burning fires of conflict.

### **Small is Big!**

Furthermore, the collapse of the region's dominant 'security regimes' (Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen) has also shuffled the pack in such a way as to enable smaller states – the smaller GCC countries in particular and also Jordan – to play a substantially bigger role in the region. As noted above, at the same time regime collapse and inter-state chaos has created the permissive conditions for a range of non-state actors to operate in different, and also across, countries more freely and directly. In Egypt, thus, we have been witness to the impact that the seesaw of power has had on that country's regional relationships – in which the UAE

is one day a hostile country (under Mohamed Morsi) but a close ally (under the post-Morsi military-backed Abdel Fattah el-Sisi government); Qatar changes from being a desired ally into an unwelcome Arab partner. In Libya, small Arab states interact with tribal, ethnic, Islamist and radical jihadi forces, often competing and pulling the people of Libya in different directions. In Yemen too it is from the GCC which we see the biggest Arab presence.

### **State Failure, Regional Collapse and the Emergence of IS**

The MENA region has stood out as a part of the world dominated by ‘strongman’ political leaders and authoritarian regimes. This phenomenon Nazih Ayubi referred to as the ‘fierce state’. For decades, autocrats and dictators have ruled over the Arab region with little regard for inclusivity, transparency in governance, or the rule of law. Thus, until the 2010s, and despite deep internal structural weaknesses, these authoritarian regimes, the most masculine of which were to be found in the region’s culturally and geopolitically significant Arab states (most notably Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen), tended to dominate regional relations and often compete to make the region in their own image. Their iron grip at home often translated into assertive behaviour abroad. So, these outwardly powerful states assumed to occupy the high ground of the region.

These countries have been, by virtue of geo-culture and political influence, the fundamental links – Lilly pads if you will – of Arab connectivity. As fountainheads, nodes, of culture and ideas they have stored and transmitted information, knowledge, and also form (diffusers of norms), to other states and communities. So long as the ruling regimes of these states remained strong at home and active abroad little prospects for change seemed possible, and the place of these states at the top table seemed assured. They were the self-appointed guarantors of the status quo, with all its shortcomings and flaws. But fierceness and interventionism proved insufficient attributes for keeping these regimes in power indefinitely.

In the absence of credible, legitimate and democratic political institutions and leadership, state institutions crumbled at the feet of their people and patrimonial regimes appeared to fail in their responsibilities to protect their citizens and secure the sovereignty of their states. Countries such as Libya, Syria and Yemen can be seen as regional failed states in this context, and Iraq and Sudan (until summer of 2019 at least) as potentially failing. Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia remain fragile and vulnerable to upheaval in neighbouring territories. Egypt, the grandest of Arab states, has diminished considerably in the wake of its two uprisings and the weaknesses of the Mubarak era have just amplified to make of this great nation a shadow of its former self. Algeria, the Maghreb’s largest and arguably most powerful state, may have been able to absorb the first wave of regional political upheaval of the 2010s, but even here strong signs of decay have been evident. In 2019, in fact, the octogenarian ‘strongman’ president of Algeria (Abdelaziz Bouteflika) had been side-lined under intense and relentless pressure from the masses, and with this the prospects of a more democratic polity had begun to grow.

But the key point for me is that the demise of what we refer to as the 'node states' in rapid succession – the very states which tended to provide the reservoirs of pan-Arab networks of ideas, culture and social interaction – has plunged the region into a deep crisis. At one extreme of this spectrum stands IS, which has attempted to reorder the geography of Iraq and Syria in the interest of building a new 'Caliphate'. The irony of using pan-Islamism as the ideological justification for constructing a new territorial entity within two existing sovereign states should not be lost, but the real impact of a deconstructed Iraq and Syria is to be found in the unravelling of order at the heart of the region. The appearance of these geopolitical potholes on the MENA landscape has destabilized what had remained of the regional system and has profoundly traumatized its peoples and states. Corrosion of leadership is palpable. It is arguably the collapse of several of these major state nodes in the region which has precipitated de-regionalization.

From a neoclassical realist perspective, one might say, in the absence of great power hegemonic influence (namely the United States), disorder has become endemic and the crisis of the state has intensified. The relative strength of non-state actors lies in regional incoherence and state competition; the weakness of non-state actors, by contrast, is manifested in cooperation and solidarity between MENA states.

### **In Sum**

So, finally, it can be argued that the process of state failure has had three significant consequences.

*Firstly*, it has created vast ungovernable spaces in which law and order has become transactional and administered by local persons, militias, or armed gangs. In parts of Iraq and Syria, and virtually all of Libya and Yemen central authority, or one which enjoys the confidence of the people, has vanished and armed groups with competing agendas and interests have filled the vacuum. In an environment of ungoverned spaces in which millions of people find themselves at the mercy of mercenaries with a low tolerance threshold it becomes virtually impossible to build cooperative bridges across Arab-majority spaces of the region. Such large and strategically located ungoverned spaces also provide a permissive environment for unaccountable non-state actors to wreak havoc. They can unsettle neighbouring states, agitate their populations and make their borderlands insecure. We see this in Tunisia and Egypt in the case of Libya, and also in the case of Yemen with regard to Oman and Saudi Arabia. But Israel's security concerns are partly fuelled by the ungoverned spaces in Iraq and Syria which has allowed Iran to navigate the movement of its own military forces and that of its Shia militias across international boundaries and to the frontiers of Israel. Further, in the absence of a recognised and/or effective central authority it becomes virtually impossible for neighbours and outside parties to negotiate the return of peace and security to these countries. So the strategic potholes remain unfilled.



*Secondly*, the human cost of this situation has been great and should be a stain on Arab rulers' image: "MENA is now the only geopolitical region in the world where the proportion of the population that is food insecure is larger than what it was in 1990. The number of undernourished people increased... between 1990 and... 2019, from 16.5 million to... 52 million... The Mashreq sub-region, MENA's most populous one, is home to more than 44 million undernourished people, who constitute 85% of MENA's food insecure population. Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Sudan have hunger rates that are among the highest in the world".<sup>4</sup>

According to the International Monetary Fund, "Syria's 2016 GDP, for example, is estimated to be less than half its 2010 preconflict level. Yemen lost an estimated 25 to 35 percent of its GDP in 2015 alone, while in Libya... GDP fell by 24 percent in 2014 as violence picked up".<sup>5</sup> By 2018, the civil war had cost Syria a shocking \$388 billion, according to the UN's regional agency.<sup>6</sup> The cost to the Arab region as a whole is probably over \$800 billion, excluding the opportunity costs of productive activity. Societies, thus, have been crushed under the weight of the crisis of the state: As many as 35 million people have had to flee their homes between 2010 and 2016.<sup>7</sup>

*Thirdly and Finally*, state failure has raised the prospects of demise of some key states as currently constituted, which has in turn invited intervention by neighbours and outside powers. This is power play in action! We have seen the consequences of this problem very clearly in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. In Iraq, Iran and Tehran-sponsored militias took control of vast tracts of Iraqi territory in their fight against IS in central Iraq, and indeed shared these ungoverned spaces with the US military and its allies on the ground. Much of Iraqi territory is now the security playground of Iran-supported forces, to the grave concern of Iraq's Gulf Arab neighbours. Similarly in Yemen, absence of central authority has allowed al-Qaeda to breed, has invited military intervention by Saudi Arabia and its allies, and has seen extensive American and other Western military interventions against real or imagined targets in that country. In Libya, Western countries are militarily active, Egypt and its Gulf Arab allies have acquired a military presence, and Turkey and Qatar are actively involved in the power struggle in that country. The case of Syria is most telling of course: We have seen Russian, American, British, Iranian, Turkish and Israeli militaries in action across this country. Central authority is also being challenged in Algeria, Lebanon, Tunisia and Sudan. Prospects of state collapse has magnified the sense of insecurity and thus has invited further securitisation of inter-regional relations, and the premium on holding on to power.

State failure in Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen has also sucked into the maelstrom an array of major powers whose competing agendas have prevented the emergence of collective or cooperative efforts to deal with the Arab region's multitude of crises. In Syria, the United States and Russia compete with each other; in Libya, they ignore each other; in Syria, China and Russia stand on one side of the geopolitical scales and the United States and the EU on the other; and in Yemen, the US dominates as the most interventionist external power.

As a consequence of these competing machinations, the region remains unstable, regimes feel unsteady, and the Arab masses continue to feel exposed and vulnerable. This myriad of forces has tended to compete with each other for the spoils of failure rather than work in concert to prevent total collapse of the regional order. Policy opportunism has followed, therefore, pitting neighbour against neighbour. And the lack of policy cohesion has made it almost impossible for multilateral organisations to restore order. Power, in this geopolitical and socioeconomic mess, has become a very fluid commodity, and therefore tradeable. Like any commodity its price is now ever changing, it is affected by 'market forces' – that is to say susceptible to social forces, and access to it is subject to sometime arbitrary mechanisms of control.

Going back to the core of my presentation, finally, it should be obvious that in the absence of control we find power to be in contestation, and perhaps this is to be the state of play we will find ourselves in in the MENA region for the foreseeable future.

END.

<sup>1</sup> Data extracted from OPEC's Annual Statistical Bulletin.

<sup>2</sup> Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Contemporary Politics in the Middle East* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 137.

<sup>3</sup> Marina and David Ottaway, *A Tale of Four Worlds: The Arab Region After the Uprisings* (London: Hurst, 2019).

<sup>4</sup> Amal Kandeel, <https://www.mei.edu/publications/end-not-near-sleepwalking-through-human-and-military-security-crises-mena>, 19 August 2019.

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2017/12/imus.htm>

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180810-un-cost-of-war-destruction-in-syria-388bn/>

<sup>7</sup> Paul Rivlin, 'The Arab Human Disaster Report: The Arab World Five Years After: Part 1', *Middle East Economy*, Vol. 6, No. 12, December 2016, pp. 1-9.



# Session I-1: Politics

Aekyung Hall (2F)

10:45-12:50	<p><b>Chair</b> Anoush EHTESHAMI (Durham University)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Güljanat KURMANGALIYEVA ERCİLASUN (Ankara Haci Bayram Veli Univ.)          "A Geo-Economic Approach to Turkey: Central Asian Relations"  <b>Discussant</b> LEE, Hyo bun (Incheon National University)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Saleh A. ALMANI (King Saud University)          "Conflict in the Middle East: The Failed-state Hypothesis"  <b>Discussant</b> JUNG, Sang Ryul (Myongji University)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Narayanappa JANARDHAN (Emirates Diplomatic Academy)          "Gulf-South Korea Ties: Special, Smart and Strategic"  <b>Discussant</b> KIM, Eunbee (Korea National Defense University)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> LEE, Changju (Ajou University) &amp; PAIK, Seunghoon (HUFS)          "The Middle East and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The Transition of International Geo-Economic Structure and the Connectivity Within"  <b>Discussant</b> LEE, Joosong (HUFS)</p> <p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Robert LAWRENCE (Dongduk Women's University)          "Threat Perception and Turkey-U.S. Relations"  <b>Discussant</b> Rovshan IBRAHIMOV (HUFS)</p>



## **A GEO-ECONOMIC APPROACH TO TURKEY – CENTRAL ASIAN RELATIONS**

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### The Year of 1991, Turning Point

With gaining the independence in 1991, a new era began for Turkic-speaking countries of Central Asia. Political, economic and cultural relations of Central Asian Turkic Republics with foreign countries, as well as with Turkey, and inter- and intra-regional relations gain a new dimension. In this study, the political and economic relations between the Republic of Turkey and Central Asian Turkic Republics for the last 28 years are analyzed. Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of Central Asian Turkic Republics, which was a very crucial and meaningful step at that time, and therefore, it still has positive impacts.

First of all, geo-political relations between Turkic-speaking states are dealt with. While examining the political relations, the political vectors of Turkic republics in foreign policy, and the effects on relations as well as the results of these tendencies are focused on below. Therefore, it was aimed to draw a picture of the stage that the Turkic republics have, in terms of political relations. The scope of their relations, friendship and cooperation relations, and problems at present are dealt with. In this context, political relations between Turkey and Central Asian states are examined in the context of regional and global conjuncture.

Secondly, the development of economic relations between Turkey and Central Asian Turkic Republics are investigated. Determination and evaluation of the dimensions and the current situation of the economic relations have been searched. Further, the rate of change in trade volume between Turkey and Central Asian republics are analyzed below.

Indeed, the role of cooperation between Turkey and Central Asian states, geo-political factors are dealt with. After the dissolution of the USSR, “New Great Game” emerged in Central Asia, which is more complex than the 19<sup>th</sup>-century Great Game. The number of players is more this time: the USA and European countries emerged as global powers; Russia and China are neighboring major states; India, Japan [and Korea] are countries with no direct geo-borders, but important powers with regional weight; and Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan are assessed as countries with significant potentials in the Islamic world (Akçali, 2012: 598).

Moreover, target for Central Asian Republics in the post-Soviet period was mainly to build democratic, secular and independent states, and transition to market economy. Turkey's policy towards Central Asian republics differed from the international environment, and it was shaped according to the general foreign policy line.

Concerning the international cooperation; an institutionalization of relations can be seen to a certain degree. CIS, Collective Security Treaty Organization, OIC, CICA, SCO, EurAsEc, Eurasian Customs Union, TürkPA are only some of the common political and economic organizations, playing key role in the both intra-regional and international relations. Turkic Council, TICA, TURKSOY, Twesco (Turkic Academy) are the institutions that are significant mostly in the academic and cultural cooperation, though not limited with. There are several aspects that bear a necessity in cooperation in the global conjuncture. There are many other international cooperation organizations covering Turkey and Central Asian Republics.

If to draw a main political characterization of the foreign policies of the Central Asian states, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan chose to be withdrawn from the global world, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan have been determined to be integrated into the global system by opening to the outside world (Aydingün, 2012: 624). Here it must be underlined that the Uzbekistan's way has being changed much in the last few years.

### Turkey – Uzbekistan Relations

Uzbekistan is a country in Central Asia with solid historical and cultural roots. Besides, the Uzbeks are the most populous people in Central Asia. At the same time, Turkey-Uzbekistan relations had been the worst until Shavkat Mirziyoyev's rule.

Uzbekistan had been perceiving many developments inside and outside the country as a threat to the integrity of the state. The activities of the opposition parties had been closely monitored during the presidency of Islam Karimov.

Relations of Uzbekistan had ups and downs not only with Turkey, but also the USA and the RF. Indeed, there had been a high threat perception in relations with Turkey. Nevertheless, Uzbekistan is not a country to “give up” (Akçalı, 2012: 609-11).

“Although our people is a part of Turkic nations in terms of history and language, it rejects the promises of Pan-Turkism and the chauvinist idea of ‘Great Turan’. Turan is a cultural symbol for us, but not the political unity of the peoples who speak Turkic languages. In addition, we also have common cultural, historical and anthropological ties with the Tajik people. This shows that our culture is an original synthesis of Turkic and Persian elements” (Karimov, 1998, cited in Balım, 2012: 289). Karimov’s words briefly conclude the attitude and foreign policy of Karimov’s period.

The period of Karimov’s presidency was described as the “Uzbek model”. “If I say that the way known as the “Uzbek model” in the world, has proved itself as the most right and correct way during our contemporary twenty-year history, I would have expressed the opinion of you, all the public and all our people sitting in this magnificent square.” September 1, 2011, Islam Karimov, the speech dedicated to the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of independence (Balım, 2012: 224).

Turkey-Uzbekistan relations have entered a new and positive phase with the Presidency of Mirziyoyev. Political, economic, cultural relations have been developed especially in the last two years. In addition, Uzbekistan –for the first time- has participated as a permanent member in the 7<sup>th</sup> Summit of Turkic Council, held in Baku, in October 14-15, 2019.

#### Turkey – Turkmenistan Relations



There have been certain problems in the relations of Turkmenistan and Turkey, though not as much as with Uzbekistan. One of the most disappointing issues for the Turkmen administration was the Blue Stream project. With the realization of this project, Turkmenistan has shifted to other countries outside of Turkey. It seems that the way to benefit from the Turkmen gas for Turkey is unavailable under the current conditions.

Turkmenistan administration keeps staying “closed” and unreachable. The opposition states that there is a glorification of the leader, and pressure on the opposition. The “Turkmen model of development”, set by the First President Turkmenbashy (Saparmurat Niyazov) has preserved some traditions under Berdimuhammedov as well. Moreover, Turkmenistan feels sort of discomfort from ideological and religious discourses.

#### Turkey – Kazakhstan Relations

Kazakhstan is assessed as the most advanced country in terms of regional power, a locomotive in terms of economic development level. Kazakhstan holds a multi-vectored, balanced, consistent, successful and effective foreign policy. Kazakhstan – Turkey bilateral relations has always been mutually positive.

Kazakhstan and Turkey are the countries that are open and warm to bilateral cooperation. The two countries take part in the various events with the concept of “the Turkic World”. Significant progress has been made in political, economic and cultural relations. Economic indicators of the bilateral relations are demonstrated below.

#### Turkey – Kyrgyzstan Relations

Kyrgyzstan confronts several problems such as the shortage of natural resources and problems related to the economic development level, as well as the problems concerning the political and economic stability. Besides, Kyrgyzstan had had significant steps in terms of democratization. In Central Asia, only in Kyrgyzstan, two presidents had to leave the presidency and flee from the country due to the public reactions and revolutions. In addition, political parties and NGOs in Kyrgyzstan are much free.

Kyrgyzstan-Turkey relations are mainly positive. Political, economic and cultural relations continue being positively (Akçalı, 2012: 609-614). However, following July 15 (2016) process, some problems arose in the relations of Kyrgyzstan and Turkey. At present, bilateral political relations are stabilized and positive.

### Turkey – Azerbaijan Relations

Although Azerbaijan is not located in Central Asia, without Azerbaijan, the picture of Turkey - Central Asian Turkic republics relations would not be whole and complete. Azerbaijan and Turkey's relations are assessed as "One nation, two states" (Heydar Aliyev's speech). Especially right after 1990, for a decade, an emotional, warm and close relationship could be observed. Here personal good friendships of the leaders, Heydar Aliyev and Süleyman Demirel's communion and diplomacy, was significant and decisive.

### Economic Relations

Furthermore, regarding the economic cooperation between Turkey and Central Asian republics, there are several factors that play role at this point. There is an impact of regional and global actors struggling for efficiency in the region that affect the economic aspects. Besides, the fact that economic policy of the Soviet period made republics connected and dependent on each other also play the role. Economic crises clearly show that there is a need for cooperation.

Turkey's main investment areas in Central Asia are the branches of construction, hotel management, consumer goods, textiles, food, service sector, banking, transport, oil, agriculture, and so on. Turkish goods have a popularity with the brands "Made in Turkey", with regarding quality and price. In Central Asian market, Turkish goods are evaluated as the goods with "European quality, Asian price" or having "Western quality, Eastern price". "Made in Turkey" goods have to compete mainly with the European goods, Russian goods and Chinese goods.

**TABLE. MUTUAL TRADE BETWEEN TURKIC COUNTRIES (IN THOUSAND US DOLLARS)**

TURKEY'S											
	IMPORT			EXPORT			TRADING VOLUME			CHANGE	
	2001	2012	2018	2001	2012	2018	2001	2012	2018	2001-2012	2012-2018
Azerbaijan	78.075	339.936	378.734	225.214	2.587.482	1.474.368	303.289	2.927.418	1.853.102	9,7 times	0,63
Kazakhstan	90.343	2.056.086	1.470.257	119.795	1.069.372	695.265	210.138	3.125.458	2.165.522	14,9 times	0,69
Kyrgyzstan	6.307	45.226	47.342	17.350	257.519	377.073	23.657	302.745	424.415	12,8 times	1,40
Uzbekistan	36.045	813.287	795.545	89.725	450.365	951.458	125.770	1.263.652	1.747.003	10 times	1,38
Turkmenistan	71.739	303.507	260.995	105.278	1.480.534	467.202	177.017	1.784.041	728.197	10,1 times	0,41
							<b>839.871</b>	<b>9.403.314</b>	<b>6.918.239</b>	<b>11,2 times</b>	<b>0,74</b>

AZERBAIJAN'S											
	IMPORT			EXPORT			TRADING VOLUME			CHANGE	
	2001	2012	2018	2001	2012	2018	2001	2012	2018	2001-2012	2012-2018
Kazakhstan	99.540	340.557	174.068	6.617	52.870	46.644	106.157	393.427	220.712	3,7 times	0,56
Kyrgyzstan	1.357	2.241	2.049	256	26.677	4.034	1.613	28.918	6.083	17,9 times	0,21
Uzbekistan	6.089	8.027	34.597	3.108	11.523	9.351	9.197	19.550	43.948	2,1 times	2,25
Turkmenistan	135.172	32.714	109.352	12.047	58.916	23.800	147.219	91.630	133.152	0,62	1,45
Turkey	225.214	2.587.482	1.474.368	78.075	339.936	378.734	303.289	2.927.418	1.853.102	9,7 times	0,63
							<b>567.475</b>	<b>3.460.943</b>	<b>2.256.997</b>	<b>6,1 times</b>	<b>0,65</b>

**TABLE. MUTUAL TRADE BETWEEN TURKIC COUNTRIES (IN THOUSAND USD) (Continued)**

KAZAKHSTAN'S											
	IMPORT			EXPORT			TRADING VOLUME			CHANGE	
	2001	2012	2018	2001	2012	2018	2001	2012	2018	2001-2012	2012-2018
Azerbaijan	6.617	52.870	46.644	99.540	340.557	174.068	106.157	393.427	220.712	3,7 times	0,56
Kyrgyzstan	33.455	333.050	230.391	86.987	723.966	634.867	120.442	1.057.016	865.258	8,8 times	0,82
Uzbekistan	81.088	817.200	844.773	150.234	1.343.721	1.643.314	2.321.322	2.160.921	2.488.087	9,3 times	1,15
Turkmenistan	77.488	178.982	12.892	14.178	165.601	86.650	91.666	344.583	99.542	3,8 times	0,29
Turkey	119.795	1.069.372	695.265	90.343	2.056.086	1.470.257	210.138	3.125.458	2.165.522	14,9 times	0,69
							<b>2.849.725</b>	<b>7.081.405</b>	<b>5.839.121</b>	<b>2,5 times</b>	<b>0,82</b>

KYRGYZSTAN'S											
	IMPORT			EXPORT			TRADING VOLUME			CHANGE	
	2001	2012	2018	2001	2012	2018	2001	2012	2018	2001-2012	2012-2018
Azerbaijan	256	26.677	4.034	1.357	2.241	2.049	1.613	28.918	6.083	17,9 times	0,21
Kazakhstan	86.987	723.966	634.867	33.455	333.050	230.391	120.442	1.057.016	865.258	8,8 times	0,82
Uzbekistan	66.723	84.314	177.988	47.987	124.437	158.500	114.710	2.008.751	336.488	1,8 times	0,17
Turkmenistan	8.977	2.545	1.465	1.546	7.578	3.307	10.523	10.123	4.772	same	0,47
Turkey	17.350	257.519	377.073	6.307	45.226	47.342	23.657	302.745	424.415	12,8 times	1,40
							<b>270.945</b>	<b>3.407.553</b>	<b>1.637.016</b>	<b>12,6 times</b>	<b>0,48</b>

UZBEKISTAN'S											
	IMPORT			EXPORT			TRADING VOLUME			CHANGE	
	2001	2012	2018	2001	2012	2018	2001	2012	2018	2001-2012	2012-2018
Azerbaijan	3.108	11.523	9.351	6.089	8.027	34.597	9.197	19.550	43.948	2,1 times	2,25
Kazakhstan	150.234	1.343.721	1.643.314	81.088	817.200	844.773	231.322	2.160.921	2.488.087	9,3 times	1,15
Kyrgyzstan	47.987	124.437	158.500	66.723	84.314	177.988	114.710	208.751	336.488	1,8 times	1,61
Turkmenistan	no info		237.798	no info		35.231	no info		273.029	NA	NA
Turkey	89.725	450.365	951.458	36.045	813.287	795.545	125.770	1.263.652	1747003	10 times	1,38
							<b>480.999</b>	<b>3.652.874</b>	<b>4.888.555</b>	<b>7,6 times</b>	<b>1,34</b>

TURKMENISTAN'S											
	IMPORT			EXPORT			TRADING VOLUME			CHANGE	
	2001	2012	2018	2001	2012	2018	2001	2012	2018	2001-2012	2012-2018
Azerbaijan	12.047	58.916	23.800	135.172	32.714	109.352	147.219	91.630	133.152	0,62	1,45
Kazakhstan	14.178	165.601	86.650	77.488	178.982	12.892	91.666	344.583	99.542	3,8 times	0,29
Kyrgyzstan	1.546	7.578	3.307	8.977	2.545	1.465	10.523	10.123	4.772	same	0,47
Uzbekistan	no info		35.231	no info		237.798	no info		273.029	NA	NA
Turkey	105.278	1.480.534	467.202	71.739	303.507	260.995	177.017	1.784.041	728.197	10,1 times	0,41
							<b>426.425</b>	<b>2.230.377</b>	<b>1.238.692</b>	<b>5,2 times</b>	<b>0,56</b>

**Source:** Economic data are derived from [www.trademap.org](http://www.trademap.org).

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While examining the trade of the Turkic countries with each other, the period between 1991 and 2001 can be evaluated as a period of recovering from the Soviet past. In the first decade, the new independent countries mainly paid attention to overcome the economic collapse of the Soviet era and establish economic ties with the world. For this reason, economic data after 2001 became more solid and meaningful in comparison to the previous decade. It comes out that in general the mutual trade of the Turkic countries increased between 2001 and 2012. However, the trade of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan stayed as exceptions in this generally increasing trend. In addition, since Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan preferred staying a closed economy during this period, there is no statistical data available.

Moreover, global trade trend entered a general slowdown phase after 2013. This slowdown, in its turn, affected the trade between the Turkic countries. Global trade started to recover since 2017, and in 2018 it exceeded the 2012's trade volume. However, the trade between the Turkic countries has not recovered yet from this slowdown. As it can be seen from the table, Uzbekistan is the only country that has increased its trade with other countries in the last six years. The reason for this is the gradual abandonment of this country from closed economy. On the other hand, trade volume between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan has also increased in this period. This is the recovery of the trade between these two countries, in comparison to the previous decade.

## Conclusion

To sum up, the year of 1991 was the milestone for newly independent Central Asian states to implement foreign policy and diplomacy. Turkey – Central Asian republics geo-political relations with in general have been positive, although there have been ups and downs from time to time. Almost 30 years of bilateral relations witnessed mostly warm, but sometimes frozen relations with some countries. As for the economic relations, Turkish economic investment and goods are welcomed in Central Asian market. In the recent years, it experienced decrease in the mutual trading volume.

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## **Conflict in the Middle East: the failed-state hypothesis.**

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The Middle East has historically witnessed a tenuous relationship between certain centripetal forces and other centrifugal ones. The nation-state as we know it today in the region is of a recent origin dating back to something like one hundred years. Before that, the region was nominally under the aegis of major powers, the Ottoman Empire in the Levant and the British Empire in the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, and France in the Maghreb region.

Those empires did not exercise their power directly but had more of a nominal authority over the governing elites in the cities. The hinterland was afforded more of an independent latitude, with the powerful tribes playing a balancing act against each other, and nominally giving respect to the imperial authority. With independence and discovery of oil, power became more local, if not even concentrated in the hands of the new rulers of the state. As the economic fortunes of the nation-state increased in the center so has political authority and direct influence over its population. The increase of the fortunes of the centralized nation-state did not mean the demise of its constituent social and political parts, mainly the tribes of the country, but their decline vis-à-vis the central authority.

Those tribes became the subjects of the new states benefitting from its wealth through direct subsidy to the tribal sheikhs and new education and employment opportunities for its youth. The leadership of the tribe was also concentrated in the hands of one or two leaders instead of being shared by many. A recognition of authority of a single tribal leader by the central government meant a concentration of power within the tribe similar to the concentration of power within the state. Such a social concentration brought immense political power and wealth to the tribal leadership. It became adjunct to the central political leadership through membership in the new political institutions of the state. Even in less-wealthy countries like Jordan, tribal leaders became part and parcel of the governing elites of the country and state institutions such as the army, the parliament and various government ministries.

As long as the government was endowed with natural resources or had access to these resources through direct aid from oil producing Arab states, the relationship between the central government and various tribes was healthy and organic. Once funds available to the central government would dry-up, this relationship became weak and the tribes would look for new sources of funds from regional powers or would collaborate with new internal political factions vying to rest power from the central government.

This paper attempts to analyze this relationship in some weak or failed states in the Arab World like Iraq and Yemen and, and link it with other ideological or religious parties that seek to supplement or replace the existing regimes in these countries.

### **The Failed State Concept and its Critics:**

The first use of the failed state term surfaced in Political Science literature in the middle Nineties. It was linked to the collapse of state institutions and subsequent failed intervention of US forces in Somalia. Helman and Ratner (1992-93) argued that failure of many state institutions in Africa and Asia was attributed to the international system itself in which those weak states sought membership even though they haven't succeeded fully in building their institutions to be admitted to the comity of nations and given full recognition. They argued that those countries did not have the economic basis nor the political institutions to support the establishment of a newly established nation-state.

Similarly, the famed African political scientist Ali Mazrui, argued that those new states in Africa need some sort of "trusteeship" by regional organizations such as The Organization of African Unity or other major African country to ensure stability to save those newly independent countries from crumbling. In the Middle East and in his critique of Nasser's Egypt the famed Egyptian political scientist Nazih Ayubi (1995) argued that Nasser's Egypt and similar Arab military states "are hard states and indeed that many of them are fierce states, few of them are really strong states. Although they have large bureaucracies, mighty armies and harsh prisons, they are lamentably feeble when it comes to collecting taxes, winning wars, or forging a really hegemonic power block or an ideology that can carry the state beyond the coercive and corporative level and into the moral and intellectual sphere" (Ayubi, 1995, p. XI).

In linking ideology with Arab state historical formation we may have to rely on Ibn Khaldun's thesis that formation of Arab states particularly in the Maghreb was always linked to a powerful internal ideology and sheikh (a preacher) who would forge an alliance with a powerful tribal leader to unify a large country based on the new ideology and enforced by the hegemony of a tribal alliance that turn a tribal entity into a larger state based on this alliance of tribes that would challenge existing regime and establish a new powerful state. (Ibn Khaldun, *AlMuqadwamah*). Ibn Khaldun does not view state decay in a binary notion (strong state vis-à-vis weak or failed state) but looked at it from a continuous continuum. This rhymes well with recent critique of literature that most theorists of the failed state in the Arab World have looked at this phenomenon in a binary fashion (Fawcett, 2017) Since the international system or regional systems did not exist in the 15th Century, ideology for Ibn Khaldun was a local phenomenon

and was not contagious across regions or transnational in character.

### **The Ideological Threat:**

In the wake of the end of the Cold War and demise of East-West competition, coupled with fatigue in Western countries after the Iraq war, we have witnessed a new development by regional actors to assert their influence through ideology and subservient political parties across several Arab States. Turkey for example became the champion of the Muslim Brotherhood parties in many Arab countries, and Iran became the champion of Hizb Allah and other militias in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. Having found weak or feeble states in those countries, those regional powers took advantage of the weakening of those states to challenge their power politically and militarily, by creating new political parties with a military wing that at times would become more powerful than the existing military establishment of the state itself.

Iran since the Khomeini Revolution took upon itself the formidable task of building satellite political and military parties in many Arab lands and even beyond. Coming from a fragment segment of the Muslim World, it had to utilize zealous religious and sectarian appeal to expand the adherence of the sect and to utilize this appeal to try and build a new Farisi empire under the guise of religious appeal. This process was undertaken slowly but assiduously through propaganda and agitation, first through appealing to a wider Islamic audience by adopting Islamic unity, and championing the Palestinian cause. Despite the initial setback of the Iraq-Iran War, the Iranian leadership began to work on many fronts to weaken its foes especially in Iraq and sided with the Bush Administration in 2003 invasion of the country. After the invasion it took advantage of the chaos by sending political leaders and cadre to work with the new colonial administration to chart a political course that benefit its subordinate factions and allies. The new Iraqi state despite having enormous oil wealth was not strong like the old Saddam regime nor govern the country in a fully functioning fashion. The powerful Iranian neighbor kept the new administration in Iraq weak and feeble, cutting major water tributary rivers that feed the River Dijlah and creating water shortages in southern Iraq.

The war against Daesh in Iraq which was fought under the banner of fighting this harsh terrorist group, which indeed DAESH was, but also utilized to weaken the constituent Sunni population in Iraq in the north and west of the country. Despite suppressing DAESH, the new Iraqi state did not come out of this process as a powerful one, but the weakness of the country continued on a faster scale. The Iraqi government after defeating DAESH, found itself in the thorough of new Iranian supported military groups like Al-Hashd Alshaapi, with a membership of over a hundred and fifty thousand military militia outside the purview of the Iraqi state and its army, and under the direct the guidance of Qassem Suleimani and the Quds Brigade of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.



Yemen is another example of a weak state that was weakened by a civil war as well as by the Arab Spring. By 2010, the central Yemeni government has fought eight wars over a decade and a half with the Houthis. They were based in Saadah in the north of the country. They mobilized the young against their parents. Summer camps worked very well in indoctrinating young boys with little or no education. The militia provided its members with Qat (a local sedating drug) as well as weapons and ideology. They were against the established Zaidi scholars, a school of Fiqh very close to Islamic Sunni teachings. The Houthis wanted to go back to the old traditional Shiite Twelvers, which is the dominant school of religion in Iran. Their guide or Imam is not Zaid Bin Al Hussein or Ibn Alwazir or AlQadi Ahmed AlAnsi or other Sheikhs and luminaries of Yemen, but the spiritual guidance of the group came from Qum and Tehran. So, the relationship between the Houthis and Tehran is ideological, spiritual and military. Both Abdulmalik Alhouthi and his father attended religious seminaries in Qum and Tehran. Khomeini was their Imam and Tehran was their Makkah. During the Nineties and the first decade of this century Muammar Alqadthafi of Libya was generous with the Houthis, they had also some backing from some other Arab states. After they seized power in Sanaa, money and weapons came from Tehran, and Hizb Allah of Lebanon sent some military advisers to train and support the young militia.

But the weakness of the Yemeni state was very well documented before the Fall of Sanaa to the Houthi offense on 21 September 2014. Back in 2011 Yemen was running out of oil and water. The oil production declined from 313000 barrels/day in 2007 to well below 119000 barrels per day in 2014. Water was scarce and water shortage was widespread in the country to the point that the World Bank was predicting that the capital Sanaa would be running out of water in ten years.

### **The Malaise:**

It is the contention of this paper to argue that the weakness of many Arab states lies in two major factors: dwindling of natural resources including shortage of water and oil, combined with a population explosion. The old balance between food and natural resources on one hand and population on the other created conditions for harmonic and stable social and political conditions. With the youth bulge and rising national expectations, demands on state institutions were very high. During the Cold War most of these states would seek external assistance from major foreign powers. The Oil producing Arab states in the past forty years provided a monetary cushion to the empty coffers of these states. Foreign workers employed in those Arab oil producing countries would also send their families part of their earnings abroad, and this had a positive impact on the balance of payments sheet of these countries. Ideological political parties on the other hand vied to rest power from the military leaders ruling those states. Those ideological parties are not interested in political and economic development which enhance job creation, in as much as creating more chaos to increase their

chances of ascending to power within these states. Regional actors are also searching to increase their influence directly and through expanding their particular religious and political vision. Regional bipolarity between Iran and Saudi Arabia replaced the old East West Cold War. Saudi Arabia could provide direct monetary aid to those countries and with other regional Gulf states could open-up their job markets for the neighboring young Arab youths to find job opportunities in its companies. Iran on the other hand could not provide jobs for other Arab youths nor financial assistance to their government bursaries. It could provide military weapons and sectarian ideology for those political organizations allied to it in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen.

The weakening of oil prices coupled with mismanagement of financial resources by the elites of recipient countries combined to ignite unfulfilled expectations of the populations of recipient states. We are well aware of mass demonstrations for change in many Arab countries since 2011 to the present day. The elites of those weak Arab states did not meet rising demands for job creation and basic services. The rising turmoil forced many citizens to rely on their paternal network of family and tribe to help in their existential circumstances. Family and tribe in many parts of the Arab World still provide support for its members in times of need. Identity politics served at times to garner social and political support for individuals and families. Political parties basing their platform on identity or sectarian politics could find immense support from external backers, but at a price. Thus, Hizb Allah in Lebanon would have to fight against the aspiration of the Syrian people at the behest of its Iranian government backers. Al Houthis in Yemen instead of making peace and compromises with their democratically elected government, would be engaged in continuous military campaign to serve the interests of its Iranian backers. Unfortunately, the military might of those militias and parties was not matched by the requisite independence of political decisions. And as a result, sovereignty of those states was compromised. Thus, not only the states in those countries were weak or feeble, so has been their constituent political parties.

## **Conclusion:**

This paper has argued that state weakness in many parts of the Arab World is the result of misbalance between population increases and natural resource endowment, particularly water and oil. Other factors relating to mismanagement of resources or bad governance remain very important in the making of weak or failed states, but remain for the time being outside the purview of analysis in this paper. Unfortunately, Arab political parties are not necessarily service parties seeking to enhance the citizens welfare in as much as to appeal to impulses of identity or sectarian politics. In countries like Iraq and Lebanon people have already recognized this malaise and as a result are rejecting in mass the failure of these parties and their constituent governments. In Yemen, mass misery would have to force the Houthis and its militia to come to terms with the internationally recognized government. Those

ecological factors can explain many conflict-ridden disruptions in regional political behavior, and regional conflicts. This ecological and political imbalance bodes ill for those states concerned and may also spell over regionally and cause inter-state conflicts. To guard against the weakening and collapse of regional countries, it is hoped that regional organizations, such as the Arab League and The Gulf Cooperation Council would benefit from establishing a task force or regional centers to predict the onset of these imbalances and guard against state failures, or policies that leads to internal political decay of state and social institutions in the Arab World and in the wider region, and establish mechanisms that address such impending crises.

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## Gulf-Korea Ties: Special, Smart & Strategic

Dr N. Janardhan



## Gulf-South Korea Ties

- Linked to exponential growth in Gulf-Asia ties since 2000
- Miracle in the Desert **versus** Miracle on the Han River
- Gulf – camel to cruise; soft to smart power; IBM to Maggie
- South Korea – from manpower exporter to tech exporter
- Ties rooted in energy cooperation
- Also includes construction, engineering, transport, medium-sized businesses, healthcare, ICT, space and defence sectors
- Economic diversification-knowledge economy link – Korea model

## Gulf-South Korea Ties

- 3 successive Korean governments have showed consistency in Gulf policies – **economic sense is common sense** (both sides)
- President Park Geun-hye – Gulf region is “answer to South Korea’s prayer for economic revitalization.”
- 2018 – President Moon – ‘**strategic** relationship’ with UAE was elevated to ‘**special** strategic partnership’ (**VIP becomes VVIP**)
- Both sides keen to engage in Industrial Revolution 4.0 – artificial intelligence, robotics, Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, 3D printing, quantum computing and nanotechnology
- Different from Chinese deals – real win-win formula!

## Largest Producers of Oil

The 10 largest oil<sup>1</sup> producers and share of total world oil production<sup>2</sup> in 2018<sup>3</sup>

Country	Million barrels per day	Share of world total
United States	17.87	18%
Saudi Arabia	12.42	12%
Russia	11.40	11%
Canada	5.27	5%
China	4.82	5%
Iraq	4.62	5%
Iran	4.47	4%
United Arab Emirates	3.79	4%
Brazil	3.43	3%
Kuwait	2.87	3%
Total top 10	70.96	70%
World total	100.66	

<sup>1</sup> Oil includes crude oil, all other petroleum liquids, and biofuels.

<sup>2</sup> Production includes domestic production of crude oil, all other petroleum liquids, biofuels, and refinery processing gain.

<sup>3</sup> Most recent year for which data are available when this FAQ was updated.


## Largest Crude Importers (2018)

RANK	IMPORTER	CRUDE OIL IMPORTS (US\$)	%WORLD TOTAL
1.	China	\$239.2 billion	20.2%
2.	United States	\$163.1 billion	13.8%
3.	India	\$114.5 billion	9.7%
4.	Japan	\$80.6 billion	6.8%
5.	South Korea	\$80.4 billion	6.8%
6.	Netherlands	\$48.8 billion	4.1%
7.	Germany	\$45.1 billion	3.8%
8.	Spain	\$34.2 billion	2.9%
9.	Italy	\$32.6 billion	2.8%
10.	France	\$28.5 billion	2.4%

<http://www.worldstopexports.com/>

## Oil producers-consumers synergy

South Korean Crude Oil Imports by Origin




Source: IHS Markit, Commodities at Sea

© 2019 IHS Markit

## Main Crude Suppliers

Figure 4. South Korea crude oil imports by source, 2017




Sources: Global Trade Tracker (accessed April 2018)

**Gulf countries supplied 82% of crude requirements**

## Main LNG Suppliers

Figure 8. South Korea LNG imports by source, 2017



Source: IHS Energy  
Note: Others include Algeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and re-exports.

**Gulf countries supplied 42% Korea's LNG requirements**



## Creative economic connection


- Kuwait – Hyundai building Sheikh Jaber Al Sabah Causeway
- Kogas-Rasgas long-term LNG agreement until 2024-2026
- Most of Qatar's LNG carriers built by Korean shipyards
- 2016 – President Park's Iran visit yielded 30 joint economic projects worth \$37 billion.
- 2019 – \$8.3 Saudi-Korean deal; SMART nuclear cooperation
- Saudi-Korean Vision 2030 Committee – five key sectors: energy & manufacturing, **smart** infrastructure & digitisation, capacity-building, healthcare & life sciences, SMEs & investment

## UAE-Korea ties

- 2004 – Samsung primary contractor for Burj Khalifa
- \$21 billion – UAE projects to Korean companies (2009-2016)
- Korea developing three oil fields in Abu Dhabi since 2012
- UAE storing crude in South Korea since 2013
- 2015 – ADNOC and GS Energy sign 40-year deal for 3% stake in onshore oil concession
- 2018 – \$3.5b ADNOC-Samsung Engineering deals
- Korean firms eyeing \$25 billion deals in UAE energy projects

## Gulf-South Korea Trade

**Figure 3. South Korea's Trade with the Gulf Region (2009-2018)**



Source: Korea Customs Service,

<http://www.customs.go.kr/kcshome/trade/TradeCountryList.do>

## GCC-South Korea Trade (2018)

Country	US\$ billion
Saudi Arabia	30
Qatar	17
UAE	15
Kuwait	14
Oman	3
Bahrain	1

Source: Author's compilation

## Gulf-Asia trade ties

### GCC main trade partners (1990-2015)

Country	1990 (\$ b)	2000 (\$ b)	2005 (\$ b)	2008 (\$ b)	2013 (\$ b)	2015 (\$ b)
China	1.3	11.8	44.9	121.4	224.4	137.2
India	4.4	6.6	21.4	119.3	183.9	104.9
Japan	33.5	52	103.8	176.1	171.6	91.9
South Korea	6.1	25.6	53.4	109.7	136.1	71.9
European Union	59.9	66.7	142.5	212	216.2	180.3
United States	19.1	33.9	66	124.8	137.2	88

## Soft power

- 2016 – Korean Cultural Centre opened in UAE (region's first)
- King Sejong Institute – Korean language & cultural centre (ZU)
- 13,000 Koreans live in the UAE; 170 major Korean companies
- Korean children new STEM whiz kids in schools
- 200 Korean staff operating Sheikh Khalifa Specialty Hospital
- 3,500 Emiratis treated in Korean hospitals in 2016
- K-Pop, kimchi & bibimbap winning hearts

## Sunshine & Moonshine diplomacy



## Political and diplomatic commonalities


- South Korea's politics & diplomacy useful templates
- Sunshine & Moonshine policies handy for Gulf's quest for peace
- Lesson in delicately balancing ties with Iran
- Sports diplomacy – cohosting 2002 FIFA World Cup with Japan & 2018 Winter Olympics with North Korea (**Gulf Cup in Qatar**)
- Proactive Gulf – Saudi Arabia & UAE facilitate Eritrea-Ethiopia peace deal

## Iran factor

### Sanctions Effect

Some Asian buyers have halted Iranian oil imports ahead of Nov. 4 deadline

■ China ■ India ■ Japan ■ South Korea



Note: June-Sept. figures are based on data from Bloomberg; Oct. figures are FGE's estimates

Sources: Bloomberg, FGE

**Bloomberg**

**Saudi Arabia & United States making up for loss of Iranian oil**


## Strategic cooperation

- 2009 – first foreign deployment of Korea's naval forces to US-led CTF-151 – anti-piracy operations in Gulf of Aden & Horn
- From 2011 – Korean special forces 'Akh' (brother) training special warfare unit in UAE & conducting joint exercises
- 2011-2016 – \$31 billion – Korea's defence exports to UAE
- 2019 – South Korean anti-piracy naval contingent dispatched to Gulf of Aden on rotational mission
- 2019 – after attacks on Aramco facilities, Riyadh requested Seoul to help bolster kingdom's air defence system

## US 'pivot' to Asia

### U.S. oil imports shrink

Imports as percentage of daily demand




SOURCE: RAYMOND JAMES

## Scope for Synergy

### Asia is projected to have the largest increase in energy use of non-OECD regions

IEO2018 Reference case  
non-OECD energy consumption by region  
quadrillion Btu



Source: EIA, International Energy Outlook 2018

## Opportunities and Challenges

- US-Saudi-Iran tension and sanctions add to uncertainties
- Global economic slowdown has affected both
- Future partnerships – Bilateral versus multilateral
- Is United States disengaging from the region?
- Will it be the end of 'free riders' nigh? Korea's interests?
- Future of Gulf security – collective security architecture?
- Gulf-Asia ties acquiring strategic value
- China or Asian or Asian-led collective security?

## Thank you



**'Wow' or 'Ah-aha' factor – Gulf-Korea ties has both!**



# The Middle East and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): The Transition of International Geo-Economic Structure and the Connectivity Within



**PAIK, Seunghoon**  
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

**LEE, Changju**  
Ajou University



## Overview



### I. Introduction

### II. Rebalancing in the Middle East: Shift of Common Interest & Common Threat

### III. What is the Belt & Road Initiative?

### IV. China's BRI in the Middle East



### V. Case Study: Crude Oil Future in Shanghai



## 1. Introduction


## I. Introduction



[illegible]

## I. Introduction

### Or Is Putin becoming the go to guy??




■ “The Holy Quran says violence is only acceptable when defending your kin,”

Vladimir Putin, Ankara Summit, Sep. 16

- ✓ Putin told a press conference after the summit. “So we’re willing to provide aid to Saudi Arabia in defending their kin, their country.” The Saudis should “make a wise, statesman like decision,”
- ✓ Putin suggested, and purchase S-300 air defense systems as Iran did, or the more modern S-400 ones which Turkey recently purchased. “They will reliably protect any Saudi Arabian infrastructure,”

## I. Introduction


### China and the Middle East





## II. Rebalancing in the Middle East : Shift of Common Interest & Common Threat

### II. Rebalancing in the Middle East : Shift of Common Interest & Common Threat




Unit: Mtoe

China	3,164
United States	2,258
India	929
Russia	800
Japan	424
South Korea	307
Germany	301
Canada	301
Brazil	290
Iran	265
Indonesia	251
France	243

■ **Acceleration in energy consumption in 2018 (+2.3%) driven by high growth in electricity and gas demand**

- Global energy consumption grew significantly in 2018, spurred by the sustained economic growth and rising demand in China, the world's largest energy consumer since 2009. Chinese energy consumption posted its highest growth since 2012, mainly driven by power generation, strong industrial demand and increasing transport fuel consumption encouraged by a growing vehicle fleet.

## II. Rebalancing in the Middle East : Shift of Common Interest & Common Threat




Unit: Mt

United States	676
Saudi Arabia	583
Russia	556
Canada	259
Iraq	230
Iran	214
China	193
United Arab Emirates	181
Kuwait	150
Brazil	136
Mexico	102
Nigeria	101

### ■ Global crude oil production rose (+2%) driven by explosive growth in the United States (+16.5%)

- Crude oil production in the United States saw a significant increase as exploration and extraction of oil from its plentiful shale reserves grew, causing the largest ever annual increase by a single country. This was due to new projects coming online, a persistent demand for oil and higher prices (US\$14 per barrel higher than 2017).

## II. Rebalancing in the Middle East : Shift of Common Interest & Common Threat



Unit: Mt


China	3,770
India	982
United States	624
Russia	234
Germany	217
Japan	189
South Africa	186
South Korea	150
Poland	129
Turkey	125
Australia	113
Indonesia	109

### ■ Continued rise in global coal consumption (+0.9%) driven primarily by Asia (+1.8%)

- China, responsible for nearly half of global coal consumption, has seen its second consecutive annual increase, driven mainly by power generation and some industrial sectors such as steel, chemicals and cement. Coal consumption increased again in 2018, against a slowdown in economic growth and gas supply worries lowering emphasis on a shift from coal to gas space heating. This goes against previous efforts to “green” the economy whilst maintaining prosperity.

### III. What is BRI , The Belt & Road Initiative?

## What is The Belt & Road Initiative?



The Economist


#### The Belt & Road Initiative

- The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road
- Beijing is in the process of building international free trade zone based on comprehensive three-dimensional space network(connectivity)

#### Is BRI an Initiative or Strategy for China?

- Initiative: Pursuing “Absolut Gain” with recipient countries, win-win, mutual prosperity
- Strategy: Pursuing National Interests focused on “Relative Gain”, a kind of zero-sum

#### Polar Silk Road (2018)



## How does connectivity form BRI operation system? 한국외국어대학교 Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Connectivity  
(互联互通)



Policy Coordination  
政策沟通

Financial Integration  
资金融通

Physical Connectivity 设施联通

- Improvement in Infrastructure

Institutional Connectivity 贸易畅通



- Ex) Simplify Custom Institution, FTA etc.

People-to-People Connectivity 民心相通


- Activate People-to-People exchange on the platform.

五通

## China's the Belt & Road Strategy is based on "Go Abroad(走出去)" Strategy 한국외국어대학교 Hankuk University of Foreign Studies



Source: People's Daily




Source: Shipping data from University College London Energy Institute.

China's the Belt & Road Strategy is aiming at expanding their market and improving their energy security.



## IV. China's BRI in the Middle East

### China's BRI in the Middle East





## China's BRI in the Middle East

### Top 15 crude oil exporters to China, 2018 (\$bn)





Table 3. BRI-participating economies and economic corridors

Economy	Economic Corridor	Economy	Economic Corridor
1 People's Republic of China	-	37 Singapore	China-Indochina Peninsula
2 Bangladesh	Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar	38 Thailand	China-Indochina Peninsula
3 Bhutan	Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar	39 Timor-Leste	China-Indochina Peninsula
4 India	Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar	40 Viet Nam	China-Indochina Peninsula
5 Myanmar	Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar	41 Belarus	China-Mongolia-Russian Federation
6 Nepal	Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar	42 Estonia	China-Mongolia-Russian Federation
7 Sri Lanka	Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar	43 Latvia	China-Mongolia-Russian Federation
8 Albania	China-Central West Asia	44 Lithuania	China-Mongolia-Russian Federation
9 Armenia	China-Central West Asia	45 Mongolia	China-Mongolia-Russian Federation
10 Azerbaijan	China-Central West Asia	46 Russian Federation	China-Mongolia-Russian Federation
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina	China-Central West Asia	47 Afghanistan	China-Pakistan
12 Bulgaria	China-Central West Asia	48 Pakistan	China-Pakistan
13 Croatia	China-Central West Asia	49 Bahrain	China-Pakistan
14 Georgia	China-Central West Asia	50 Kuwait	China-Pakistan
15 Islamic Republic of Iran	China-Central West Asia	51 Oman	China-Pakistan
16 Iraq	China-Central West Asia	52 Qatar	China-Pakistan
17 Israel	China-Central West Asia	53 Saudi Arabia	China-Pakistan
18 Jordan	China-Central West Asia	54 United Arab Emirates	China-Pakistan
19 Kyrgyzstan	China-Central West Asia	55 Yemen	China-Pakistan
20 Lebanon	China-Central West Asia	56 Czech Republic	New Eurasian Land Bridge
21 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	China-Central West Asia	57 Hungary	New Eurasian Land Bridge
22 Republic of Moldova	China-Central West Asia	58 Slovak Republic	New Eurasian Land Bridge
23 Montenegro	China-Central West Asia	59 Slovenia	New Eurasian Land Bridge
24 Palestinian Authority or West Bank and Gaza Strip	China-Central West Asia	60 Poland	New Eurasian Land Bridge
25 Romania	China-Central West Asia	61 Kazakhstan	New Eurasian Land Bridge
26 Serbia	China-Central West Asia	62 Ukraine	New Eurasian Land Bridge
27 Syrian Arab Republic	China-Central West Asia	63 Egypt	21st-C Maritime Silk Road
28 Tajikistan	China-Central West Asia	64 Ethiopia	21st-C Maritime Silk Road
29 Turkey	China-Central West Asia	65 Indonesia	21st-C Maritime Silk Road
30 Turkmenistan	China-Central West Asia	66 Kenya	21st-C Maritime Silk Road
31 Uzbekistan	China-Central West Asia	67 Maldives	21st-C Maritime Silk Road
32 Brunei Darussalam	China-Indochina Peninsula	68 Morocco	21st-C Maritime Silk Road
33 Cambodia	China-Indochina Peninsula	69 New Zealand	21st-C Maritime Silk Road
34 Lao People's Democratic Republic	China-Indochina Peninsula	70 Panama	21st-C Maritime Silk Road
35 Malaysia	China-Indochina Peninsula	71 Korea	21st-C Maritime Silk Road
36 Philippines	China-Indochina Peninsula	72 South Africa	21st-C Maritime Silk Road

Note: This list contains the 65 economies listed in China's Official Action Plan for the BRI launched in March 2015 and seven economies that have been associated with the initiative more recently.  
1. May also be counted as part of the China-Central West Asia Economic Corridor  
Source: OECD research from multiple sources, including: HKTDC, MERICS, Belt and Road Center, Foreign Policy, The Diplomat, Silk Routes, State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China, WWF Hong Kong (China).

OECD BUSINESS AND FINANCE OUTLOOK 2018 © OECD 2018

## China's Arab Policy Paper (2016)



### "1+2+3" cooperation pattern

- 1 core: Energy Cooperation
- 2 wings: Infrastructure Construction Trade and Investment Facilitation
- 3 breakthroughs, high and new tech fields: Nuclear energy, Space satellite and New Energy



中华人民共和国工业和信息化部  
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT)

## V. Case Study

### Case Study: Crude Oil Future in Shanghai

#### Exclusive: China taking first steps to pay for oil in yuan this year - sources

Sumeet Chatterjee, Meng Meng

5 MIN READ



HONG KONG/BEIJING (Reuters) - China is taking its first steps towards paying for imported crude oil in yuan instead of the U.S. dollar, three people with knowledge of the matter told Reuters, a key development in Beijing's efforts to establish its currency internationally.

"Being the biggest buyer of oil, it's only natural for China to push for the usage of yuan for payment settlement. This will also improve the yuan liquidity in the global market," said one of the people briefed on the matter by Chinese authorities.

What if China and the Middle East seek to expand their oil trade by using this type of trade platform.



Launch of the first Chinese crude oil futures in Shanghai

Shanghai's new crude contract is traded in yuan.

"this will help the Chinese government in its efforts to internationalize renminbi (yuan),"

Thank You

شكرا

감사합니다.

외대를 만나면 세계가 보인다!

# Threat Perception and Turkey-U.S. Relations

**Robert Lawrence, PhD**

Dongduk Women's University

## **1 Introduction**

Turkey and the United States have been allies since the Soviet Union began threatening the territorial integrity of the Turkish Republic after the Second World War. Their strategic partnership was founded because of a shared common threat, the two countries have the largest militaries in the NATO alliance, and share a long history of operational cohesiveness. However, Turkey and the United States of America's strategic partnership has come under increasing stress over the last several years. Indeed, in the recent past, it is difficult to recall any extended period of time during which the U.S.-Turkish alliance was not being called to question, and several highly public disputes have indicated a rift in the partnership. There was the arrest of Turkish banker Mehmet Hakan Atilla connections with the gold-for-oil scheme that was allegedly undertaken to circumvent U.S. sanctions on Iran and implicated Erdogan himself amongst other leading officials. Also, American pastor Andrew Brunson was imprisoned in Turkey for approximately two years in what many described as "hostage diplomacy." The continued sanctuary given to Fethullah Gulen in the U.S., who is considered the head of a terrorist organization by Ankara, is a constant source of friction. Additionally, the two countries have not been able to iron out an understanding regarding Turkey purchase of the Russian made S-400 missile defense system and its involvement, or lack thereof, in the F-35 fighter jet project. Finally and most importantly, the now well-publicized disagreement over the status of the U.S.-backed fighting force in northern Syria has exacerbated the relationship to the point of termination. These are not headlines one would normally expect to see regarding nations that have friendly relations, much less strategic partners.

Recent articles in the media and academia alike have diagnosed the ailing relationship, but there has been a noticeable deficit in contextualizing the current strategic incongruence. This paper employs threat perception to explain the deteriorating U.S.-Turkish relationship. I argue that fundamental differences in threat perception have resulted in strategic divergence and a nonfunctional bi-lateral partnership. Accordingly, policy initiatives detrimental to each other's national security should be abandoned and the relationship must be recalibrated in order to remain efficacious.

## **2 Research Questions**

This paper endeavors to tackle essential questions concerning the U.S.-Turkish alliance. More specifically, what are the foundations of the alliance? What are the root causes of the current rift between the two countries? And finally, what how bad is the rift, is it salvageable, and what are the options to do so? By tackling these questions, this paper provides a comprehensive description of the alliance between the NATO allies and offers insight on how to move forward.

## **3 Background of the U.S.-Turkish Alliance**

### **3.1 The Cold War Period**

Like its imperial predecessor, the Soviet Union, took issue with being trapped by the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. In March of 1945, as the Second World War was coming to an end, the Soviet Union unilaterally decided that it would not renew the Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality. Their calculations were that the status of Russian access to the straits along with several eastern Turkish provinces held by the Russian Empire in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century needed to be revisited and went so far as to claim control over both of them.<sup>1</sup> At the time, the Turkish military was armed with World War One era weaponry and stood no chance in defending itself against the Soviets. Turkey's geographic location made it an alluring partner for the U.S., as the latter did not want to see Soviet expansion into the oil-rich Middle East, and thus the U.S.-Turkish alliance was born out of a mutually beneficial geostrategic defense strategy. Turkey needed protection from Soviet claims on its territory, and the U.S. needed Turkey to act as a southern border to curb Soviet expansion. Accordingly, the U.S. began giving Marshall Aid to Turkey in order to improve its economy and make it less susceptible to communist ideology, and Turkey proved to be an essential ally in security operations. In 1952, Turkey's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization became the cornerstone for U.S.-Turkish defense coordination, and consequently, the U.S. began to build military installations and deployed troops to bases in the country.<sup>2</sup> In 1954, the relationship was formalized by the Military Facilities Agreement which included a Status of Forces Agreement. Hence, the alliance was anchored in international and bi-lateral treaties and was believed, in the U.S., to be a model for other regional actors since Turkey was a secular, democratic, Muslim state suddenly of great geostrategic

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<sup>1</sup>Geoffrey Roberts, "Moscow's Cold War on the Periphery: Soviet Policy in Greece, Iran, and Turkey, 1943—8," *Journal of Contemporary History* 46, no. 1 (2011):73-75.

<sup>2</sup> Aylin Guney, "An Anatomy of the Transformation of the US-Turkish Alliance: From "Cold War" to "War on Iraq," *Turkish Studies*, 6, no. 3 (September 2005): 341-342.

importance.<sup>3</sup> This example did not fall on deaf ears, as the next year, with strong U.S. support, the Baghdad Pact was formed as a deterrent to Soviet southern expansion.<sup>4</sup>

The Turkish-U.S. alliance expanded to include several military bases and intelligence installations. The Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) later renamed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) had stations throughout Anatolia to monitor Soviet communications and electronic intelligence. The installations proved valuable as the U.S. was able to gather intelligence on Soviet Naval exercises in the Black Sea, missile telemetry and testing, underground nuclear testing, and space launches.<sup>5</sup> In return for the use of their soil to conduct these operations, along with protection from Soviet incursion, Turkey received hundreds of millions of dollars in military assistance and debt restructuring. Additionally, billions of dollars were poured into the Turkish defense industry through Turkish-American joint ventures.

U.S.-Turkish alliance was largely mutually beneficial and successful throughout the Cold War, but there were several occasions when strategic incongruence hindered operational efficacy, and they should not be overlooked when analyzing the roots of distrust between the countries. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the U.S. pulled its Jupiter missiles out of Turkey prompting Turks to question the reciprocity of their commitment as deterrence. Additionally, as a crisis was developing in Cyprus in 1964, President Lyndon Johnson sent a patronizing letter to Prime Minister Izmet Inonu implicitly warning Turkey that the United States would not guarantee Turkey's safety should the Soviet Union enter the conflict if Turkey continued to act antagonistically. In what became known as the "Johnson Letter," the U.S. effectively showed their true colors in the eyes of the Turkish government and populace with 84 % of those polled saying that the incident negatively affected their opinion of the U.S.<sup>6</sup> The letter was a gift to the growing Turkish left who argued that Johnson's action threatened Turkish independence and was indicative of further Western imperialism.<sup>7</sup> Understandably, this was seen as an affront to regime security by those in power as the U.S., for all practical purposes, demonstrated an utter disregard for threats to Turkey both domestic and foreign. The Johnson Letter accentuated the asymmetric nature of their relationship, forcing Turkey to seek multi-dimensional defense strategies in order to assure its defense capabilities and breeding skepticism as to the nature of the security-based relationship.<sup>8</sup> Consequentially, conspiracy theories, of which there is not a deficit in Turkey,

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<sup>3</sup> Michael Gunter, "The U.S.-Turkish Alliance in Disarray," *World Affairs*, 167, no.3 (Winter 2005): 113.

<sup>4</sup> The Baghdad Pact was a military alliance formed by Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The U.S. didn't join because of congressional disapproval, but it still played an important role. The pact lost Iraq in 1958, and is largely seen as ineffective after the Turkish incursion into Cyprus in 1974 and the ensuing three-year embargo, but it did not formally end until the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

<sup>5</sup> Gunter, "The U.S.-Turkish Alliance," 114-116.

<sup>6</sup> Suha Bolukbasi, "The Johnson Letter Revisited," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 29, no. 3 (1993): 506,517.

<sup>7</sup> George Harris, "Troubled Alliance" (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1972), 129.

<sup>8</sup> Bolukbasi, "The Johnson Letter," 507.



began to take shape in the form of CIA plots against Turkish sovereignty.<sup>9</sup> These claims were made by government officials and media alike. One such theory widely understood in the mid-1960's, was that the U.S. Peace Corps was acting as an intelligence gathering entity for the CIA vis-à-vis the Kurds in eastern Anatolia. Unsurprisingly, skeptics appeared to be vindicated in 1968 when former CIA analyst Robert Kromer was appointed ambassador to Turkey.<sup>10</sup>

Despite the Johnson Letter, a decade later the Turkish army intervened in Cyprus against the wishes of the U.S. and other NATO members. After the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus using U.S. supplied weapons, the U.S. Congress implemented an arms embargo that lasted for three years. In response, Turkey repealed the U.S. Status of Forces Agreement and took control of U.S. installations in the country while allowing U.S. forces performing NATO duties to remain. Consequently, when DECA was signed in 1980, U.S. forces in Turkey were under NATO patronage.<sup>11</sup> While NATO intelligence and military ventures continued during the embargo, bi-lateral trust was severely undermined.

Almost from its inception, the bi-lateral relationship between the U.S. and Turkey was heavily scrutinized. By the end of the Cold War, the relationship had experienced genuine challenges that were solved through a NATO framework rather than bi-lateral concurrence until a unifying threat forced the political calculation to prefer cooperation to squabbling.<sup>12</sup> Regardless, Turkey's geostrategic positioning and cooperation supplied vital intelligence over decades, and it is not an overstatement to say that Turkey played as big of a role as any NATO ally in assisting the fight against the Soviets during the Cold War.

### **3.2 Between the End of the Cold War and 9/11**

The fall of the Soviet Union brought a new political landscape with new challenges. Initially, the U.S. began to scale down its foreign military aid to several countries, including Turkey (instead of military grants, countries were given low-interest loans). It is logical to assume that Turkey feared a decrease in its utility in the alliance, as the common threat which bound it together had suddenly ceased to exist. Consequently, Turkey joined the U.S. and the coalition in Operations Desert and Shield Desert Storm in an attempt to prove that they played a valuable role. Turkey closed off the Iraqi border and allowed coalition forces to use Incirlik Air Force base to conduct raids on the Iraqi regime. In doing so, Turkey reinforced and accentuated its geostrategic importance and was compensated with batteries of Patriot missiles, fighter jets, and

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<sup>9</sup> Prime Minister to be and major player in Turkish politics of the later 20<sup>th</sup> century Bulent Ecevit claimed that the CIA was using the communist threat as cover to annihilate Turkish domestic opposition which were less U.S-friendly.

<sup>10</sup> Gunter, "The U.S.-Turkish Alliance," 118.

<sup>11</sup> U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Turkey-U.S. Defense Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges*, by Jim Zanotti, R41761 (2011), 37.

<sup>12</sup> One such threat, after the aforementioned embargo ended in 1978, was the Iranian Revolution.

hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to modernize its military.<sup>13</sup> While initially deemed a strategic success by then Prime Minister Turgut Ozal, the Gulf War cost Turkey tens of billions of dollars and up to half of a million Kurdish refugees fled across their southern border from Iraq in order to flee the retaliatory onslaught from the Iraqi government after their attempted uprising.<sup>14</sup> Additionally, in order to stop the slaughter of Kurds in northern Iraq, a no-fly zone, which effectively created the Kurdish *de facto* autonomous region that would become the Kurdish Regional Government (hereafter referred to as the KRG), was implemented. Ironically, the no-fly zone was enforced from planes flying out of Incirlik. Many believed that this autonomous region posed an existential threat to the territorial integrity of the Turkish state and blamed the U.S. for its creation.<sup>15</sup> A lot of these worries concerns were quashed after U.S. intelligence played an integral role in apprehending Abdullah Ocalan, the founder and leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (*Partiya Karkêren Kurdistan*, hereafter referred to as the PKK), but as this paper will demonstrate later, this relief was short lived.

The Turkish-U.S. relationship during the period between the end of the Cold War and 9/11 was indicative of the shifting complexities in contemporary geopolitics. The tie that bound the two countries together disappeared, thus it was necessary and predictable to re-evaluate the approach towards one another. Given that unipolar post-Soviet era, it was logical for other states to question the hegemon's intentions, and this certainly occurred frequently in Turkey during the 1990's. However, in American policy circles, Turkey was an indispensable partner in post-Cold War geo-strategy as was evident in Bill Clinton's 1999 speech to the Turkish National Assembly when he claimed that much of the 21<sup>st</sup> century would be shaped by Turkish decisions,<sup>16</sup> and that the relationship was a strategic partnership that did not rest on the common concern from the Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup>

### 3.3 9/11 to the Present

Around the turn of the century, there were three changes that would shape the future of Turkish-U.S. relations: The election of George W. Bush in the U.S., the terror attacks of 9/11, and the election of the *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (hereafter referred to as the AKP) in Turkey. The U.S.'s post-9/11 strategy expected strict loyalty in the War on Terror, and while Turkey deployed troops to the NATO mission in Afghanistan in 2003, it did not allow the U.S. to deploy the U.S. Army's 4th division to open a northern front in its invasion of Iraq. This was a crucial part of the

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<sup>13</sup> Guney, "An Anatomy," 346-347.

<sup>14</sup> Henri Barkey, "Turkey and Iraq: The Making of a Partnership," *Turkish Studies*, 12, no 4 (2011): 663.

<sup>15</sup> The thought being that the KRG would either encourage Turkish Kurds to seek more autonomy or have expansionary goals to encompass all historically predominantly Kurdish lands.

<sup>16</sup> Soli Ozel, "Indispensable Even When Unreliable," *International Journal*, 67, no. 1 (Winter 2011-2012): 58.

<sup>17</sup> Ahmet K. Han, "From 'Strategic Partnership' To 'Model Partnership': AKP, Turkish – U.S. Relations and the Prospects Under Obama," *Revista UNISCI*, 23 (2010): 92.



war plan, and U.S. officials lobbied vigorously, using sticks and carrots, to ascertain Turkish support or at the very least, acquiescence.<sup>18</sup> However, their efforts failed and there was a tangible rift between the two NATO allies.<sup>19</sup> Under the Bush administration, tensions between Washington and Ankara had several more high-profile rifts. For example, tensions rose when Turkish Special Forces soldiers were captured in Kirkuk by U.S. Marines in 2003,<sup>20</sup> Hamas's military chief was invited to Turkey in 2005,<sup>21</sup> and the lack of support in fighting the PKK drove Turkey to amass 100,000 troops along the Iraqi border in an act of brinkmanship to obtain greater U.S. support.<sup>22</sup> Collectively, these incidents had grave affect on America's image in the Turkish street.<sup>23</sup>

Despite these apparent setbacks, Ankara and Washington were largely able to compartmentalize their grievances and continue healthy cooperation. In an effort to play down the disagreement on Iraq, Bush went to Istanbul in 2004 and gave a speech similar to that of his predecessor in 1999, touting the importance the strategic partnership and enthusiastically supporting Turkey's path to E.U. membership. Throughout the Bush administration, Turkey faithfully fulfilled its NATO duties, trade volume steadily increased, and the U.S. declared the PKK to be an enemy of the state leading to close military and intelligence collaboration against the organization.

When Obama came to office in 2009, Turkey was one of his first overseas trips was to Turkey where he addressed the national assembly. During the same visit, Obama argued that the Turkish-U.S. relationship can be built as a "model partnership" despite occasional disagreements as the friendship makes the two countries stronger and the world more secure.<sup>24</sup> Obama's personal relationship with Erdogan, along with the sharp contrast he represented from the previous administration, gave rise to a wave of optimism for improvement in relations. There was a flurry of media hype known as "Obama-mania" and as late as 2012, Obama noted that Erdogan was one his closest friends and a leader with whom he had formed a personal "bond of trust."<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> A) Ahmet Sözen, "A Theoretical Evaluation of Different Faces of Power: US-Turkey Relations Towards Iraq", *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, 6, no. 24 (Winter 2010): 64-68. B) Gunter, "The U.S.-Turkish Alliance," 119.

<sup>19</sup> Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz have consistently pointed a finger toward Ankara when diagnosing early problems in the 2003 invasion.

<sup>20</sup> Banu Eligur, "Turkish-American Relations Since the 2003 Iraqi War: A Troubled Partnership," Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University, Middle East Briefs no. 6, May 2006, 2.

<sup>21</sup> Mark R. Parris, "Common Values and Common Interests? The Bush Legacy in US-Turkish Relations," *Insight Turkey*, 10, no. 4 (2008): 6.

<sup>22</sup> U.S. Library of Congress, *Turkey-U.S. Defense Cooperation*, 20.

<sup>23</sup> "Global Attitudes and Trends," Pew Research Center, Accessed September 15, 2019, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/1/country/tr>.

<sup>24</sup> Eligur, "Turkish-American Relations," 98.

<sup>25</sup> Yuri van Hoef and Ryan O'Connor, "Sentimental Utility Theory: Interpreting the Utilization of Collective Emotions by the Political Elite Through the Erdoğan-Obama Friendship," *Political Psychology*, (2019): 1-2.

However, the occasional disagreements of which he spoke would prove to be in abundance. The U.S. often wanted Turkey to soften its messaging towards Israel, it did not appreciate Turkish interference in its nuclear negotiations concerning Iran, and by the end of Obama's second term, Turkish-U.S. relations were at a historic low point. Most notably, the decision to arm the Democratic Union Party (*Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat*, hereafter referred to as the PYD), the Syrian offshoot of the PKK, continues to force both countries to question the nature and utility of their partnership.

## **4 Threat Perception**

As the name implies, threat perception refers to how states perceive the dangers they face. Naturally, states with different geographic locations, economic influence, and military might have different perceptions of threat because of their ability to leverage power to counteract said threat. Turkey and the U.S., despite their decades of strategic partnership, have always had different threat perceptions, but their current state of affairs represents the largest incongruence in the alliance's history because both countries see the other acting contrary to their own threat perception.

### **4.1 The U.S. Decision to Arm the PYD and why it Matters**

Through a Turkish lens, the U.S. decision to arm the PYD in the Syrian Civil War poses a threat to Turkish national security. It is imperative to give this perception context and ample explanation in order to fully the gravity of the decision.

#### **4.1.1 Historical Context of U.S. involvement in Predominantly Kurdish Lands**

Recently, the U.S. involvement with Kurdish groups has received a great deal of international attention, but from the Turkish perspective, external exploitation of Eastern Anatolians to the detriment of the central government is a narrative that predates the country itself. Legitimate skepticism regarding foreign intentions in eastern Anatolia is deep-rooted and often reasonable. In the mid nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire's power was waning, the Kurdish emirates had been dismantled, and Christian missionaries from France, England, Russia, and the U.S. were growing increasingly present.<sup>26</sup> More precisely, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (hereafter referred to as ABCFM) set up a headquarters in Istanbul in 1831 and began missions in the eastern provinces in 1850.<sup>27</sup> American missionaries initially sought to convert Eastern Orthodox Christians to Protestantism, but their objectives adapted with circumstances, and the conversion of eastern Anatolian Muslims became common. For example, some concluded that Alevis were in fact "descendants of a Christian stock, made

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<sup>26</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State* (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Zed Books, 1992) 229-230.

<sup>27</sup> Markus Dressler, *Writing Religion: The Making of Turkish Alevi Islam* (Oxford University Press, 2013), 34-35.

nominal Moslems by the sword.”<sup>28</sup> Alevis<sup>29</sup> were generally thought to be viewed as heretical by the state, so ABCFM missionaries perceived them to be fair game for proselytizing per their understanding of Ottoman law. But through the Ottoman lens, this was a threat to public order and likely an attempt to use sectarian and ethnic chasms to assist in the disintegration of the state.<sup>30</sup>

Following World War One, President Woodrow Wilson’s “14 Points” speech gave implicit American support for a Kurdish nation to be recognized. Point twelve argues for the secure sovereignty of the Turkish portions of the empire and opportunity for autonomous development for the non-Turkish portions. This initiative was discernible in the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 that partitioned the empire. The attempt of an American president to give eastern Anatolia to a Kurdish state a hundred years ago leads many to assume continuity in U.S. policy up to the present.

As mentioned above, as early as the 1960’s, there was legitimate concern about the U.S. commitment to Turkish security, and this concern gave rise to elements of Turkish society to believe that the CIA was involved in Kurdish movements. This uncertainty was heightened following the fall of the Soviet Union as the utility of Turkey in U.S. strategy was questioned. In the wake of the first Gulf War, Kurds in northern Iraq rebelled as they saw a weakened regime that had been battered by coalition forces. Hussein’s forces marched north and began slaughtering Kurds in retaliation, compelling coalition forces (mainly American and British) to enforce the no-fly zone that enabled Iraqi Kurds to establish the KRG recognized in the 2005 Iraqi constitution. Many in Turkey believed that the U.S. planned the Kurdish enclave in Iraq, and that it would encourage separatist sentiments in Kurdish nationalist groups in the southeastern Turkey. Understandably, Turkish concerns over Iraqi Kurds establishing an independent state was one of the central points of friction regarding Turkish opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq as they feared that it would attempt to expand into Turkish territory.<sup>31</sup>

As the war in Iraq continued, Ankara complained that Turkomans in Iraq were being intentionally marginalized and abused in Telefar and Kirkuk. Local Turkomans in the two cities believe that the U.S. was acting in line with Kurdish forces to compel Turkomans to leave the cities and replace them with Kurds to change regional demography. They argued that this was being accomplished through aerial bombardment and that an estimated 30,000 Turkomans had

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<sup>28</sup> *Ibid*, 38

<sup>29</sup> Then referred to as Kizilbas, Alevis were often viewed with skepticism for their unorthodox practices as well as a perceived inclination to favor the rulers of Persia over the Ottoman Shahs.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, 35-36.

<sup>31</sup> Aylin Guney, “Anti-Americanism in Turkey: Past and Present,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 44, no. 3 (May 2008): 477

been forcibly removed by March of 2005.<sup>32</sup> Ankara feared that Kurds were receiving preferential treatment and being prepped for secession by the U.S.<sup>33</sup>

As the Syrian conflict got under way in 2011, the U.S. and Turkey acted in coordination to help train and assist rebel groups who sought to oust the Assad regime. However, these costly endeavors were not achieving their desired results, and the U.S. administration began to search for alternatives. Eventually, the U.S. found a capable fighting force in the PYD's military wings which were able to successfully confront IS forces. Accordingly, given that Turkey views the PYD to be an arm of the PKK, with whom Turkey has been in intermittent conflict for nearly four decades, the decision to arm the PYD was looked at with critical skepticism from Ankara.

#### 4.1.2 Historical Background of Kurds in Turkey

The origins of the Kurdish people are contested. Some, mostly those associated with or part of the Turkish nationalist groups, argue that they are simply a branch of Turkic peoples.<sup>34</sup> However, the majority agree that they are an Indo-Iranian people who speak several dialects of an Indo-European language completely unrelated to Turkish.<sup>35</sup> While many argue that the Kurds are the descendents of the Medes who conquered the Assyrians back in the seventh century B.C.E.<sup>36</sup>, the acknowledgement of the Kurds goes back to at least Xenophon's *Anabasis* composed in the fourth century B.C.E.<sup>37</sup>

There is a long history of Kurdish autonomy though nominally being part of expansive empires. From the mid-to-late Abbasid period onward, between the Zagros Mountains of modern Iran and the Taurus mountains of Turkey, many Kurdish emirates enjoyed varying degrees of autonomy according to political context. As the Safavid and Ottoman Empires competed for territory, most of these Kurdish emirates came under Ottoman suzerainty, but remained un-Ottomanized. Rather, they served as buffers between the two empires and conduits through which Istanbul connected with the people of the region.

The relationship between the Ottoman state and the emirates remained unchanged until the Tanzimat reforms of the early-to-mid nineteenth century that sought to centralize power in peripheral lands in order to stem its own decline in the midst of encroaching British, Russian, and French influence. In eastern Anatolia, the Ottomans had to essentially conquer their own land

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<sup>32</sup> Eligur, *Turkish-American Relations*, 3.

<sup>33</sup> Guney, "Anti-Americanism in Turkey," 480.

<sup>34</sup> Veli Yadirgi, *The Political Economy of The Kurds of Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) 17.

<sup>35</sup> G.R. Driver, "Studies In Kurdish History", *Bulletin of The School of Oriental Studies*, University of London 2, no. 3 (1922).

<sup>36</sup> The lineage of the Medes is explicitly referred to in the Kurdish national anthem, "Ey Reqîb."

<sup>37</sup> Wadie Jwaideh, *The Kurdish National Movement*, 1st ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006) 11-12.

because though the region was nominally Ottoman, the people did not share many cultural similarities with their counterparts in western Anatolia.<sup>38</sup> Nonetheless, by the middle of the century, hereditary Kurdish rulers were finished, and the once-autonomous Kurdish polities were brought under direct Ottoman rule.<sup>39</sup>

In the wake of World War One, approximately 30 million Kurds were divided among Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The 1920 Treaty of Sevres implied the possibility of a Kurdish state, but it was not accepted by Ankara and was replaced with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, after the Turkish War of Independence. In order to create a homogeneous state identity, the Republic of Turkey began implementing sweeping assimilation projects, as Turkism was the adopted state ideology. Accordingly, minority groups who did not assimilate were perceived as an internal threat or collaborators with external threats to the continuity of the state. Given that the Turks fought on multiple fronts against several nations' armies during the War for Independence, the accusation of alignment with external foes had far reaching implications. Turkism left no political space in which minority groups could attempt to compel the state to recognize their efforts in the War of Independence, or even their existence in some cases.<sup>40</sup>

Throughout the twentieth century, eastern Anatolia developed at a slower rate than the rest of the country. Additionally, state assimilation projects denied the Kurds the right to teach their history, wear their traditional clothes, or even speak their language for decades after the founding of the republic. These generation-spanning regulations, along with decades of economic neglect led to high unemployment and high poverty rates, created explicable resentment among the Kurds of Turkey towards the state, and produced an environment which was ripe for the formation of radical anti-establishment groups. It was in the milieu that the PKK began to develop. In 1978, Abdullah Ocalan founded the Marxist-Leninist PKK with the sworn intention of creating a separate Kurdish state. After the military coup in Turkey in 1980, the military increased pressure on Kurdish nationalists, and the PKK turned more aggressive. The domineering measures taken by coup leaders mobilized Kurds and raised sympathy for their cause instead of suppressing the movement.<sup>41</sup> By the mid-1980's this had progressed into a war of secession in southeastern Turkey led by the PKK. Throughout the 90's, Syria hosted the PKK leadership until it brought Turkey and Syria to the brink of war, and Ocalan was forced out of the country only to be caught in 1999 in Nairobi, Kenya. Initially sentenced to death, his sentence was changed to life in prison in Turkey. From prison, Ocalan maintains symbolic and

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<sup>38</sup> Cagaptay, *The New Sultan*, 101.

<sup>39</sup> Veli Yadirgi, *The Political Economy of The Kurds of Turkey*, 94-95.

<sup>40</sup> Kurds were not recognized by the state as a separate group until the 1990's. Prior to that, they were considered "Mountain Turks."

<sup>41</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, "Kurds, Turks and The Alevi Revival in Turkey", *Middle East Report*, no. 200 (1996): 7-10.

representative control over the PKK and has negotiated several ceasefires while participating in peace talks at times and fanning the flames of war at others.

#### **4.1.3 The Threat Posed to Turkey by Kurdish Nationalist Groups**

Turkish fears of foreign intervention into domestic affairs, specifically in regard to the Kurdish question are often disregarded as paranoia and referred to as Sevres Syndrome in reference to the Treaty of Sevres that carved up the Anatolian Peninsula after World War One. However, Turkey has a great deal to lose if an independent Kurdish state is internationally recognized, so being overly concerned is understandable. The biggest fear is that any such Kurdish state would eventually target the predominantly Kurdish areas of the Turkish state and thus, the territorial integrity of the Turkish state. The territory that is historically predominately Kurdish is of momentous importance to Turkey because it provides a natural buffer zone against potential enemies from the south and east through its mountainous terrain and contains the headwaters of both the Tigris and the Euphrates. These rivers give Turkey the ability to harness their energy in hydro-electric plants, and the location of their headwaters gives Turkey significant leverage over Iraq and Syria. Since the 1970's, Turkey has invested heavily in the region through the Southeastern Anatolian Project, or Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi (hereafter referred to as GAP) and the Eastern Anatolian Project or Doğu Anadolu Projesi (hereafter referred to as DAP). GAP and DAP projects have generated hundreds of billions of dollars in jobs, energy, education, and industrial zones. GAP alone consists of 22 multi-purpose dams and 19 hydraulic power plants which give it 3 times the water storage capacity of Syria and Iraq.<sup>42</sup> Understandably, Turkey is not willing to part with such a sizable investment that is yielding such valuable returns. Furthermore, Turkey is an energy-poor country. Allowing another state, especially one with whom, it is logical to assume, Turkey would have volatile relations, between itself and sources of hydro-carbon energy would be detrimental to their energy security. Additionally, the degree to which these regions are Kurdish is dubious at best. The Turkish state stopped gathering census data based on ethnicity in 1965, and there has been a vast amount of voluntary and forced migrations to and from these regions in the meantime. So, infringing on the integrity of the Turkish state in order to form a new Kurdish state would be predictably violent and messy. Thus, Kurdish nationalists' ambitions on the predominantly Kurdish regions of Turkey pose disastrous threats for the Turkish state and the region.

Historically, the threat posed by the PKK is of both domestic and international significance. During the Cold War, the Soviets armed and supported the PKK as they were ideologically allied and operated as an adversarial force in one of only two places in the world where NATO and Soviet lands met. For years, Ocalan and the PKK top ranks sought refuge in Syria. Accordingly,

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<sup>42</sup> E. Issa, et al., "Expected Future of Water Resources within Tigris-Euphrates Rivers Basin, Iraq," *Journal of Water Resource and Protection* 6, (2014) 421-432



Syria weaponized the actions of the PKK as leverage leading to contentious relations between the two states. So, it is imperative to recognize that the PKK posed an internal threat as well as a foreign threat that was leveraged by two Cold War era enemies when assessing the degree of distrust between the PKK and Turkey. The PKK are another collaborative force that seeks to tear down the state and they use internal and external forces to accomplish their goals.

#### 4.1.4 The Siege of Kobani and PYD Support

Syrian Kurds did not organize militarily en masse until comparatively late because Syria was a base for PKK operations and they towed the line of the Syrian government in return for safe haven. However, shortly after Ocalan's capture in 1998, the leftover remnants of the PKK in Syria formed the PYD.<sup>43</sup> The PYD remained under the heavy-handed control of the central government in Damascus until the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011. The PYD's armed wing, the People's Protection Units (*Yekîneyên Parastina Gel* hereafter referred to as the YPG) are the principal actors in the U.S. backed Syrian Democratic Forces (hereafter referred to as the SDF) in the Syrian Civil War.

In 2014, the Islamic State swept across Syria and Iraq and held vast amounts of territories while committing well-documented atrocities. To the U.S., IS posed a threat by inspiring people to act in its likeness all over the world. Their cyber caliphate influenced attacks in the U.S. and all over Europe. Thus, it was necessary to find a capable force to challenge the group as there was neither the political will, nor would it have been strategically wise to have a heavy footprint with American boots on the ground. As the Syrian civil war progressed, the PYD in the north of Syria neither supported the Assad regime, nor joined the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army. Beginning in 2013, Turkey and the PKK had maintained a ceasefire, and Turkey initially did not take an antagonistic position vis-a-vis the PYD. But, in early 2014, the PYD declared the cantons of Afrin, Kobani, and Jazira to be autonomous regions in Syria, and Turkey's posturing towards the PYD changed in the form of a sustained media campaign comparing them to IS, or arguing that they posed an even bigger threat.<sup>44</sup>

Having drastically changed its vote-seeking strategies,<sup>45</sup> it now benefited the AKP to take a more hostile approach to Kurdish entities, both domestic and foreign. Therefore, when the

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<sup>43</sup> While some argue that these two organizations are not affiliated, this paper maintains that the two are different sides of the same proverbial coin. They share the same ideological background, both organizations accept Ocalan's leadership, and they both fall under the control of the Kurdistan Communities Union, or KCK, the umbrella organization for Kurdish nationalist movements throughout the Middle East. The PYD was founded in 2003.

<sup>44</sup> Ezgi Basaran, *Frontline Turkey: The Conflict at the Heart of the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 113.

<sup>45</sup> The HDP (a political party representing Kurdish nationalists) received 9.8% of the vote in the Presidential elections of August, 2014. In an attempt to prevent them from crossing the 10% threshold to enter the national assembly, thus severely damaging the AKP's ability to push through its reforms, the AKP abandoned its policy of appeasement concerning the Kurds and sought Turkish nationalists' votes. This strategy would come to fruition in

Islamic State laid siege to the small Kurdish town of Kobani along the Turkish border in northern Syria, Turkey had nothing to gain from helping the PYD combat IS because Kobani was an important link for the PYD to be able to connect the cantons in what could eventually be a contiguous Kurdish region. So, Turkish tanks did nothing to impede the onslaught and tacitly formed another flank by not allowing anyone to cross over the border to flee, nor did it allow Turkish Kurds to cross the border to help the people of Kobani. Turkey's reluctance to help or allow others to help the outnumbered and outgunned town against IS was regarded as complicity at best and assistance at worst. With mounting bipartisan pressure to act in support Kurdish fighters in Kobani,<sup>46</sup> the U.S. saw an opportunity to assist an already established group of fighters and began cooperation with the PYD/YPG forces that were defending Kobani. Thus began the tactical U.S.-PYD relationship. Operation Inherent Resolve was created to combat IS in the summer of 2014, and the U.S. began coordinating with and assisting the YPG during the Siege of Kobani in October 2014. However, the patronage in earnest came with the formal establishment of the SDF in October of 2015, when the SDF announced that they were assured arms and equipment from the U.S.<sup>47</sup>

In order to demonstrate the threat posed to Turkey by this move, some context concerning the greater conflict with the PKK is necessary. The aforementioned ceasefire ended in the summer of 2015 and southeastern Turkey turned into a war zone. The PKK took the fight to the cities in an unprecedented tactical shift, inspired by the success of the PYD, to attempt to hold territory inside of Turkey.<sup>48</sup> Naturally, this was not acceptable to the Turkish state and as fighting continued, villages, neighborhoods, and districts of cities in the southeast were turned to rubble. It was in this milieu that the U.S. began to equip and deploy its special forces alongside the SDF.<sup>49</sup> So, as a war of succession was raging in part of its territory, Turkey's strategic partner was arming the group(s) responsible for the insurrection.

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the results of the 2015 snap-elections and the formal alliance between the AKP and the nationalist party, the MHP in the 2017 elections.

<sup>46</sup> To many Americans, IS is an evolved extension of Al Qaeda and evokes memories of 9/11. Additionally, the very familiar narratives of Kurds being massacred by the Hussein regime in Iraq results in a homogenization of Kurds in the U.S. media and consequentially, the populace. This led to a large public outcry to support Kurds against the IS attacks.

<sup>47</sup> Jackson Hanon and Kilic Bugra Kanat, "The Manbij RoadMap and The Future of U.S.-Turkish Relations," *Middle East Policy* 25, no. 3 (Autumn 2018): 111-112.

<sup>48</sup> Emel Parlar Dal, "Impact of the transnationalization of the Syrian civil war on Turkey: conflict spillover cases of ISIS and PYD-YPG/ PKK," *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 29, no.4 (2016): 1403

<sup>49</sup> U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response*, by , Carla E. Humud, Christopher M. Blanchard, Mary Beth D. Nikitin, RL33487 (2019):3.



## 4.2 The 2016 Attempted Coup in Turkey

In July of 2016, the war was still raging on in the southeast of Turkey, IS was losing ground and was on the run in Syria, and there was a highly polarized political atmosphere after heavily contested elections in Turkey the previous fall. On July 15<sup>th</sup>, there was an attempted coup against the Erdogan administration in Turkey. The threat this attempted coup posed has not been recognized sufficiently by many outside of Turkey. In a country where the governing party was garnering just above 50% of the vote, any attempt at a coup would divide the country and it is reasonable to assume that violence would have ensued should an unelected entity have seized power. Additionally, with an unstable and possibly divided state, the PKK would have had more room to operate in their quest for autonomy in the southeast. Likewise, IS tends to thrive in chaos where it can take and hold land with minimum resistance rather than challenge standing armies in secure stable environments. Given the losses it was taking in Syria and Iraq at the time, it is logical to assume that a chaotic Turkey would have been prime destination for the terror group. Given the gravity of the three probable outcomes described here in addition to the severity of the coup attempt, the coup posed an existential threat to the state itself. It is not an exaggeration to assume that the borders of the state could have redrawn had the coup been successful.

The U.S. did not offer any immediate support once the coup was underway, and this was widely considered to be inadequate from a strategic partner. Moreover, the alleged mastermind of the coup, Fethullah Gulen, lives in Pennsylvania and the planes that took part in the coup flew out of Incirlik Air Force Base where the majority of the U.S. personnel in Turkey are based. To those who were already skeptic about U.S. intentions, this was just another example of a plot against the Turkish state. It is an understood certainty in many Turkish policy circles that the U.S. was behind the coup. Erdogan had long hinted at the Gulen movement being a “subcontractor of global forces” and that it acted with orders from abroad, and on the night of the coup, Erdogan said that the coup came from a “higher mind,” a euphemism often used for the U.S. in AKP circles.<sup>50</sup>

## 4.3 Turkish Complacency with Extremist groups

From the U.S. perspective, religiously extreme non-state actors pose a critical threat. They were responsible for 9/11 and have inspired or been responsible for several attacks on U.S. soil. Thus, Al-Qaeda, its affiliates, and its offshoots all pose a constant national security threat, as they seek to harm U.S. citizens at home and abroad. More specifically, IS’s ruthless approach to achieving its goal of establishing a caliphate made most people in the U.S. consider it a threat to humanity and civilization. Accordingly, Turkey encouraged a massive amount of skepticism and rebuke in the U.S. when it turned a blind eye to ISIS aggression in Kobani. After all, three days

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<sup>50</sup> Selim Koru, The Resiliency of Turkey-Russia Relations, *Black Sea Strategy Papers, Foreign Policy Research Institute*, (2018): 10-14.

into IS's Kobani offensive, the 46 Turkish citizens taken hostage by IS in their siege of Mosul were released, and many saw this as a *quid pro quo*.<sup>51</sup> Further evidence of compliance was the outrage demonstrated by Erdogan when PYD forces defeated IS forces to take control of the town of Tel Abyad.<sup>52</sup> It was only after the PYD captured Tel Abyad that Turkey began to threaten an invasion of Syria. Also, Columbia University's Institute for the Study of Human Rights produced a comprehensive report explicitly detailing links between the terror group and Turkey. The report alleges implicit and explicit Turkish support for IS in the forms of providing military support, training, medical care, recruitment, financing through oil sales, and assisting in the Battle of Kobani.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, trucks carrying ammunition bound for Syria were stopped in Hatay province in early 2014 in what became a well publicized scandal for Erdogan. Despite the best efforts of the state, the evidence pointed towards the intelligence services arming extremist groups in Syria.<sup>54</sup> Finally, the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army is linked with Al Qaeda affiliated groups and is therefore an eminent threat to U.S. national security.<sup>55</sup> This group comprises the essential fighting force for Turkish ambitions in Syria, and it consists of several organizations that are hostile to the U.S. In short, the U.S. sees Turkey arming groups that pose a clear and present and have stated goals of attacking the U.S.

#### 4.4 Geo-strategic Discrepancies

Turkey has engaged in a wide range of foreign policy endeavors that undermine U.S. regional objectives. The AKP has distanced itself from the once close relationship shared by Turkey and Israel complicating tactical calculations for collective regional defense and the defense of Israel. Turkish support for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt along with the backing Qatar in the rift between the Gulf states is resolutely contrary to U.S. ambitions. Also, Turkey and the U.S. find themselves on opposite sides of the dispute over drilling rights in the waters off of Cyprus. Finally, the continued warning of flooding Europe with refugees and IS fighters (whether Turkey's frustration is justified or not) is understood as a threat to global security. This is a direct threat to other NATO allies and it implies leveraging the aggression of sworn enemies and terrorists against allies with whom Turkey supposedly has a strategic partnership.

It is impossible to leave Russia out of the conversation when addressing the current state of U.S.-Turkey affairs. After the 2008 Georgia-Russian War, the shooting down of the Russian jet in 2015, and the assassination of the Russian ambassador in Turkey in 2016, it would be logical

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<sup>51</sup> Basaran, "Frontline Turkey," 114.

<sup>52</sup> Totten, "The Trouble with Turkey," 9.

<sup>53</sup> David L. Phillips, "ISIS-Turkey Links," Columbia University Institute for the Study of Human Rights, (November 2014): 1-6.

<sup>54</sup> Basaran, "Frontline Turkey," 119.

<sup>55</sup> Charles Lister, "The Free Syrian Army: A Decentralized Insurgent Brand," The Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, no. 26 (November 2016): 34-38.

to assume that Turkish-Russian relations would have deteriorated, yet they have improved. Turkey has engaged in the Asana Talks, with U.S. adversaries Russia and Iran, which cut the U.S. out of the Syrian peace process. These talks are rightly seen as an attempt to marginalize the U.S. while cozying up to its two largest geo-political rivals. Additionally, Russian-Turkish energy ties have grown and become more symbiotic through the construction of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant and the Turkstream gas pipeline bringing gas underneath the Black Sea to western Turkey and on to Europe. Finally, Turkish acquisition of the S-400 missile defense system from Russia threatens Turkey's bi-lateral relations with the U.S., its involvement in the F-35 program, and its position in NATO. The S-400 system being used by a NATO ally contradicts the fundamental objective of NATO, and it is a threat to air superiority achieved by the new F-35 fighter jet. Russia is determined to undercut U.S. hegemony and objectives in every part of the world that it sees an opportunity. From a U.S. perspective, Turkey's actions are helping Russia in its endeavor.

## **5 Deteriorating U.S.-Turkish Relations**

### **5.1 In the U.S.**

Over the last several years, officials at the highest levels of the U.S. government have advocated for policies that indicate the U.S.-Turkish partnership is either no more, or no longer shares strategic objectives. In the executive branch, John Bolton, who served as Ambassador to the United Nations during the G.W. Bush administration and as National Security Advisor in the Trump administration, repeatedly called for an independent Kurdish state, encouraged and supported the Iraqi Kurdish referendum, and attempted to deter Turkey from harming PYD forces.<sup>56</sup> While he had no authority to enact policy, he was in an exceptionally close position to the president, he actively and openly called for change that would threaten the Turkish state, and, from a Turkish perspective, he lobbied on behalf of terrorist organization that longs for the dismantling of Turkey.

In addition, the legislative branch has introduced legislation supporting an independent Kurdish state. The resolution supported Kurdish Independence and received support from Democrats, Republicans, and Tea Party members.<sup>57</sup> Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer

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<sup>56</sup> A) "Amb. John Bolton says Kurdistan Referendum a 'good idea'," YouTube, accessed October 5, 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8RTaXpgIHDE>. B) "Amb. John Bolton: US Should Respect Kurdistan Referendum and its Results," Kurdistan 24, accessed October 5, 2019, <https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/4ce786cb-4ae1-420f-bcea-e1dd84d180a5>. C) "Erdogan Rebuffs U.S. Call to Protect Kurds, Complicating Effort to Leave Syria," The Wall Street Journal, accessed October 5, 2019.

<sup>57</sup> "H.Res.534 - Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the people of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq have the right to determine their status as a sovereign country" Congress.gov, accessed October 5, 2019. <https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-resolution/534?r=1>

voiced his support for Kurdish independence, and his voice was echoed by the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Eliot Engel. Additionally, Senator Ted Cruz, who ran for president in 2016, is an avid supporter of Kurdish independence. He has given several interviews on the matter and recently addressed the issue at a speech at the U.S. think tank, the Hudson Institute, where he promoted a free and independent Kurdistan. These legislators are experienced and play significant roles in the legislative branch's role in foreign policy.

After the incident outside of the Turkish ambassador's residence in Washington in 2017 in which Erdogan's security detail fought with peaceful protesters, the House of Representatives passed a resolution to prohibit the use of U.S. funds to facilitate arm sales to Erdogan's security detail, and the Senate included the same prohibition in the 2019 appropriations bill.<sup>58</sup> Recently, the House overwhelmingly approved a resolution recognizing and condemning the Armenian Genocide of 1915, an issue that the Turkey lobby fought hard against for years. Of the 109 voting members that the Turkish Coalition of America claims are members of the Turkey Caucus in the current congress, seven members voted "nay", two voted "present," and one did not vote. All of the other members, including the four co-chairs of the caucus, voted for the resolution. Bi-partisan support condemning the incursion into northern Syria was evident in recent legislation passed in the House by a margin of 403-16. This sentiment was echoed in the Senate. Additionally, in congressional hearings with ranking diplomats and officials over the previous month, a notably bi-partisan, pro-Kurdish tone has been evident.

While bi-partisan condemnation of Turkey is observable in recent weeks, there is also a domestic political aspect to Trump's seemingly pro-Erdogan stance. The vitriolic state of U.S. domestic politics has resulted in a tribal approach towards anything enterprise undertaken by the administration. In this case, in the court of public opinion and congress alike, Erdogan is guilty of his alignment with Trump more than anything else. This association quite easily and often overshadows objective reasoning in various theaters of U.S. public discourse as in the media and in congressional hearings, there is a scarcity of clear-headed analysis of the complexities of Turkish-Kurdish relations.

## **5.2 In Turkey**

As demonstrated above, Anti-American sentiment has deep roots in Turkey. For brevity's sake, this paper will only discuss events in the last two decades. After the previously mentioned incident when Turkish Special Forces were detained by U.S. Marines in Iraqi Kurdistan, polls indicated that 88% of respondents did not accept the U.S. explanation. Journalists remarked that both civilian and military citizen believed that the PKK was harbored by the U.S., and by March of 2006, 83% believed that the U.S. would not assist in bringing down PKK camps. In a poll taken

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<sup>58</sup> U.S. Library of Congress, *Armed Conflict in Syria*, 21.

in 2005, 75% of respondents said the U.S. approach towards the PKK is the biggest obstacle in U.S.-Turkish relations.<sup>59</sup> The continued presence of the PKK in the KRG, which Ankara considered to be under U.S. control was a constant problem that came to fruition when Turkey amassed 100,000 troops on the border in 2007 and threatened to enter Iraq until the U.S. acquiesced and labeled the PKK an enemy of Turkey, Iraq, and the U.S. while agreeing to increasing information sharing and military cooperation on the matter. While Turkey got what it wanted, the damage had been done in the Turkish public as U.S. popularity ratings fell into the single digits.<sup>60</sup> It is logical to assume that decision makers in Ankara had to question the efficacy of a partnership that required that level of brinkmanship in order to ascertain cooperation in fighting a group that has long been denounced as a terror group by both nations. Thus, over the course of time in which American troops were in Iraq, the Turkish government and citizenry believed there was cooperation between the PKK and the U.S.

The bi-lateral U.S.-Turkish relationship has suffered greatly because of the decision to arm the PYD in Syria. Though there were suspicions of the U.S. assisting PKK forces dating back to the 90's, after 2014 the U.S. openly armed its Syrian branch, the PYD. The U.S. maintained that the arrangement was tactical and not strategic, implying a degree of finality in the relationship, but this didn't change the fact that a Turkish ally was arming its enemies. Vitriolic and conspiratorial statements about the U.S. have been abundant in the media ever since. For example, just last year, the former Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug argued that the U.S. gave Ocalan to Turkish intelligence so that it could take over operations of the PKK.<sup>61</sup> Erdogan and other officials regularly take swipes at the U.S., and the citizenry has responded accordingly. According to the Pew Research Center, favorable public opinion of the U.S. has not been above 30% since the AKP came to power and was at 18% as of 2017.<sup>62</sup> According to recent polling from Kadir Has University, the respondents said the most important issue in Turkish foreign policy in 2019 is relations with the U.S. However, 87.9% of them said that the U.S. is not Turkey's friend. Only 8.4% believe that Turkey should cooperate with the U.S. in its foreign policy, and 75% of respondents define the relationship with the U.S. negatively. More importantly, the U.S. is considered the most threatening country to Turkey. When asked "What countries pose a threat to Turkey?" 81.3% responded with the U.S. which is approximately 10.5 percentage points higher than the next

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<sup>59</sup> Eligur, "Turkish-American Relations," 2.

<sup>60</sup> Parris, "Common Values," 8.

<sup>61</sup> "US delivered Öcalan to Turkey to gain control of PKK: Ex-military chief Başbuğ," *Hurriyet Daily News*, Accessed October 1, 2019, <http://www.hurriyetailets.com/us-delivered-ocalan-to-turkey-to-gain-control-of-pkk-ex-military-chief-basbug-128695>.

<sup>62</sup> "Global Attitudes and Trends," Pew Research Center, Accessed September 15, 2019, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/1/country/tr>.

biggest threat, Israel. Since 2015, when the U.S. openly stated that it was arming the SDF in Syria, the percentage of people who believe that the U.S. poses a threat has risen from 35% to 81%.

## 6 Conclusion

As noted above, the cornerstone of the U.S.-Turkish relationship was defense, security, and strategy. However, since the end of the Cold War, there has not been much strategic concurrence of which to speak. Where the U.S. perceived a threat in the Saddam Hussein regime, Turkey perceived the invasion as a threat in the forms of a potential refugee crisis, economic loss, and the establishment of a Kurdish entity on its border. During the 2016 coup attempt, the U.S. waited for the results before supporting Erdogan, and Turkey perceived complacency at best and assistance at worst from the U.S. towards the plotters. In Syria, the U.S. perceived a global threat in IS and terror groups in Turkish-backed FSA forces, and a partner in the PYD. From the U.S. perspective, the PYD forces were the most able group to fight an evil entity that threatened civilization as we know it. The PYD posed no threat to the U.S. and IS posed a threat to all of humanity. Accordingly, the U.S. looked skeptically while Turkey neglected to take the threat of IS more seriously with the consensus being that Turkey had at the very least turned a blind eye to its evolution, and arguably encouraged its rise as a force to fight the PYD.<sup>63</sup> Conversely, Turkey perceived an ally in the FSA, a tool in IS, and a threat in the PYD. From the Turkish perspective, their ally (the U.S.) was willfully arming a terrorist group who was responsible for tens of thousands of deaths over four decades of fighting while IS was another fundamentalist radical group that didn't pose a big threat because they didn't want to fight against a military like Turkey's in a stable environment. The PYD, on the other hand, is their proclaimed enemy that poses an existential threat to the state. The difference in threat perception could not have been greater, and this difference is at the heart of the strategic divergence.

Not only have threat perceptions become so confused that the countries are view the same issues with contrasting assessments, but as the polls above demonstrate, the U.S. is the actual threat to an overwhelming percent of the Turkish public. This means that cooperation with the U.S. can be detrimental to domestic political objectives, while challenging the U.S. is likely to be beneficial in ascertaining a rally around the flag effect. With the two countries' threat perceptions being so gravely at odds with one another, and if the foundation of the relationship is strategic defense, then what holds the relationship together? The answer for the time being is NATO. NATO maintains high levels of popular support in Turkey with approximately 61% of

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<sup>63</sup> Michael J. Totten, "The Trouble With Turkey: Erdogan, ISIS, and the Kurds," *World Affairs*, 178, no. 3 (FALL 2015): 6-9.



people polling that membership should be continued.<sup>64</sup> NATO, as a multilateral framework can continue to be an overarching mechanism which both parties hold in a high regard and allows them to save face while continuing to provide support in the areas where they still agree. Should other NATO countries also have similar problems with Turkey, it is very possible that Turkey will look elsewhere for security guarantees, and Russia would gladly play that role.

It is imperative that the U.S. and other NATO allies come to grips with a couple political realities. First, Turkey is no longer a country that is going to fall into a junior partner role that suits more powerful nations' needs at the expense of their own. Erdogan has no intention of continuing on the path of his western leaning predecessors, nor is his foreign policy a shift towards the Middle East or Russia. Erdogan aims to govern a Turkey that is an independent regional and global power. Diplomacy in the form of the letter recently sent from President Trump to President Erdogan is reminiscent of the Johnson Letter and does not have a place in contemporary U.S-Turkish relations if they are to continue. Exploiting the asymmetric aspects of the relationship needs to be done carefully and with precise calculation in order to avoid pushing Turkey to form alternate alliances.

Second, there needs to be a more nuanced understanding of the complexity of Kurdish issues, and governments need to clarify their positions. In the U.S, Kurds are often homogenized, collectively victimized, and idealized as a liberal democratic secular entity encouraging religious plurality and gender equality. Kurdish suffering under Saddam Hussein has played a part in the U.S. narrative of the region since the late 80's, and there is a decade and a half of battlefield friendship developed with Kurds in northern Iraq. These combine to form the (often romanticized) idea of the group who fought against IS on the U.S.'s behalf. This homogenized, romanticized version of what Kurds are confuses the complexity of Kurdish nationalist groups and their development. There is not enough articulation of the differences between PYD fighters who have fought against IS in Syria and peshmerga forces from the KRG who have fought alongside U.S. forces since 2003. This is either done out of ignorance of their differences, or it is an intentional homogenization of Kurdish entities to impose a unified Kurdish nationalist movement. Regardless, policy makers need to clarify their understanding of the political complexities and form opinions accordingly.

Turkish-U.S. relations are in a state of strategic divergence, and even where the two countries do agree, there is a tremendous distrust. Now is a time for the multilateralism of NATO to create a cohesive framework for cooperation as bi-lateral relations are not effective. If the Turkey-U.S. alliance is to be a strategic one in the future, then U.S. policy makers in the U.S. need

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<sup>64</sup> Global Attitudes and Trends," Pew Research Center, Accessed September 15, 2019, <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/database/indicator/1/country/tr>.

to recalibrate their approach to Kurdish nationalist movements in the region because from a Turkish perspective, powerful legislators are introducing resolutions and promoting policies that pose threats to the Turkish state. Simply put, the U.S. declared the PKK to be a terrorist organization, an enemy of the state, yet the U.S. is arming its offshoot against an ally, and that reality should be addressed. Additionally, the plight of Fethullah Gulen will have to be addressed if trust is to be restored. Likewise, Turkish policy makers would help relations by recalibrating Turkey's relations with groups that are sworn enemies of the U.S. Additionally, the degree to which it grows increasingly close to Russia should be measured against its utility in its alliance with the U.S. The current trajectory of Turkish-Russian relations decimates Turkish utility and borders on antagonism towards the U.S. and NATO. Though U.S.-Turkey relations are no longer functioning on the strategic partner level, if level heads take compromising steps, ties can be mended with time.



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# Session I-2: Culture & Society

Room 503

10:45-12:50	<p><b>Chair</b> OH, Chong Jin (HUFS)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Hidemitsu <b>KUROKI</b> (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)          "The Syrian Civil War in Comparison with Lebanese and Yugoslavian Civil Wars"  <b>Discussant</b> AHN, Jung kook (Myongji University)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> KIM, Suwan (HUFS)          "Perception of Islam and Muslim in Korean Media"  <b>Discussant</b> YUN, Eun-Kyeong (HUFS)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Suna Timur <b>AGILDERE</b> (Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University) &amp; Berna <b>DENGIZ</b> (Başkent University)          "University-Industry Cooperation in Turkey and its Impacts to the Middle East and North Africa"  <b>Discussant</b> YANG, Min Ji (HUFS)</p> <p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Mesut <b>IDRIZ</b> (Sharjah University)          "Peace and Extremism Redefined: The Case of the Middle East"  <b>Discussant</b> KIM, Kangsuk (Dankook University)</p>



# The Syrian Civil War in Comparison with Lebanese and Yugoslavian Civil Wars

Hidemitsu **KUROKI**

Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

- No material received -

# Perception of Islam and Muslim in Korean Media

**KIM**, Suwan  
HUFS

- No material received -

**UNIVERSITY-INDUSTRY COOPERATION IN TURKEY**  
**AND**  
**ITS IMPACTS THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA**

**Prof. Dr. Suna Timur Agildere**

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Turkey is a member of the G20 countries, and it is also one of the fastest-growing economies in the OECD. According to 2017 data from the World Bank, Turkey has a share of 1.05% of world GDP which makes it the 17th biggest economy. In terms of purchasing power parity, Turkey ranks 13th globally.

Our country is aware of the role and importance of science, industry and technology (STI) for its economic and social growth and has made a lot of effort in recent years to strengthen university-industry cooperation.


To this end, the National Strategy for Science, Technology and Innovation (2011-2016) (NSSTI) and the National Strategy for Industry and Technology 2023 (NSIT 2023) concerning the field of "national technology movement" have been approved by the Ministry of Industry and Technology, and in both of these National Strategies the field of university-industry cooperation has a privileged and prominent place.

Indeed, during these 20 last years, Turkey has made great efforts to develop necessary infrastructure for the realization of "national technological movement".

Among the infrastructures needed for the development of industry, technology and science Turkey has 207 Universities, 1200 Research and Development Centers (R & D Center), more than 350 Design Centers, 84 Technological Development Zone (TDZ) and many Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs). Additionally, 265,000 staff and researchers work in the R & D sectors mentioned above. During this period, Turkey has invested 177 billion TL in the field of R & D of which 48% belongs to (DC) the private sector, 42% to universities and 10% to public institutions respectively. The private sector's share of R & D investment has increased from 29% in 2002 to 57% in 2017. (NSIT 2023, 2019: 18). The sectoral distribution of TÜBİTAK (Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) grants which are among government grant in Turkey is given in Figure 1. As seen from here, the major support is used




by information and communication, automotive, machinery and manufacturing, defense, health, food-agriculture-farming, energy technology sectors for R&D purposes between 1995-2018.



**Figure 1.** The sectoral distribution of TÜBİTAK grants

Source: TÜBİTAK, 2018




**Figure 2.** R&D expenditures and Gross domestic product increase in Turkey

Source: TÜBİTAK, 2018

University and Industry Cooperation (UIC) in Turkey is important because it provides competitive advantage, and grant supports from government and private sector and

investment for innovation have been increasing every year. Particularly, after 2006 the Ar-Ge funds expenditures and the gross domestic product show a parallel increase (see Figure 2). The blue line shows R&D expenditures while the red line represents gross domestic product. It can be said that Turkey puts very big emphasis on innovation supporting R&D over the past fourteen years



**Figure 3.** R&D expenditures in Turkey by different sectors

Source: TÜBİTAK, 2018

It is seen from Figure 3 that private sector expenditure on R&D has increased more than that of the high education sector during the last six years.

The main accelerated structures of UIC in Turkey for innovation and R&D are TDZ, TTOs, R & D Centers, DCs, TÜBİTAK, Pre-incubation, Incubation centers, Development and Support of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises Administration (KOSGEB) under the umbrella of Ministry of Industry and Technology. (Yüksel H., and Cevher E.,2011: 14.)

According to the data in August 2019 in NSIT 2023, within the TDZ, 33,027 R & D projects have been completed, and there are 9,149 projects in progress in 5,414 enterprises, 310 of which are foreign enterprises. (NSIT 2023, 2019: 19)

Many national and foreign companies have participated in research and development activities in cooperation with universities. The long list of companies include foreign enterprises such as Mercedes-Benz, Ford, Huawei, Socar and Bosch. Ericsson's research and development center, GE and AVL have been established as the innovation hub of their global

networks as part of TÜBİTAK's research and development laboratory support program . (NSIT 2023 ; 2019: 20)

In these centers, Turkish and foreign researchers, most of whom hold doctorates, conduct advanced research within their companies under related programs given in this link (<https://e-bideb.tubitak.gov.tr/basvurususonaerenprogramlar.htm>).

Several doctoral and research programs in various fields of industry have been developed in Turkey to increase cooperation between universities and industry. Among these programs, we can mention the Industrial PhD Program in cooperation with TÜBİTAK and KOSGEB (SME), Programs entitled "SAYEM Center of Excellence", Program of International Researchers, Platform for Public-University-Industry Cooperation were launched in recent years.

Among these TÜBİTAK programs, we can mention three major programs that are intended to improve the competence of public research in universities: TÜBİTAK 3001 the Support Program for Beginning Researchers, TÜBİTAK 1005 the Support Program for National New Ideas and Products, TÜBİTAK 1003 the Support Program for Research, Technological Development and Innovation Projects in Priority Areas.

As part of the TÜBİTAK 2244 program for industrial PhD support, projects from 33 different universities collaborating with 77 different companies were supported. Through this program, 517 PhD students will be trained in 120 different projects related to the needs of Turkish industry. (source: [www.tubitak.gov.tr](http://www.tubitak.gov.tr))

In order to effectively achieve UIC, it is essential to measure and plan universities' skills and to raise industry awareness of these skills. In 2016, TÜBİTAK developed a map by assessing the proficiency levels and proficiency levels of our universities in 42 areas of intervention (of which the nine priority areas include: ICT, aerospace, automotive, defense, health, energy, machinery technologies and food).

As the OECD 2014 Report aptly points out, "Many countries are diversifying their commercialization policies and promoting two-way flows between industry and science through public-private partnerships, joint research initiatives/centers, outward and inward licensing of intellectual property (IP) by universities and public research institutions (PRIs), and incentives for the mobility of entrepreneurial academics. Turkey's TÜBİTAK launched the 1513 TTO Support Program to provide funding for TTOs training, capacity building for university-industry co-operation, project management support, academic entrepreneurship activities, and IPR support. (OECD Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2014: 213)

Turkey considers that an Afro-Eurasia ecosystem approach centered on the business sector and entrepreneurs is essential to the proper functioning of the innovation system. A policy approach based on the concept of ecosystem has been in place since 2011. To this end, Turkey attaches great importance to the internalisation of foreign students and researchers.

Indeed, as highlighted in the OECD 2014 and 2018 reports on science, technology and innovation (STI) policies in various countries, "The internationalization of higher education has also played a role in the global competition for talent. International students contribute significantly to the cultural mix and to the creation of international knowledge networks. Indeed, the research systems of major R & D players depend on international students. "(OECD 2014: 41)

### **Internationalization of the Higher Education System and the R & D and Innovation Ecosystem in Turkey: Its Impacts on Middle East and North Africa**

According to 2014 UNESCO and OECD data, 6 million higher education students in the world study in a country other than their home country, of which more than half of these students are from Asia, about 20% from Europe and 10% from Africa and 10% from foreign students come from North America and Latin America.

However in recent years we are seeing a big rise in the number of African students who prefer to study in Turkey. We will also look closely at the case of African students in Turkey.

According to figures from the Council of Higher Education, Turkey currently hosts more than 150,000 foreign students from 182 different countries and 3,220 foreign academics (Tables 1, 2,3).

Many of the students coming for these programs receive undergraduate, graduate and postgraduate programs in various departments of Başkent University. Başkent university has also cooperation agreements with Semey State Medical University (Kazakhstan), Azerbaijan Medical University, International University of Kyrgyzstan, SIND Institute of Medical Sciences (Pakistan) , Golis University (Somali) and Hiroshima University (Japan).

**Table 1.** Number of international academic staff in Turkey (2019)

United States of America	408
Iran	347
Syria	328
Azerbaijan	219
England	193
Germany	158
Egypt	117
Russia	82
Iraq	77
France	72

*Source: [www.yok.gov.tr](http://www.yok.gov.tr)*

**Table 2.** Number of North African Students in Turkey (2018-2019)

Egypt	2 910
Libya	1 756
Morocco	1 071
Algeria	588
Tunisia	396
Mauritania	247

Source: [www.yok.gov.tr](http://www.yok.gov.tr)

**Table 3.** Top 5 countries of African Students in Turkey (2018-2019)

Somalia	4 440
Egypt	3 910
Libya	1 644
Nigeria	1 562
Morocco	1 071

source: [www.yok.gov.tr](http://www.yok.gov.tr)

**Table 4.** Home country of Sub-Saharan African students showing higher growth (2010-2015)

Host Country	Rank 2010	Rank 2015	Count	Change between 2010 and 2015
Ghana	0	5	17 518	+ 17 518
Saudi Arabia	16	6	13 786	+ 11 501
Ukraine	0	12	6 775	+6 775
Turkey	34	13	6 736	+ 6 239
India	14	10	8 123	+5 069
Tunisia	0	18	4 835	+4 835
United Arab Emirates	0	19	4 646	+ 4 646

Source : *Campus France 2017 : 6-7*

However, over the last three years, we have seen a sharp increase in the number of students from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa who prefer to study at graduate level in Turkish universities.

According to a study entitled " The International Mobility of African Students in 2017 "of the French National Agency for the Promotion of Higher Education Abroad (Campus France):" Europe remains the priority (49% ) for African students, France is losing ground for intracontinental mobility (21%), particularly to South Africa, Ghana, Tunisia or Morocco. The Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, has recently increased its attractiveness by developing a specific offer of Islamic scholarships. Turkey, Ukraine and India also make a strong breakthrough on sub-Saharan countries. China, which does not publish its figures, is also growing significantly. We must note Turkey's spectacular progress from 34th to 17th, 9 times more African students than in 2009. In addition to a major scholarship program, Ankara continues to develop its network of cultural institutes. Four Yunus Emre Institutes already exist in Africa (Algiers, Rabat, Johannesburg, Khartoum), and three others could open in Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania. »(Campus France 2017: 3-7)

Since 2015, under the "Action Plan for Africa", the Presidency of the Higher Education Council (YÖK) has signed Memorandum of Understanding with several African countries so that students from African countries concerned can study in Turkey with the scholarship granted by their government. The purpose of these agreements is to support the sustainable development of the African continent and to meet the real needs of the African industrial community. The countries with which intergovernmental agreements have been signed are: Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Gambia, Djibouti, Niger, Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda.

According to data from the 2017 YÖK, more than 17,000 African students are studying at Turkish universities.

On the other hand, since 2012, the General Directorate of Technical Education of the Ministry of Education has been in cooperation with the Agency for International Cooperation and Development (TIKA) to provide training for African trainers from 10 African countries (Tunisia, Sudan, Madagascar, Senegal, Tanzania, Cameroon, Guinea, Zambia, Togo, Djibouti, Chad) in the fields of agricultural technology, health and tourism.

In agreement with the Industrial National Strategy Document (2011-14 and 2014-2018) to become the Africa-Eurasia production base in medium and high technology products and the ecosystem of human resources and the transfer of knowledge, TÜBİTAK cooperates with the Research Centers Technological of the African continent. Among these cooperations we can mention the cooperation with MESRS (Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research of Tunisia) and CNRST (the National Scientific and Technological Research Center of Morocco) for projects with high added value to the economies of the countries concerned. In addition, the TÜBİTAK National Metrology Institute (UME), with its \$ 1 million project, will create "metrology" and "temperature and humidity" laboratories in Sudan.

In the field of social science projects, with the financial support of TIKA, TRT (Turkish Radio and Television) and the Turkish History Society and in cooperation with the Research Centers of African Universities, the Center for Research on Mediterranean and African

Civilizations of Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University is leading projects on documentaries on African civilizations.

On the other hand, it is important to add that Turkey is currently receiving more and more students from the Middle East. Indeed, Turkey is a country lying between Europe and Asia, and it is also one of the countries that hosts the largest number of refugees in the world. These refugees are mostly from Middle Eastern countries such as Syria Afghanistan . Among these refugees, there are large number of students who are in higher education and in the master and doctorate programs, as it is seen in the following table.

**Table 5.** Number of Middle Eastern Students in Turkey (2018-2019)

Syria	33 554
Iraq	8 928
Iran	8 184
Afghanistan	7 158
Yemen	3 076
Jordan	2 643
Palestine	2 483
NorthCyprus	888
Lebanon	466
SuidiArabia	416
Qatar	39
Bahrain	31
United Arab Emirates	21
Kuwait	19
Oman	8

*Source:www.yok.gov.tr*

Several scientific projects concerning Syrian refugee academics and students in Turkey are supported by the Turkish Higher Education Council. Among these projects we can mention the project entitled "The conservation of the cultural heritage of the Middle East".

As mentioned in the Campus France report, foreign students and researchers benefit from Turkish government scholarship programs that encourage them to study or do research in Turkey. For this purpose, (TÜBİTAK) grants several scholarships for international students

and researchers. TÜBİTAK grants fellowships for international scientists / researchers who would like to give workshops / lectures / readings, or conducts R & D activities in Turkey in the fields of Natural Sciences, Engineering and Technological Sciences, Medical Sciences, Agricultural Sciences, Social Sciences and Humanities. The program aims to promote Turkey's scientific and technological collaboration with the countries of the prospective fellows. Among these scholarships there are many programs offered by TÜBİTAK such as for International Mobility Researchers Programs and International Industrial R & D Projects Grant Program, International Industrial R & D Projects Grant program for EUREKA, ERA-Net, Horizon 2020, and other similar programs. The objective of these programs is to create market-focused international R & D projects and to increase cooperation with firms, universities, and research institutions in other countries. (to see more detail go to source: [www.tubitak.gov.tr](http://www.tubitak.gov.tr) )

In conclusion, we can say that in agreement with the OECD 2018 report, which stresses that "The contributions to innovation of research conducted by higher education institutions (HEIs) and public research institutions (PRIs) are well recognized, as is the need for public support for such research. In the emerging globalized knowledge economy, where the best innovations are key success factors, research is more important than ever. "(2018: 206) Turkey, aware of the importance of university-industry cooperation, is making every effort in accordance with the 'Industrial National Strategy Document (2011-14 and 2014-2018) to become the Africa-Eurasia production base in medium and high technology products and the ecosystem of human resources and intercontinental knowledge transfer. To this end, the internationalization of foreign students and researchers, and in particular of researchers and students from countries in Africa and the Middle East, has a major impact.



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## Databases and data sources

Higher Education Council of Turkey (YÖK) Education Database, [http:// istatistik.yok.gov.tr](http://istatistik.yok.gov.tr)

UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS) Education Database, [http:// data.uis.unesco.org](http://data.uis.unesco.org)

# Peace and Extremism Redefined: The Case of the Middle East

Mesut **IDRIZ**  
Sharjah University

- No material received -



# Session II-1: Economics

Room 503

14:00-16:15	<p><b>Chair</b> LEE, Kwon Hyung (Korea Institute of International Economic Policy)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> LEE, Mansokku (State University of New York at Geneseo) &amp; SONG, Sang Hyun (Dankook University)          "Labor Productivity, Total Factor Productivity, and Economic Growth in the GCC Countries"</p> <p><b>Discussant</b> SON, Sung Hyun (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> JUNG, Jae Wook (Korea Institute of International Economic Policy)          "Economic Impact of Women Empowerment Policy in Saudi Arabia"</p> <p><b>Discussant</b> KIM, Byeongho (HUFS)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Jessie MORITZ (Australian National University)          "The Shale Oil Revolution, Fiscal Pressure, and the Changing Rentier Social Contract in the GCC"</p> <p><b>Discussant</b> RYOU, Kwang Ho (Korea Institute for International Economic Policy)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Moamen GOUDA (HUFS) &amp; Shimaa HANAFY (HUFS)          "Democratic Institutions and Islamic State Jihadists: An Empirical Investigation"</p> <p><b>Discussant</b> Humaid AI-HAMMADI (Emirati-Korean Friendship Society)</p>



## Labor Productivity, Total Factor Productivity, and Economic Growth in the GCC Countries

Mansokku Lee\* and Sanghyun Song<sup>†</sup>

### Abstract

In this paper, we discuss changes in labor productivity and labor market conditions in the GCC countries and the causes of poor labor productivity. We also examine the contribution of various factors of production to potential output growth for a period 1990 – 2018. For this, we develop a measure of a country's long-run output growth using Kalman filtering and apply panel data regressions to find empirical evidence. Our empirical findings confirm that for the past decades, the GCC countries have made continuous technological progress and introducing innovative ideas and strategies, which lead to an increase in potential output growth.

**Keywords:** GCC, labor productivity, total factor productivity, potential output growth, panel data regressions

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
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## INTRODUCTION

As of 2015, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries account for about one third of the world's crude oil reserves and possess at least about one fifth of the global natural gas reserves (AOP, 2017). Therefore, these economies have a sizable oil and energy sector and high dependence on the export of oil. The contribution of net exports to the economy has fluctuated in response to changes in the world demand for crude oil and natural gas: Net exports account for 9.1 percent of GDP in the region in 1990 and rises to 18.7 percent in 2010. Then, as oil price declines, it goes down to 3.2 percent in 2015. This contribution is large, compared to that of other Asian economies, such as China's 3.6% in 2010. Such a high dependence on oil revenue brings greater volatility in the economic performance of GCC countries and gives detrimental effects especially in downturn in the world economy. In this regard, the GCC countries have invested in various industries to diversify their economies, and as a result of such efforts, the average share of mining to GDP fell from 26 percent in the period 1990-2010 to 18 percent in the period 2010-2015. Instead, the contributions of other industries such as finance, real estate, and business activities have significantly increased from 13 percent to 18 percent between the two periods (AOP, 2017).

However, as shown in figure 1, the overall economic progress of the GCC economies measured in per capita real GDP growth has lagged for the past two decades, compared to the 1980s and 1990s. One of the reasons for this slow economic growth can be poor labor productivity improvement. Labor productivity can be measured by dividing a total amount of output by the number of employees, or the number of hours worked. Per worker GDP or output produced per hour can serve as a proxy for labor productivity. Differences in per capita GDP between countries can be explained by their labor productivity gap.



**Figure 1. Per Capita Real GDP Growth**

Sources: APO Productivity Database

Economic growth can be defined as an increase in output production, and a nation's revealed economic growth is measured in actual (observed) GDP growth, which is based on both its potential output growth and various random shocks to the economy. Theoretically, in the absence of shocks, the economy is expected to achieve its potential level of output. However, various random shocks cause the economy to produce more or less than its potential level, creating the short-run business cycles fluctuations. While actual GDP indicates the value of realized outputs, a nation's potential output represents more fundamental aspects of the economic system. The estimate of economic potential is referred to as potential or trend GDP. Since potential GDP is unobservable, its estimation depends on statistical methods and thus requires understanding of the structural effects of factors of production, such as labor, capital, and productivity, on a nation's production system. It is worth to study the determination of potential GDP in the GCC countries because identifying the fundamental relationship between production inputs and outputs allows the efficient resource allocation of the economic system in the GCC region.

From this perspective, the goal of this paper is twofold: (i) discussing the causes and results of changes in labor productivity and (ii) examining how various determinants have influenced potential GDP growth in the GCC economies for the past decades. In addition, in this paper, we have the following research questions:

- Has the labor productivity in the GCC countries decreased or increased over the past decades?
- What are the factors impacting the GCC countries' labor productivity?
- What are the possible ways to improve labor productivity in the GCC countries?
- What factors have determined economic potential in the GCC economies?

To answer the questions, we conduct empirical analysis by applying panel data regressions. Since the 1990s, there have been extensive investments in information and communication technologies (ICT) industries. In addition, the adoption of new technologies has increased the demand for skilled and educated workers (Goldin and Katz 2009). This paper incorporates such industrial trends into empirical specifications by separating labor input into two components, labor quantity and labor quality, and capital input into ICT and non-ICT capital, and examining their impacts.

Our empirical findings suggest that in the GCC economies, the economic efficiency that is represented by total factor productivity (TFP) is major determinants that lead to an increase in potential output growth. Different from labor productivity, TFP captures the aspect of efficiency of economic system, given labor and capital inputs. It is calculated as the percentage increase in the level of output that is not accounted for by changes in labor and capital inputs. Thus, TFP can serve as a better proxy for an economy's return on capital.



This paper uses a structural time-series model to extract time-varying potential GDP growth from actual GDP growth by applying econometric techniques to the model whereas much of the literature has regarded potential GDP growth as constant, ignoring the possibility of structural changes in the production system. It is important to estimate potential GDP because it represents an economy's long-run level of output production and as a consequence, long-term industrial and economic policies aim to increase potential output growth.

This paper contributes to the literature by examining the influence of the long-run growth of labor, capital, and productivity on potential GDP while many empirical studies focus on examining the contribution of the amount of production inputs on a country's economic growth measured in actual GDP rather than its potential output.


The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE GCC ECONOMIES reviews relevant data on labor productivity in the GCC countries. In section MEASURING POTENTIAL OUTPUT GROWTH, we estimate the growth rate of potential output by applying econometric methods. Section DETERMINANTS OF POTENTIAL OUTPUT presents the regression model, variable description, and preliminary data analysis. Section EMPIRICAL RESULTS reports empirical results, and the last section includes concluding remarks.

## **LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN THE GCC ECONOMIES**

A country's per capita GDP growth can be decomposed into two parts by its contributing components: labor productivity growth and changes in the employment rate. For most countries, labor productivity growth can explain a relatively larger share of per capita GDP growth than changes in employment. According to AOP (2017; 2019), the GCC countries achieved the average per capita GDP growth of 0.5 percent and 1.4 percent for the periods 1990–2010 and 2010–2017, respectively. Improvement in employment explains almost all of that growth for both periods. For the period 1990-2010, employment change accounts for 0.6 percent of per capita GDP growth whereas labor productivity accounts for -0.1percent of per capita GDP growth, making up 0.5 percent of aggregate per capita GDP growth. For the period 2010-2017, the contribution of employment accounts for 1.4 percent of per capita GDP growth. During this period, employment accounts for about 0.7 percent of per capita GDP growth while labor productivity accounts for about -0.6 percent of per capita GDP growth, making up 1.4 percent of aggregate per capita GDP growth. The contribution of employment rate was much higher in the GCC economies than other Asian countries, such as Singapore (49%), Malaysia (49%), Korea (44%), and Taiwan (44%) for the period 2010-2015.

Over the period 1970-2015, except for UAE's a positive labor productivity increase which is slightly greater than 1%, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia 's labor productivity decreased. Kuwait's labor productivity was the largest among the GCC members.

It fell by more than 3%, and other countries labor productivity fell by 1% - 1.5%. Figure 2 shows that labor productivity in the GCC countries has remained low, or even negative since the 1990s. According to AOP (2017), such poor labor productivity and heavy dependence on foreign workers, both skilled and unskilled are negative factors on industrialization and economic growth in the region, as well as their high income and strong local currencies.



**Figure 2. Per-Worker Labor Productivity Growth**

Sources: APO Productivity Database


According to Shediak and Samman (2010), low labor productivity can raise unemployment rate in the GCC economies. They highlight the causes of low productivity as follows: First, despite expatriate workers' great contribution to the local economic growth, in the GCC countries, the prevalence of foreign workers lowers the need for internal development of critical skills and the need for promoting a strong work ethic among their nationals. Second, education failings in the GCC countries make it difficult to expect the improvement in labor market conditions. Therefore, their education system should focus more on the provision of various practical job training and the development of science curricula, fulfilling industrial requirements. Third, the size of employment of the GCC's nationals is too big in the public sector, compared to that of the private sector. It is difficult to expect the realization of technological innovation in the public sector. Fourth, the lack of effective labor market policies makes the situation worse.

In addition to these causes, in the article "Low Productivity Hinders Economic Growth" (2018) absenteeism, poor performance being accepted as the norm in the public sector, and generous public employee supporting programs are criticized for poor labor productivity, as


well as private sector employers' strong preference toward expatriates due to their cost-effectiveness and many young nationals' preference toward jobs in the public sector.

Figure 3 shows that since the 1990, the size employment of both nationals and expatriates has increased in the GCC countries. This can be attributed to an expansion of working-age population as a result of high population growth, especially in 1970s and the 1980s. Government policies that encourage the employment of expatriates can also contribute to this employment increase. However, as shown in figure 4, except for Qatar, the employment rate in the region has slowed or declined since the mid-2000s.

Figures A.1 through A.4 in APPENDIX A present labor productivity growth by industries in the GCC countries. For more information on employment share by industries, see APPENDIX B.



**Figure 3. Number of Employment**  
Sources: APO Productivity Database



**Figure 4. Employment Rate**  
Sources: APO Productivity Database

## MEASURING POTENTIAL OUTPUT GROWTH

The growth rate of GDP at period  $t$  can be given by the log difference of the two consecutive periods' actual GDP:

$$GDP\ growth_t = \ln(Y_t) - \ln(Y_{t-1})$$

where  $Y_t$  denotes the level of actual GDP at period  $t$ .

The potential GDP (or the Long-Run GDP growth or trend GDP) is an expected level of maximum output produced at a full employment level without causing any inflation. If  $Y_t^*$  denotes potential GDP at period  $t$ , the difference between the log real GDP and the log potential GDP at time period  $t$  is referred to as output gap.

$$Output\ Gap_t = \ln(Y_t) - \ln(Y_t^*)$$

The output gap serves as a proxy for business cycle, expressed as a percent of potential GDP. A positive output gap indicates a boom whereas a negative output gap represents a recession.


The rate of potential output growth (natural rate of output growth) can be given by log first difference of potential GDP for two consecutive periods:

$$Potential\ GDP\ Growth_t = \ln(Y_t^*) - \ln(Y_{t-1}^*)$$


If potential GDP increases at a constant rate over time, the growth rate is deterministic. By differentiating underlying assumptions on potential GDP, we can construct the stochastic potential GDP growth model. Details on model setup and the Kalman filtering process are available in APPENDIX C. We first use per capita GDP (constant 20110 USD) for the GCC countries for the period 1975 – 2018.

Figure 5 presents the estimates of the long-run trend and cyclical components. In figure 5, trend GDP is given by  $100 \cdot \ln \text{GDP per capita}$ . In the model in equation (2) and (3) in APPENDIX C, the stochastic drift ( $\beta_t$ ) can serve as the growth rate of potential GDP. As shown in figure 5, except for Oman, other five GCC countries experienced a severe recession in the late 1980s, and since then, all six GCC economies' potential GDP has increased until the mid2000s. Then, it has slowed or even declined until 2018.


Figure 6 presents estimates of time-varying potential growth rates ( $\beta_t$ ) for the GCC countries. Most countries experienced a gradual increase in potential growth until the mid-2000, with huge peaks and valleys, particularly in the 1990s. After the peak in the mid-2000s, it is common for all six countries to have significant declines in their potential output growth, but this was slowed during the 2008-2009 recession global caused by the global financial crisis.



**Figure 5. The Long-Run Trend and Cyclical Components**



**Figure 5 (continued). The Long-Run Growth Trend and Cyclical Components**



**Figure 6. Potential GDP Growth (Beta)**

## DETERMINANTS OF POTENTIAL OUTPUT GROWTH

Solow (1957) 's growth accounting provides the measures of the contribution of factors of production to economic growth. Consider the following Cobb-Douglas production function that exhibits the determination of the level of output:

$$Y = AK^{\alpha}L^{1-\alpha}$$

where  $Y$  is the aggregate level of output (GDP), the coefficient  $A$  represents the level of technology,  $K$  is capital stock,  $L$  is labor stock, and  $\alpha$  indicates the share of capital. This production system assumes constant returns to scale since  $\alpha + (1 - \alpha) = 1$ . By taking log



on both sides of the model, we show that changes in output production can be explained by a linear combination of factors of production.

$$\ln Y = \ln A + \alpha \ln K + (1 - \alpha) \ln L$$

Both labor and capital stocks are main determinants of output growth. This analysis indirectly calculates the rate of technological advance, measured as a residual. The changes in output not directly caused by changes in labor and capital inputs can be accounted for by changes in  $A$ , which is referred to as Total Factor Productivity (TFP). TFP represents the economy's level of productivity that is determined by technological progress.

Since potential output growth is a key element of a country's sustainable economic growth and competitiveness, there has been efforts to find its determinants. To examine the contribution of underlying factors of production to potential GDP growth, we propose the following panel data regression model:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Potential GDP Growth}_{i,t} & \quad (1) \\ &= \alpha + L'_{it}\beta + K'_{it}\gamma + \zeta TFP_{it} + \phi_t + \eta_i + \varepsilon_{it} \\ & i = 1, \dots, 18. \quad t = 1990, \dots, 2016. \end{aligned}$$

where  $L$  is a regression vector that contains two variables, labor quantity and labor quality, and  $K$  is a regression vector that includes two variables, ICT and Non-ICT capital.  $TFP$  indicates total factor productivity. Our estimates of potential GDP growth ( $\beta_t$ ) serve as a dependent variable. Since the dependent variable, potential GDP growth, is an estimate of annual growth rate of long-run trend GDP, the corresponding regressors are also measured in percentage changes of annual trend (the long-run level). For this, we apply filtering techniques again to annual growth of labor quantity, labor quality, ICT, non-ICT capital, and TFP.

We use Conference Board's Total Economy Database (TED) for internationally comparable time series, which covers the GCC countries for the period of 1990-2018. According to TED, a measure of Labor Quantity indicates the level of employment and is based on total hours worked and/or total number of people engaged in a country's production system. Workers' education level is used to identify productivity differentials across workers and empirically explains the patterns of wages (Bosler et al. 2016). Therefore, Labor Quality is measured by data on employment and wages by workers' educational attainments, and its variation shows the changes in the composition of the workforce by education level. Growth in capital stock refers to an increase in the flow of productive capital goods such as buildings, machines, and various equipment including transportation devices. Especially, in TED's classification, ICT capital assets are composed of computer hardware, computer software, telecommunication equipment, and other related services. So, the variables ICT and Non-ICT capture the growth

of ICT and non-ICT capital assets, respectively. TED also notes that TFP captures the contribution of technological advance, efficiency improvements, innovation and other inputs that are not able to be measured directly.

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of variables for the GCC countries. The average annual growth rate of potential output for sample countries is 3.63 percent for the period of 1990 – 2018. The long-run growth rates of Labor Quantity and Labor Quality are 5.51 percent and 0.62 percent, respectively. The average annual growth rate of trend ICT capital is 14.79 percent while trend Non-ICT capital grows at 4.78 percent per year. The average annual growth of trend TFP is -1.04 percent.

**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics**

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Potential Growth	174	3.6321	5.0480	-8.3467	16.2166
Labor Quantity	174	5.5149	3.5450	-1.1992	16.0073
Labor Quality	145	0.6172	0.6293	-1.0967	2.0645
ICT Capital	174	14.7897	6.5836	-0.7998	30.7738
Non-ICT capital	174	4.7770	3.3265	-2.0835	13.6039
TFP	174	-1.0437	2.7999	-6.0878	5.1240

These figures are higher than those of other advanced economies such as G-7 countries' 1.16 percent (the average potential GDP growth), 0.24 percent (labor quantity), 0.46 percent (labor quality), 6.94 percent (ICT), 2.3 percent (Non-ICT), and 0.1 percent (TFP), for the same period. The GCCs' high Labor Quantity growth can be attributed to the inflow of expatriates into the region in addition to increases in population in the 1970s and 1980s. A huge difference in trend TFP growth between the two groups of countries, the GCC and G-7, can be explained by the convergence of productivity among countries. There has been substantial literature on determinants that may affect the TFP convergence, such as R&D, innovation, knowledge transfer (Cameron, Proudman, and Redding 2005), corporate taxes (Gemmell et al. 2018), public policies, institutions (McMillan and Rodrik 2011), and human resources (Ding,

Guariglia, and Harris 2016). In addition, Porter and Van der Linde (1995) suggest that environment regulations may have a positive impact on innovation and productivity growth through the realization of energy efficiency, investment in new technology, and the reduction of production cost.

## **EMPIRICAL RESULTS**

Table 2 presents empirical findings that are directly related to our research questions. The empirical results show that in the GCC countries, if all factors of production increase at an equal rate, a rise in TFP have the largest impact on potential output growth, followed by an improvement in Non-ICT capital. Thus, the contributions of TFP and Non-ICT capital to potential GDP are significantly larger.

The GCC economies heavily rely on natural resource and energy related industries, and they have been making efforts in diversifying their industrial and economic structure, with investments in service sectors, such as finance and real estate. Such efforts have brought changes in the efficiency and productivity of economic system (TFP) and as a consequence, raised the rate of potential output growth in the region. Since non-ICT capital deepening serves as a significant driver of GDP growth in the GCC countries, the relative importance of ICT capital can be smaller compared to Non-ICT capital. A positive contribution of traditional capital stock to the GCC economies is not surprising because although their domestic markets are not sizable, as the world's largest oil and gas reserve and exporting area, the GCC economies realize the economy of scale. Negative coefficient values of Labor Quantity and Labor Quality may indicate poor labor productivity, implying the lack of cost-benefit efficiency when labor inputs increase.

We estimate the model using four estimators: pooled (panel) OLS, First Difference (FD), Fixed Effect (FE), and Random Effect (RE). In each estimation, we use robust standard errors to control heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. Year-specific effects may exist across the sample, implying various global shocks at specific year(s). We can also consider the existence of idiosyncratic country-specific shocks. Based on Wald tests, the panel data specific estimators, the FE and RE, control for these time-invariant country-fixed effect and year fixed effects, while as a benchmark regression, the pooled OLS and FD estimators assume that there are no such effects in the panel dataset.

**Table 3: Results of Panel Data Regressions**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Pooled OLS	FD	FE	RE
Labor Quant.	-0.1397* (0.1078)	-0.3855* (0.2711)	-0.8378* (0.5345)	-0.7181*** (0.1018)
Labor Qual.	0.4153 (0.8865)	-6.4847*** (1.5425)	-3.9554* (2.5379)	-0.5564 (0.6458)
ICT	0.1912*** (0.0729)	0.0565 (0.1459)	-0.0954 (0.1697)	0.0179 (0.0416)
Non-ICT	0.4155** (0.2343)	1.2510*** (0.4623)	0.7567 (0.6058)	0.7601*** (0.2617)
TFP	1.0392*** (0.2228)	1.0214*** (0.2064)	1.0015*** (0.2343)	0.8209*** (0.2575)
Year FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
Country FE	No	No	Yes	Yes
$R^2$	0.2975	0.2454	0.7642	0.7385
Observation	145	140	145	145

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ . Robust standard errors in parentheses and the significance of independent variables' coefficients are based on one-tailed tests. Country-

fixed effect dummies and year-fixed effect dummies are tested but not reported. We do not report a constant term for parsimony. For FD estimator, we use the first difference values for both dependent and independent variables. For the FE, we report within  $R^2$ , and for the RE, we report between  $R^2$ .

The negative coefficients of Labor Quantity are uniformly significant across estimators and suggest that potential workforce growth without productivity improvement can lower economic potential, wasting economic resources. A 1 percent increase in the long-run growth of Labor Quantity lowers potential GDP growth by 0.14 - 0.84 percent. In the OLS, a 1 percent increase in the long-run growth of Labor Quality raises potential GDP by 0.41 percent, but it is not statistically significant. In other three estimators, the coefficients are negative. a 1 percent increase in the long-run growth of Labor Quality negatively contributes to potential GDP by 4.0 percent, and it goes down to 0.45 percent decrease in the FD. ICT coefficients are positive only in the OLS, FD, and RE, and negative in the FE. However, they are consistently only in the OLS. Non-ICT yields a positive coefficient, but significant in the OLS, FD, and RE estimations only. A 1 percent growth of trend Non-ICT capital can lead to potential GDP growth of 0.41 – 1.25 percent, while the impact of an equal increase in trend ICT capital varies from 0.02 percent to 0.19 percent in the OLS, FD, and RE. In the FE, a 1 percent increase in trend ICT capital causes potential GDP to decrease by 0.1 percent. As expected, the effect of improvement of TFP is positive and uniformly significant across estimations in columns (1) through (4) in table 2. Specifically, a 1 percent increase in trend TFP contributes to potential GDP growth in a range of 0.87 percent to 1.04 percent.

To find a preferred estimator, we apply a battery of statistical tests. Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier (LM) test suggests the OLS and FD estimations over the RE estimation, with the test statistic  $\chi^2(01)$  that is very close to 0. Finally, the  $F$ -test to test for whether fixed effects are jointly zero suggests that the FE estimation is preferred over the OLS and FD estimations, with test statistic  $F(4, 107) = 6.33$ .

## CONCLUSION

A nation's economic growth can be determined by its production activities. For its competitive industrial performance and sustainable economic growth, a country needs to maintain an amount of productive labor force as well as investment in capital accumulation. The realization of innovation and technological progress by continuous enhancement of the quality of production system is critical in building national competitiveness and furthermore, a fundamental component of sustainable prosperity. A government is also responsible to


implement relevant economic and public policies that can enhance the economic system's overall productivity for more efficient utilization of various resources.

This paper reviews changes in labor productivity and other labor market conditions in the GCC are for the past decades and provides an empirical analysis on the determinants of potential output growth on the long-run. Empirical evidence suggests that in the GCC countries, since 1990, improvements in the efficiency and productivity of the economic system have led to an increase in the potential rate of output growth.

Regression results also show the negative effects of investments in labor inputs as an evidence of low labor productivity. Such negative coefficient values of labor quality and labor quantity in our empirical model imply the need for well-planned investments in education and other human capital for significant impact on the promotion of economic potential. If a decrease in demand for labor continues due to the spread of automated production process, the quality of labor determined by workers' education attainments will be more importantly regarded and re-shape the growth pattern of economic potential. Furthermore, given the current demographic structure, the GCC countries should consider effective economic policies as well as bold stimulus policies to make more nationals engages in economic activities in the private sector.


Applying an analysis similar to that used in this paper to other heterogeneous groups of countries, such as MENA economies for comparisons, will also be interesting and help better understanding of the GCC economies. In addition, it will be worth to investigate determinants of differences in labor productivity among the GCC countries.

## APPENDIX A. Labor Productivity Growth by Industries




**Figure A.1. Labor Productivity Growth in Agriculture**

Sources: APO Productivity Database




**Figure A.2. Labor Productivity Growth in Manufacturing**

Sources: APO Productivity Database




**Figure A.3. Labor Productivity Growth in Wholesale and Retail**  
Sources: APO Productivity Database



**Figure A.4. Labor Productivity Growth in Transportation and Communication**  
Sources: APO Productivity Database




## APPENDIX B. Employment Share by Industries




**Figure B.1. Agriculture Share in Employment**

Sources: APO Productivity Database



**Figure B.2. Manufacturing Share in Employment**

Sources: APO Productivity Database



**Figure B.3. Service Share in Employment**

## APPENDIX C. Kalman Filter and State-Space Model

In this section, we provide a measure of potential output by applying a time-series filtering technique. As a first step, following Watson (1986) and Clark (1989), we construct a univariate unobservable-component model. Suppose that a time series  $y_t$ , actual GDP growth can be decomposed into a trend component  $\tau_t$  and a cyclical component  $c_t$  as follows:

$$y_t = \tau_t + c_t \quad t = 1, 2, 3, \dots, T \quad (2)$$

The smoothed trend GDP represents economy's long-run level of output growth, and can be defined by

$$\tau_t = \beta_{t-1} + \tau_{t-1} + v_t, \quad v_t \sim i.i.d. N(0, \sigma_v^2) \quad (3)$$

In equation (2), the trend is assumed to follow a random walk process, with drift  $\beta_{t-1}$ . In this model, the drift  $\beta_t$  is the random rate of change and assumed to follow a random walk as well:

$$\beta_t = \beta_{t-1} + \omega_t, \quad \omega_t \sim i.i.d. N(0, \sigma_\omega^2) \quad (4)$$

Finally, we close the model by assuming that the output gap follows a second order autoregressive process, as Clark (1987) and Harvey (1991) suggest:

$$c_t = \phi_1 c_{t-1} + \phi_2 c_{t-2} + \varepsilon_t, \quad \varepsilon_t \sim i.i.d. N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2) \quad (5)$$

The trend component  $\tau_t$  moves smoothly as only if the variance of error term  $\sigma_v^2$  is smaller than the variance of cyclical component  $\sigma_\varepsilon^2$ . The variance of the error of drift  $\sigma_\omega^2$  is also assumed to be smaller than  $\sigma_\varepsilon^2$ . We set  $\sigma_\omega^2$  to be positive and  $\sigma_v^2$  to zero for a smoother trend with stochastic drift suggested by Harvey and Streibel (1998), Harvey (2001), Harvey and Bernstein (2003), and Harvey et al. (2004). As a result, shocks to the rate of drift (potential output growth) captured by  $\sigma_\omega^2$  are only innovations to potential output.

Watson (1986) originally assumes that the rate of potential output growth is constant over the sample period by setting  $\sigma_\omega^2 = 0$ . However, some studies, such as Clark (1989) and Perron and Wada (2009), suggest that the use of stochastic slope can avoid potential misleading results and better explains the data. Assuming a variable potential growth rate for

the trend component is a testable hypothesis, and many studies support this set-up by showing empirical results. Gerlach and Smets (1997) point out that such an assumption on a deterministic rate of output growth is restrictive to apply to many industrialized economies and suggest allowing the rate of drift to vary over time. Harvey and Streibel (1998) and Harvey (2001) propose to test the null of  $\sigma_\omega^2 = 0$  to confirm empirically the random walk assumption. Harvey et al. (2004) also apply a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test on the same null hypothesis against the alternative,  $\sigma_\omega^2 > 0$ . The test rejects the null of a deterministic trend as well.

The goal of our empirical strategy is to have estimates of unobservable components: the trend, output gap, and potential rate of output growth. For this purpose, we convert the model into the form of State-Space representation and then apply the Kalman filter to estimate parameters in equations (1) through (4) simultaneously.

A state-space model requires two equations, a measurement equation and transition equation, which show the relationship between observable and unobservable components and the dynamic changes in the unobservable variables, respectively. A matrix form of measurement equation is given by,

$$y_t = [1 \quad 1 \quad 0 \quad 0] \begin{bmatrix} \tau_t \\ c_t \\ c_{t-1} \\ \beta_t \end{bmatrix} \quad (6)$$

The above equation shows a linear combination of the potential output and cyclical component. A matrix form of the transition equation is given by,

$$\begin{bmatrix} \tau_t \\ c_t \\ c_{t-1} \\ \beta_t \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & \phi_1 & \phi_2 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \tau_{t-1} \\ c_{t-1} \\ c_{t-2} \\ \beta_{t-1} \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} v_t \\ \varepsilon_t \\ 0 \\ \omega_t \end{bmatrix} \quad (7)$$

The Kalman filter provides the smoothed series of  $\tau_t$  and  $\beta_t$  and the optimal estimates of the parameters,  $\sigma_v^2$ ,  $\sigma_\omega^2$ , and  $\sigma_\varepsilon^2$  that maximize the following likelihood function,

$$\ln L = -\frac{1}{2} \sum_{t=1}^T \ln(2\pi^n \det(f_{t|t-1})) - \frac{1}{2} \sum_{t=1}^T \eta'_{t|t-1} f_{t|t-1}^{-1} \eta_{t|t-1} \quad (8)$$

where  $T$ ,  $f_{t|t-1}$ , and  $\eta_{t|t-1}$  denote the sample size, the prediction errors defined by  $y_t - y_{t-1}$  and the variance of the prediction errors, respectively.

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November 23, 2019  
2019 KAMES International Conference

The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) or the Government of the Republic of Korea.

## Outline

## 1 Introduction

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Research Questions

## 2 Background

Female Labor in GCC  
Labor Market in KSA  
Oil Income and Women Empowerment

### ③ Empirical Analysis

- Data
- Benchmark
- Economic Growth Effect
- Substitution Effect

## 4 Discussion

Expats in Domestic Jobs  
Restrictions on women's economic participation

## 5 Conclusions

## Motivation

- In the Saudi Vision 2030,
  - "Our economy will provide opportunities for everyone – men and women, young and old ..."
  - "... to increase women's participation in the workforce from 22% to 30%."



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Motivation

Saudi Arabia send money abroad the second largest in the world<sup>1</sup>

Country	Outflows (US\$ million)
United States	~70,000
Saudi Arabia	~35,000
Switzerland	~28,000
Germany	~25,000
Russian Federation	~22,000
China	~18,000
France	~15,000
Kuwait	~14,000
Luxembourg	~13,000
Korea Rep.	~12,000

■ Migrant remittance outflows (US\$ million)

• 4.3% of GDP was sent abroad by foreign workers in 2018

<sup>1</sup>World Bank(2019.10)

Economic Impact of Women Empowerment Policy in Saudi Arabia
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Motivation

Actually, it's been a long history for women empowerment in KSA

Table: The History of Female Education and Labor in Saudi Arabia<sup>2</sup>

Year	Changes
1955	the first private school for women, Dar Al Hanan founded
1960	A general directorate for girl's schools decreed
1962	First official primary school for girls in Riyadh opened
1970	First college of education for women opened
2008	Princess Noura University became the largest women's university in the world
2013	Quota of 20% for women in the Al-Shura Council enacted
2015	empowerment of women in the legislative municipal elections
2018	women permitted to drive
2019	First female ambassador to the US appointed
2019	travel restrictions on women lifted

<sup>2</sup>Kechichian(2015); Alsharif(2019)

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## Research Questions

## Research Questions

- Does women economic empowerment policies in Saudi Arabia work well?
  - Does more labor market participation of Saudi women positively affect economic growth?
  - Do Saudi female workers substitute for Non-Saudi workers?

## Female Labor in GCC

Saudi nationals - men and women are relatively well-educated












Figure: School Enrollment in GCC Countries











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Data

Data

Table: Variables

Variable	Description	Source
<i>FLMPR</i>	Saudi national female LMP	calculation with GAS data
<i>RFMLMPR</i>	LMP of Saudi female to male	calculation with GAS data
<i>NonSaudLF</i>	Non-Saudi share in the labor force	calculation with GAS data
<i>NonSaudEmp</i>	Non-Saudi share in the employment	calculation with GAS data
<i>gdppc</i>	Real GDP per capita	World Bank
<i>oilshare</i>	Share of oil and gas sector in GDP	SAMA
<i>oilincome</i>	Oil and gas income per capita	calculation with SAMA and WB
<i>oilrealprice</i>	Real oil prices	calculation with IMF

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Benchmark

Model: Benchmark (Ross, 2012)

$$FLMP_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(gdppc_t) + \beta_2 (\ln(gdppc_t))^2 + \beta_3 oilincome_t + e_t \quad (1)$$

$$RFMLMP_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(gdppc_t) + \beta_2 (\ln(gdppc_t))^2 + \beta_3 oilincome_t + e_t \quad (2)$$


$$FLMP_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(gdppc_t) + \beta_2 (\ln(gdppc_t))^2 + \beta_3 oilshare_t + e_t \quad (3)$$

$$RFMLMP_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(gdppc_t) + \beta_2 (\ln(gdppc_t))^2 + \beta_3 oilshare_t + e_t \quad (4)$$

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Benchmark



### Result: Benchmark (Ross, 2012)

dependent variable	FLMP	RFMLMP	FLMP	RFMLMP
model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
$\ln(gdppc)$	-17.70 (-1.44)	-18.03 (-0.92)	-16.25 (-1.31)	-15.91 (-0.80)
$(\ln(gdppc))^2$	0.92 (1.48)	0.95 (0.96)	0.84 (1.34)	0.84 (0.84)
$oilincome$	-0.01*** (-3.23)	-0.01*** (-2.98)	—	—
$oilshare$	—	—	-0.12*** (-3.26)	-0.18*** (-3.00)
constant	85.20 (1.41)	85.83 (0.89)	78.27 (1.28)	75.69 (0.78)
$N$	20	20	20	20
$adj R^2$	0.88	0.87	0.88	0.87



$t$  statistics computed with standard errors in parentheses.  
\*  $p < 0.1$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

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















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## Conclusions

- Saudi women empowerment policy started much earlier than the launch of Saudi Vision 2030 in 2016
- Saudi female labor market participation is strongly and positively related with economic growth
- The goal of women economic empowerment in Vision 2030 is being partially achieved.
  - Saudi female workers are partially substituting for non-Saudi workers but demand for non-Saudi workers are still increasing
  - Esp. Demand for non-Saudi in domestic jobs is strong
  - Important institutional changes happened but still institutional and cultural restrictions on women's behaviors hinder female labor market participation

Economic Impact of Women Empowerment Policy in Saudi Arabia Jang, Jung, Ryou, and Son



# THE SHALE OIL REVOLUTION, FISCAL PRESSURE, AND THE CHANGING RENTIER SOCIAL CONTRACT IN THE GCC

Jessie Moritz


Australian National University

November 2019

## RENTIER STATE THEORY IN THE MODERN GCC STATES


- Rentier State Theory (RST) first developed in 1970 to explain the poor development performance of pre-revolutionary Pahlavi Iran (Mahdavy 1970).
- RST suggests that capital-rich 'rentier states' – those that derive at least 40% of government revenue from oil and gas exportation – can avoid taxation and coopt citizens by offering significant material benefits in exchange for political quiescence. Economic or political reform in such a state generally only occurs when the rentier 'contract' is disrupted, for ex. when oil prices are low (Luciani 1987; Beblawi 1987).
- More recent work by Hvidt (2013) Gray (2011), Hertog (2010) has argued that rentier states *do* create long-term development policy, and demonstrate (some) adaptability to global oil market challenges (via "late rentierism").
- *However, we don't yet know enough about how rentier states will pursue reform during periods of low oil prices.*
- This presentation builds on work by Krane (2018) & Charles et al (2014) to question how the 'late rentier' state has adapted to post-2014 fiscal pressure. *How will these economic policy changes affect the 'rentier' contract between state and society?*

### Key features of the classic rentier state



## THE CONTEXT: CHANGING OIL MARKETS

- Oil exporters are currently facing a number of seismic challenges as a result of shifting global oil markets
  - Supply pressures: the shale oil revolution, reducing the breakeven price for a number of North American conventional oil deposits has reduced OPEC market share and placed downward pressure on prices
  - Demand pressures: consumption overall still growing, however slowing GDP growth in India and China will reduce demand for oil, as will a greater focus on renewable energy and efficiency gains in existing technology (e.g. automobiles)
- Many of these factors were relevant to the sudden oil prices fall in mid-2014, where oil prices halved in six months.
  - WTI, for example, went from US\$96 in Q3 2014 to US\$45 in Q1 2015
  - Brent crude currently sitting around \$62, compared to over \$100/bbl in early 2014
- Key driver: Shale oil breakeven prices have markedly reduced. Even at US\$30/bbl, the World Bank (2018) estimates that about 50 percent of technically recoverable US shale would be economically viable.



Source: Data drawn from BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2018

## FISCAL BREAKEVEN PRICES 2016 (Us Dollars Per Barrel)

Country	2016	% change from 2015
Bahrain	105.7	-10.96
Iran	58.4	32.43
Iraq	46.7	-20.21
Kuwait	47.2	-8.75
Oman	88.9	-12.76
Qatar	50.0	1.77
Saudi Arabia	96.6	2.77
UAE	60.7	-6.18

Source: Calculated based on IMF estimates, available in International Monetary Fund, *Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia* (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2017) p. 108.


## GCC AVERAGE ECONOMIC GROWTH 2000-2016




Source: calculated from World Bank data.<sup>[1]</sup>

<sup>[1]</sup> Data for Bahrain and Oman not available for 2016, thus average calculated for remaining GCC states only.

## OIL AND GAS CONSUMPTION IN THE GCC




Source: calculated from data available in the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. Bahrain data could not be disaggregated so has been omitted.




Source: calculated from Public Authority for Social Insurance data available in NCSI Statistical Yearbooks, various years

## PRIVATE SECTOR WAGE LEVELS (OMR/MONTH)



### Estimated Omani Unemployment and Jobseekers, 2005-2015



Source: calculated from NCSI and other Omani government data, various years.

The Omani government estimated citizen unemployment at approx 24% in 2010: the higher estimate here is likely to due incomplete labour force data provided by the government

Governorate	Wilayat	Expat	Omani	Total	Governorate	Wilayat	Expat	Omani	Total			
Muscat	Muttrah	0.8	13.5	3.8	al-Dakhlīya cont.	Izki	0.1	17.2	11.6			
	Bawshar	0.4	11.9	3.1		al-Sharqīyah	Bid Bid	0.5	13.8	9.8		
	Seeb	0.3	17.5	7.2			Sur	0.2	30.5	19.3		
	al-Amrat	0.3	18.1	10.7			Ibra	0.3	20.9	11.6		
	Muscat	0.3	18.1	9.4			Bidiyah	0.3	31.3	17.8		
	Qurayyat	0.1	17.9	10.5	al-Qabil		0.2	26.8	16.3			
al-Batinah	Sohar	0.2	25.2	10.8	al-Sharqīyah	al-Mudaybi	0.2	20.3	12.3			
	Rustaq	0.2	22	16.3		Dima w'al-Taiyyin	0.2	19.8	13.5			
	Shinas	0.3	25.2	23		al-Kamil w'al-Wafi	0.3	26.5	15.7			
	Liwa	0.2	29.9	14.6		Jaalan bani bu Ali	0.1	23.7	14.8			
	Saham	0.3	30.5	22.1		Jaalan bani bu Hasan	0.1	28.2	18.3			
	al-Khaburah	0.2	30.2	22.3		Wadi bani Khalid	0.2	25.6	16			
	al-Suwayq	0.2	28.2	18.9		Masirah	0.4	34.1	19.9			
	Nakhla	0.4	17.8	14.2		Hayma	0.1	31.9	2.1			
	Wadi al-Maawil	0.3	19.3	13.3		Muhut	0.1	40.6	22.3			
	al-Awabi	0	17.9	9.6		Dhofar	Dokum	0	37	4.3		
	al-Musanah	0.3	25.6	14.1			al-Jazer	0.1	44.2	6.5		
	Barka	0.2	23.9	11.4			Salalah	0.5	37.4	16.3		
	Musandam	Khasab	0.9	27.1			16	Thumrayt	0.6	47.8	14.7	
		Bukha	3.3	29.2			15.9	Taqah	0.2	40.8	28.1	
		Daba	1.4	32.3			14	Mirbat	0	52.9	35.1	
Madha		3.2	30.3	13.8	Sadh		0.2	53.5	27.4			
al-Dhahira	Ibri	0.1	23.2	12.1	Rakhyut		0.9	48.2	33.1			
	Yanqul	0.1	24.6	15.7	Dalkhut		2.4	41.9	28.4			
	Dank	0.1	30.7	19	Muqshin		0	35.9	13.2			
al-Dakhlīya	Nizwa	0.1	14.5	7.6	al-Dakhlīya	Shalim wa juzur al-Halliniyat	0	50	8.5			
	Samail	0.2	14.8	9.9		al-Buraimi	al-Mazunah	6.1	73.2	56.8		
	Bahla	0.1	19.5	14.2			al-Buraimi	1.5	37.3	16.8		
	Adam	0	26.5	6.4			Mahdah	0.2	42.8	12.7		
	al-Hamra	0.4	16.7	13			al-Sunaynah	0	27.5	2.2		
	Manah	0	15.4	9.6			OMAN TOTAL				0.4	24.4

Source: Oman NCSI, "khaṣā'is al-bāḥathīn 'an 'amal," [Characteristics of Jobseekers] (2015), 47-48. Governorates reported as they existed in 2010

## SOHAR PROTESTS 2011




## FOSSIL-FUEL SUBSIDIES (2011, MILLION US\$)

TYPE OF SUBSIDY	BAHRAIN	KUWAIT	OMAN	QATAR	SAUDI ARABIA	UAE	GCC TOTAL
Oil (specifically gasoline, diesel, kerosene, LPG)	1,389	4,340	2,189	2,030	46,120	3,930	56,420
Natural gas	n/a	2,080	5,540	1,860	n/a	11,520	21,000
Electricity	665	4,680	550	2,090	14,820	6,370	29,175
Total	2,054	11,100	8,279	5,980	60,940	21,820	106,595
Subsidies per capita (US\$, not million US\$)	1,699	3,396	2,285	3,263	2,109	2,640	Avg: 2,656

Source: Oil data drawn from IEA, *Fossil Fuel Consumption Subsidies* (Paris: International Energy Agency, 2013) <http://www.iea.org/subsidy/index.html>; data for oil for Bahrain and Oman drawn from IMF 2013, and includes gasoline, diesel & kerosene but not LPG; natural gas and electricity data drawn from IMF, *Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications* (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2013) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/012813.pdf>; population estimates for 2012 drawn from GCC Statistical database <https://dp.gccstat.org/en/DashBoards/2nnd0h4AYU12Vp2d9ze9w>.

## SUBSIDY AND PRICE REFORM



## IMPLICATIONS OF ENERGY SUBSIDY REFORM

- Subsidy and energy pricing reform started well before oil prices fell, even if it intensified afterwards. This suggests there are reformist groups within the state related to late rentierism whose influence was *enhanced* but not created by fiscal shortfalls post-2014.
- For example: energy subsidy reform was emphasised in early to mid-2000s development strategies, and implemented across the Middle East and North Africa particularly post-2008. States such as Jordan backtracked in 2011 in response to the Arab Spring but began to push for subsidy reform again from 2012 onwards.
- Another example: Bahrain's reinvigorated fiscal reform post-2014, driven by a reformist faction in government that had also initiated the mid-2000s economic reform program.
- Subsidy reform is part of a broader effort towards diversification, though it is among the most politically sensitive forms of (partial) economic liberalisation and diversification.
- Subsidy reform challenges major domestic energy users, such as energy-intensive private and state-owned enterprises based out of industrial zones that had previously been prioritised within late rentier development strategies (esp 1980s-present). This suggests a potential new phase in late rentier development, if current patterns continue.

## IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

- GCC citizens have mobilised in response to subsidy cuts or price increases, especially sudden and extreme increases
  - The #April 21 Movement, fierce debate in Kuwait's parliament in 2015, 2017 twitter protests in Oman, rare instances of public criticism from a largely loyalist parliament in Bahrain, among other examples, align with traditional expectations within RST
- However, that protests *haven't* snowballed into broader political challenges thus far suggests that either:
  - a) extraneous factors (for example the failure of the Arab Spring and major demonstrations in neighbouring states, alongside heightened repressive governance) have reduced opportunities to politically mobilise, or;
  - b) we have overestimated the rigidity of the social contract in rentier states and underestimated the state's ability to reform in response to fiscal pressure while maintaining the rentier contract.
- GCC rentier states have used two key tactics to maintain political legitimacy:
  - Zig-zag method of reform – 'testing the waters' and reversible, often ad hoc, policies
  - Shifting costs to expats either directly or through transfers to citizens - resulting in more targeted subsidies
  - Both tactics send mixed messages to citizens, perhaps explaining limited evidence of major decreases in medium to long-term demand for non-renewable energy thus far

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# Democratic Institutions and Islamic State Jihadists: An Empirical Investigation

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## Abstract

Although some argue that persistent local conditions of autocracy and oppression played a major role in convincing many radical Islamists to fight alongside the ranks of Islamic State in Syria, a considerable number of foreign fighters also came from developed countries enjoying high levels of democracy and personal freedom. Even after the demise of Islamic State, the IS “returnees” remain a source of severe security risk globally. This paper examines the effect of democracy and personal freedom on the inflow of IS foreign fighters to Syria, as well as their flow back home as returnees. Whereas the effect of democracy appears to be inconclusive, our cross-country regressions show that countries with a higher level of personal freedom (i) had a significantly larger outflow of foreign fighters (per million population) to join IS, and (ii) receive a significantly larger percentage share of returning foreign fighters. Our results are robust across different model specifications and account for possible collinearity concerns.

**Keywords:** Democracy, Freedom, Terrorism, Islamic State, Foreign Fighters.

**JEL Classification:** D74 Conflict • Conflict Resolution • Alliances • Revolutions  
F51 International Conflicts • Negotiations • Sanctions  
F52 National Security • Economic Nationalism  
H56 National Security and War  
P48 Legal Institution

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## 1. Introduction

Never before in modern history have foreign fighters (FF) gathered at the speed and scale as they have in the territory of Islamic State (IS) (Hegghammer, 2013; Lang & Al Wari, 2016). Radicalisation Awareness Network (2017) estimates that over 40,000 foreigners joined IS from more than 110 countries both before and after the declaration of the caliphate in June 2014. Most foreign fighters came from Arab states, generally from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. Barrett (2017) and Mishali-Ram (2018) argue that persistent local conditions of autocracy and oppression prevalent in these societies were significant factors behind IS foreign fighter recruitment. Nevertheless, a considerable number of foreign fighters also came from developed countries enjoying high levels of democracy and personal freedom, including Austria, Belgium, France and Germany (The Soufan Group, 2015).

Even after the demise of Islamic State in 2017, the IS foreign fighters may continue their jihad as “returnees”, against targets in their homeland. A study by the Soufan Center and the Global Strategy Network estimates that around 5,600 fighters have already returned to their home countries (Barrett, 2017). Almost 30% of the 5,000 European Union citizens who fought alongside the IS in Syria have returned home (Radicalisation Awareness Network, 2017). Hegghammer (2013) shows that between 1990 and 2010, one in nine Western foreign fighter returnees subsequently became domestic terrorists. A recent Pew survey (2017) finds that the fear of an attack by IS ranked first in global concerns, exceeding climate change.

Former French Interior Minister Manuel Valls labeled the IS returnees issue a “ticking time bomb” (Lynch, 2013). The bomb eventually struck Europe on the 24<sup>th</sup> of May 2014, when a French IS fighter returnee, Mehdi Nemmouche, killed four people at the Jewish Museum in Brussels. Nemmouche had spent a year fighting in Syria with IS linked militants before returning to Europe (BBC, 2014). Another Frenchman who had joined IS in Syria, Ibrahim Boudina, was arrested in France in 2014 while allegedly planning an attack on several domestic targets (Cruickshank, 2014). Most importantly, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the Belgian mastermind behind the deadly November 2015 Paris attacks, is known to have spent time fighting alongside the ranks of IS in Syria in 2013

(RT France, 2015). Lister (2015, p. 2) states that there were many other alleged plots linked to returned FFs, which have been detected and foiled in several western countries.

A debate is currently ongoing in much of the world, especially in Europe, on how to achieve a balance between democracy and personal freedom on one hand and national security on the other. The EU has been recently trying to adopt new counter-terrorism measures, including implementing EU-wide rules for the collection of airline passenger data and enhancing external border checks. However, these measures have typically been slowed down by national sovereignty concerns, law enforcement barriers to sharing sensitive information, and personal freedom protection<sup>3</sup>. Certain governments have gone further and removed the citizenship of dual nationals fighting abroad in order to prevent their return (Van Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016).

Interestingly, it seems that many around the world are willing to forgo some freedoms in return for better security measures against terrorism. A survey released in December 2015 showed that 56% of Americans were more concerned that the government's anti-terror policies have not gone far enough to fight terrorism, compared with 28% who were concerned with losing personal freedom and civil liberties in the process (Pew Research Center, 2015). Another survey conducted by the market research group infratest dimap (2015) revealed that 91% of Germans support the enforcement of additional security measures, ranging from increased police presence to identity checks.

This paper examines the effect of democracy and personal freedom on Islamic State fighters' flow from and back to their home countries. Regarding foreign fighters' flow to IS territory, we expect the prevalence of democracy (minimally defined as political offices being filled through contested elections) in a certain society to reduce the number of extremists joining IS in Syria and Iraq. Democratic societies provide multiple channels to express dissent without the threat of

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<sup>3</sup> For example, addressing the legal challenge posed by IS returnees in the Netherlands, Van Ginkel and Minks (2018) argue that terrorism provisions in the Dutch Criminal Code are unable to handle such threats. The authors note that the criminal charge of "inciting to terrorism" (article 131, paragraph 2 Dutch Criminal Code) has no clear legal threshold or boundaries. It could thus be argued that this behavior is considered "within the realm of the rights to freedom of speech or religion" (2018, p. 67). For more on this, see Boutin (2016).

government retaliation and allow for change through non-violent means. Hence, groups in democratic societies are more likely to pursue nonviolent alternatives to further their interest rather than the costly affiliation with terrorist groups such as IS. Thus, we expect democracies to have less outflow of foreign fighters than repressive ones.

On the contrary, we argue that personal freedom, an essential feature of a liberal political philosophy that is highly respected in the democratic world (Beetham, 1999; Dahl, 2000; Sen, 1999; Zakaria, 1997)<sup>4</sup>, may increase the amount of outflow of Islamic radicals to join IS in Syria and Iraq. Free societies, compared to repressive ones, allow more freedom of speech, association and movement, becoming less able to prevent terrorist group mobilization and, as a result, are more likely to experience radicalism and Islamic State recruitment.

Regarding the return of foreign fighters to their home countries, we argue that the prevalence of democracy and personal freedom in a certain society may decrease the cost of returning home for IS foreign fighters. Foreign Jihadists are less likely to return to countries where harsh consequences are imposed on IS terrorist activities. In that sense, for a given IS fighter, the cost of returning from expat jihadism will be less in societies that respect democracy and/or personal freedom than in autocracies with limited personal freedoms. Building on this argument, we hypothesize that the prevalence of both democracy and personal freedom in a certain society have a positive effect on the number of radical fighters returning from IS territory.

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<sup>4</sup> Dahl (2000, p. 51) states that “a democratic culture is almost certain to emphasize the value of personal freedom and thus to provide support for additional rights and liberties”. It is generally considered that democracy and freedom are inseparable. Nevertheless, Wenders (1990) argues that freedom and democracy are essentially different. Whereas democracy addresses how affairs in the public sector will be conducted under majority rule, freedom is concerned with the voluntary interaction among people in the private sector, outside the purview of the state. Berggren & Gutmann (2019) show that electoral democracy has a robust relationship with two out of seven types of personal freedom only (freedom of association, assembly and civil society as well as freedom of expression and information). There are cases where democracy existed without freedom, which seems to be a “contradiction in terms” (Beetham, 2004, p. 62). Mironov (2005) and Freedom House (2018) cite Russia as a democracy without essential freedoms, including that of speech and religion. Turkey under the military rule in the 1980s is also seen as another case of “democracy without freedoms” (Ahmad, 2004, p. 151). On the other hand, Hong Kong is often cited as a case of freedom without democracy (Hui, 2015).

Our results show that, although democracy has no effect on IS recruitment outflow, countries with a high degree of personal freedom significantly have a larger outflow of foreign fighters (per million population) to join IS. The different findings on democracy and personal freedom suggest that whereas the level of democracy, per se, does not affect joining IS, the prevalence of personal freedom does. Examining subcomponents of personal freedom, we show that this finding is driven by the freedom of movement and the prevalence of the rule of law.

As for the inflow (returnees), we initially find that democracy has a significant positive effect on the number of IS returnees. However, democracy loses significance when personal freedom is added, showing a positive and statistically significant effect. This suggests that the initially identified positive effect of democracy on IS returnees is primarily driven by the prevalence of personal freedom as a feature of democratic political systems. Further regression analysis shows that the positive effect of personal freedom is driven by several PFI subcomponents, including; rule of law, security and safety, freedom of movement and freedom of expression and information. Our results support the hypothesis that countries with a higher degree of personal freedom send and receive more IS fighters.

Our study contributes to different strands of literature. First, our study is the first to focus primarily on the (dis)incentives created by democratic environment on radical Islamists aiming to join IS. Second, a multitude of studies have dealt with the challenges posed by IS returnees to their home countries (Reed & Pohl, 2017; Renard & Coolsaet, 2018; United Nations Security Council, 2018). Yet, no empirical study has so far investigated factors determining whether IS foreign fighters return home. Our study is the first to explore the determinants of inflow of IS returnees to their home countries. Finally, empirical literature on determinants of terrorism has dealt with a multitude of rights and freedoms including political freedom (Abadie, 2006; Brooks, 2009), political rights (Gaibullov, Piazza, & Sandler, 2017; Li, 2005), rule of law (Choi, 2010), freedom of press (Melnick & Eldor, 2010; Rohner & Frey, 2007) and human rights (Piazza, 2017; Walsh & Piazza, 2010). Personal freedom, as well as its specific subcomponents, has barely been

studied in relation to terrorism. Our study is the first to focus on the link between personal freedom and IS fighters, or terrorism in general.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section two reviews the relevant literature; we describe our theory and hypotheses in Section three; Section four presents our data and empirical strategy. A discussion of our empirical findings follows in Section five; and we conclude with a summary of our main results and outlook in Section six.

## **2. Literature review**

No study has so far been conducted on the effect of personal freedom on the flow of Islamic state fighters. Some political institutions, including those focused on democracy and political rights, have been controlled for in the few empirical studies examining the phenomenon of IS foreign fighters. The results are found to be contradictory. Though Benmelech and Klor (2018) find some evidence that most IS foreign fighters come from recognized democracies with very high political rights, Thomas (2015) and Abdel Jelil et al. (2018) show that civil liberties and political rights are negatively associated with IS foreign enrollment. This finding resonates with Krueger (2006) who shows that countries with low levels of civil liberties or political rights were likely to have more citizens joining the Iraqi insurgency. Other studies find no effect of democracy (Gouda & Marktanner, 2018a; 2018b) or political freedom (Pokalova, 2018) on IS recruitment.

As for the literature on terrorism in general, there are numerous theoretical studies on the relationship between personal freedom and terrorism (Gostin, 2003; Romaniuk, Grice, Irrera, & Webb, 2017; Small, 2011). There is hardly any study that empirically examines this relationship. Lee (2013) examines the effect of democracy and personal freedom<sup>5</sup> on hostage-taking terrorism. The author finds that democratic countries with a high degree of civil liberties and press freedom

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<sup>5</sup> Lee (2013) uses ‘personal freedom’ and ‘civil liberties’ interchangeably throughout the study. This is not uncommon as many works interchangeably use the two terms (see (Davis & Silver, 2004; Enders & Sandler, 2006; Netanyahu, 1997)).

have higher probability of experiencing hostage-taking incidents. Executive constraints, by contrast, have a negative influence on hostage-taking terrorism.

According to Choi (2010), existing studies on the relationship between democracy and terrorism are generally categorized into three strains: (1) the first examines the overall impact of democracy on terrorism; (2) the second investigates the effect of different sub-features of democratic institutions on terrorism; and (3) the third focuses on the relationship between democracy and specific subtypes of terrorist events. Regarding the first strain, two theoretical schools of thought study the relationship between democracy and terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981; Eyerman, 1998). The “strategic” school argues that democratic governments seeking to protect civil liberties and political freedoms are limited in their ability to monitor and detain terrorism suspects, are prohibited from making extensive police sweeps to catch terrorists, and must afford alleged terrorists access to a lawyer and a public trial (Dreher, Gassebner, & Siemers, 2010; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; Gearty, 2007).

The “political access” school argues that democracy alleviate grievances by insuring better electoral access and peaceful conflict-resolution mechanisms. Democratic societies protecting personal freedom, as well as political and human rights, have non-violent alternatives to express dissent and resolve conflicts. As conflicts are solved by using non-violent means, there is a lower probability of resorting to violence or terrorism to resolve conflicts (Brooks, 2009; Ross, 1993; Schwarzmantel, 2010; Windsor, 2003).

Most empirical studies dealing with the first strain find a positive relationship between democracy and terrorism in support of the strategic school (Campos & Gassebner, 2013; Chenoweth, 2010; Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; Eubank & Weinberg, 2001; Li & Schaub, 2004; Piazza, 2007). Using Freedom House rankings, Gause (2005) shows that “free” countries experience approximately twice as many terrorist attacks as countries that are “not free”. The implication is that democratic states are generally more vulnerable to terrorist attacks (Eubank & Weinberg, 2001; Li, 2005; Piazza, 2008a; Schmid, 1992). A small number of articles show a

negative relationship, supportive of the political access school (Crenshaw, 1981; Eyerman, 1998; Krieger & Meierrieks, 2010; Li, 2005; Shahrouri, 2010). Other articles find no significant relationship (Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011; Piazza, 2008b; Savun & Phillips, 2009). A handful of articles uncover an inverted U-shaped relationship in which some intermediate regime type in between autocracy and democracy displayed the greatest amount of terrorism (Abadie, 2006; Chenoweth, 2013; Gaibullov, Piazza, & Sandler, 2017). Consequently, empirical findings about the relationship between democracy in general and terrorism are mixed and inconclusive.

The second strain of literature postulates that some features of democratic institutions encourage terrorist activities whereas other features discourage them. Many studies examine the effect of individual features of democratic regimes on terrorism by avoiding aggregating all the distinctive features of democracy into a single composite index. Melnick and Eldor (2010) and Rohner and Frey (2007), for example, find that freedom of the press allows terrorists and their supporters to publicize their grievances. Choi (2010) shows that rule of law reduces the likelihood of any type of terrorist events. Testas (2004) finds that political repression is a positive determinant of terrorism in Muslim-majority countries.

Whereas the first and second strains of literature study the effect of democracy on the aggregate number of terrorist events, the third strand delves into specific subtypes of terrorist attacks. Considerable literature, for example, exists on the relationship between democratic institutions and suicide terrorism (Benmelech & Berrebi, 2007; Santifort-Jordan & Sandler, 2014; Pape, 2003; Wade & Reiter, 2007). Others study the relationship between democratic institutions and assassinations (Mandala, 2017). Ivanova and Sandier (2006) shows that democratic regimes are more likely to be vulnerable to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism due to easy access to the necessary knowledge for obtaining such weaponry through institutions of higher learning.

Our study is linked to all aforementioned strains of literature. More specifically, we intersect with the first group when investigating the effect of democracy, in general, on IS fighter flow to and



from their home countries. We are also linked to the second strand, as we examine how flows of IS fighters are affected by personal freedom, a central element of liberal political philosophy that is frequently associated with electoral democracy (Berggren & Gutmann, 2019). Finally, we are linked to the third strand because we examine a specific type of terrorism, demonstrated by joining the IS terrorist organization.

### **3. Theoretical arguments and hypotheses**

According to Schneider et al. (2015), rational-choice models are the preferred theory of most economic analyses of terrorism (e.g., (Caplan, 2006; Enders & Sandler, 2002; Kurrild-Klitgaard, Justesen, & Klemmensen, 2006). Based on the rational model of crime (Becker, 1968), terrorists are considered rational actors who try to maximize their utility, given the benefits, and (opportunity) costs of terrorism, where the utility from terrorism is usually associated with achieving certain political and/or economic goals (Enders & Sandler, 2002). We apply the rational choice model to two types of decisions taken by an Islamist radical; first, the outflow of IS potential fighters to join IS in Syria, and second, the inflow (return) of fighters to their home countries after leaving IS ranks.

#### **3.1. Outflow of IS fighters**

Applying this concept to the outflow of IS fighters, a radical foreigner would join IS in Syria only when his benefit exceeds the cost of this action. Benefits of becoming a member in a terrorist organization are numerous, including achieving a sense of community, status, providing a means of vengeance for past humiliations (Schaefer, 2007), as well as martyrdom (Abrahms, 2008). Costs include foregone utility from opportunities associated with non-terrorist activity, such as wages or similar material rewards linked to participation in the ordinary economic life in the home country. Moreover, a potential IS terrorist's calculus of costs includes physical costs coming from apprehension possibility and penalty for terrorist offenses (Schneider, Brück, & Meierrieks, 2015).

Although there is no consensus on the relationship between democracy and terrorism in general, we argue that democracy reduces incentives of an Islamist to join IS abroad. In nondemocratic

societies, the lack of opportunities for political participation prompts political grievances and dissatisfaction among dissenters, motivating incentives to join terrorism organizations or to become a terrorist (Crenshaw, 1981). In contrast, democracies allow dissenters to express their policy preferences and seek amends (Ross, 1993). Different social groups, including Islamic political movements, can participate in the political process to further their interest through peaceful means, such as voting and forming political parties (Eubank & Weinberg, 1994; 2001). Since democracy lowers the cost of achieving political goals through legal means, Islamists seeking to make Islam play a bigger role in public life should find membership of an illegal terrorist organization less attractive. It is expected that, as wide democratic participation increases political efficacy of citizens, transnational terrorist groups will be less successful in recruiting new members in democracies than in autocracies (Li, 2005).

*Hypothesis 1: Democracy has a negative effect on the flow of IS fighters to Syria.*

On the contrary, we argue that personal freedom has a positive effect on IS recruitment. Liberal-democratic freedoms of movement and association, coupled with legal restraints on security forces and due-process safeguards, make it easier for potential terrorists to establish and join terrorist groups. Crenshaw (1981) notes, “[T]errorists view the context as permissive, making terrorism a viable option” (1981, p. 383). Consequently, we argue that free societies, as compared to repressive ones, decrease a potential terrorist’s cost of joining Islamic State in Syria, thus allowing greater IS recruitment and mobilization.

*Hypothesis 2: Personal freedom has a positive effect on the flow of IS fighters to Syria.*

### 3.2. Inflow of IS fighters

Using a rational choice model, we argue that the ability to return home after joining IS is a major factor that is considered by IS fighters. Democracy and respect for personal freedom in a certain society may decrease the cost of returning for members of extremist groups, as fighters are less likely to return to countries where they could face harsher legal consequences for their terrorist activities and/or where rule of law is weaker. Moreover, stronger prevalence of freedom of

movement, associations and expressions are likely to attract returnees that want to pursue further *jihad* (Magen, 2018, p. 111). In that sense, for a given radical person, the cost of returning from IS will be less in societies that respect democratic institutions and personal freedom than in autocratic societies with limited personal freedoms.

*Hypothesis 3: Democracy has a positive effect on the inflow of IS fighters back home.*

*Hypothesis 4: Personal freedom has a positive effect on the inflow of IS fighters back home.*

#### 4. Estimation Strategy and Data

We empirically investigate the effect of democracy and personal freedom on (1) the amount of FFs joining IS (outflow of IS fighters), and (2) percentage share of returnees (IS fighters that return to their home countries). Our models can be summarized as follows

$$ForeignFighters_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Democracy_i + \beta_2 PersonalFreedomIndex_i + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$$Returnees_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Democracy_i + \beta_2 PersonalFreedomIndex_i + \gamma X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (2)$$

where  $i$  = country  $i$

“Foreign fighters per million population” (ForeignFighters) in country  $i$  is our dependent variable in Model (1) whereas “returnees as a percentage of foreign fighters” (Returnees) is our dependent variable in Model (2). We use a Tobit model as both dependent variables are left-censored. This is the case in Model (1) as some countries have sent zero FFs and in Model (2) as some FFs sending countries have received zero returnees. However, both dependent variables are continuous for the non-zero observations.  $X$  is a vector of control variables that are described above. Regional dummies are only included when they are jointly significant. We use robust standard errors.

We developed a cross-country dataset to test our hypotheses. Our dependent variables on FFs are collected from two reports published by the Soufan group (The Soufan Group, 2015; Barrett, 2017). Table A.1 in Appendix A describes our data and sources. Table 1 shows the numbers of FFs per country. The first and second number in parentheses are the total number of FF and FF per one million population, respectively. Figure 1 shows the distribution of FFs by region. The

majority of foreign fighters (more than 90%) come from three regions, namely Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (40%), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA) (29%), and Western Europe (WE) (22%).

Table 1: Foreign fighter sending countries in Syria and Iraq by region

East Asia and the Pacific (EAP)	Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA)	Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC)	Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Australia (165, 7.1) Cambodia (1, 0.1) China (300, 0.2) Indonesia (600, 2.37) Japan (9, 0.1) Malaysia (91, 3.1) N. Zealand (8, 1.8) Philippines (100, 1) Singapore (2, 0.4)	Albania (90, 31.1) Azerbaijan (900, 95.02) Bosnia and Herzeg. (248, 96.1) Bulgaria (10, 1.38) Georgia (200, 53.0) Kazakhstan (500, 29.12) Kosovo (300, 165.7) Kyrgyz Republic (500, 86.4) Macedonia, FYR (140, 67.4) Moldova (1, 0.3) Montenegro (30, 48.3) Romania (1, 0.1) Russia (3417, 23.8) Serbia (50, 7.0) Tajikistan (1300, 157.15) Turkmenistan (360, 68.7) Uzbekistan (1500, 49.1)	Argentina (23, 0.5) Brazil (3, 0) Trinidad and Tobago (130, 96.3)	Algeria (170, 4.5) Egypt, Arab Rep. (600, 6.8) Israel (60, 7.4) Jordan (3000, 350.2) Kuwait (150, 41.0) Lebanon (900, 167.5) Libya (600, 96.5) Morocco (1660, 48.7) Qatar (10, 4.4) Saudi Arabia (3244, 107.0) Tunisia (2926, 264.1) UAE (15, 1.7)
North America (NAM)	South Asia (SA)	Sub Saharan Africa (SSA)	Western Europe (WE)
Canada (185, 5.2) USA (129, 0.4)	India (75, 01) Maldives (200, 497.3) Pakistan (650, 3.54) Sri Lanka (32, 1.6)	Madagascar (3, 0.1) Somalia (70, 5.3) South Africa (1, 0) Sudan (150, 4.0)	Austria (296, 34.7) Belgium (528, 47.2) Denmark (145, 25.7) Finland (80, 14.7) France (1910, 28.9) Germany (915, 11.3) Ireland (30, 6.5) Italy (110, 1.8) Netherlands (280, 16.6) Norway (90, 17.7) Portugal (12, 1.2) Spain (204, 4.4) Sweden (300, 31.1) Switzerland (70, 8.6) Turkey (1500, 19.6) UK (850, 13.2)


Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Soufan (2015, 2017) and Barrett (2017).

Although one half of the 68 FF sending countries have not received any returnees, the other half shows a strong variation in terms of the percentage share of returned FFs.<sup>6</sup> Figure B.1 in Appendix B shows the percentage share of returnees per FFs. Finland, Algeria and the United Kingdom received the highest share of returnees (50-54%), followed by Denmark (46%), Turkey (40%), Sweden (35%), Norway (33%), and Germany (33%).

<sup>6</sup> We dropped Afghanistan from our sample because there are errors in recordings of FFs in- and outflows.

As a measure of democracy, we use the dummy variable “democracy” that was developed by Cheibub et al. (2010). The democracy variable distinguishes between regimes in which executive and legislative offices are filled through contested elections and those in which they are not. The variable takes on the value 1 for the former and zero otherwise. The variable follows a minimal definition of electoral democracy, which is optimal in our case as we are interested in separating the effects of democracy and personal freedom.<sup>7</sup> For our analysis, we use the updated dataset by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019).

Figure 1: Regional distribution of foreign fighters



Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Soufan (2015, 2017) and Barrett (2017)

We use the Personal Freedom Index (PFI) by Vásquez and Porcnik (2017) to capture the level of personal freedom. The PFI is a measure of the Human Freedom Index and consists of two equally weighted parts. The first part entitled “legal protection and security”, consists of two subcomponents; Rule of Law and Security and Safety. The second part of the PFI measures specific personal freedoms: Movement; Religion; Association, Assembly and Civil Society; Expression and Information; and Identity and Relationships.<sup>8</sup> PFI uses a continuous score that

<sup>7</sup> Cheibub et al. (2010) offer methodological arguments that support their indicator as opposed to alternative democracy measures. We use other democracy measures for robustness checks.

<sup>8</sup> For more details on PFI subcomponents, see Vásquez and Porcnik (2017). Although other freedom indicators use a positive liberty approach, the Human Freedom Index applies an approach of negative liberty. According to Berlin (1969), positive liberty refers to the possession of the capacity to act upon one's free will. Negative liberty is, however, defined as freedom from external restraint on one's actions. Vásquez and Porcnik (2017) argue that the concept of positive freedom suffers from subjectivity, since it is “more likely to mean different things to different people and thus

ranges from 0 to 10, where countries with more personal freedom receive higher ratings. Figure B.2 in Appendix B shows a boxplot of PFI in democratic versus non-democratic countries. Democracies show a higher PFI value. However, we can also see that the confidence intervals are rather wide.<sup>9</sup>

In our cross-country analysis, we control for a country's GDP per capita to rule out estimated effects of democracy or personal freedom that are only reflecting the effect of a country's level of economic advancement. Moreover, we account for the Muslim share of population and the geographic proximity by controlling for the distance between a country's capital and Damascus. Further controls include income inequality using the Gini coefficient, religious and language fractionalization (which could fuel radicalization), (the logarithm of) youth unemployment, and an interaction term of Muslim population share and youth unemployment, following Gouda and Marktanner (2018a). Regional dummies control for non-observable regional fixed effects.

Table A.1 describes the variables that we use for our empirical analysis, their abbreviations and sources. Table A.2 provides descriptive statistics for our variables based on our full estimation sample of 153 countries, which is restricted by the availability of independent variables. In the descriptive statistics, we additionally distinguish between FF sending countries and countries that did not send any FFs. A first look at the descriptive statistics shows that the share of democratic countries is similar among FF sending and FF non-sending countries (65% of both groups of countries are democratic). Moreover, FF sending countries, on average, have a higher level of personal freedom and GDP per capita. However, as there are several differences between the two groups of countries and as the number of FF strongly vary among FF sending countries, a more rigorous empirical analysis is needed to analyze the effects of democracy and personal freedom on IS fighters' decisions. Moreover, the unsurprising strong correlation between our

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cannot be measured independent of the goals that conflicting ideologies or groups might identify with freedom" (2017, p. 12). Positive freedom may have considerably different meanings for an evangelist, a Marxist, an Islamist, and so on. On the other hand, negative liberty "comes in only one flavor— the lack of constraint imposed on the individual" (McMahon, 2012, p. 10). PFI thus measures the degree to which the negative freedoms of individuals are respected in the countries observed.

<sup>9</sup> Some non-democracies show a relatively high level of PFI like Hong Kong (9.0), Montenegro (8.1), Bosnia and Herzegovina (7.93) and Singapore (7.4), whereas some democracies are associated with lower levels of PFI, for example, Tunisia (6.1), Sri Lanka (5.7) and Pakistan (4.9).

two main variables of interest democracy and PFI ( $r=0.62$ ), as well as the strong correlation between GDP per capita and PFI ( $r=0.55$ ), as shown in Table A.3, requires special attention to collinearity concern while conducting our empirical analysis.

## 5. Results

### 5.1. Outflow of IS fighters

#### 5.1.1. The effect of aggregate PFI and democracy

Table 2 shows the Tobit regression results for various specifications of Model (1) on IS fighters' outflow. Due to the high correlation between democracy and personal freedom, we start in column (I) by estimating the impact of democracy on Foreign Fighters, while controlling for GDP per capita ( $\ln y$ ), income inequality (Gini), youth unemployment (YouthUnemploy), the Muslim population percentage share (Muslim), distance to Damascus (Distance), and regional dummies. The regional dummies are jointly significant in all model specifications of Table 1. Democracy does not show any significant effect on the fraction of a country's population that join IS. In column (II), we include our personal freedom variable PFI, which shows a positive and statistically significant effect on ForeignFighters, whereas the effect of democracy remains insignificant. In column (III), we further control for religious and language fractionalization and in column (IV), we additionally account for the interaction term of the Muslim population share with youth unemployment, following results of Gouda and Marktanner (2018a).

Although democracy remains insignificant across all model specifications, the effect of PFI is always positive and statistically significant. The significance level of the PFI coefficient improves from 10% in column (II) to 5% when allowing for more controls in columns (III) and (IV). Our results show that countries with a higher degree of personal freedom had a significant larger outflow of foreign fighters (per million population) to join IS. The different findings on democracy and personal freedom suggest that the existence of (electoral) democracy does not affect joining IS, whereas the prevalence of personal freedom does. In Section 5.1.2, we further analyze which aspects of personal freedom affect joining IS.

Table 2: Determinants of IS fighters' outflow (Dependent Variable = Foreign Fighters per million population)

	I	II	III	IV
PFI		25.11* (14.11)	26.81** (13.49)	26.92** (13.33)
Democracy	-40.67 (28.39)	-34.12 (24.9)	-32.13 (25.73)	-24.65 (26.41)
Lny	25.62* (14.77)	-0.78 (8.68)	-10.1 (8.01)	-7.32 (7.33)
Gini	0.7 (1.19)	0.7 (1.13)	0.48 (1.16)	0.7 (1.21)
YouthUnemploy	14.01 (13.29)	5.81 (9.81)	3.19 (9.13)	-13.74 (10.87)
Muslim	1.33*** (0.45)	1.13*** (0.35)	1.3*** (0.36)	0.48 (0.34)
Distance	-2.16 (3.5)	-2.59 (3.41)	-3.92 (3.22)	-1.79 (3.28)
ReligiousFrac			108.18*** (29.24)	68.62*** (24.34)
LanguageFrac			-46.18 (34.64)	-72.22** (36.43)
MuslimxYouthUemploy				17.03*** (5.34)
EAP	-6.52 (34.56)	3.59 (30.57)	-7.47 (27.11)	0.84 (26.43)
EECA	-2.26 (25.14)	-1.17 (19.19)	-29.41 (19.97)	0.58 (20.41)
LAC	-44.46 (47.07)	-18.06 (46.67)	-21.13 (42.58)	-4.85 (43.17)
SA	72.77 (77.53)	2.35 (41.39)	-9.16 (44.02)	2.85 (42.64)
SSA	-105.99*** (38.33)	-104.05*** (37.24)	-127.2*** (38.01)	-103.98*** (36.81)
MENA	-27.49 (45.76)	34.63 (40.35)	36.75 (34.56)	47.89 (35.31)
constant	-298.28* (173.7)	-218.55* (115.06)	-147.68 (110.21)	-189.52 (119.44)
N	153	138	135	135
Log-Likelihood	-365.55	-324.42	-318.19	-312.87
Left-censored	95	84	81	81

Note: Regressions are based on a Tobit Model. Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*=significant at 10%, \*\*=significant at 5%, \*\*\*=significant at 1%.



Regarding the magnitude of the effect of personal freedom on ForeignFighters, the marginal effect of PFI on ForeignFighters needs to be computed.<sup>10</sup> Based on the regression results in column (IV), we calculate the marginal effect of PFI on ForeignFighters as

$$\frac{\partial \text{ForeignFighters}}{\partial \text{PFI}} = 5.87$$

Accordingly, a one-point increase in PFI increases the number of IS foreign fighters by, on average, 5.87 persons per million population.

As to the control variables, the GDP per capita only shows a positive and significant effect before the introduction of PFI. This effect no longer holds after the introduction of PFI in models (II) to (IV). The Muslim population share in a country shows a positive and statistically significant effect on the fraction of population joining IS. Though the effect on youth unemployment is individually insignificant, the interaction term of the Muslim population share with youth unemployment is positive and significant at the 1% level (Model IV), supporting earlier findings by Gouda and Marktanner (2018). Furthermore, religious fractionalization has a positive and statistically significant effect, supporting the argument that religious fractionalization might fuel religious radicalization. On the contrary, language fractionalization does not fuel Islamic radicalization. In fact, the variable shows a negative effect on ForeignFighters in Model (IV) which might be the result of higher cultural openness. The Gini coefficient is not significant suggesting no effect of income inequality. Regional dummies capture unobservable regional characteristics and show a negative and significant effect of the SSA dummy (as compared to the reference group of North America and Western Europe). The distance to Damascus is insignificant. This result does not change when removing the regional dummies from our model.

### 5.1.2 Insights from PFI components

In the next step, we investigate which of the PFI subcomponents drives our previous result on the aggregate positive effect of PFI. The bivariate correlation between each of the seven

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<sup>10</sup> Regression coefficients in Tobit models cannot be readily interpreted as marginal effects as in Ordinary Least Square (OLS) models. Tobit regression coefficients capture a combination of an independent variable's marginal effect on whether a certain observation is non-zero and its marginal effect on non-zero observations.

subcomponents ranges between 0.4 and 0.85, as can be seen in the correlation matrix in Table A3. We re-estimate the Tobit regression (IV) of Table 1, while replacing PFI with each of its seven components separately. Results are reported in Table A.4 in Appendix A. While all subcomponents show a positive coefficient, only the effect of rule of law and freedom of movement is statistically significant. The calculated marginal effects equal 5.4 and 2.4, respectively, as reported at the bottom of Table A.4. Our results show that countries with a higher level of rule of law, as well as a higher level of freedom of movement have a significantly larger outflow of foreign fighters (per million population) to join IS. Specifically, a one-point increase in rule of law index, which measures procedural, civil and criminal justice, increases the number of foreign fighters by, on average, 5.4 persons per million population. On the other hand, a one-point increase in freedom of movement, which includes freedom of domestic movement as well as the freedom to leave the country, increases outflow of FF by, on average, 2.4 persons per million population.

## 5.2. Inflow of IS fighters

### 5.2.1. The effect of aggregate PFI and democracy

Table 3 shows the Tobit regression results for various specifications of Model 2, which investigates the effect of personal freedom and democracy on the percentage share of IS foreign fighters that return to their home countries. The analysis is naturally limited to 68 FF sending countries as explained in Section 4. The sample size is further limited by available data on our main variables of interest and control variables.

In column (I), we investigate the effect of democracy on the percentage of FF returnees, while controlling for GDP per capita ( $\ln y$ ), the Muslim population share (Muslim) and distance to Damascus (Distance). We do not include regional dummies as, in contrast to Model 1, they are jointly insignificant across all specifications of Model 2. Democracy shows a positive and statistically significant effect on Returnees in column (I). However, the effect of democracy becomes insignificant when PFI is included in column (II). PFI shows a positive and statistically significant effect at the 1% level. This suggests that the initially identified positive effect of

democracy on FF returnees in column (I) is primarily driven by prevalence of personal freedom as a democratic institution. Our results support our hypothesis that countries with a higher degree of personal freedom significantly receive a larger percentage of IS returnees.

Table 3: Determinants of IS fighters' inflows (Dependent variable = Returned IS fighters as percentage share of fighters)

	I	II	III	IV
PFI		11.57*** (3.15)	10.97*** (3.88)	10.93*** (3.08)
Democracy	21.55*** (6.85)	5.45 (5.94)	1.43 (6.26)	5.7 (5.86)
Iny	8.12*** (2.56)	4.6* (2.54)	6.65** (3.14)	4.98* (2.66)
Muslim	0.21** (0.09)	0.43*** (0.13)	0.42*** (0.13)	0.42** (0.18)
Distance	-2.13** (0.88)	-1.68** (0.77)	-1.1 (1.04)	-1.59* (0.86)
ReligiousFrac			-10.78 (13.95)	
LanguageFrac			16.68 (11.63)	
Gini			-0.45 (0.44)	
YouthUnemploy				2.9 (5.14)
MuslimxYouthUnemploy				-0.18 (3.66)
constant	-84.27*** (27.22)	-135.11*** (33.32)	-134*** (38.39)	-141.7*** (36.22)
N	62	58	54	58
Log-Likelihood	-163.67	-152.60	-143.42	-152.44
Left-censored	29	26	23	26

Results are based on Tobit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*=significant at 10%, \*\*=significant at 5%, \*\*\*=significant at 1%.

As to the control variables, results show that countries with a higher GDP per capita, with a higher Muslim population share and with a shorter distance from Damascus significantly receive more returnees. The results of our baseline model remain robust when allowing for more control variables. In column (III) we further control for the social heterogeneity factors religious fractionalization, language fractionalization and income inequality (Gini), which further reduces our sample size from 58 to 54 countries. None of these three variables is significant. Neither are they jointly significant ( $F(3,45) = 1.03$ ), which is why we drop these three variables again in column (IV). In column (IV), we control for labor market variables by adding youth unemployment

and its interaction term with Muslim population share with youth unemployment, which do not show any significant effect.<sup>11</sup>

Calculating the marginal effect of PFI on Returnees based on our baseline model in column (II) yields

$$\frac{\partial \text{Returnees}}{\partial \text{PFI}} = 6.94$$

This implies that a one-point increase in PFI increases the percentage share of returnees by, on average, 6.94 percentage points.

### 5.2.2 Insights from PFI components

Again, we investigate which of the PFI subcomponents drives our previous result on the positive effect of PFI on returned fighters. We re-estimate Model 2 while replacing PFI with each of its seven subcomponents separately. The results are shown in Table A.7 for our baseline regression of Table 2. Note that the results do not change when adding more control variables. Our results show that both parts of the Personal Freedom Index, legal protection and security on the one hand, as well as specific personal freedom on the other hand are significant determinants of returning fighters.

As to the first half of PFI, both indicators of legal protection and security show positive and statistically significant coefficients: Rule of law is positive and significant at the 5% level, while security and safety are significant at the 1% level. Calculated marginal effects show that a one-point increase in rule of law increases the percentage share of returnees by, on average, 6.7 percentage points and a one-point increase in the security and safety indicator increases the percentage share of returnees by, on average, 6.0 percentage points. Our results imply that justice and lawful trials as well as the lack of homicide and disappearances increase the share of returned fighters to their home countries.

Regarding the second half of PFI on specific personal freedom, our results show a positive and statistically significant effect of freedom of movement at the 1% level, freedom of expression and

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<sup>11</sup> PFI remains significant when all control variables are added together.

information at the 1 % level and freedom of identity and relationship at the 5% level. The calculated marginal effects are 1.8, 5.8 and 1.4, respectively. Accordingly, freedom of expression and information show the strongest effect among the specific personal freedoms as a determinant of returned IS fighters.

### 5.3 Further analyses and robustness checks

The strong correlation of PFI with democracy (0.62) and with GDP per capita (0.55), as shown in Table A.3, suggests that further analysis is needed to rule out collinearity concerns. Regarding FF outflows, we re-estimate Model 1, while replacing PFI by the unexplained residual from an OLS regression of PFI against GDP per capita (lny) and democracy.<sup>12</sup> This orthogonalizing procedure of PFI presents a tougher test on the hypothesis regarding the effect of PFI on ForeignFighters, as it attributes to each lny and democracy their shared covariance with PFI and thus biases against finding a significant effect of PFI. Yet, even after orthogonalizing PFI, it remains positive and significant across all model specifications. Results are reported in Tables A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix. The effect of democracy and GDP per capita remain insignificant across all specifications. The results confirm the robustness of our findings as PFI remains positive, statistically significant and of similar magnitude as in Table 1. This implies that the identified effect of a country's level of personal freedom on the fraction of population that joins IS is not driven by the existence of electoral democracy or economic advancement.

We conduct a similar analysis regarding the returnees. Results are reported in Tables A.8 and A.9 in Appendix A. Despite the tougher test on the effect of PFI after its orthogonalization, the effect of PFI residuals (unexplained by both democracy and lny) remains positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. Its marginal effect on Returnees is only marginally smaller than our

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<sup>12</sup> This has the purpose of obtaining a measure of PFI that is independent of GDP per capita and democracy. See Li (2005) for a similar approach. Using a Tobit regression instead of OLS shows similar results.

computations based on Table 2 (6.60 compared to 6.94 above). Our additional analysis confirms that a higher level of personal freedom increases the number of returnees among IS fighters.<sup>13</sup>

Our results are robust to using an alternative measure of democracy. Replacing our democracy variable with the polity IV project's polity score, developed by Marshall et al. (2016) and published by the Center for Systemic Peace, does not change our findings on determinants of FF outflows and inflows. Results are available upon request.

## 6. Conclusion and Policy Implications

This paper examines the effect of democracy and personal freedom on the outflow of IS foreign fighters to Syria, as well as their flow back home as returnees. Our cross-country regressions show that countries with a higher level of personal freedom (i) had a significantly larger outflow of foreign fighters (per million population) to join IS, and (ii) receive a significantly larger percentage share of returning foreign fighters. Further analysis of subcomponents of personal freedom show that in- and outflows of IS *jihadists* are both driven by rule of law and freedom of movement. In addition, the prevalent levels of security and safety as well as freedom of expression and information have a significant effect on the decision of IS fighters to return home.

Such relationship may represent a true dilemma for many governments around the world, especially in democracies. On the one hand, democratic governments are bound by constitution and democratic values to protect civil liberties. On the other hand, many governments around the world are faced with the phenomenon of Islamic State recruitment and returnees. It seems there is no easy solution for such a dilemma, as counter-terrorism legislation aimed at combating the FF phenomenon may negatively affect personal freedoms. For instance, the German Federal Government has recently agreed to introduce the statutory forfeiture of citizenship for Islamic State FFs. The proposed law, because of its requirements of engagement in combat operations

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<sup>13</sup> Note that only when fully attributing the shared covariance between PFI and democracy to the democracy variable, the effect of the latter becomes positive and statistically significant (Table A.9). This highlights that any positive effect of democracy on the number of returnees is primarily driven by the democratic institution of personal freedom, as suggested by findings of Table 2.

and previously obtained second nationality, will in practice be applicable only to a small number of cases. It runs the risk of creating factions of left-behind extremists that may escape any meaningful oversight. This will increase the danger of undetected reorganizations of terrorist networks. Thus, it could be argued that the proposed law is not sufficient to combat FF threat. Nevertheless, Roithmaier (2019) considers the proposed law incompatible with rule of law, proposing instead that Germany applies “costly monitoring of returning [FFs] and comprehensive reintegration programs”. The author goes on to state that, “while it may sound unjustified to invoke state duties towards [FFs] after they have actively turned their back against the rule of law and fundamental rights, Germany should not abandon these general principles out of retaliation”.

Karl Popper might have predicted this dilemma several decades ago. Popper writes, “unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.” (Popper, 1966, p. 265). Public attitudes, partisan politics, international and domestic law, the probability of successful prosecution, the potential risk to public safety, and legal/humanitarian concerns all influence and complicate policy decisions towards FF phenomenon. Although some countries have already addressed this issue in an ad hoc manner, there is still no overall strategy or plan that could be agreed upon by relevant stakeholders. We believe that governments facing the foreign fighters’ phenomenon should devote resources to understand the radical Islamists scene. There is no easy solutions but more effort is certainly needed.

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## APPENDIX

### Appendix A: Tables

Table A.1: Data and Sources

Variables	Description	Source
Dependent Variables		
ForeignFighters	Foreign fighters per million population	Soufan (2015, p. 7) and Soufan (Barrett, 2017, p. 12). Soufan (2015) reports official and non-official counts, and Soufan (2017) revised 2015 counts. Some numbers are reported as ranges (for example, “100-200”), others with a “~”, “+”, “<” or “>” sign (for example, “~90,” “104+,” “<10,” or “>165”). Whenever available, we took Soufan (2017) data. If Soufan (2017) data was unavailable, we took available official count data from Soufan (2015). If neither Soufan (2017) nor official counts in Soufan (2015) data was available, we took the unofficial count in Soufan (2015). For numbers given with ranges, we took the midpoint of the range. Data provided with “~”, “+”, “<” or “>” signs were reported by ignoring the signs. Population data are 2011-2015 averages from the World Bank Development Indicator Database (WDI).
Returnees	Returned Foreign Fighters per Foreign Fighters (%)	Calculated from Soufan (2017)
Main independent variables		
PFI	Personal Freedom Index. 2011-2015 average.	Vasquez & Porcnik (2017)
Democracy	As a measure of democracy, we use the dummy variable “democracy” which was conceptualized by Cheibub et al. (2010)and updated by Bjørnskov and Rode (2019). The democracy variable takes the value 1 for regimes in which executive and legislative offices are filled through contested elections and zero otherwise.	Bjørnskov and Rode (2019)
PFI components		
RuleOfLaw	Rule of Law	Vasquez & Porcnik (2017)
Sec&Safety	Security and Safety	
FreeMove	Freedom of Movement	
FreeRel	Freedom of Religion	
FreeAsso	Freedom of Association, Assembly and Civil Society	
FreeExp&Inf	Freedom of Expression and Information	
Freelden	Freedom of Identity and Relationships	
Control Variables		
lny	GDP per capita (constant \$2010), 2011-2015 averages, logarithm	World Bank Development Indicators Database

Distance	Distance of Expat Jihadist's Home Country's Capital to Damascus in 1000 kilometers	Mayer, Thierry, and Soledad Zignago. "Notes on CEPII's distances measures: The GeoDist database" (2011). dist_cepil.dta dataset
Gini	Index of income inequality. Latest available observation.	United Nations University's World Income Inequality Database (WIID).
YouthUnemploy	Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate), 2011-2015 average, logarithm	World Bank Development Indicators Database
Muslim	Muslim population percentage share. 2010 observation.	Association of Religion Data Archives (www.thearda.com/)
Muslim*YouthUnemploy	Interaction term of Muslim and YouthUnemploy, logarithm	
LanguageFrac	Language Fractionalization Index,	Alesina et al (2003)
ReligiousFrac	Religious Fractionalization Index	Alesina et al (2003)
Regional Dummies	EAP=East Asia and the Pacific, EECA=Eastern Europe and Central Asia, LAC=Latin America and the Caribbean, MENA=Middle East and North Africa, NAM= North America SA=South Asia, SSA=Sub Saharan Africa WE= Western Europe	The World Bank. We further split Europe and Central Asia into WE and EECA.
<b>For robustness checks</b>		
Polity	Polity2 score. A value which ranges between negative ten and positive ten. Values between negative ten and negative six indicate autocracies, values between negative five and positive five anocracies, and values between positive six and positive ten democracies.	Center for Systemic Peace



Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics of full estimation sample of Model 1

Variable	Sample	N	Mean	Min	Max	S.D.
ForeignFighters	All	153	16.325	0.000	497.280	57.918
	FFCtry=1	58	43.065	0.015	497.280	88.167
	FFCtry=0	95	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Democracy	All	153	0.654	0.000	1.000	0.477
	FFCtry=1	58	0.655	0.000	1.000	0.479
	FFCtry=0	95	0.653	0.000	1.000	0.479
PFI	All	138	7.195	3.570	9.480	1.330
	FFCtry=1	54	7.590	4.667	9.480	1.421
	FFCtry=0	84	6.942	3.570	9.241	1.209
Y	All	153	13,112	233	105,800	19,173
	FFCtry=1	58	22,680	409	89,068	23,626
	FFCtry=0	95	7,270	233	105,800	12,846
Gini	All	153	38.921	23.600	60.800	8.782
	FFCtry=1	58	35.754	23.900	60.800	7.799
	FFCtry=0	95	40.855	23.600	60.790	8.824
YouthUnemploy	All	153	17.051	0.390	60.413	12.215
	FFCtry=1	58	19.034	0.390	60.413	13.234
	FFCtry=0	95	15.841	0.522	52.055	11.453
Muslim	All	153	23.582	0.000	99.000	34.591
	FFCtry=1	58	33.052	0.000	99.000	38.469
	FFCtry=0	95	17.800	0.000	99.000	30.795
Distance	All	153	5.960	0.086	16.643	4.036
	FFCtry=1	58	4.472	0.086	16.286	3.535
	FFCtry=0	95	6.869	0.329	16.643	4.069
LanguageFrac	All	148	0.402	0.002	0.923	0.284
	FFCtry=1	57	0.338	0.012	0.865	0.254
	FFCtry=0	91	0.441	0.002	0.923	0.296
ReligiousFrac	All	152	0.446	0.002	0.860	0.238
	FFCtry=1	57	0.429	0.003	0.860	0.245
	FFCtry=0	95	0.455	0.002	0.819	0.234
MuslimxYouthUnemploy	All	153	3.620	0.000	8.210	2.730
	FFCtry=1	58	4.980	0.000	8.210	2.139
	FFCtry=0	95	2.789	0.000	7.899	2.727
RuleOfLaw	All	138	5.205	2.407	8.676	1.546
	FFCtry=1	54	5.872	3.267	8.676	1.697
	FFCtry=0	84	4.776	2.407	7.990	1.277
Sec&Safety	All	138	8.048	4.334	9.928	1.403
	FFCtry=1	54	8.614	5.546	9.881	1.234
	FFCtry=0	84	7.684	4.334	9.928	1.390
FreeMove	All	138	7.772	0.000	10.000	2.521
	FFCtry=1	54	7.957	2.333	10.000	2.343
	FFCtry=0	84	7.653	0.000	10.000	2.635
FreeRelig	All	138	7.856	4.060	9.663	1.221
	FFCtry=1	54	7.727	4.060	9.562	1.489
	FFCtry=0	84	7.939	5.044	9.663	1.014
FreeAsso	All	124	8.093	0.500	10.000	2.409
	FFCtry=1	52	8.231	0.500	10.000	2.645
	FFCtry=0	72	7.993	1.500	10.000	2.237
FreeExp&Inf	All	138	7.911	3.918	9.762	1.291
	FFCtry=1	54	8.097	5.098	9.762	1.319
	FFCtry=0	84	7.791	3.918	9.622	1.267
Freelden	All	138	7.559	0.000	10.000	2.805
	FFCtry=1	54	7.969	0.000	10.000	2.979
	FFCtry=0	84	7.295	0.500	10.000	2.672

Notes: (i) Descriptive statistics are based on our full estimation sample (which corresponds to Regression I in Table 1). (ii) FFCtry=1 are FF sending countries. FFCtry=0 are countries that did not send any FF.



Table A.3: Correlation Matrix (based on full estimation sample of Model 1)

	ForeignFighters	Democracy	PFI	LnY	Gini	YouthUnemploy	Muslim	Distance	LanguageFrac	ReligiousFrac	MuslimxYouthUnemploy	RuleOfLaw	Sec&Safety	FreeMove	FreeRelig	FreeAsso	FreeExp&Inf	FreeIden
ForeignFighters	1																	
Democracy	-0.29	1																
PFI	-0.29	0.62	1															
LnY	-0.20	0.31	0.55	1														
Gini	-0.07	-0.17	-0.29	-0.11	1													
YouthUnemploy	0.16	0.13	0.08	-0.01	0.08	1												
Muslim	0.47	-0.49	-0.67	-0.40	0.00	0.04	1											
Distance	-0.22	0.26	0.25	0.12	0.43	-0.23	-0.40	1										
LanguageFrac	-0.21	-0.03	-0.17	-0.28	0.04	-0.07	0.13	-0.01	1									
ReligiousFrac	-0.21	0.17	0.27	0.16	0.21	-0.01	-0.41	0.36	0.21	1								
MuslimxYouthUnemploy	0.42	-0.40	-0.55	-0.36	-0.07	0.38	0.78	-0.54	0.24	-0.25	1							
RuleOfLaw	-0.21	0.40	0.77	0.86	-0.24	-0.04	-0.50	0.12	-0.23	0.20	-0.44	1						
Sec&Safety	-0.23	0.44	0.80	0.50	-0.42	0.03	-0.36	0.09	-0.15	0.07	-0.29	0.68	1					
FreeMove	-0.24	0.54	0.85	0.27	-0.10	0.09	-0.61	0.36	-0.13	0.22	-0.54	0.46	0.55	1				
FreeRel	-0.32	0.55	0.74	0.22	-0.10	0.03	-0.68	0.33	-0.07	0.35	-0.53	0.42	0.35	0.69	1			
FreeAsso	-0.18	0.68	0.76	0.20	-0.07	0.21	-0.49	0.20	-0.08	0.22	-0.37	0.40	0.43	0.72	0.73	1		
FreeExp&Inf	-0.28	0.62	0.91	0.51	-0.17	0.10	-0.67	0.27	-0.19	0.22	-0.55	0.70	0.61	0.79	0.75	0.85	1	
FreeIden	-0.29	0.45	0.81	0.25	-0.24	0.07	-0.62	0.24	-0.08	0.34	-0.49	0.42	0.61	0.73	0.56	0.55	0.63	1

Table A.4: Determinants of IS fighters' outflow: Insights from PFI subcomponents (Dependent Variable = Foreign Fighters per million population)

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
	RuleofLaw	Sec&Safety	FreeMove	FreeRelig	FreeAsso	FreeExp&Inf	Freelden
<b>PFI sub-component</b>	<b>23.32*</b>	<b>1.92</b>	<b>11.07**</b>	<b>6.13</b>	<b>4.23</b>	<b>13.78</b>	<b>6.68</b>
	<b>(13.27)</b>	<b>(10.24)</b>	<b>(5.14)</b>	<b>(8.41)</b>	<b>(3.39)</b>	<b>(9.61)</b>	<b>(4.49)</b>
Democracy	-12.23	-4.89	-13.11	-9.27	-23.45	-15.73	-5.9
	(22.31)	(22.28)	(22.67)	(23.99)	(27.57)	(24.7)	(20.62)
Iny	-18.68	0.44	-0.83	2.12	-7.1	-2.02	0.71
	(14.37)	(7.26)	(6.62)	(7.19)	(6.87)	(6.7)	(7.03)
Gini	0.83	0.1	0.05	0.26	0.24	0.41	0.22
	(1.25)	(1.14)	(1.12)	(1.18)	(1.17)	(1.2)	(1.17)
YouthUnemploy	-12.42	-11.07	-14.16	-11.54	-8.03	-14.03	-11.71
	(11.28)	(11.4)	(10.87)	(11.54)	(10.86)	(11.28)	(11.24)
Muslim	0.24	0.16	0.34	0.24	0.07	0.29	0.37
	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.3)	(0.27)	(0.3)	(0.36)
Distance	-0.02	0.56	-1.24	-0.05	2.19	-0.46	0.2
	(2.78)	(3.1)	(3.15)	(2.93)	(3.14)	(3.16)	(2.95)
ReligiousFrac	57.34**	67.29**	79.75***	62.02**	63.1***	62.79***	66.14**
	(26.62)	(26.92)	(25.68)	(24.32)	(20.42)	(23.41)	(26.75)
LanguageFrac	-74.64**	-83.35**	-74.21**	-85.54**	-87.69**	-76.66**	-83.51**
	(35.66)	(40.15)	(35.98)	(40.96)	(40.43)	(37.76)	(39.51)
MuslimxYouthUnemploy	18.38***	17.4***	17.35***	17.63***	17.86***	17.98***	17.5***
	(5.44)	(5.39)	(5.34)	(5.45)	(5.69)	(5.53)	(5.6)
constant	-25.71	-61.56	-121.26	-109.5	-2.94	-134.49	-112.16
	(101.91)	(118.34)	(101.43)	(108.13)	(84.48)	(118.53)	(114.26)
Regional dummies	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	135	135	135	135	121	135	135
Log-Likelihood	-313.56	-315.88	-312.56	-315.58	-296.08	-314.68	-314.5
Left-censored	81	81	81	81	69	81	81
<b>Calculated marginal effect</b>	<b>5.38*</b>		<b>2.36**</b>				

Results are based on Tobit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes only one PFI subcomponent as an explanatory variable. Calculated marginal effects of significant PFI subcomponents are included at the bottom of the Table. \*=significant at 10%, \*\*=significant at 5%, \*\*\*=significant at 1%.

Table A.5: Orthogonalization of PFI in equation (1) with regards to Iny and democracy (Dependent variable: PFI)

	coefficient	robust SE	p-value	
Iny	0.44	0.06	0.00	***
Democracy	1.20	0.20	0.00	***
constant	2.53	0.44	0.00	***
N	154			
R2	0.55			

\*\*\* significant at <1%.

Table A.6 Tobit regression results using residuals from orthogonalization in Table A.5 (PFires)

	I	II	III
PFires1	25.11* (14.11)	26.81** (13.49)	26.92** (13.33)
Democracy	-3.99 (20.81)	0.04 (20.68)	7.66 (20.98)
Iny	10.39 (7.82)	1.83 (7.33)	4.66 (7.35)
Gini	0.7 (1.13)	0.48 (1.16)	0.7 (1.21)
YouthUnemploy	5.81 (9.81)	3.19 (9.13)	-13.74 (10.87)
Muslim	1.13*** (0.35)	1.3*** (0.36)	0.48 (0.34)
Distance	-2.59 (3.41)	-3.92 (3.22)	-1.79 (3.28)
ReligiousFrac		108.18*** (29.24)	68.62*** (24.34)
LanguageFrac		-46.18 (34.64)	-72.22** (36.43)
MuslimxYouthUnemploy			17.03*** (5.34)
EAP	3.59 (30.57)	-7.47 (27.11)	0.84 (26.43)
EECA	-1.17 (19.19)	-29.41 (19.97)	0.58 (20.41)
LAC	-18.06 (46.67)	-21.13 (42.58)	-4.85 (43.17)
SA	2.35 (41.39)	-9.16 (44.02)	2.85 (42.64)
SSA	-104.05*** (37.24)	-127.2*** (38.01)	-103.98*** (36.81)
MENA	34.63 (40.35)	36.75 (34.56)	47.89 (35.31)
constant	-154.98 (95.45)	-79.79 (91.1)	-121.34 (99.09)
N	138	135	135
Log-Likelihood	-324.42	-318.19	-312.87
Left-censored	84	81	81

Results are based on Tobit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*=significant at 10%, \*\*=significant at 5%, \*\*\*=significant at 1%.

Table A.7 Determinants of IS fighters' inflow: Insights from PFI components (Dependent variable = Returned IS fighters as percentage share of fighters)

PFI Components	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
	RuleofLaw	Sec&Safety	FreeMove	FreeRelig	FreeAsso	FreeExp&Inf	Freelden
<b>PFI sub-component</b>	<b>11.23**</b>	<b>10.59***</b>	<b>3.07***</b>	<b>2.19</b>	<b>2.33</b>	<b>9.72***</b>	<b>2.47**</b>
	<b>(4.56)</b>	<b>(3.38)</b>	<b>(1.13)</b>	<b>(3.26)</b>	<b>(1.69)</b>	<b>(3.57)</b>	<b>(1.12)</b>
Democracy	14.67*	12.17*	14.01**	18.19**	11.29	9.94	15.45**
	(7.56)	(6.47)	(6.72)	(7.55)	(9.67)	(7.18)	(6.58)
Iny	-2.15	4.19	8.37***	8.74***	9***	5.76**	8.78***
	(4.34)	(2.68)	(2.57)	(2.61)	(2.98)	(2.75)	(2.58)
Muslim	0.32**	0.26**	0.32***	0.29**	0.28**	0.39***	0.36***
	(0.13)	(0.1)	(0.1)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.1)
Distance	-1.52*	-1.9**	-2.16**	-2.02**	-1.75**	-1.87**	-1.76**
	(0.84)	(0.84)	(0.85)	(0.85)	(0.84)	(0.81)	(0.85)
constant	-54.58**	-134.48***	-107.83***	-107.19***	-107.76***	-138.12***	-111***
	(23.7)	(33.66)	(28.57)	(38.58)	(35.64)	(34.22)	(28.84)
N	58	58	58	58	56	58	58
Log-Likelihood	-153.89	-153.65	-155.63	-157.44	-152.13	-153.93	-155.76
Left-censored	26	26	26	26	25	26	26
<b>Calculated marginal effect</b>	<b>6.67**</b>	<b>6.03***</b>	<b>1.78***</b>			<b>5.77***</b>	<b>1.4**</b>

Results are based on Tobit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Each regression includes only one PFI subcomponent as an explanatory variable. Calculated marginal effects of significant PFI subcomponents are included at the bottom of the Table. \*=significant at 10%, \*\*=significant at 5%, \*\*\*=significant at 1%.

Table A.8: Orthogonalization of PFI in Equation (2) with regards to Iny and democracy (Dependent variable: PFI).

	coefficient	Robust SE	p-value	
Iny	0.45	0.13	0.00	***
Democracy	1.60	0.35	0.00	***
constant	2.21	1.02	0.00	*
N	61			
R2	0.54			

\* significant at 10%, \*\*\* significant at 1% level.


Table A.9 Tobit regression results using residuals from orthogonalization in Table A.8 (PFires)

	I	II	III
PFires2	11.57*** (3.15)	10.97*** (3.88)	10.93*** (3.08)
Democracy	23.98*** (7.53)	19.01* (9.99)	23.21*** (7.45)
Iny	9.77*** (2.55)	11.55*** (2.74)	9.86*** (2.57)
Muslim	0.43*** (0.13)	0.42*** (0.13)	0.42** (0.18)
Distance	-1.68** (0.77)	-1.1 (1.04)	-1.59* (0.86)
ReligiousFrac		-10.78 (13.95)	
LanguageFRac		16.68 (11.63)	
Gini		-0.45 (0.44)	
YouthUnemploy			2.9 (5.14)
MuslimxYouthUnemploy			-0.18 (3.66)
constant	-109.54*** (29.48)	-109.74*** (33.24)	-117.54*** (33.85)
N	58	54	58
Log-Likelihood	-152.60	-143.42	-152.44
Left-censored	26	23	26

Results are based on Tobit regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. \*=significant at 10%, \*\*=significant at 5%, \*\*\*=significant at 1%.

## Appendix B: Figures


Figure B.1: Returned foreign fighters per foreign fighters (%) by country (with at least one returned fighter)



Source: Authors' calculations based on data from Soufan (2015, 2017).

Note: Only FF sending countries that received at least one returned fighter are included in the list. The following 34 foreign fighter sending countries did not receive any returned fighters back according to Soufan (2017): Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Ireland, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, FYR Macedonia, Madagascar, Maldives, Moldova, Montenegro, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Serbia, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan.

Figure B.2: Boxplot of distribution of PFI by democracy



# Session II-2: Culture & Society

Room 101

14:00-16:15	<p><b>Chair</b> SAH, Heeman (Chosun University)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> KIM, Joong-Kwan (Dongguk University)          "Governance Framework for Syrian Refugees in Italy: Social Integration and Cultural Assimilation"</p> <p><b>Discussant</b> JEONG, Young-kyu (Hyupsung University)</p> <p>○ <b>Presenter</b> EUM, Ikran (Dankook University)          "Saudi Vision 2030, Nationalism and Women"</p> <p><b>Discussant</b> LEE, Kyungsoo (HUFS)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Mohamed ELASKARY (HUFS) &amp; YUN, Eun-Kyeong (HUFS)          "Muslim Minority in China"</p> <p><b>Discussant</b> KIM, Eunji (HUFS)</p>





# Governance Framework for Syrian Refugees in Italy

## – Social Integration and Cultural Assimilation – \*

Kim, Joong-Kwan \*\*\*

### <ABSTRACT>

This paper aims to discuss and analyze on the main causes and consequences of the influx of Syrian refugees into Italy in the respect of social integration and the issue of cultural assimilation governance. The main issues of the study are ① the possibility of refugees returning home due to changes in the situation of Syria; ② refugee registration and finance on refugee camp; ③ the entry routes and flows of refugees to Italy; ④ the issue of distribution of the second settlement at the initial entry point. The author derived policy implications through the analysis on the challenges and risks of refugees in Lampeduza, Mare Nostrum, Triton, and the Sophia rescue program.

Italian society concerned about the spread of migrant Syrian refugees with their Arab culture and Islamic religions that are not ready for social integration in the local community. The refugee governance of Italy is vulnerable due to the lack of man power on border controls, refugee registration facilities, police officers and interpreters. This paper identified not only the problems of government budget for refugees and the issue of forced repatriation to Syria, but also the lack of unified EU regulations on the acceptance and relocation of refugees, and disagreements.

Key words: Syrian refugees, Italy, Lampeduza, Social Integration, Cultural Assimilation

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Grant funded by the Korean

\*\* Professor, Dongguk University-Seoul, Korea, FSEGT El-Manar, Tunisia, marcojk@dongguk.edu

## 1. Introduction

Most European countries are now trying to converge their migration policies to general rules, including procedural measures for granting asylum to foreign citizens. An impetus for such actions is the ongoing Syrian refugee crisis that has gripped Europe in recent years. The overwhelming majority of immigrants to the European continent are Syrians, forced to flee from war, lawlessness, and poverty.

The problems associated with Syrian refugee's influx in Europe in 2019 are still in the focus of attention of most European politicians, sociologists, and members of the public. This suggests that the migration crisis has not yet been overcome, despite the efforts made by the leading European countries. Italy has been a record as the most interested country for the refugee status requests. Most illegal immigrants from the countries of the Middle East and North Africa seek Italy firstly in order to find a gate to get to Europe.\*\* The border services managed to reduce the flow of illegal migrants: there were more than a million attempts to enter Europe illegally. Italy has got into the top three countries, with the highest number of cases of crossing by refugees of the borders of the European Union. There were illegal migrants 157,022 crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Italy by the end of 2015.\*\*\*

As for the attitude towards refugees, despite EU leaders' statements about the need for tolerance, public opinion in Italy is increasingly inclined towards negative attitudes towards Syrian migrants.\*\*\*\* Actually, most of Arab refugees have a quite disparate culture and religion and are not ready to integrate into new social conditions (Kondrashov 2016, 89). In addition, the growing number of terrorist attacks in different European countries,\*\*\*\*\* such fears can be considered well-founded: incidents involving migrants occurred in Italy many times.

This paper will find causes and consequences of Syrian refugees' influx in

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\*\* The number of illegal immigrants who arrived in Italy since 2014 differs significantly from official statistics, and on the whole the number of those who arrived to Europe by sea increased significantly within short period: in 2014, 216,000 such migrants were recorded, and in 2015 – more than 800,000.

\*\*\* Eurostat (<http://zagranportal.ru/spravochnaya/emigraciya/migranty-v-evrope.html>).

\*\*\*\* In Italy, refugees have no legal right to work until they receive an official status; therefore migrants have to look for a temporary job. Most of the refugees living in distribution centers hope to obtain political asylum in Italy. However it takes a long time to make up a decision on issuing a residence permit for political or religious reasons.

\*\*\*\*\* As many Europeans, Italians fear that of uncontrolled flow of migrants, representatives of terrorist and extremist organizations may penetrate the country.

Italy through Lampeduza: challenges and dangers of the largest transit island and intensify on the survey of forced migration of Syrians to Italy. Also we will look into the challenge and problems on economic, social and cultural integration of Syrian refugees in Italy. Moreover, the prospects of economic and social stabilization in forced migration processes will be described and studied throughout the chapters. The conclusion sums up the situation with the migration crisis in Italy as an example of failure of the system created by the global beneficiary, which, as part of the global projects, was supposed to restrain the flow of refugees from the conflict zones.

## **2. Causes and Effects of Syrian Refugees' influx in Italy: Lampeduza**

### **2.1. Prior researches on the Arab refugee and immigrants**

Researches on the social adaptation of the Arab refugee and immigrants in English, German, and French can be divided into four topics. First, most of the study developed measures to respond to refugees and migrants to local countries. The study covers topics such as border management, refugee management and related legislation. Second, there are studies of Arab refugees and European terrorist issues analysis. Third, there are some studies that have analyzed the economic development policies of refugees, settlers and European countries. Fourth, there are also studies that have analyzed the relationship between refugees and migrants, and between Turkey and the EU and the European countries. These studies focus on the expansion of the territories under the control of the Arab states, which contributed to the increase in the number of refugees and the overflow of immigration capacity at receiving countries.

There are some typical studies that examined the refugee policy of each European country, some of the studies use the AHP evaluation.\* But the practical study of the social, cultural and financial ramifications of refugee migration in Europe is rare. Therefore, this study adapt a different topic from existed studies and will be focusing on European immigrants and immigration policies, and produces a model that considers the cost-benefit of the refugee

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\* Analytic Hierarchy Process: Hierarchical analysis Process (Xiangyu Liu 2017; Ruirui Miao 2016).

state on the basis of a practical study to help develop new refugee policies. In order to do this, we compare refugee acceptance and management policies from within Italy. And the Department of Refugees and International refugee officials, local Middle Eastern and indigenous peoples, and administrative agencies will be selected to conduct a recognition investigation and conduct a survey on the local situation, such as the perspectives and policies of refugees in the local country and the positions and opinions of local migrant refugees. This study will use the governance evaluation and socio-economy approach together from the type 1 and 3. (See Table 1)

<Table 1> Prior research on the refugee and immigrants

Type	Research Topics	Researchers
Type 1	European refugee and immigrant's response policy: Border management, refugee management	Benvenuti (2017) Baxewanos (2015) De Genova (2017)
Type 2	European refugee and immigrant issues and terrorism	Rossen Koroutchev (2016) Guy Verhofstadt (2017) Christopher (2017)
Type 3	Economic development policy for European refugees, settlers and European countries	Kraal, Roosblad (2010) Wrench (2010) Van Wupper (2015)
Type 4	Analyze the relationship between refugees and migrants and between Turkey and EU and European countries	Frances (2017) Verhofstadt (2017) Wolfgang Frindte (2017) Nico Dietrich (2017)

## 2.2. Consequences of Syrian refugees' influx in Italy

### 2.2.1. Main reasons of migration movement

More than a million refugees and migrants have arrived in Europe by sea since the beginning of 2015. On the whole the number of those who arrived to Europe by sea increased significantly within short period: in 2014, 216,000 migrants were recorded, and in 2015 – more than 800,000.\*\*

Italy has got into the top three countries, with the highest number of cases of crossing by the Syrian refugees of the borders of the European Union. In

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\*\* The Migration crisis in Europe: Causes, scope, prospects  
(<http://zagranportal.ru/spravochnaya/emigraciya/migranty-v-evrope.html>).

2015, illegal migrants 157,022 crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Italy. In 2013, the number of migrants, annually arriving to Italy, increased significantly due to Syrian refugees, most of who arrive on the east coast of Sicily from Egypt. Arab refugees get to Italy approaching the island of Lampedusa, the nearest to the rebellious shores of Libya and Tunisia.

① The main reasons for this migration movement are economic, political, demographic and national legal instability. These include: Wars and armed conflicts destabilizing the situation in the regions, include the Civil War in Syria, the Civil War in Iraq, the War in Afghanistan (2001–2014 and 2015), the Civil War in Libya (present); Population explosion in Africa and the Middle East countries, exceeding the capacity of their economies to provide employment (Blinova 2012, 230) increasing poverty; social inequalities that are grounds for the spread of extremist movements (Abylkalikov 2012, 36).

② The reasons for the sharp increase in the number of Syrian refugees in Italy are: The aggravation of the civil war in Syria, the lack of prospects for resolving the conflict, prevented the return of Syrian refugees to their homeland, and their own enduring livelihoods (refugees are not allowed to work) forced people to leave the camps in the direction of Italy, in the hope of a high standard of living in European countries through Italy. (Syrian geopolitical izol 2015, 6); Deterioration of funding for Syrian refugee camps in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan and, as a result, reduction in the refugees' diet, introduction of fees for using water and electricity, and lack of access to school for refugees' children. Through Italy, many migrants seek to get to other European countries (Sweden, Germany), where their relatives have already settled and where there are vast immigration communities (Tsareva 2015, 97). The Second Civil War in Libya, which itself had previously taken Syrian migrants, forced many refugees from the countries of North Africa and Libya to change their desired country of residence to Italy. Comparatively simple way to get settled in Italy: according to the Dublin Agreement, registration or application for asylum must take place in the first EU Member State that the refugee has entered.

③ The immediate causes of the crisis in Italy, due to a sharp increase in the number of Syrian refugees, are: Lack of funding: the Italian budget was calculated without expenses for maintaining the refugees; Lack of a unified concept for the reception and distribution of refugees across EU countries

(Terrorism in the modern world 2016, 46); Lack of free housing and lack of staff for registering refugees, border control and escort police officers, interpreters.

### **2.2.2. Adaptation of joint rules for solving problems**

Against the background of the developing European crisis, Italy found itself in extremely disadvantageous position compared to other countries of the Europe Union due to its geographical position.<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Thus, Italy automatically becomes the first entry country for all migrants arriving there. According to the Dublin agreement, it is the first-arrival countries that is responsible for all accepted migrants. The Dublin Regulation defines the responsibility of an EU member state to examine an asylum application in order to avoid a situation in which applicants ask many EU countries for asylum, or a situation in which no state assumes responsibility for the applicant. By default (if no family or humanitarian grounds are submitted), the applicant must send a request for asylum to the first EU member state in which he entered and in which his finger prints were taken.

If the applicant moves to another state from the list of EU members, they can deport him back to the first state he entered. Because of this provision, the Dublin Rules were strongly criticized, as it imposes on EU member states located on borders (Italy, in particular) too much responsibility for asylum seekers instead of developing a system sharing burden between EU states (Yazkova 2014, 44-48).

The main problem caused by migrants was not their influx, but the lack of solidarity to adopt joint rules for solving problems of their settlement, which lead to significantly uneven load on the migration services of individual countries in Italy. As a result, the massive influx of migrants threatens the existence of the Schengen Agreement, and the contradictions between the EU countries on the resettlement of migrants deepen the split in the European Union.


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<sup>\*\*\*</sup> Italian islands are the nearest to the shores of Libya and Tunisia. And if it is in good weather, boats from Tunis can reach to the Italian islands within an hour and a half, and from the Libya coast – three hours (<http://ru.euronews.com/2013/11/15/Lampeduza-the-forgotten-island>).

The number of illegal immigrants who arrived in Italy since 2014 differs significantly from official statistics: for example, the Frontex agency that is responsible for the security of the borders of the EU countries claims that only in 2016 there were about half a million (510,000) illegal crossings of the EU borders. Most illegal immigrants seek to get to Europe from the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. According to the same agency, the border services managed to somewhat reduce the flow of illegal migrants: in 2015 there were more than a million attempts (1,000,230) to enter Europe illegally.\*\*\*\*

In 2019 the Frontex (European Agency for the Protection of External Borders), estimating statistics on illegal crossing of the EU borders by migrants, stated that in 2018 150,411 cases of illegal crossing of the EU external borders were recorded.\*\*\*\*\* The figures decreased by 27 percent compared with 2017 (112,740). The reduction is registered for the third year in a row. (See Diagram 1)

<Diagram 1> Statistics on illegal crossing of the EU borders by migrants (2015-2018)



In 2018, 23,000 people entered the country in this area – 80 percent less than in 2017. This suggests the need for further support for the work of Frontex by the European Union (<http://gosnovosti.com/2019/01>). However, the extension of the border service is questionable: at the end of October 2018, the German government expressed its doubts about the possibility of

\*\*\*\* The peak of refugee status petitions came in 2015, but these figures show only the number of official appeals to the Italian migration services and do not reflect the reality of refugees (<http://zaganportal.ru/spravochnaya/emigraciya/migranty-v-evrope.html>).

\*\*\*\*\* The Frontex Director, Fabrice Leggeri, pointed out; however, that one should not speak of an "acute crisis" in this case (<http://gosnovosti.com/2019/01>).



significant increase in the number of Frontex employees in the near future. However the proposal to increase the staff of Frontex to 10 thousand already in 2020 is a tremendous task. Therefore, it is favorable longer and gradual process of expansion of the border service against this background.

## **2.3. Lampeduza: challenges and dangers of the largest transit island**

### **2.3.1. Lampeduza in the Mediterranean Sea**

The island is one of the largest transit points for many illegal Syrian immigrants since 2013 up to 2019, who regularly arrive at Lampeduza in crowded boats in hope of moving to Italy and then to other European countries, and starting a new life there. Hundreds of them die during such voyages.\* After October 2013, Italy introduced the Mare Nostrum rescue program, for which 9 million euros were allocated monthly. 900 militaries, 32 sea vessels and an aircraft participated in the operation every day. In total, 150.000 people were saved.\*\* In 2014, at least 218,000 migrants crossed the Mediterranean Sea in various boats, and about 3,500 people drowned during a transport crash.\*\*\*

The Refugees Center at Lampeduza experiences difficulties because of non-stop influx of Syrian refugees.\*\*\*\* Within 2014–2016 more than 320,000 refugees arrived to the island. Most of them, violating EU law, moved further north. In the first five months of 2016, about 31,000 migrants arrived in Lampeduza, and it was obvious that the camp was not able to cope with the number of refugees. The camp was originally designed for first aid, that is, people cannot stay here for more than three days. According to the rules, they must then go to the appropriate authorities (Sicily), where they can ask for political asylum. European legislation, in particular the Dublin Agreement,

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\* Lampeduza is a small Italian volcanic island in the Mediterranean Sea, 205 km from Sicily and 113 km from Tunisia, with the area of 20.2 km<sup>2</sup> with the local population of around 6300 people. In 2013, 32,000 migrants sailed to the island, while more than 400 people died in shipwrecks in October 2013 alone (<http://www.island-on-map.ru/Lampeduza.html>).

\*\* In November 2014, the program was replaced by the Triton patrol operation. The Italy border was controlled by 19 EU countries with the help of two ships, 4 patrol vessels, 2 airplanes and a helicopter (<http://www.island-on-map.ru/Lampeduza.html>).

\*\*\* In April 2015, a boat with 700 to 950 illegal immigrants got shipwrecked 70 miles from the island, and only 28 people were found alive (<http://business-swiss.ch/2018/07/italija-rashody-na-socialnuju-industriju/>).

\*\*\*\* <http://ru.euronews.com/2013/11/15/Lampeduza-the-forgotten-island>

defines the EU country responsible for granting official status to refugees. Usually this is the first European country where they arrive at Italy (<http://www.dw.com/ru>).

Most refugees use a cargo ships, and if the weather is good, it takes a ship an hour and a half from Tunis to the island, from the coast of Libya – it takes three hours. The Coast Guard should always be on the alert for the rescue operation to begin within 30 minutes. A well-trained team works there and they can come to aid within 10–15 minutes after the disaster signal.\*\*\*\*\* In October 2013, the Italian government announced the start of a maritime operation (Mare Nostrum): to help the Italian authorities, the European Commission promised to allocate extra 30 million euros. Since then, at least 3,000 people have been saved. At present all the migrants are a kind of hostages of Lampeduza. Many of them do not want to stay in Italy, dreaming of getting to Northern Europe. But European legislation does not allow them to do it legally.

Discontent of Lampeduza inhabitants is growing. Local people feel helpless at the senseless death of refugees, poor conditions in the migrant camps, scandalous headlines of newspapers, which threaten the reputation of the island and tourism business of the local people. Fear of the economic future of 5,000 inhabitants of the island is aggravated by the fear of a new refugee influx and increasingly tangible danger from Islamist terrorists. The inhabitants of the island are not to blame either for the deaths of the refugees or the conditions under which they are held in temporary camps. 5,000 local residents also complain a lot of difficulties they experience because of the refugees. Italian government does nothing to improve the situation.

The difficult situation of migrants on the island, the lack of the most necessary things – drinking water, food, everyday items – is aggravated by long waiting periods. This provokes discontent on the part of the refugees, and, as a result, conflicts with the Italian authorities (<http://ndnews.it/ru/468537.html>). The official communiqué of the Italian Navy notes that “onboard the Italian Navy ships involved in patrolling the

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\*\*\*\*\* Lieutenant ‘Umberto Castronovo’ commenting on the situation, said that it was military operation because it involved military specialists and equipment, and at the same time, a humanitarian operation, because the main goal was to increase the level of safety at sea. The ship graveyard at Lampeduza serves as a constant reminder of death and tragedy. In October 2013, more than 350 people died as a result of the shipwreck and 150 refugees were rescued (<http://business-swiss.ch/2018/07/italija-rashody-na-socialnuju-industriju/>).

Mediterranean Sea as part of “Mare Nostrum” Operation, when taking on board immigrants, a special unit (“San Marco” Navy brigade and several female officers) carries out a personal inspection, and their duties include returning items that do not pose a danger to their rightful owners, without any exemption.

In November 2013 Syrian refugees went on a hunger strike at Lampeduza.\* Protesters were dissatisfied with the living conditions. Syrian refugees, who were in a special camp at Lampeduza, went on a hunger strike to protest against the Italian authorities’ delays on decision about their fate. By that moment the protesters had spent more than a month at the Lampeduza Distribution Center. According to them, they were tired and did not know what to expect from local authorities.

### **2.3.2. The migration crisis in Lampeduza**

The migration crisis is doing its job, and in 2019 the prices for Lampeduza hotels are generally lower than on other Italian islands. Many of the migrants are minors without parents and relatives. According to the Italian intelligence services, in 2016 there were about 500,000 people in various refugee camps in Libya, and at least half of them were willing to take a chance and go to Europe by sea. In addition, the view is widely discussed that Islamist terrorists are forcing people to flee in order to destabilize the situation in Europe. There are also fears that terrorists could enter Europe among refugees. Italy has got into the top three countries, with the highest number of cases of illegal crossing by the Syrian refugees of the borders of the European Union. In 2015 illegal migrants 157,022 crossed the Mediterranean Sea to Italy.\*\*

Due to its geographical position, Lampeduza has always attracted the attention of migrants from North Africa and was considered so-called ‘door to Europe’. Local people did not feel discomfort until 4 years ago, due to the government decision, when more than 6,000 refugees were brought to the island within one month. This situation was undoubtedly an emergency, from

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\* Syrian refugees went on hunger strike on Lampeduse Protesters dissatisfied with conditions of detention ([http://lb.ua/world/2013/11/08/239570\\_siriyskie\\_bezhentsi\\_obyavili.html](http://lb.ua/world/2013/11/08/239570_siriyskie_bezhentsi_obyavili.html)).

\*\* Most of refugee in the world was from Syria, the majority of Syrians who left their country lived in Turkey (3.6 million), Lebanon (968.100) and Jordan (667.200) (Eurostat, <http://www.island-on-map.ru/Lampeduza.html>).

that moment on, Lampeduza\*\*\* became a symbol of migration. Tourism was strongly affected by the situation. The way of crossing sea borders is the same: on the Libya coast smugglers load migrants into old fishing boats without engines.

There are first aid migration centers in Italy (CPSA). One of them is located in Lampeduza, where people are given first aid, the personnel collect personal data, and migrants are given the opportunity to request refugee status. Subsequently, foreigners are transported to other migration centers outside the island.

By 2019 illegal migration has severely undermined the tourism business of the island. Lampeduza was once famous for its beautiful beaches, but is now better known as a place of illegal migrants to Tunisia entering Europe. In fact, a huge number of refugees create an objective danger to tourists. Obviously, tourists in Sardinia or Sicily feel more secure (<http://www.island-on-map.ru/Lampeduza.html>). From 2013 to 2018, the number of flights to Lampeduza was greatly reduced.

### **3. Economic, Social and Cultural Integration: Challenges and Issues**

#### **3.1. Difficulties and problems of forced migration**

##### **3.1.1. The problem of governance on immigrants**

The main difficulties that Italy is experiencing are as follows: 1) the lack of funds – there are not enough funds to allocate for illegal immigrants and refugees' maintenance\*\*\*\*; 2) the absence of agreement on migration issues within the European Union – a unified strategy for the reception and distribution of immigrants has not been developed; 3) the lack of suitable housing – there are not enough special camps or accommodations for refugees; 4) The lack of necessary human resources, including volunteers, police, border guards, translators Furthermore, Syrian refugees started to arrive in Italy in 2012.\*\*\*\*\* More than 24,000 refugees from Syria asked for

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\*\*\* The tourism island of Lampeduza developed successfully, but the situation changed dramatically in 2011 (<http://italiareport.com>).

\*\*\*\* <http://zaganportal.ru/spravochnaya/emigraciya/migranty-v-evrope.html>

\*\*\*\*\* e.g., in August 2012, a fishing vessel with refugees was intercepted by the Italian coast guard and escorted to

asylum in the EU countries in 2012 according to the official data of the European Union.\* In 2013 their number increased: Syrians, trying to get to Italy illegally, flooded the coast of Sicily. At any time, the island, being very near the war-ridden region, could get on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe. In fact and according to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the period between Januarys to September of 2013, more than 3 thousand Syrian refugees arrived in Italy. After the Sicilian Syracuse faced a shortage of financial and structural funds,\*\* they had to spend considerable amounts of money in order to cope with this crisis. Nevertheless, municipal authorities' budget was not enough to cover all the expenses. Everything happened not because of the limited budget of the communes, but mostly because of the particular fund lack. The Italian local cities administrations insisted that the problem could be solved together because solitary efforts were not enough. Besides, Some government agencies 'the Umberto I Center in Syracuse (or the center)', which was initiated by Pope Francis had to take in and support young Syrian children who came to Italy alone, without relatives. Moreover, supporting one minor immigrant costs the city treasury approximately 2 thousand euros per month. However, there were hundreds of such children in Italy, and the figures became alarming.

It was necessary to reconsider the attitude towards the problem of immigrants, and to not perceive their arrival as an extraordinary event. On the contrary, it was important to create a centralized mechanism for receiving asylum-seekers even before their arrival.\*\*\* All Sicilian organizations were encouraged to participate in the process of creating new institutions that provide proper admission to immigrants, often following further to other European countries.

It is necessary to state that not all EU countries approved this idea. As a matter of fact, in August 2013, Malta completely refused to accept more than 102 illegal migrants rescued from the sinking boat by the "Salami" tanker crew. The island authorities, despite the European Union indignation, did not

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the "Crotone port in southern Italy

(<http://azerros.ru/news/5378-siriyskie-bezhency-pribyvayut-v-italiyu.html>).

\*<http://italia-ru.com/forums/vse-ob-italii/novosti-italii/italiya-otnesetsya-siriiskim-bezhentsam-gumanno-86714>

\*\* The mayor wrote to Italian Prime Minister Enrico Letta, insisting on "emergency intervention." He said that Syracuse had found itself in the same situation as all Sicilian cities (and other South European cities) were facing that time.

\*\*\* <http://italia-ru.com/forums/vse-ob-italii/novosti-italii/italiya-otnesetsya-siriiskim-bezhentsam-gumanno-86714>


permit the landing, arguing that the immigrants (among whom there were four pregnant women), were not in danger. So, it was obvious that the problem of refugees became pan-European. In no case should the host country be the only one deciding which immigrants have the priority to stay over others. There is no doubt that the Malta incident seriously violated international norms. On the other hand, it is also necessary to measure reasonably the possibilities of such miniature countries such as Malta or Cyprus. According to the UN Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), within several months of 2013, more than 8,000 refugees have moved to the Italian and Maltese coasts. Malta is a small island with an area of 315 square kilometers, where less than 400 thousand people live, therefore, such migration flows negatively affect its livelihoods. However, for its refusal to land immigrants, Malta, a member of the European Union, was subject to sanctions by the Court of European Communities and the European Court of Human Rights.\*\*\*\* This happened during the Arab Spring, and today we have witnessed a similar scenario unfolding against the backdrop of the Syrian conflict. The problem of immigration flows is a global phenomenon that should be discussed at a broad international level. Uncontrolled migrant movement causes numerous fatalities. In 2019 the UN presented information on the number of refugees crossing the Mediterranean, pointing out that the situation between Libya, Italy, and Malta was close to a catastrophe – on the way between Libya and Italy, every 15th refugee dies. In 2018, across the Mediterranean Sea, 117,000 refugees reached EU countries, with at least 2,275 drowned in the sea. Humanitarian organizations believe that the death toll is understated since not all bodies and boats can be found.\*\*\*\*\* On the whole the number of those who arrived to Europe by sea increased significantly (more than four times) within short period: in 2014, 216,000 such migrants were recorded, and in 2015 – 1,000,000. (See Diagram 2 and 3)

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
\*\*\*\* The geographic features of host countries should not be ignored in any way. Refugees who landed off the coast of Sicily in 2013 were mostly from Syria. It is not surprising that the immigration flow from countries, experiencing civil war or political crisis, is growing (<http://ubr.ua/ukraine-and-world/society/v-italiu-pribyli-bolee-3-tysiach-siriiskih-bejencev-251186>).

\*\*\*\*\* According to the UNHCR, in 2018 the number of refugees who died when crossing the Mediterranean Sea increased (proportionally). Especially difficult situation is on the route between Libya and Italy or Malta. In 2017, on this route, one refugee out of 37 died, then in 2018 there was already one out of 14 (<http://gosnovosti.com/2019/01>).

<Diagram 2> Number of migrants and refugees crossing the Mediterranean Sea to Italy (2014–2018)



<Diagram 3> Number of refugees drowned while crossing the Mediterranean to Europe (2014–2018)



But even the danger and the risk of drowning on the way to the desired destination which is Europe does not stop people fleeing from war. Hope for a better life in Europe and the opportunity to get specific refugee benefits encourage migrants to risk their lives.

Staying on the territory of Italy, the same as any EU countries as a refugee has a number of indisputable advantages for Syrians, fleeing from war and violence, including:\* ① a minimum of preparation for moving, that is, there is no need to specially prepare a lot of supporting documents, prove availability of funds for living, demonstrate language knowledge, etc.; ② opportunity to submit an asylum request immediately after crossing the state border and the right to get certain benefits immediately after submitting the application while waiting for migration services decision; – right to a social package, including, as a rule, cash allowances, medical care, utilities, etc.; – confidentiality of information about the applicant; – absence of requirement of exit the previous citizenship; – ability to carry family members with them; – possibility (in the

\* <http://zagranportal.ru/spravochnaya/emigraciya/migranty-v-evrope.html>

future) to obtain citizenship of one of the EU countries.

### **3.1.2. Influx of refugees and conditions of asylum**

The growing influx of Syrian refugees to Italy was caused not only by conflict situation inside Syria, but at the same time, this suggested tougher conditions of asylum in the regions. In September 2013, when around 3,300 Syrian refugees arrived in Italy in search of asylum, Adrian Edwards, representative of the UN High Commissariat for Refugees

The growing influx of Syrian refugees to Italy was caused not only by conflict situation inside Syria but at the same time, this suggested tougher conditions of asylum in the regions. In September 2013, when around 3,300 Syrian refugees arrived in Italy in search of asylum, Adrian Edwards, representative of the UN High Commissariat for Refugees\*\* commented on the situation: "We are witnessing a change of the situation in Egypt over the past months, which has led to the tightening of visa control. This has caused some Syrian refugees to flee to other countries". According to him, the majority of Syrian refugees arrived in the Italian island of Sicily from Egypt. A. Edwards pointed out that in total since the beginning of 2013 about 4.6 thousand Syrian refugees arrived in Italy. In 2012, the number of refugees from Syria to Italy was 369 people for the entire year. "The growing influx of refugees is a sign of a conflict situation inside Syria, but at the same time, this suggests tougher conditions for asylum in nearby regions," Edwards stated, noting that this situation was linked to the tightening of asylum conditions in Egypt.

In September 2013 Italian sailors rescued about 500 Syrian refugees who arrived from Egypt in two leaking boats. The first group of 170 Syrian refugees was rescued by Italian coast guard officers during evening duty. It happened 50 kilometers away from the Calabria coast just at the moment when the boat of refugees began to leak. Among the refugees, there were about 50 women with small children. Another ship carrying about 320 refugees also almost sank 120 kilometers away from the coast of Sicily. The merchant ship appeared on the horizon quite on time – panic had already

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\*\* <http://ubr.ua/ukraine-and-world/society/v-italiu-probyli-bolee-3-tysiach-siriiskil-bejencev-251186>



begun onboard due to the incoming water.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports (have reported) that between August–September 2013, 3,300 Syrian refugees arrived in Italy from Egypt.

The Italian authorities had even more shocking statistics: within 2012 about 360 Syrian refugees arrived in the country, in 2013 there were already more than 4,600 people.

All these people were forced to flee from Egypt, due to the difficult political situation within the country. During the rule of the ousted president Mohammed Mursi, the Syrians were welcomed, but later on they were seen as enemies and supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.

### **3.2. Economic, social and cultural integration of Syrian refugees in Italy**

Although Italy has not developed a refugee integration program yet, material assistance is provided to everyone in need. In addition refugees can also expect to receive free medical care, and their children can go to public school institutions and kindergartens (<http://lgotypro.ru/bezhency-v-italii/>). Given the ever-increasing number of refugees and migrants stream drain finances of the Italy. And vouch for providing assistance to those who really are proven to have to right to stay in the country.\*\*\*

In some cases, refugee centers in Italy have become a profitable business for their owners. In Italy, during the first months each refugee is given an allowance of 18 euros per day. So, all the costs must be reduced to the European level, and all centers for refugees and organizations that provide housing to refugees on behalf of the state should be thoroughly checked.

The National Anti-Corruption Bureau should also be involved in the allocation of costs for refugees. Italian government intends to allocate money for the integration of only those migrants who have received refugee status. In Italy, there are over 130,000 illegal immigrants, whose refugee status

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\*\*\* In 2019, according to Italian Vice Prime Minister, Matteo Salvini, Italy will have to cut down the relevant costs on social industry making the first step to fight against the migration chaos (<http://business-swiss.ch/2018/07/italija-rashody-na-socialnuju-industriju/>)

applications for may still be pending for up to two and a half years. Despite this, they still receive benefits and integration assistance (<http://nomad.su/?a=3-201901300020>).

The network of structures for the migrants' placement in Italy is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, and in towns that is the responsibility of the Social Protection Department to work with them. For refugees in Italy there are subordinated to the Ministry of Internal Affairs\*\*\*\* of reception centers (CPSA, CDA, CARA, CIE). In CPSA – first aid centers (for example, in Lampeduza), – those refugees who have just arrived, they are photographed and registered, and they can demand international protection.

<Table 2> Reception centers for refugees and migrants in Italy


Center	Function	Location	Period of Stay
CPSA	First Aid and Reception Centers	Lampeduza Otranto (Lesse) Pozzallo (Ragusa)	3 days
CDA	Reception Centers (for a short stay)	Ancona, Rome, Foggia, Bari, Brindisi, Lecce, Crotone, Catania,	A few days
CARA	Reception Centers for Asylum Seekers	Ragusa, Caltanissetta, Lampeduza, Trapani, Cagliari, Gorizia, Milan	35 days
CIE	Centers for Identification and Expulsion	Turin, Rome, Bari, Trapani, Crotone, Caltanissetta, Restinco (Brindist)	90 days

Further, depending on their status, refugees are sent around to other CIE, CDA or CARA centers. CDA are reception centers where migrants stay for a short period of time, while they are in the process of passing identification. CARA is a reception center for asylum seekers. There are also identification and expulsion centers (CIE). The period of stay in the centers varies sufficiently. (See Table 2)

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\*\*\*\*<http://thequestion.ru/questions/102441/kak-prokhorit-zhizn-bezhencev-v-italii>

<Diagram 4> Number of refugees and migration centers in Italy(2015-2016)



On the whole, Italy, recognizing the role of the German chancellor in finding a solution to a common problem, is blocking the opening of new reception centers, which the EU is asking for. In such centers, migrants will need to be identified and photographed, but until the rules on the refugees' transfer to other states are established, Italy is not in a hurry to build such centers, because it is afraid that the migrants will keep living on its territory (<http://regnum.ru/news/1973897.html>).

Pending the government decision, the Italian Ministry of the Interior sent a circular to the local authorities through the prefectures requesting the development of regional quotas for foreigners' accommodation of in free hotels and campgrounds. This decision can lead to a disastrous outcome, if it comes to suspending the Schengen Treaty, in accordance with the request of several EU members, among which Hungary stands out. In 2017, The Italian Ministry of the Interior presented the "National Integration Plan" for non-economic migrants which includes: learning Italian, respecting the law, starting from the Constitution, participating in the economic and social life of the country (<http://regnum.ru/news/polit/2327502.html>).

There was a risk that the obligation to assimilate might cause the processes of de-culture of foreigners, generating, especially in the second and third generations, a feeling of exclusion from public life (<http://regnum.ru/news/polit/2327502.html>). The refugee integration program was funded from European funds and defined a number of priorities: support for inter-religious dialogue, mandatory participation in language courses, the right for education, strengthening the rights of migrants affected by smugglers. In order to fight against the "risk of Islamophobia" (Boartnikov

2016, 73–77), it was planned to implement a national “Islamic pact” by forming imams and opening new religious buildings with conditions of “full transparency of financial flows.” On the whole, the plan suggested that Muslims living in Italy should share the values of the country they live in, the values of which “are not negotiable”.

.Actually, refugees can become an asset to Italy in terms of labor resources and an opportunity for economic recovery (<http://regnum.ru/news/1973897.html>).\*\*\*\* In contrast to the transit way of life in the migration centers, the small town of Camino, in southern Italy, facilitated a sense of normality for Syrian people, while the continuous influx of refugees was perceived as a problem for most European countries.

## **4. Key Points of Resolution of Migration Process**

### **4.1. Approved Immigration legislation**

All refugees took from boats as part of the mission were delivered to Italian ports until 2018. However, the new populist government in Rome announced that Italy would no longer intend to be the only country to receive refugees rescued at sea within the framework of “Sophia”.\* Rome considers unacceptable the provision enshrined in this mission mandate that Italy alone is obliged to accept those rescued at sea.

In November 2018 Italian Parliament approved immigration legislation that was previously approved by the Senate (<https://www.dw.com/ru>). According to Salvini’s decree, the granting of a residence permit for humanitarian reasons would be severely restricted. Refugees were planned to be resettled in large reception centers. Migrants recognized as dangerous would be deported.

It should be noted that despite all these disagreements within the EU, the EU countries take a completely different position than the United States.\*\* In the European Union, this is probably not going to happen – primarily because the EU feels bound by international humanitarian law and does not express a

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\*\*\*\* An example of such an asset is the situation with the Italian town Camini, which was revived by Syrian refugees (<http://islamdag.ru/node/43775>).

\* Foreign Minister Enzo Moavero-Milanese (<https://www.dw.com/ru/>).

\*\* President Trump declares that migrants should be returned to the countries from where they came, without trial, almost momentarily.

desire to revise them.

Italy, despite all its protests and radical proposals, has never questioned the norms of existing international law and believes that these norms must be respected.

## **4.2. Problems and Solutions within EU**

### **4.2.1. The solution of complicated problems**

Italian authorities associate the main prospects for resolving the current situation with Syrian refugees with the solution of several complicated problems: ① re-settlement of accepted Syrian refugees from Italy to other European countries (for the beginning of 2019 only 5% of all migrants were distributed from the first entered country to other EU countries); ② lifting the ban for “secondary movement” of Syrian refugees to other European countries (according to the regulations, migrants to EU without documents approving financial guarantees are not allowed to move further to the territory of the EU, and must stay in the first entered EU country); ③ creating “hotspots” (refugees centers) all around the EU territory, not only on the territory of the first entered country (Italy); ④ creating so called “EU coastal zone”, so that all migrants entering this zone are distributed among all the EU countries before they step on Italian territory.

In June 2018, at the Brussels summit all these problems in Italy were discussed by the EU countries’ heads and governments, and the parties reached compromise on refugees reception issues. Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, insisted on not signing the communique on the meeting results, until there was certainty on this issue, and put forward his plan for solving it. As a result of negotiations, almost all the requirements of the Italian government were satisfied. There were key points for which Italy have diverging positions from other EU countries.\*\*\*

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\*\*\* During the negotiations, Italy achieved that point to be corrected like “migrants arriving in Italy were considered arriving in the EU,” that is, the collective responsibility of the EU countries was recognized. According to Giuseppe Conte. “Italy is not alone any more in this issue” ([http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/yabloko-razdora-bezhentsy/?sphrase\\_id=72959](http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/yabloko-razdora-bezhentsy/?sphrase_id=72959)).

#### 4.2.2. The key points on discussion

The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Italy suggested the decision after recorded a decline in the number of Syrian refugees arriving in the country by the August 2018 (<http://ria.ru/20180912/1528425778.html>). Those included some key points targeting to increase the number of people to return to Syria, but the situation in Italy still remains very tense.

The first point of the migration policy concerned Italy's proposal to designate so-called "coastal zone of the European Union" as a whole, but not each country separately. Thus, all migrants entering this zone should be distributed to the EU countries. This implies complete and radical revision of the Dublin Agreement, which is currently in force. Currently, in accordance with Dublin, the country of first entry was responsible for the migrants arriving in it, providing them with asylum, and was accounted for everything that happened with the refugees further. The summit also discussed the possibility of revising the Dublin Agreement.

The second point was refugee reception centers ("hot spots"). At present, the country of the first entry must identify refugees, as they often arrive without documents. However, Germany and France advocate that such reception centers serve not only the primary identification center, but also the places where migrants are waiting for a decision to grant him refugee status. This proposal was refused by Italy, because it would lead to the overflow of these centers – those who are arriving would be added to those who were denied refugee status and who are awaiting expulsion from the country.\*\*\*\*

The third point on opinions diverged was so-called "secondary movement" of migrants – when they move from the first entry country to countries with better stay conditions, to Germany, Austria, France. In accordance with the current Schengen agreement, to which France and Germany appealed, refugees, include citizens of any other countries, are not allowed to enter the Schengen zone, as they need proof of ownership or some kind of financial guarantee. Of course, they do not have such documents. So they have no right to cross this zone, but must remain in the country of the first entry.

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\*\*\*\* Italy insists that such "hot spots" should be in different countries of the European Union, as well as in African countries, in particular, in Tunisia, in Libya  
([http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/yabloko-razdora-bezhentsy/?sphrase\\_id=72959](http://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/yabloko-razdora-bezhentsy/?sphrase_id=72959)).

Italy was categorically opposed to this position, and Germany and France supported it, because they wanted to minimize the flow of migrants to their territories. Admittedly, over the past two years, the flow of secondary movement to Germany and Austria has decreased by almost 90%. Nevertheless, they would like to avoid this completely, by tightening borders control.

The fourth point concerned the repatriation of those migrants who were denied refugee status. Here, the positions of all EU countries converged: it is necessary to increase the number of returned refugees.\*\*\*\*\* The countries of origin are not always ready to accept migrants back, or, are willing to accept less than the EU is ready to send. Today, only 35% of migrants who are denied refugee status are able to return to their countries of origin. EU countries believe that in 2019 this figure should be increased to 70%.

The fifth point of disagreement is so-called "immigrants". Resettlement of refugees, that is, their distribution across EU countries, is proposed in accordance with four criteria: the country's GDP, the number of its population, the number of unemployed in the country, and the number of already accepted migrants. Thus quotas are formed. Italy, France and Germany on this issue are a united front; they support the distribution according to these criteria. The migration burden of Italy would be reduced, if this scheme worked. But by 2019, based on the four criteria, Italy had already been exceeded by 150% of the refugees. In accordance with these quotas for the entire period from 2015 till 2019, only 5% of all migrants who arrived on the territory of the European Union were resettled. This figure is negligible in fact; the quota system does not work (Elena Alekseenkov 2018).

## 5. Conclusion

The migration crisis in Italy has become an example of the failure of the whole system created by the global beneficiary. As part of the EU projects, it was supposed to restrain the flow of refugees near the borders of the conflict zones. However, the migration crisis in Italy carries the risks of a geopolitical

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\*\*\*\*\* That didn't mean to issue more refusals in granting refugee status, but that, if a decision is made to deny the refugee status, such people could be guaranteed to be sent back. However, this issue largely depends on re-admission agreements with refugees donor countries.

weakening of the EU on the whole due to internal contradictions revealed by the crisis and deterioration in public security and the economic situation. This can be an important implication of this study for Korean society and modern history – national interests are at the core of the policies of any state, and only then numerous obligations under international treaties.

The large number of migrants actualizes the problems on their adaptation to local society that should resolve it eventually, including some institutional perspective. In this regard, such a model of cultural diversity management policy, which is a consequence of increased migration flows, is multiculturalism, the concept of which involves integration of various ethnic and racial groups into a single community while preserving and officially supporting their cultural identity. The government should pay attention to the issues of legalization and socio-cultural adaptation of migrants, creating special programs for labor migrants, pursuing a policy of protecting human rights in relation to migrants of both legal and illegal status.

Italy is taking extensive legislative measures to regulate migration, legalize migrants and organize the reception of refugees. The migration policy of Italy is not limited to only prohibitive measures and stricter control of entry. It is distinguished by its mobility and adequacy in relation to the constantly changing migration situation. However, the problem of illegal migration still remains acute. And it is relevant not only for Italian, but for even in the Korean society.



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# Saudi Vision 2030, Nationalism and Women<sup>1</sup>

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## Saudi Vision 2030 and Nationalism

Saudi Vision 2030, announced in April 2016, is a national plan that aims to diversify the Kingdom's economic structure and reduce dependence on oil revenue through the following three themes: "A Vibrant Society," "A Thriving Economy," and "An Ambitious Nation." The drastic decrease in oil revenues between 2014 and 2016 became a powerful driving force in the Saudi government's bid for economic diversification. Saudi Vision 2030 strengthens Saudi First nationalism in pursuit of national prosperity and security. Rejecting the previous paradigm of religious nationalism based on Wahhabism,<sup>2</sup> the policy has produced a "Saudi First" nationalist ideology (Al-Rasheed, 2017, 2018a; Duran, 2017; Ghattas, 2018; Jabbour, 2017; Karasi, 2015; Lall, 2018; Murphy, 2014). "Saudi First" nationalist ideology has political, religious, and economic implications, as it demarcates stronger boundaries between insiders and outsiders and creates real and fictional enemies both inside the country (e.g., the Muslim Brotherhood, foreign workers, and the Islamic State) and outside (e.g., Iran and Yemen's Houthi rebels). Murphy (2014) argues that the time when the state can use religion to enforce uniform social behavior and impede political action has passed.

Lall (2018) asserts that current Saudi nationalism has both softer and harder sides from a political perspective. On the softer side, the government has reinforced national arts and culture, whereas on the harder side, the government has aimed for regional dominance, especially through Saudi-led engagement in the Yemeni Civil War, to prevent the expansion of Iran's Shia Islam. Under Saudi First nationalism, the traditional distinction of an enemy/a

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2 Unlike other majority Arab countries, which have, at times, adopted a form of secular nationalism to unite peoples of disparate religions, classes, ethnicities, and tribes during the post-colonial era, Saudi Arabia sought to create unity across the region through Wahhabism to gain political leadership and independence since 1932. The Al-Saud Family relied on Wahhabism's religious ideology as the main mechanism by which cultural, regional, sectarian, and tribal diversity could be subdued. Hitman notes that Wahhabism was a prominent component of Saudi people's national belonging. Saudi people constructed a new collective identity upon this religious tradition (2018, p.86-87). Hitman's argument reflects Al-Rasheed's (2013) concept of religious nationalism. She argues that Saudi Arabia's religious nationalism served "as an umbrella to construct a homogeneous nation out of a fragmented, diverse, and plural Arabian society," resulting in a "pious nation" (p. 16). With regards to gender issues within Saudi Arabia, Al-Rasheed asserts that it is not Islam itself but rather a tacit partnership between the ruling Al-Saud family and Wahhabi religious leaders that have manipulated the image of women to maintain a pious national image. Consequently, women have become the most visible symbols of Saudi Arabia's religious-national identity.

friend country has become ambiguous. For example, in 2017, the Saudi First policy led to a diplomatic rift with Qatar, as Saudi Arabia criticized Qatar for its alleged support for the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran. Such critiques are notable considering that Qatar was considered a brethren country with which Saudi Arabia shares cultural, religious, and political commonalities. In 2017, Saudi Arabia also implied the establishment of cooperative diplomatic relations with Israel, a country which has long been considered an enemy of the Arab world, with the intention of isolating Iran. By portraying Iran as an enemy who supports Houthi Shia rebels in Yemen, the Saudi government was able to legitimize its engagement in the Yemeni Civil War while strengthening internal unity. This reflects an emphasis on Saudi national identity before Arab or Muslim identity. By promoting the younger generation's Saudi-first national identity through Saudi Vision 2030, the Crown Prince aims to construct the youth as a homogenous identity that traverses internal tribal and regional divides. This approach appears to be effective: according to a recent Saudi Social Cohesion survey, which measures individual and collective feelings toward political, economic, socio-cultural and security issues, the Saudi national cohesion rate is over 84% (Al-Dahass, 2018). From a religious perspective, Saudi Vision 2030's declared shift towards moderate Islam — regardless of its real accomplishments or motivations — enables Saudi Arabia to differentiate itself from Iran, identifying Iran as a dangerous country that propagates a violent and extreme version of Islam (Duran, 2017).

Economically, the Saudi government has promoted the “Saudization” of the labor force to decrease the unemployment rate among Saudi youth, with a focus on increasing female labor force participation, after observing how youth unemployment in other countries undermined political stability during the Arab Spring. Furthermore, from a secular-nationalist perspective, foreign workers, who currently compose 38% of the total population, are seen as not only hampering national integration but also taking employment opportunities from local people. Therefore, the Saudi government has designated 12 private-sector industries as Saudi-only sectors beginning in January 2018 (*Arab News*, 2018). To regulate the entry of expats and their families into Saudi Arabia, the government introduced family tax in 2017, which caused many expats to leave Saudi Arabia (*Khaleej Times*, 2017). Expanding women's workforce participation is meant to increase the country's economic prosperity and reduce the unemployment rate among native Saudis as they move into positions vacated by expat workers. Various women-friendly policies have been put forward under Saudi Vision 2030's “A Thriving Economy” theme, which includes lifting the ban on women's driving and creating new jobs in new sectors for women. However, Saudi Vision 2030's reform policy has its limitations from a gender perspective, as it was derived not from the need for social evolution but from fiscal challenges.

### **Situating women within the Saudi Vision 2030's Nationalism and Creation of "New Women"**

The Saudi reform project pursued under the Saudi Vision 2030 seems especially favorable for women, shifting the role of women from inactive, private, and invisible to active, public, and visible. Among the many reform policies implemented since the declaration of Saudi Vision 2030 in 2016, lifting the ban on women's driving is one of the most remarkable changes. The ban on women's driving blocked women's freedom of movement and therefore, limited their access to employment, as they often could not find suitable transportation to work.<sup>3</sup> In addition to lifting the driving ban, the Crown Prince also declared that the *abaya*, the hallmark of conservative Islamic dress, was no longer necessary as long as female attire is "decent and respectful," a declaration which secured support from a Saudi cleric in March 2018 (*Gulf News*, 2018). Furthermore, in May 2018, Saudi Arabia's Council of Ministers passed for the first anti-harassment law for women, providing a maximum penalty of up to five years in prison and a fine of up to SAR 300,000 (approximately 80,000 USD). The law is intended to protect employed women who are now visible in public places. In addition, Shura Council members have proposed that compensation be paid to divorcees, as many Saudi women suffer from financial difficulties after divorce (Al-Qahtani, 2018). In 2019, guardianship law was relaxed in August 2019, as Saudi women were able to travel without male guardian's approval, to apply for passports, register a marriage, divorce or child's birth and be issued official family documents. It also stipulates that a father or mother can be legal guardians of children.

It is undeniable that the rights of Saudi women have increased under the shift from religious to secular nationalism embedded within Saudi Vision 2030. However, a gender perspective requires consideration of what image of women the Saudi government intends to construct. It appears the Saudi government promotes an image of "new women" who are assertive in terms of their economic contribution to and protection of their country. To meet Saudi Vision 2030's goal of increasing the female labor force to 30%, the government urges women to work in private-sector jobs traditionally occupied by expatriates. To bolster the private sector, the Labor Ministry has, as a pilot project, offered 400 women vouchers for the ride-hailing apps Uber and Careem, with the goal of serving up to 150,000 women by 2020. The government also no longer requires strict segregation in the workplace; companies can hire women to work side by side with men if they provide separate toilets, a security system, and a private room where women can pray (Al-Omran, 2017). Al-Rasheed (2018a) refers to the government's shift from emphasizing religious morality to economic prosperity as the emergence of "Saudi Homo Economicus," wherein women constitute an essential part of a nationalist project to build a prosperous country.

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<sup>3</sup> Women typically had to hire a foreign driver that cost around 1,105 USD per month. By lifting the ban on women's driving, households are spared driver expenses, and the realm of women's activities has been expanded. Women are now not only able to drive their children to school, but can also go shopping or visit the hospital by themselves. Male family members are also relieved from the burden of driving their female relatives around, which can interrupt their own working hours. Consequently, women's driving thus has both social and economic benefits.

Concurrently, Saudi Arabia's new nationalistic discourse seems still to carry with it a masculine image. The new image of Saudi women has been constructed to represent them as strong protectors of the nation, including as soldiers. Doaiji (2018) argues that Saudi Arabia has promoted "hazm" (decisive) nationalism alongside the country's "decisive" entry into the Yemeni Civil War in 2015. In the hazm nationalism, traditional womanhood, which was portrayed as "pious," has shifted to emphasize its nationalist and masculinist character. For example, female Saudi journalist Haifa al-Zahrani gained recognition when photographed at the frontlines of the Yemeni conflict wearing a military-style helmet and vest. This photograph helped to construct a militarized image of the nation and a strong "masculine" image of women. Doaiji argues that Saudi women are portrayed as "fulfilling a duty to the nation" within hazm nationalism (2018, pp. 130–131), a portrayal that coincides with Saudi Arabia's new policy allowing female soldiers into the army. Saudi women symbolize the Crown Prince's new nationalism and in this way, the once "invisible" Saudi women have thus emerged as "saviors" of the economy and "protectors" of nation.

### **The Limits of Women's Rights Reforms**

Despite the emergence of a new image of Saudi women under Saudi Vision 2030 reforms, these new reforms have limitations, as evidenced by the government's detention of women activists and the subsequent of Canadian-Saudi diplomatic dispute. Since early 2018, Saudi authorities have arrested more than a dozen leading women's rights activists, whom they accused of having had suspicious contact with foreign entities and receiving financial support to "destabilize the kingdom and breach its social structure and mar the national consistency" (El Sirgany & Clarke, 2018). Saudi authorities have accused several of those detained of serious crimes, branding them "traitors" rather than using the term "*kafir*" ("apostate" or "heretic"), which was predominantly used during the rise of religious nationalism in the 1980s and 1990s for people who strayed from religious norms, secularists, and intellectuals (Ghattas, 2018). Among those detained include internationally recognized women's rights activist Samar Badawi, a recipient of the United States' 2012 International Women of Courage Award, best known for challenging Saudi Arabia's discriminatory male guardianship system. She was one of the first women to petition Saudi authorities to allow women the right to drive as well as the right to vote and run in municipal elections (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

The arrest of Badawi caused a diplomatic crisis between Saudi Arabia and Canada.<sup>4</sup> When Samar Badawi was arrested, Canada's foreign minister, Chrystia Freeland, tweeted a request for her immediate release, adding that "Canada stands together with the Badawi

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<sup>4</sup> Badawi is the sister of Raif Badawi, a Saudi dissident blogger who has been imprisoned by the Saudi government since 2012 on charges of "insulting Islam through electronic channels" (Williams, 2018). Raif Badawi's wife, Ensaf Haidar, and their three children have been living in Quebec, Canada, since 2015 to escape further persecution, and they were given Canadian citizenship on July 1, 2018.

family in this difficult time (Baker, 2018).” The Saudi Foreign Ministry responded that the tweet was “an overt and blatant interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,” and demanded that the Canadian ambassador leave the country within 24 hours. Saudi Arabia also declared the suspension of “all new trade and investment transactions” between Saudi Arabia and Canada as well as the withdrawal of all Saudi students studying in Canada (Williams, 2018). These sanctions were efforts by the Crown Prince to control internal and external challenges to his leadership. By cracking down on social movements within Saudi Arabia, he sends the message to Saudis that there are limits to the new rights emerging under Saudi Vision 2030. The sanctions simultaneously allowed the Crown Prince to convey a message of non-interference to the international community, especially Western countries. Canada was thus a good target, as, in contrast to the US, it is not one of Saudi Arabia’s most important allies (Drezner, 2017).

The detention of women activists and its aftermath shows that although the situation of Saudi women is ostensibly improving under Saudi Vision 2030, the reforms have inherent limitations. It seems that the reforms empower women economically but continue to deny them voices and agency, as most women who were arrested were those who actively fought for women’s rights rather than taking a “wait and see” position. Tucker and Lowi (2018) state that Saudi Arabia’s detention of women activists reveals the narrow vision of gender reform, criticizing it as

...a state project designed and run with the interests of the rulers in mind. What apparently it does not want, or feel it needs, is an independent woman’s voice of any kind. The state will decide on the character and pace of reform, the state will be the sole spokesperson for reform.

This interpretation is consistent with Liou and Musgave’s (2016) argument, which stresses that reforms were derived not from the need for social evolution but from fiscal challenges. Ghattas (2018) similarly argues that the detention of female activists exposed “the crown prince’s much-touted reforms as nothing more than a sham.”

It is also noticeable that women not only have to obey the patriarchal government but also are controlled by the traditional code of honor and dignity of Saudi society. Saudi women can now attend sporting events, concerts, and movies alongside unrelated men, but if they violate the traditional honor code, they are still subject to severe punishment. A Saudi woman was arrested and sentenced to two years in jail after running on stage and hugging the popular male Iraqi-Saudi performer Majid al-Mohandis in Taif in July 2018 (McKernan, 2018). The limits to women’s rights make it clear that Saudi Arabia’s reform policies still aim to control and tame women. Women’s rights seem to be permitted only within the boundaries



demarcated by the government, with the message that these rights are not something women have gained through their own efforts, but privileges granted by the state's top down policy. Despite the limitation of the Saudi's reform on women's issues, it is undeniable that Saudi women would welcome and enjoy their new rights and roles as it opens and expands their realm of activity. Saudi's reform policy for women within the context of Saudi Vision 2030 and Saudi First nationalism will likely be continued as the government will need women's support to maintain the young Crown Prince's leadership as well as women's contribution in building a new nation.

Today, a growing number of Saudi women have become visible due to Saudi Vision 2030 and its gender reform policies. Saudi women's participation in the workforce, in addition to other newly granted rights, may slowly empower Saudi women in the future. However, if women do not maneuver between their traditional role and the new roles constructed under Saudi Vision 2030, the reforms may ultimately lead to a worsening of the position of Saudi women, as they will have the added burden of serving as an income earner in addition to their conventional roles of home manager, caregiver, and honor keeper. In other words, if the new perception of emancipated women is not accompanied by further social changes, Saudi women will be forced to obey the demands of both the formal public and informal private patriarchies, rather than experiencing a legitimate expansion of their rights and freedoms as equal partners in a new Saudi Arabia.

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# Muslim Minority in China

Mohamed Elaskary and Eun Kyeong Yun<sup>1</sup>

## I. Introduction

China has 23 provinces, four municipalities directly under the Central Government, five autonomous regions and two special administrative regions. Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region lies along China's northern border. Established on May 1, 1947, the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region was China's first autonomous region for a minority people. With its long history, Inner Mongolia is one of the birthplaces of Chinese civilization. It is dotted with cultural sites going back to the Paleolithic Era—the Dayao Culture, the Culture of the “Hetao People,” the Hongshan Culture, the Xiajiadian Culture and the Jalai Nur Culture. There are numerous sites bearing witness to prehistoric human activity— a Paleolithic Era stone implement making site, the earliest stone wall in China and cliff drawing in the Yinshan Mountains. History has seen a succession of ethnic groups on this land—Xiongnu (Huns), Donghu, Xianbei, Wuhuan, Chi-le, Turks, Dangxiang, Qidan (Khitan), Nuzhen (Jurchen), Mongols and Han Chinese, all of which contributed to a rich and colourful Chinese culture. In particular, with the unification of the various Mongol tribes by Genghis Khan during the 13<sup>th</sup> century, the Mongol people came onto the world stage, adding a further splendid chapter to the annals of the Chinese nation and its culture.

According to Gladney (2003, p. 452), Islam in China has been primarily been propagated over the last 1,300 years among the people now known as “Hui”. He states that according to the reasonably accurate 1990 national census of China, the total Muslim population is 17.6 million including Hui (8,602,978), Uyghur (7,214,431), Kazakh (1,111,718), Dongxiang (373,872), Kyrgyz (373,65), Salar (87,697), Tajik (33,538), Uzbek (14,502), Bonan (12,212) and Tatar (4873). Hui speak mainly Sino-Tibetan languages; Turkic-language speakers include the Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek and Tatar. The combined Turkic-Mongolian

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speakers include the Dongxiang, Salar and Bonan. However, many human rights organizations have been reiterating the fact that Chinese authorities have been repeatedly abusing human rights in predominantly Muslim regions of Ningxia, Gansu, and Qinghai. Muslims in Xinjiang, for example, have been banned (according to Sophie Richardson) from giving their babies Islamic names and from time to times police officers visit Muslim families to check whether they abide by the newly-introduced laws of forcing Muslim to assimilate into Chinese way of life and become less Islamic.<sup>2</sup>

Our aim here today is to reflect rather broadly upon issues of diversity and hybridity, and in particular to reflect upon attitudes to the diverse and the hybrid rather than venture into the knotty problems of definitions, or boundaries, or indeed the theoretical paradigms expounded by particular schools or particular thinkers. There is a public discourse, which thinks of diversity in terms of equality of provision, treatment and opportunity according to gender, sexuality, ethnicity. The assumption of cultural continuity, that there is a core Mongolian Muslim culture that can be preserved in a single reproducible form, is an ingredient in the establishment of the essentialism necessary for the defender viewpoint.

## **II. Muslims in China**

As we look into the subject of Muslim Chinese integration into the Chinese Society, the factor of human rights cannot be washed away. Sanders (1992, p. 516) states that Mongolian lawyer Badzarsad commented that under Article 16, Mongolian citizens would “enjoy rights and freedoms inconceivable a couple of years ago”. The sentiments of Sanders are echoed albeit remotely by Israeli (1981, p. 902) who states that among the minorities in China, national or otherwise the thirty million or more Muslims stand out as a unique case for good reasons. First unlike other minority groups, such as the Mongols, the Tibetans, and the Zhuang, the Muslims are not concentrated in any particular province. Citing Articles 4 and 6 of UN regulations, Sullivan (1988, p. 488) stipulates that States “are required to “make all efforts to enact or rescind legislation” and to take other effective measures to prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion or belief”. This is clearly what is not happening in China.

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<sup>2</sup> Sophie Richardson, “China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in Xinjiang,” *HRW*, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/24/china-bans-many-muslim-baby-names-xinjiang>, and “China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region,” <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region>, cite accessed on May 13, 2018.

We anticipate that the situation will worsen so as long as no measure are taken to make sure that everyone, not only Muslims, have their own freedom to choose their own religious preferences and have their human rights respected. In line with Hung (2010, p. 400), it might be pertinent here to refer to the fact that as early as 1949 Chinese authorities started to crackdown on any form of religious practices by banning what they termed “secret societies and superstitious sects”. By “secret societies and superstitious sects” the Chinese government meant all religions, whether it was Islam, Christianity or Judaism.

## **2.1 Trade**

The integration of Chinese Muslims is found within the parameters of trade. But let us first of all foreground this discussion. Mongolia consists mainly of a high plateau at the eastern end of the belt of open grassland or steppe which stretches across most of Asia between the latitudes of forty and fifty-degree north. Peers (2015, p. 27) observes that equally important was the role of long distance trade. This not only supported the city states of the silk road which connected China and the Mediterranean, but diffused precious metals and other goods among the nomads as tolls of tribute, or by stimulating demand for horses hides and other local products. The tribute exacted from China by nomad invaders often included items like silk and gold (Peers 2015, p. 31). This refers to the form of trade that is carried out within the Mongolian land. The pattern of trade as enumerated above is repeated with varying degree where each town or village presents its own specialty for sale.

Allsen (2001, p. 37) states that he even knows something of the individual merchants who made use of these impressive ships to bring East Asian wares to Iran. While as a field researcher he calls them ‘individuals’ these were actually Muslim traders. It is clear that Muslim traders played an active role in trade. In the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the Shaikh al-Islam Jamal al-Din Ibrahim ibn Muhammad al-Tibi the Mongol’s superintendent of taxes in Southern Iran and Iraq ran an extensive transcontinental trading operation from his base on the island of Qais in the Persian Gulf. This successful enterprise in the words of Vassaf, “was so managed that the produce [biza’at] of remotest China was consumed in the farthest West (p. 42). From other literary sources we know that the produce conveyed to Iran included spices, copper, sandalwood, pearl and other jewels. Textiles of course were also major item of import.

Commerce in Mongolia is a very important occupation and the Mongolian Muslims acquired a reputation of being hard nose business people. The trade and commerce involved large scale and small scale within and outside Mongolia. In the past and even present times, the large scale business is with the city of Hot and other parts of Mongolia and beyond. This involves strewing across the desert through what is popularly known as the silk road trade routes. Items traded on large scale are cattle, sheep, goats, rice, pepper, locally made salt. They also traded hand-made caps and gowns made with embroidery patterns. Traditional medicine such as herbs, roots, and leaves are also sold. Mongolian Muslims also bring items (for sale) from the southern part of Mongolia and beyond. Nowadays trade links moving with time changes are opening in Mongolia and the world at large where the universe is now a global village; and Mongolians Muslims are quick at grabbing such opportunities to their advantage. In recent times, trade with far distant places has taken a new trend due to the current wave of modernity and technology. Means of transportation has greatly improved where goods are conveyed in car, and by airplanes. Internet business is also gaining grounds.

Economy involved what an individual does to earn a living. Mongolian Muslims are industrious people and idleness is not tolerated amongst them. Below is an overview of this sector. Looking at Farming, in a lay man's language, farming is the occupation of tiling the soil in order to grow crops. The Mongolian Muslims practice two methods of farming which are traditional and mechanized which briefly we discuss below.

In the past, according to field researchers, traditional farming was done through the use of crude farming implements. These included hoe, rope, axe, sickle, cutlass and knife. However, it is important to mention that farming activity and use of implement was carried out in different ways based on the soil structure. While many books on Mongolian Muslims have continued to depict them as using crude farming implements, the truth of the matter is that many households have embarked on mechanized cultivation. The mode of mechanized farming is heavily reliant on the use of mechanized implements such as tractors, combine harvesters, threshing machines etc. In this type of farming, modern techniques are applied to boost yield and improve quality of the farm produce. Varieties of fertilizer and improved variety of crops are also used. Under this type of farming method, vast land is cultivated within short time which in turn saves time, money and energy in addition to good and healthy farm produce.



Nowadays, the application of these modern techniques is extended to dry season farming in which dams and other sources of water are utilized for irrigation. Through such technological advancement, the Mongolian Muslims are benefiting a lot in terms of creating job opportunities, reducing idleness, minimizing poverty and hunger; thereby boasting the economic well-being of those who live near such regions. Cosmo (2010, p. 14) observes that in Eastern Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, agriculture existed long before the Xiongnu period. Such non-Chinese people as the Rong, Di and Hu are often portrayed in the traditional historiography of ancient China as greedy, aggressive and acquisitive (Cosmo 2010, p. 1). According to an Arabic commercial handbook dating to the late ninth century, the Middle kingdom sent to the Muslim world silk, aromatics, porcelains, paper, ink, saddles, cinnamon (p.12). On some coins there are Arabic formula "Qa'an/the Supreme (p. 26). When Abaqa died in 1282 there was a certain amount of contention over the succession between Teguder, Hulegu's oldest surviving son, and Arghun, Abaqa's eldest son. In the end Arghun stepped aside thereby averting a military confrontation and possibly.

## **2.2 Social Culture**

Gladney (2003, p. 451) states that "many of the challenges China's Muslims confront remain the same as they have for the last 1,400 years of continuous interaction with Chinese society but some are new as a result of China's transformed and increasingly globalized society. The Mongolian Muslim social culture revolves around the concept of communal effort and tradition. This hinges on cooperation among members of the society where what befalls one (person) also affects every community member. To this effect, collective effort and approach are most often followed to tackle such problems in the interest of all (members).

There are also communal ties. The base line in this relationship is the fact the individuals concerned were born and raised in the same environment under the care and guidance of elders in the entire community. For this reason, the Mongolian Muslims consider a town's man as brother or sister in certain situations. From what has been said about social set up among the Muslim Mongolian people, one can figure out the significance of leadership and level of discipline and closeness among members of a community. This gives way for the communal desired goal. This way, the set up in Mongolian Muslim society is knitted in such a way that people are related in one way or the other. For this reason, heads are always put

together towards achieving a common goal for the betterment of the community and the society at large.

### **2.3 Dressing, weapons and Armour**

The traditional dress of the Mongolian Muslims consists of loose flowing gowns. The trousers are loose at the top and centre but narrow around the legs. They also put on caps and others tie a small turban round the cap. They also wear covered and half shoe or even ordinary slippers. The women tie wrappers with blouses and shawl around their necks or for covering their heads. The Mongol soldier was equipped in a simple but practical fashion for the harsh climate of his homeland though there does not seem to have been anything that we would recognize as a uniform (Peers, 2015, p.74). According to John de Plano Carpini, quoted by Peers (2015, p.74) he usually wore a long fur or sheepskin coat, a fur cap with earflaps, and boots. Martin for example compares the Mongol massacres with the 15,000 citizens of the Sung town of Tsao-Chia Pao killed by the Chin in 1218 and the 30,000 Hindus slaughtered by the Muslim conqueror Ala Ud-Din Khilji in 1303 (Peers 2015, p. 260). Rashid Ud-Din quotes the observations of a chief Sorkat of the Baya'ut clan on the various contenders for power in eastern Mongolia in the 1190s (p. 271). In fact, even during the period of mounting tension between the central government and the Muslim minorities in Inner Mongolia and even among the Uighurs regarding the *abaya*, the authorities adopted some ostensibly conciliatory moves such as establishing the "Chinese-Islamic Association" and allowing a few Muslims to go to Mecca for the Holy Hajj.

### **2.4 Literacy**

Mongolian Muslims use Arabic script as well as the pinyin. Long contact between the Arabs and the Mongolian Muslims through trade links, exploration and propagation or spread of Islam resulted into the Arabic writing systems apart from the Pinyin. Evidence of contact (between Arabs and the Mongolian Muslims) can be dated back to the 9<sup>th</sup> century. By the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the Arabic writing system was well established. The Arabic was used to record the Mongolian language and several other written histories.

Atwood (2004, pp 255-256) states that the Mongolian empire sparked some of the greatest historical writing in the Islamic world, particularly in Persian and these histories form

one of the most important bodies of data and interpretation about the Mongol empire. In his *al-Kamil fi'l Ta'rikh*, which covered world history to the year 1231, Ibn al-Athir described the initial Mongol invasions, viewing them as an unprecedented, almost uncanny, catastrophe to Islam. In 1204, after defeating and conquering the Naiman tribe, Genghis Khan began to adopt the use of the Uygur script to write the Mongol language and ordered the children of the nobility to learn the new script. Called the Turkic-Mongol script, it was the earliest form of the current Mongolian written language. During the period of the empire, official documents, letters, seals and inscriptions on the "Genghis Khan Stone," a stone tablet erected in 1224 and now kept in the St. Petersburg Museum of Fine Arts. On his part, Israel (1981,905) mentions the holiness of the Arabic script that remained central not only to the Chinese-speaking Muslims of the Northwest. Until 1956, the Uighurs of Xianjian used the Arabic alphabet. The Uighurs, the Kazakhs, the Kirghiz and the Uzbeks have evidently preserved their attachment to their holy script.

## **2.5 Religion**

Religion is a way or form of worship. Millions of Muslims live in today's China. They practice Islam as religion which was brought by Prophet Muhammad (as a messenger of God) through angel Jibril. Qur'an is the Divine Book (as well as the primary source of injunctions) and the *Hadith* is the secondary source of Islam in interpreting the verses of the Qur'an through sayings, deeds and silent approvals of the Prophet Muhammad. Beckerleg (1995, p. 23) says that an "assumption exists amongst anthropologists and development specialists that 'the more a society modernizes the less religious it will become'". She adds that religious movements are usually characterized as conservative and the antithesis of modernization, but this is not always the case. Inner Mongolia has always been an area with multiple religions, including Buddhism, (Tibetan and Chinese Buddhism), Taoism, Islam, as well as Christianity (Catholic, Protestant and Eastern Orthodox). There are 805 regular places of worship throughout the region—116 for Tibetan Buddhism, 45 for Chinese Buddhism, two for Taoism, 177 for Islam, 159 for Catholics and 306 for protestants. Religious followers number more than 900,000, accounting for 3.7 percent of the population, and there are 4,945 clerics. There are six religious organizations at regional level, namely: the Buddhist Association, the Islamic Association, the Patriotic Association of the Catholic Church, the Catholic Bishops College, the

Three-Self Movement Committee of the Protestant Churches, and the Christian Council. There are more than fifty religious bodies at the levels of leagues/cities and banners/counties. The autonomous region has a Buddhist school and a Catholic seminary, in addition to training classes for Christian volunteers. Among the prominent religious figures in the region, two hold posts as members of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), ten as members of the CPPCC regional committee. Temples, churches and mosques are to be seen in cities and farming and pastoral areas. Hothot, capital of the autonomous region, is renowned for ancient monasteries and mosques, which are an important part of this famous historical city. Among them are the Dazhao and Xiaozhao lamaseries, the Five-pagoda Temple and the Mosque.

Atwood (2004, p. 632) mentions Ghazan Khan, the new Muslim ruler of the Middle Eastern Il Khanate who destroyed churches, synagogue and Buddhist temples. In 1313, Ozbeg Khan seized power in the Golden Horde and executed emirs and Buddhist *baqshis* (teachers) who opposed his Islamization policy. The Mongols not only virtually exterminated Nizari Isma'ili believers but sought out and destroyed all copies of their books of which only fragments survive (Atwood, 2004, p. 256). No specific decrees are known for Christian and Muslim clergy, but in 1219 Chinghis Khan spared Samarqand's chief Islamic clergy and their dependents from the general pillage and in 1222 he was inquiring about traditions of Muhammad's life (Atwood, 2004, p. 469). He adds that at the same time, Islam had a significant presence, particularly among the Oirats. Both Esen Taishi and Bunyashiri Oljeitu Khan converted to Islam (Atwood, 2004, 408). Allsen (2001, p. 11) states that almost all of the major religious movements originating in the Middle East—Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity, Manichaeism, and Islam—reached China, while Chinese ideological systems made no inroads to the West. Naturally, the movements of religious and commercial goods across Eurasia brought a growing awareness and appreciation of distant and initially quite alien, artistic traditions (ibid).

Amitai-Preiss (1996, p. 2) writing on Ghazan Khan makes an interesting observation. He states that the conversion of Ghazan Khan to Islam in A.H. 694/A. D 1295 was an event of great importance for both Mongol ruling class and the Muslim subjects of his kingdom. He adds, thus, "Another area of Mongol Imperial culture which might have been influenced by Ghazan's conversion to Islam was his relationship to the Qa'an/Great Khan (1996, p. 6).

Amitai-Preiss further observes that Ghazan's Islam was a syncretistic faith and having converted, he maintained a belief in various aspects of Mongol custom and tradition, much of which explicitly contradicted the precepts of his new religion. This syncretism also characterized the Islam of the Mongols as a whole (1996, p. 9).

### III. Islamic viewpoint on nationhood

According to Lipman (1984, p. 289) Muslims arrived in China as early as the seventh century. They are referred to as Hui or Sino Chinese and the majority of not all of them are non-Han. Gladney (2003, p. 452) argues that Muslims in China are "the largest Muslim minority in East Asia" yet they are "the most threatened in terms of self-preservation and Islamic identity". Inter-racial and internal conflicts are not a rare community in our troubled world. In Asia, Africa, South America, and Europe, tensions, border and inter-racial issues are common. In this concern, Kären Wigen (1999, p. 1183) argues this the "old War has put regionalism back on the map" worldwide. When it comes to dealing with minorities, a nation has mainly two options: either to accommodate the needs and rights of minority/minorities or ignore this and instead oppress them. At the beginning, China opted for or was obliged for political reasons to opt for the first but recently China has been cracking down on the rights of minorities (not only Muslims) in many parts of the Chinese territories. Ironically enough, Raphael Israeli (1981) claims that no matter how China tolerates or oppresses its Muslim minority the outcome is the same: revolt. Israeli argues that:

the two opposite extremes of "crash integration" and "lax liberalization" have historically brought about the same result- the rise of Muslim separatism in China. The first instance, when the regime trespassed the threshold of a viable Muslim culture, the Muslims rose up in arms in defense of their patrimony. In the latter instance, when the opportunity presented itself, as in times of domestic relaxation, the Muslims also pressed their demands for cultural and even political autonomy if not outright political session. (p. 915)

Unlike Israeli and the handful researchers who argue that it is difficult for Muslims to integrate in China, Gladney (2003, p. 452) argues that Muslims can be part of the Chinese nation. In this regard, she states:

In China there were many attempts to reconcile Chinese culture with Islam, leading to a range of alternatives. At one extreme there are those who reject any integration of Islam with Chinese culture, such as Ma Wanfu's return to an Arabicized "pure" Islam. Conversely, at the other extreme, there are those leaders of the Gedimu, such as Hu Dengzhou, who accepted more integration with traditional Chinese society. Likewise, Ma Qixi's *Xi Dao Tang* stressed the complete compatibility of Chinese and Islamic culture, the importance of Chinese Islamic Confucian texts, the harmony of the two systems, and the reading of the Quran in Chinese.

In between, one finds various attempts at changing Chinese society to "fit" a Muslim world, through transformationist or militant Islam, as illustrated by the largely Naqshbandiyya-led 19<sup>th</sup>-century

Hui uprisings. The Jahriyya sought to implement an alternative vision of the world in their society, and this posed a threat to the Qing as well as to other Hui Muslims, earning them the label of "heterodox" (*xiejiao*) and persecution by the Chinese state. (p. 466)

Mao (2011) goes in the same vein arguing that Sino-Muslims have a unique viewpoint regarding Muslim integration into the Chinese society and being a part of motherland China. In the early twentieth century, both China and Japan tried hard to win over the minds and hearts of the millions of Muslims living in the East Asia region. Logically, Muslims themselves were divided into some affiliated with colonial Japanese while some others affiliated themselves with China motherland.

During the Japanese-Chinese tensions in the first half of the 20th century, both sides, argues Mao (2011, p. 380), tried to persuade the Muslim community to be on their side, to join them. In this regard, Mao (2011) states that:

Hoping to further advance the goal of the modernist movement to claim a rightful place for Muslims in the Chinese nation-state, many Sino-Muslims participated in anti-Japanese efforts .... In doing so they invoked a phrase from the Hadith, "Hubb al-watan min al-iman" or loving the country is loving the religion" which was first used in 1930 by Imam Wang Jingzhai. (p. 381)

Lipman (1984) and Kexun (1982) referred to the fact that many of Sino-Muslims are no less patriot than any other Chinese ethnicity. In this regard, Limpan (1984, p. 312) states that some Muslim Brotherhood members were well-known Chinese patriots who defended their motherland against Japanese aggressions. In the same vein, Mao (2011, p. 373), argues that as early as the 1930s Sino-Muslims advocated a unified Chinese nation which accommodates all communities regardless of their ethnicities or religions. In this regard, Chinese promised that the "five nationalities" – the Han, the Mongols, the Manchu, the Tibetans and the Muslims (or the so-called Hui) would enjoy equal citizenship and freedom of religion" (Mao 2011, p.376). So, Chinese Muslim delegations visited many Muslim countries in the 1930s, for example Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey, with the aim of refuting Japanese claims that Muslims would be better off if they joined Japan and at the same time promoting the Chinese cause for integrating Sino-Muslims in China rather than Japan (Mao 2011, p. 384). In 1938-39, a Chinese Muslim delegation (most of whom were Chinese students who studied Arabic and Islamic studies at Al-Azhar University in Egypt) travelled to Saudi Arabia to perform Hajj. and at the same time to promote the idea that it is for the benefits of Muslims to join China not Japan. Members of the delegation, according to Mao:

actively used their mission to advance a vision of the Chinese nation in which Muslims would play an important role in domestic and foreign affairs. This was based on a particular understanding of global politics which allowed Sino-Muslim elites to reconcile the transnational characteristic of Islam with loyalty to territorially bound "Chinese nation" (Mao 2011, p. 373).

From an Islamic point of view, one must abide by the laws and regulations of the country where he resides in either as a citizen or a guest let alone being loyal to his country to the extent that he/she would gladly lose his/ her life defending his/her homeland. Dying

while defending your country is the highest and most honourable death a Muslim can dream for; something which may elevate the participant to the position of a “*shahid*” (martyr). Muslims do not any problem integrating in any country where they live so al long they as their dignity and human are respected. If they suffer from sever problems or persecution in their homelands or elsewhere, Muslims are advised by God to seek refuge somewhere else where they can find better treatment. Yet, what we can add here is that loving one’s country is very Islamic tenet, but it is not to be taken for granted. Rather, it is a reciprocal relationship or bond between a nation and its citizens according to which people love their countries as so long as they and their rights are respected. On the other hand, people may hate their countries if they are marginalized or discriminated against.

According to Israel (1981, p. 902), their (the Muslims) “their daily validation of their membership in the universal umma is at the basis of Muslim ritual and one of the “pillars of Islam” is the tenet of Hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca-the Holy place of all Muslims.

This section is a brief review of China’s Human Rights abuses against its people in particular among the Muslim communities in Xinjiang semi-autonomous region. Other Foreign nationals too suffer though the question of Uighur suppression is dominant. It describes the various methods that demonstrate repression of the Uighur Minority Muslims in China. It assesses frankly the human rights abuses meted to them by the Chinese government, giving it low marks for abuses. It examines critically the feasibility of using the UN for example to protect the rights of the Muslims. It concludes by stating the case for an integrated and properly coordinated approach by international community as a whole not only to the problem of Muslims in China but other religions as well.

During the last two decades, Chinese crackdown on Muslim minority in China has been on the rise. Throughout this period reports of massive arrests, repressions and killings appeared in international media outlets. Again, thousands of mosques were demolished inside Chinese territories.<sup>3</sup> In 2018, Chinese authorities started to demolish a historic mosque in China’s western region of Ningxia but thousands of locals demonstrated against this and for the time being this operation has been put on hold.<sup>4</sup> According to *BBC*, in August 2018

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<sup>3</sup> Shohret Hoshur and Brooks Boliek, *Radio Free Asia*, (FRA), “Under the Guise of Public Safety, China Demolishes Thousands of Mosques,” (Reported by Shohret Hoshur and translated by Brooks Boliek) December 19, 2016, <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/udner-the-guise-of-public-safety-12192016140127.html>, cite accessed on 01/08/2018. See also, Bhagyashree Pancholy “China Destroyed Hundreds of Mosques, But The ‘Seculars’ Around The World Are Silent,” July 10, 2017, <https://topyaps.com/china-destroyed-mosques>, cite accessed on and *Asianews*, “Two thousand mosques converted into tearooms and cultural centres” July 2/2018, <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Two-thousand-mosques-converted-into-tearooms-and-cultural-centres-43039.html>, cite accessed on 01/10/2018.

<sup>4</sup> Michael Martina, “Chinese Muslims protest against plan to demolish mosque,” *Reuters*, August 10, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-islam-mosque/chinese-muslims-protest-against-plan-to-demolish-mosque-idUSKBN1KVODR>. See also, Camila Domonoske, “Thousands of Muslims Gather in China To Protest Mosque Demolition,” *NPR*, August 10, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/2018/08/10/637449044/thousands-of-muslims-gather-in-china-to-protest-mosque-demolition>, and Samuel Osborne, “Thousands of Muslims protest

international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, reported that about one million Uyghur Chinese Muslims have been held political rehabilitation camps.<sup>5</sup> An 117 pages report by HRW entitled “[‘Eradicating Ideological Viruses’: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims](#),” details human rights violations committed by Chinese authorities against Muslim minority in China. The report serves an enumeration of some of the human rights abuses meted to members of the Muslim community include mass arbitrary detention, religious repression and surveillance. The article focuses on Xinjiang. It states: “The Chinese government is conducting a mass systematic campaign of human rights violations against Turkic Muslim in Xinjiang in northwestern China<sup>6</sup>. This situation is reiterated in a 117-page report titled, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims,” where it states succinctly a new evidence of the Chinese government’s mass arbitrary detention, torture, and the increasingly pervasive controls on daily life. The article continues to paint a picture of a situation where they are subjected to among other atrocities, forced political indoctrination, collective punishment, restrictions on movement and communications, which heightened religious restrictions, and mass surveillance.

The magnitude of this atrocities is aptly captured by Sophie Richardson, who is China Director at Human Rights Watch. She observes: “The Chinese government is committing human rights abuses in Xinjiang on a scale unseen in the country in decades”<sup>7</sup>. She adds Chinese “employ high-tech mass surveillance systems that make use of QR codes, biometrics, artificial intelligence, phone spyware, and big data. And they have mobilized over a million officials and police officers to monitor people including through intrusive programs in which monitors are assigned to regularly stay in people’s homes”.<sup>8</sup> This assertion is reiterated in an article “*Eradicating Ideological Viruses*” where it solidifies the narrative of Human Rights abuses by mentioning them, for example, the use of high-tech mass surveillance systems, conducting compulsory mass collection of biometric data, such as voice samples and DNA, and use of artificial intelligence and big data. On his part, Gay McDougall, a member of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination asserts that Beijing had, as quoted by *BBC*, “turned the Uighur autonomous region into something that resembles a massive

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China's plans to demolish mosque in rare demonstration against government” Samuel Osborne, August 10, 2018, <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-mosque-demolition-muslim-protests-government-weizhou-grand-mosque-ningxia-hui-a8485871.html>, cite accessed on 01/10/2018.

<sup>5</sup> BBC, “China Uighurs: One million held in political camps, UN told,” <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-45147972>, cite accessed on 01/9/2018.

<sup>6</sup> HRW, “China: Massive Crackdown in Muslim Region,” <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/09/china-massive-crackdown-muslim-region>, cite accessed on 01/10/2018.

<sup>7</sup> HRW, <https://www.hrw.org/about/people/sophie-richardson>, cite accessed on 5/11/2018.

<sup>8</sup> HRW, “China: Massive Crackdown in Muslim Region,” <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/09/china-massive-crackdown-muslim-region>, cite accessed on 5/11/2018.



internment camp". His views are captured in *China Uighurs: One million held in political camps*.<sup>9</sup>

Over the past decade, human rights groups have documented widespread repression of this Turkic ethnic minority, from barring religious customs, to forcing many Uighurs to change their names and attend communist party rallies according to a report by Aljazeera "*Has China detained a million Uighur Muslims?*".<sup>10</sup> Furthermore, dietary traditions are violated as well. A good example is where Muslims are forced to drink alcohol and eat pork in China's re-education camps. This observation is noted by Gerry Shih.<sup>11</sup> He is quoted, "Muslims are detained for re-education by China's government and made to eat pork and drink alcohol, according to a former internment camp inmate". An article from the *Independent* states that the reason why non-Chinese had been detained, the government stated that the rights of foreigners are protected and they should be law abiding as well.

In conclusion, it can be safely concluded that world powers are not able to reprimand and publicly criticize the government of Beijing. The United States considered imposing sanctions on China for violating human rights but such proposals are just news.<sup>12</sup> This is partly attributed to the fact that China has gigantic global influence. As if not enough, China's position as a permanent member of the UN Security Council insulates her from the International community and this therefore means that it can deflect international action against her. The United States, European Union and others need to remain vocal on human rights and bring on larger contingents of likeminded countries to collectively stand against these policies. Whatever the rhetorical commitment to fundamental change and move equitable futures, strong elements of continuity will be evident, even in the medium to long term.

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<sup>9</sup> BBC, "China Uighurs: One million held in political camps, UN told," <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-45147972>, cite accessed on 01/9/2018..

<sup>10</sup> Aljazeera, a report in Upfront on September 15, 2018, "Has China detained a million Uighur Muslims?" <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/upfront/2018/09/china-detained-million-ughur-muslims-180914083334948.html>, cite accessed on 30/9/2018.

<sup>11</sup> Gerry Shih and Dake Kang, "Muslims forced to drink alcohol and eat pork in China's 're-education' camps, former inmate claims," <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-re-education-muslims-ramadan-xinjiang-eat-pork-alcohol-communist-xi-jinping-a8357966.html>, *Independent*, May 18 2018. See also, Didi Tang "Show loyalty by eating pork, Beijing tells Uighur Muslims," *The Times*, October 11 2018, "China has demanded that the country's Muslim Uighur minority turn its back on the Koran and eat pork," <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/china-demands-that-ughur-muslims-eat-pork-wm682hgc2>, cite accessed on 20/10/2018.

<sup>12</sup> Edward Wong "U.S. Weighs Sanctions Against Chinese Officials Over Muslim Detention Camps," September 10, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/10/world/asia/us-china-sanctions-muslim-camps.html>, cite accessed on 21/09/2018.

#### **IV. Conclusion**

This paper has discussed the evolution of the cultural aspects of the Muslims in Mongolia and has assessed some of the difficulties encountered in the beginning in their worship of the religion of Islam. With a new and increasingly democratic power structure in prospect in China, Islamic institutions and cultural practices will have to reassess or continue to reassess the needs of the Islamic society in Mongolia. This must mean offering more opportunities to Mongolian Muslims and those who suffered under the previous regimes. Given that there is no capacity 'slack' at the present Mongolian cultural structures, this presents a not inconsiderable problem.

It seems fair that religious minorities like the Muslims should be given some form of freedom to practice their religion freely without any bottlenecks. This certainly can be justified on grounds of the historic disadvantage of Mongolian Muslims and their impoverished representation in the decision making mechanisms of public and private life in Mongolia. The exclusion of Mongolian Muslims in important decision making is untenable both ideologically and pragmatically. The Mongolian Muslims should be at the centre of nation building and denying them any of those opportunities is, realistically dubious and from a principled stand-point, it would surely run contrary to the sense of natural justice that has informed the efforts of those who have struggled for so long in the quest for a democratic society founded on equal treatment regardless of race or creed.

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# Session II-3: Education, Language & Literature

Room 606

	<div data-bbox="564 813 1246 853" data-label="Text"> <p><b>Chair</b> CHO, Hee Sun (Myeongji University)</p> </div> <div data-bbox="327 920 1471 2054"> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> Hossein Samadi <b>BAHRAMI</b> (School of International Relations, MOFA, Iran) "Phonetic Features, Syntactic Structures and Transformational Rules of Colloquial Persian and Their Observance by Persian Language Learners" <b>Discussant</b> KWAK, Saera (HUFS)</li> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> Laila <b>FAMILIAR</b> (New York University, Abu Dhabi) "What Can Arabic Literature Offer in Times of Conflict?" <b>Discussant</b> KIM, Jeong A (HUFS)</li> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> Lama <b>NASSIF</b> (Williams College) "Integrating Colloquial Arabic in the Arabic Foreign Language Curriculum: Promoting Linguistic Awareness" <b>Discussant</b> SEO, Jungmin (HUFS)</li> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> Faisal <b>MUBARAK</b> (Antasari State Islamic University) "Phrase in Arabic and Indonesian Language: A Contrastive" <b>Discussant</b> MUN, Ji-Young (HUFS)</li> <li>○ <b>Presenter</b> Akiko M. <b>SUMI</b> (Kyoto Notre Dame University) &amp; Katsunori <b>SUMI</b> (Nagoya Institute of Technology) "The Effects of Basic Psychological Needs Satisfaction on Arabic language Acquisition in a Short-Term Intensive Arabic Camp" <b>Discussant</b> LEE, Kye Youn (HUFS)</li> </ul> </div>
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# Phonetic Features, Syntactic Structures and Transformational Rules of Colloquial Persian and Their Observance by Persian Language Learners

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## Abstract

The invention of the writing system, meant to save all the achievements of the speakers of a language, has been quite successful in fulfilling its objectives; nevertheless, it has failed to adjust itself to the changes that the spoken form of the language naturally undergoes. This problem, more or less witnessed in most languages, is quite vivid in case of Persian language, for its written system has been formulated and used for more than a millennium. Given the current condition in the field of Persian Language Teaching and Learning (PLTL) in which the written form of Persian language has dominated the field and consequentially has generated Persian language learners with strong written features in their oral communication, there is a dire need to pay greater attention to colloquial Persian features in PLTL. To this end, this study has been conducted to identify the most outstanding differences in the oral production of the Persian language learners compared with the colloquial Persian spoken by native Persian language speakers. Having recorded and transcribed the 5- to 10-minute monologues of 6 upper-intermediate Persian language learners, and analyzing the transcriptions in terms of the existence of non-colloquial features, 5 written features of Persian language that are not used in the colloquial form were found to be existing in the oral production of the mentioned Persian language learners. These five written features witnessed in the oral production of the Persian Language learners were ranked in terms of their outstanding written features of the Persian language and frequencies of occurrence:

- 1) The existence of [آسْت] /æst/ (is) rather than its various allomorphs
- 2) The occurrence of the Plural morpheme [ها] /ha/ rather than its colloquial form /a/,
- 3) The presence of the full form the direct object marker [را] /ra/ rather than its colloquially used allomorphs [رو]/ro/ and [و] /o/,



- 4) The use of full form of the demonstrative adjective referring to the objects existing in relatively far distances [آن]/an/(that) instead of its colloquial form /un/, and the ان in the words instead of اون /un/
- 5) and one fixed form of linking *pezafe* instead of its colloquially used Allomorphs

Every one of these five problematic issues for the Persian learners, taking into consideration all the potential possibilities that they may have had, was analyzed and the transformational rules at work governing their transforming from written form to their colloquial form were formulated. Finally, the concluding idea was made that these colloquial Persian language features should be introduced from the very beginning of the PLTL courses to nurture Persian language learners who are aware of the colloquial Persian language features and are able to avoid using written Persian features in their oral communications. The last but not the least, studies of this type can be a guideline for materials developers to include colloquial Persian features in their textbooks.

## 1. Introduction

Language, the spoken means to communicate, is generally a live phenomenon that like all the living creatures, in the course of time, makes adaptations to adjust itself to the needs of time and guarantee its survival; otherwise, it would gradually lose its strength and finally get extinct. The invention of the writing system meant to save all the achievements of the speakers of a language has been quite successful in fulfilling its objectives but on the other hand has had problems in adjusting itself to the gradual changes that the spoken form of the language normally undergoes. This problem, more or less witnessed in most languages, is quite vivid in Persian language.

Persian Language is mainly spoken in Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The orthography used to present it is modified Cyrillic in Tajikistan, and modified Arabic in Iran and Afghanistan. The current writing system of Persian language in Iran is based on an adaptation from Arabic writing system going back to almost one thousand years ago. The very early written records of Persian go back to the cuneiform inscriptions made and used in Darius I era in early 6<sup>th</sup> century B.C., but modern Persian writing system is dated from the 9<sup>th</sup> century.

The rigidity of the writing system to resist change and the flexibility of the spoken form of the language to embrace alterations has created two different tracks for Persian language to travel in its proceeding towards the future. The written form, due to its static nature, has remained almost constant for centuries; whereas, the spoken form, being quite dynamic and lively, has undergone substantial changes. Colloquial Persian has been on a constant trend of

change but written Persian due to its conservative nature has remained intact and in the long course of time, a big rift between the two has come into existence, (Safarzadeh, 2016). This gap will expand in future to the extent that might be problematic to the Persian speaker to abide by so many conventions in the writing of the Persian language that would not exist in the spoken form or they might find no acceptable forms to present their spoken language in written form.

The Persian language currently used in Iran has linguistic features in its spoken form that are not at all manifested in its written form. On the other hand, the written form of Persian language has characteristics that are not witnessed in the daily use of language. For example, “My house is on this street.” in the written form is /*xane-ye mæn dær in xi(y)aban æst*/; whereas, such expression is almost never heard in the spoken form and in the spoken form, what is heard is /*xune-ye mæn to in xiyabune*/.

The word آست /*æst*/(is), which is the equivalent of *is* in English, is the conjugated form of the verb *to be* for the third person singular in present tense. The word آست /*æst* is almost never used in the spoken form of Persian language. Mohsen Mahdavi (2016) states that the **Colloquial Persian** is the language of the real people coming from all social and educational background, such as lawyers, footballers, and barbers but “nobody speaks the **written Persian**” that is the language of all books and newspapers. The only speakers using the written form of Persian language are the non-native Persian language learners and newsreaders on TV. The existence of this dichotomy between the **written** form of Persian language and its spoken **colloquial** form has prompted this study to shed some light on the colloquial aspect of Persian language that has not been paid the due attention so far. This study of the spoken/colloquial form of Persian language attempts to identify the most common and high frequency elements of the *spoken Persian* and illustrate:

- Their phonetic features,
- Syntactic structures and
- Transformational rules
- As well as checking the Persian language learners’ awareness of these in-use realities

## 2. History of Persian Language Writing System

In general, the history of the system used to write in Persian language is divided into three eras:

- Ancient Persian(525BC-300BC),
- Mid-Persian (300BC-800AD)
- and Contemporary Persian (800AD-till now).

According to Lohman (1962), Old Iranian existed until 300 BC and was divided into two dialects: Avesta and Old Persian, During **Ancient Persian** era, the writing system used was coniferous alphabet. Middle Iranian dates back from 300 BC to 900 AD and one of its dialects, Pahlavi or Middle Persian, was the language of Persian Empire during this time. In **Mid-Persian** era, Iranians used Pahlavi, Manavi and Avestee writing system. **Contemporary Persian** language has been using an adaptation of the Arabic alphabet for writing. Windfuhur's (1987) identification of Persian language into Classical Persian and Contemporary Persian refers to the spoken form of the language and he believes that Classical Persian came into use around 13<sup>th</sup> century and continued to be used until the beginning of 19<sup>th</sup> century, then Contemporary Persian gradually took the scene from the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

### 2.1. Statement of the Problem/Significance of the Study

The necessity felt to include colloquial Persian language features in Persian language teaching programs goes back to the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century but it has not been given the due attention it deserves yet. Clair-Tisdall (1923), having learned Persian in India and the author of the book *"Modern Persian Conversation Grammar"* having had to move to Iran and communicate face to face with the contemporary Persian language speakers can be said to be first who noted that the Persian he had learned through books and without direct contact with the contemporary Persian speakers sounded as if one speaks English in "the Elizabethan writers" style and "with the pronunciation of that distant day". Moreover, as such, an old and archaic style being employed to communicate with the "English people of today" would seem "stilted and vulgar" and sometime even amusing, the Persian learned without implementing the colloquial Persian language feature would do the same. Therefore, the concluding idea is that there should be an effort to bridge the gap between the old Persian the Persian language and the Contemporary Colloquial Persian spoken by the native Persian language speakers in Iran.

Written form of the Persian language has failed to present the changes that Persian language has undergone in the course of time for the past almost one thousand years and the Persian language learners are usually taught to employ the modes of expression that are no longer found in the contemporary colloquial spoken Persian and can only be found in the books.

Persian language is one of the languages that sounds pleasing to the ear. It does not have harsh, husky or rough sounds and in the course of its life has always been restructuring itself in terms of its phonological features to soften its rough phonemes. A good example to mention can be the Arabic phonemes /ع، غ، ق، ط، ظ/ existing in Persian language, that have been

filtered in to be Persianized and sound soft and gentle. Even the Persian phoneme /خ/ is no longer a glottal fricative and it has become more a fricative pronounced in the middle of the mouth. Phonetic alterations of this sort are many in the colloquial Persian, but they are not reflected in the written form and since the Persian language learners are taught by means of resorting to the written teaching and learning materials, their familiarity with the spoken characteristics of Persian language is quite low that most of them, even at the advanced level, sound bookish when they speak. Therefore, it is necessary to shift the attention from written Persian to the colloquial Persian in teaching Persian to the others.

The most frequently-visited items that have quite different written-form pronunciations and the colloquial spoken-form pronunciations are the third person singular form of the verb (بودن) (to be) which is (آسْت) (is), definite or presupposed direct object marker (با), noun-noun or noun-adjective connector which is known in Persian as (اضافه) /ʔe.za.fe/. Different allomorphs of *ʔezafe* morpheme in colloquial Persian and its phonological rules and morphophonemic rules can be applied to explain its various derivations. But the existing problems, regarding this morpheme, are that the allomorphs of this morpheme are not presented in the written Persian. Therefore, it turns to be one of the most problematic issue faced by the Persian language learners.

In fact, as Moyne and Carden (1974) have indicated, *ʔezafe* in Persian is “a reduced relative clause.” This reduction has occurred in the course of time in the spoken Persian but Persian language writing system has failed to take an account of this transformation and consequently not presented the various forms in the written form. For example, in the following phrase, there are seven words linked to each other by means of using *ʔezafe*, but out of these seven *ʔezafe*, only one of them has a presentation in the written form and the other six have no written manifestations. Moreover, the only one that has written representation is misrepresented, for that *ʔezafe* is pronounced /e/ in the spoken form but is misrepresented with /ye/ rather than /e/ in the written form.

کنار آنتن رادیوی پشت بام خونه مقابل (on the antenna of the radio on the roof of the opposite house)  
[kenar-e anten-e radyo-e posht-e bam-e xune-ye moqabel].

The informal, colloquial or spoken form of Persian is nowadays the medium of everyday conversation by people of all walks. To Lazard (1957), colloquial Persian is “language familiar” and the written Persian is “language littéraire”. Persian language learners need to gain communicative competence in colloquial Persian; otherwise, their misuse or inappropriate applications of the written form in their oral communications would sound odd and even might cause troubles. Generally speaking, the use of the written Persian while speaking to the others would be an abnormality that needs to be dealt properly in Persian language classes.

### 3. This Study

The orthographic structure employed in the contemporary Persian language writing system uses 28 Arabic letters and the existence of some of these Arabic letters to be necessarily distinguished in Arabic language with no needs to be distinguished in spoken Persian is the cause of some problems for the Persian language learners and even for the native Persian language children learning the writing and reading in Persian. Furthermore, some of these Arabic letters representative of Arabic phonemes run contradictory to the euphonic soft and gentle nature of Persian language. Persian language, being one of the most euphonic languages, i.e. its melodic harmonious phonetic features sounds pleasing to the ears, despite the fact that it uses Arabic alphabet to present itself in the written form, has softened the rough and glottal Arabic phones to harmonize with euphonic nature of Persian language. To this end, new letters are added to the 28 Arabic letters used in Persian writing system (چ، ژ، پ، گ) and the Arabic (ع) used in spoken Persian is not at all a glottal fricative consonant and it is pronounced almost like the vowel /æ/.

The simplification applied according to the rule of the *Least Effort Principle* has gradually resulted in the loss of the distinction between the three Arabic letters used in Persian (س، ص، ث) and all of them are pronounced as /s/. The same modification in line with simplicity and euphonic nature of the Persian language has been employed to reduce the four Arabic letters (ذ، ز، ض، ظ) to one phone [z] in the spoken Persian language as well as the reduction of (ت، ط) to one single phone, i.e. [t]. But the existence of all these Arabic letters in the written Persian give the misleading hints to the Persian language learners to apply a great deal of useless efforts to pronounce them in accordance with their Arabic phonetic features and consequentially move away from the contemporary spoken Persian language and phonetically sound less familiar.

Many phonetic changes have gradually come into existence in the colloquial Persian in comparison with written Persian to sustain its euphonic characteristics that unfortunately are not presented in the written Persian. This study intends to shed light to some of the most outstanding features of the colloquial spoken contemporary Persian that are missing in the written Persian. Those changes that have the highest frequency in terms of occurrence in the colloquial Persian are as follows.

#### 3.1. Procedure

Participants' recordings were transcribed. Then the transcriptions were analyzed in terms of the five cases expected to have the highest differences in written and colloquial forms. The five cases have statistically been counted in the 7- to 10-minute recorded tapes in terms of their

proper, i.e. colloquial pronunciation and non-colloquial pronunciation. Finally, the collected data were fed to the SPSS software for statistical analyses

### 3.2. Participants

Six Persian language learners at the School of International Relations were asked to talk between 7 to 10 minutes about themselves, their friends or classmates, their living experience in Iran, etc. Their talking about the mentioned issues or any other topics that they liked were recorded and later on transcribed.

### 4. Results

Table 1 presents the data collected for one the participants. As seen in the table, 5 cases have statistically been identified and counted in the 7- to 10-minute recorded tape in terms of their total number of appearance, number of case colloquially pronounced, number of cases non-colloquially pronounced, and number of cases not pronounced.

Participant	Cases	Total No of cases	No of cases colloquially pronounced	No of cases non-colloquially pronounced	NO of cases not pronounced
Participant A1 7minutes Recording	آشت/æst/(is)	16	5	11	0
	Plural [ها]	17	0	17	0
	D.O. Marker [را]	12	4	8	0
	(that) /an/[آن]	24	18	6	0
	<i>ʔezafe</i>	50	48	0	2

**Table 1:** Statistical data of five cases in the oral manifestation of 2 of the Persian Language Learners

Participant	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	Total
Duration of Recording	7Ms	8.5Ms	6Ms	8Ms	9Ms	8Ms	<b>46.5</b>

**Table 2:** Participants and the duration of their monolog

Participant	cases	Total No of cases	No of cases colloquially pronounced	No of cases non-colloquially pronounced	NO of cases not pronounced
Participant A2 8.5 minutes Recording	آست/æst/(is)	19	6	13	0
	Plural [ها]	22	2	20	0
	D.O. Marker [را]	16	4	12	0
	(that) /an/[آن]	29	18	11	0
	<i>?ezafe</i>	54	50	2	2
Participant A3 6minutes Recording	آست/æst/(is)	14	3	11	0
	Plural [ها]	16	1	15	0
	D.O. Marker [را]	11	2	9	0
	(that) /an/[آن]	20	9	11	0
	<i>?ezafe</i>	39	34	2	3
Participant A4 8minutes Recording	آست/æst/(is)	18	4	14	0
	Plural [ها]	20	1	19	0
	D.O. Marker [را]	15	3	12	0
	(that) /an/[آن]	26	17	9	0
	<i>?ezafe</i>	52	44	7	1
Participant A5 9minutes Recording	آست/æst/(is)	22	4	18	0
	Plural [ها]	21	2	18	1
	D.O. Marker [را]	18	5	13	0
	(that) /an/[آن]	27	20	7	0
	<i>?ezafe</i>	58	55	1	2
Participant A6 8minutes Recording	آست/æst/(is)	20	2	18	0
	[ها]Plural	19	3	16	0
	D.O. Marker [را]	17	1	15	1

	(that) /an/[آن]	25	15	10	0
	<i>ʔezafe</i>	49	44	3	2

**Table 3:** Participants Records of colloquial and non-colloquial features

Cases	Colloquially Pronounced	Non-colloquially pronounced	Total
(is)/æst/ آسْت	24	85	109
Plural [ها]	9	105+1	115
D.O. Marker [را]	19	69+1	89
(that) /an/[آن]	97	54	151
<i>ʔezafe</i>	275	15+12	302

**Table 4:** Frequency of colloquially correct and Non-colloquially pronounced cases

The total recording time of the six participants of this study was 46.5 minutes within which they had constructed their pronunciations of the آسْت(is)/æst/, [ها]Plural, D.O. Marker [را], [آن]/an/ (that), and *ʔezafe*. The frequency of colloquially correct and non-colloquially pronounced as well as the total cases are presented in table 4. It should be mentioned that the number of the missing cases were also added to the non-colloquially pronounced cases. To mark this addition, they are presented in plus (+) forms in the non-colloquially pronounced column.

As seen in the table 4, *ʔezafe* was found to have the highest frequency of occurrence among the five cases, and definite object. marker [را] was found to be with the least frequent occurring. Plural morpheme [ها] had the highest number of non-colloquial pronunciation but *ʔezafe*, despite the fact that had the highest number of cases in the participants' recorded monologs, had the least number of non-colloquial pronunciation.

## 5. Analysis and Discussions

### 1) Allomorph of the word آسْت/æst/(is)

The element with the highest frequency in terms of occurrence and its difference in the written form and the colloquial spoken form is the third person singular morpheme of the verb *to be*, i.e. the word آسْت /æst/, which literally is the equivalent of the word, *is* in English. There are several forms for this morpheme in the spoken Persian. In order to study the variety of forms of this morpheme in the spoken form, seven possibilities need to be analyzed because there are 6



vowels in Persian language plus 28 consonants. The words ending can have one of these possibilities: terminating in one of the 6 vowels or in a consonant.

**a. Ending in vowel /a:/**

(1) [æst] → [st] / [a] — /

(2) [st] → [s] / [a] — //

Example: این بابا است. /in baba æst/ (This is the father.) is pronounced /in babas/

**b. Ending in vowel /e/**

(1) || [e] → [∅] / — [æst] /

(2) [æst] → [æs] / [e] — /

Example: این خانه است. /in xane æst/ (This is a home.) is pronounced /in xanæs/. And a third transformation needs to be applied to this sentence to match the exact one that is heard in the colloquial spoken Persian. The word خانه /xane/ (home) should be transformed to خانه /xune/ (home). This transformation is presented below in # 4 below.

**c. Ending in vowel /æ/**

It is interesting to note that there is only one word in Persian language ending in /æ/ sound. That word is the word نه /næ/ (colloquial no).

[æst] → [æs] / [æ] — /

Example: جواب او نه است. /jævabe-e u: næ æst/ (His/Her answer is No.) is pronounced /djævab-e u: næs/

**d. Ending in vowel /i:/**

[æst] → [je] / [i:] — /

**e. Ending in vowel /o/**

[æst] → [ʔe] / [o] — /

**f. Ending in vowel /u:/**

[æst] → [ʔe] / [u:] — /

**g. Ending in a consonant**

[æst] → [ʔe] / [+consonant] — /

## 2) Reduction of the Plural morpheme [ها] /ha/ to /a/

[ha] → [a] / [+consonant] || — whenever it occurs at the final position of words

Example: کتاب‌ها (which means books) /ke.tab.ha/ → /ke.ta.ba/

Some scholars have classified this use of /a/ as the reduced form of the plural morpheme ان /an/, but since /a/ as the reduced form of plurality equally appears in animate

and inanimate nouns; therefore, it strongly can be argued that /a/ is the reduced form of /ha/, because only /ha/ can be used as plural morpheme in inanimate nouns.

Example: مدادها /medad.ha/ (pencils) → مدادا /medada/

In fact, it should be said that the [h] phoneme is almost always deleted wherever it occurs between two consonants. Therefore, the following transformational phonetic rule can be written to express this fact. The existence of the symbol // is to mark the end boundary of the morphemes.

[h] → ∅ / [+consonant] // — — // [consonant]

Example: من هم (which means me/I too) /mæn hæm/ => /mæ.næm/

### 3) Reduction of را /ra/ (the direct object marker) to رو /ro/ and و /o/

3/1) [ra] → ro / [consonants and vowels] — — /

The above rule states the fact that under every condition, whether preceded by a consonant or a vowel, را is transformed to رو.

Examples: اون کتاب رو خریدم → آن کتاب را خریدم

بابا رو دیدم → بابا را دیدم

3/2) [ra] → o / [consonants] — — /

This rule states the condition under which the definite marker /ra/ changes to /o/ and the required condition is that the definite marker needs to be preceded by a consonant.

Example: اون کتاب و خریدم → آن کتاب را خریدم

Note: But this rule cannot be applied to the second example mentioned above in which the definite marker is preceded by a vowel.

### 4) Transforming /an/ into /u:n/

[a] → u: / — — [+nasal] /

Example: خیابان /xi.ya.ban/ (street) → خیابون /xi.ya.bu:n/

نان /nan/ (bread) → نون /nu:n/

تمام /tæmam/ → تموم /tæmum/

بادام /badam/ → بادوم /badum/

It should be noted that this transformational rule, in terms of pronunciation, is only applicable when ان /an/ is the final section of a single syllable preceded by a consonant as in تهران، باران، آسمان، آسان. There is also a second precondition for this rule to be applicable and that is that ان has to be a part of the word and should not be a morpheme attached to the word as it

is in the words like *دوستان* in which *ان* is the attached plural morpheme. There is also a second prerequisite for this transformational rule's applicability: /a/ and /n/ both must be the final phonemes of a syllable. For example in the word *دانش* /da.neʃ/ (knowledge), in which /a/ belongs to the first syllable and /n/ belongs to the next syllable, this rule cannot be applicable.

### 5) Allomorphs of linking *ʔezafe*

The *ʔezafe*, which is an /e/ sound, functions as a connector that acts like bridge linking two words together in a phrase. This connector does not have a clear presentation in the written form; therefore, Persian language learners usually have problem using it appropriately. The existence of *ʔezafe* and its various allomorphs are analyzed and presented below:

- a. [e]→ye / [a]— /

Example: *بابای حسن* (Hassan's Father) /ba.ba-ye hæʃæn/

- b. [e]→ye / [e]— /

Example: *خانهی حسن* (Hassan's Father) /xa.ne-ye hæʃæn/

- c. [e]→ye / [æ]— /

As earlier mentioned, there is only one word in Persian language ending in /æ/ sound and that the word *نه* /næ/ (no). This word is relatively considered to be the impolite form of the word *نخیر* /næ.xeir/ (no).

Example: *نهی حسن* (Hassan's no) /næ-ye hæʃæn/

- d. [e]→ye / [i:]— /

Example: *صندلی حسن* (Hassan's chair) /sæn.dæ.li-ye hæʃæn/

**Note:** In the written form, there is no sign to present the *ezafe* that is pronounced /ye/ in the context being proceeded by /i/ sound.

- e. [e]→ye / [o]— /

Example: *پلوی حسن* (Hassan's rice) /po.lo-ye hæʃæn/

- f. [e]→ye / [u:]— /

Example: *موی حسن* (Hassan's hair) /mu-ye hæʃæn/

- g. [e]→e / [consonants]— /

Example: *کتاب حسن* (Hassan's book) /ke.tab-ye hæʃæn/

Note: In formulating the transformational rules, the style used by J. Falk (1978) has been used.

The results found were indicative of the hypothesized prospective that Persian language learners in their oral production tend to sound more in line with the written structure of the Persian language. Out of 766 cases counted in their 46.5 minutes recorded tape, they had 342

cases incorrectly pronounced in terms of the colloquial Persian language norms. This means 44.5% of their total pronunciation is non-colloquial, i.e. almost near to half of their spoken Persian sounds bookish and non-normal in accordance to the colloquial Persian norms. Based on the collected data, further calculations also revealed that within every 8.15 seconds of their speaking, they let out one case of non-colloquial pronunciation. In other words, every minute of their oral production contains, at least, 7 cases of non-colloquial, i.e. bookish pronunciations.

Simple present tense of the verb to be, i.e. *آست*(is)/æst/, was found to be the most outstanding non-colloquial form witnessed in the oral production of these learners. Out of 109 cases of *آست*(is)/æst/ in their total oral production, 85 cases were pronounced in non-colloquial style and only 24 cases were recognized to be colloquially pronounced. This rate of non-colloquial pronunciation accounts for 77% of their production of their *آست*(is)/æst/.

Plural morpheme [ها], witnessed in 115 cases, was found to be non-colloquially pronounced in 106 cases and only in 9 cases it was colloquially pronounced. This rate of non-colloquial pronunciation of plural morpheme [ها] accounts for 92% of their production of their plural morpheme [ها] that is a very high rate of non-colloquial pronunciation. In fact the rate of mispronunciation of plural morpheme [ها] was found to be highest in this study among the 5 cases investigated.

Definite Object Marker [و] was found to be present in 89 cases in which 70 cases were pronounced in non-colloquial style and only 19 cases were recognized to be colloquially pronounced. This rate of non-colloquial pronunciation accounts for 78% of their production of their D.O. Marker [و] and only 21.3% was found to be colloquially pronounced.

The demonstrative adjective [آن](that) /an/ or the *ان* forming the ending of any word's syllabic structure was present in 151 cases out of which 97 cases were colloquially properly pronounced and 54 were non-colloquially pronounced. The percentages of colloquially proper and non-proper were respectively calculated to be 64.2% and 35.8%.

Finally, *ʔezafe* was found to be existing in 302 cases out of which 275 cases were colloquially properly constructed and pronounced and 27 cases were non-colloquially constructed and pronounced. Participants had the best performance in the case of *ʔezafe* in terms of observing the colloquial Persian language conventions. As seen, 91% of the cases of *ʔezafe* was proved to be in accordance with the colloquial Persian language rules of pronunciation and only 8.9% was found to be non-colloquially uttered.

## 6. Conclusion and Suggestions

The logic to minimize the form as much as possible provided that the content and the meaning is not distorted is the basic functional principle in all languages. Written form of languages, due to its solidity and static nature remains intact; whereas, the spoken form undergoes a constant developmental process to minimize the form. This developmental process referred to as the *Least Effort Principle* is to meet the economy of time, space and effort consumed and has been quite active in the developmental trend of the Persian language.

Having observed the oral productions of the upper-intermediate Persian language learners in this study, it was concluded that the five colloquial Persian language features should be introduced from the very beginning of the PLTL course to nurture Persian language learners who are not only aware of the colloquial Persian language features but are also competent speakers who avoid using written Persian features in their oral communications.

It should be noted that colloquial Persian language skill is a sheer productive oral-aural skill and to master this capability gaining practical communicative competence in colloquial Persian is the crucial basic requirement; otherwise, the learners' direct communications in Persian language milieu will be fraught with misuses and inappropriate applications of the written features of the Persian language. They even will have difficulties in comprehending native speakers' oral productions. All these odd and non-colloquial productions of the Persian language learners and their troublesome listening comprehensions needs to be dealt properly in Persian language classes, course books, teaching methods and curriculum designs.

Colloquial Persian has its own phonetic features as well as syntactic characteristics that need to be dissected for careful examinations prior to their presentations in the course books. At the lower levels, listening and repetitions can be useful but at the higher advanced levels, they should be accompanied with descriptive and explanatory complimentary notes and guidelines.

This study was conducted among upper-intermediate Persian language learners. It is suggested to conduct similar study among advanced Persian language learners as well and compare the findings between intermediate and advanced learners to see whether there is any improvement as they move from lower levels to higher levels or not.

The last but not the least, this study and similar ones can be a guideline for materials developers to take account of the colloquial Persian features in their textbooks and prepare materials, tasks and exercises that can result in Persian language graduates who communicate in proper colloquial Persian language form.

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# WHAT CAN ARABIC LITERATURE OFFER IN TIMES OF CONFLICT?

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## Purpose of Teaching Literature

- Educational aims
- Humanist purposes
- Literature as Culture

External Aspects of Culture	Deep Aspects of Culture
Geography History Habits & Costumes Institutions	Beliefs Needs & Aspirations Moral make-up of people Ideologies

## READING ARABIC LITERATURE





## BECOMING A GOOD READER

- Read fluently & effortlessly
- Decodify printed words automatically
- Access the meaning of words instantly

Koda (2007)



## AN INITIATIVE



## Benefits of Reading Fiction Extensively

**Linguistic:** Incidental vocab learning & automaticity in word recognition (Nation 2001, Krashen 2004, Grabe 2009, Schmitt 2010)

Sensitize to stylistics (McDonald & McDonald 1983, Lazar 1993, Carter 2007) → Creativity (Povey 1967, Collie & Slater 1987)

**Cultural:** Cultural insight, understanding, appreciation (Scott 1964, Bernhardt 1995, Kramersch 2005)

**Motivational:** Pleasure Hypothesis (Krashen 2004)

**Psychological:** Self confidence (Collie & Slater 1987)

**Humanist:** Educating the Person in empathy, civic, moral, social, political responsibility (Philip 2013)

# Pedagogical Approach

- Integrated Skills Approach
- Abridged for Mid-Advanced learners
- Exercises developed in collaboration
- Possible Courses:
  - 1) Content-Based
  - 2) Extensive Reading Programs
  - 3) Integrated in a regular semester

# Linguistic Benefits to *Saaq al-Bambuu*

- **Reading Fluency & Vocabulary Acquisition:**
  - Vocabulary is controlled (6,000 lemmas → 3,000 lemmas: 4,000 word forms)
  - Corpus linguistic tools (MADA+TOKAN, Wordsmith)
  - 800 lemmas appear 8-200 times
- **Sensitizing Learners to the Stylistics of Arabic**  
(Noticing Hypothesis: Richard Schmidt 1990)

الأسلوب	تعريف	أمثلة من الرواية
التشبيه	المقارنة بين شيئين يشتركان في صفة واحدة. وهذه المقارنة تحدث باستخدام أداة تشبيهية: ك ، كأ، مثل، يشبه، إلخ أركان التشبيه أربعة: المُشَبَّه والمُشَبِّه به وأداة التشبيه ووجه الشبه (=الصفة التي يشتركان فيها)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>العمل في الأيام العادية غير متعب. ولكنه على عكس ذلك في نهاية الأسبوع. أعمل كالآلة. أضع البطاطس في الزيت...</li> <li>السعادة البالغة كالحنن تماما، يجب أن نشارك بها أحدا</li> <li>شعور جديد يشبه الإيمان</li> <li>أصبحت أيدا شيئا، مثل أي شيء يُباع ويُشترى بثمن</li> </ul>
الاستعارة	هي تشبيه حُذِفَ منه المُشَبَّه أو المُشَبِّه به	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>لا أستبعد فكرة أن يورق رأسني (كما تورق الشجرة)</li> <li>بكاء ماما آيدا يمزق هدوء البيت (وكأنه شخص يمزق ورقة بعنف في وسط الليل)</li> <li>ولكن الأزرق كان لطيفا معي (مثل شخص لطيف)</li> </ul>
الكناية	أن تتكلّم عن شيء متجاوزا معناه الأصلي	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>احمرّ وجه أُمّي (ليس نسبة إلى اللون فقط ولكن لأن احمرار الوجه هذا يعنى أنها تشعر بالخجل)</li> </ul>

## Cultural Benefits to *Saaq al-Bambuu*

- Religious Beliefs & Practices
- Popular Beliefs (*interpretation of dreams, the evil eye, the horoscopes, etc.*)
- Traditional Kuwaiti Music & Dance
- History of Kuwait
- Cultural Representations & “Otherness”

## Humanist Benefits to *Saaq al-Bambuu*

- Labor in the Gulf – Poverty – Stateless *Biduun* - Discrimination
- Raise awareness about the sociopolitical reality in the Gulf
- Produce a more conscious learner

## Other Features

- Discussion questions
- Different writing modes
- Lots of extra reading/listening
- Real life tasks
- Role plays
- Researching culture & history
- Reading aloud for pronunciation & intonation
- Literary translation

## Uniqueness of *Saaq al-Bambuu*

- Widely acclaimed contemporary novel
- Original written by a living author
- Approved by the original author (authentic text)
- Fast moving, engaging plot
- Completely in Arabic
- Targets specific proficiency level & Heritage learners

## OTHER INITIATIVES

- Series of Graded Readers (Novice & Intermediate)  
(Routledge 2020)
- Textbook: Modern Arabic Short Stories (Advanced)

# Putting Back Fiction in the Curriculum

- Personalize the Curriculum
- Build curricula on diversity not similarity.
- Literature raises learners' awareness to the culture and socio-politics of the region.
- Ignoring literature or splitting between language and literature weakens and even undermines our teaching enterprise.
- Our students spend a lot of time reading about politics and Islam. Many times this contributes to dehumanizing the language, the culture, and the people.
- **Re-embrace literature for a vibrant Arabic curriculum & independent learners**

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**Integrating Colloquial Arabic in the Arabic Foreign Language Curriculum: Promoting  
Linguistic Awareness**

## Introduction

The situation in Arabic...is not diglossic but, rather, appears to be triglossic or multiglossic, with more than two varieties and a continuum along which native speakers shift according to a number of different variables...the term *diglossic* in connection with Arabic really refers to a multileveled complex situation and not simply to a binary one. (Al-Batal, 1992, p. 285; emphasis in original)

The passage above represents a current reality of Arabic use. It contrasts with the classical characterization of Arabic as a “diglossic” language (see Ferguson, 1959) with marked differences between a “high” variety (i.e., Modern Standard Arabic, or MSA) and a “low” variety (i.e., colloquial varieties of Arabic, or CA<sup>1</sup>), each of which serves distinct functions in Arabic speech communities. MSA is the formal variety (generally learned in schools) of the language, typically written and used in formal contexts (e.g., religious sermons, news broadcasts, mainstream literature). CA, on the other hand, is the everyday means of communication and varies widely along geographical, religious, gender, age, and socio-economic lines within and between Arab countries (Al-Batal, 1992; Bassiouney, 2009; S’Hiri, 2013, 2015b; Versteegh, 2001).

Given the sociopolitical and religious status of MSA, it is regarded as the more valued variety of Arabic. CA, on the other hand, is perceived by many to be comparatively less prestigious or even a corruption of MSA (Bassiouney, 2009; Holes, 2004; Palmer, 2007; Versteegh, 2001). For decades, MSA’s privileged status has been reflected in Arabic second language (L2) curricula, with many Arabic programs solely focusing on teaching MSA. Some Arabic L2 practitioners and researchers, however, have long called for the incorporation of a variety of CA alongside MSA<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The terms “spoken vernaculars” and “dialects” have also been used with reference to CA.

<sup>2</sup> Arabic programs have typically chosen to teach specific CA varieties that are widely understood in Arab countries, relevant to learners’ needs, and familiar to the educators.



within Arabic curricula. The goal of such an implementation is to foster Arabic learners' linguistic awareness by equipping them with knowledge of how Arabic is actually used and preparing them for real-life communication with Arabic speakers. This approach faces several challenges, including concerns about confusing learners, impeding their progress, and imposing cognitive overloads (see, e.g., Huntley, 2018; Youness, 2015). These fears arise given the marked syntactic, morphosyntactic, phonological, and pragmatic differences between MSA and CA. Logistical issues, such as hours of instruction, teacher training, and the choice of which variety of CA should be taught, pose further challenges.

While relevant pedagogical experiences abound, empirical research and theoretical tenets applicable to learner acquisition of multiple varieties within a diglossic language are lacking in second language acquisition (SLA) research. The current study seeks to address this gap by investigating the speech productions of learners with MSA and CA training in L2 Arabic learning.

### **Literature Review**

Traditionally, teaching CA in L2 Arabic curricula has been the exception rather than the norm (Al-Batal, 2018; Al-Batal & Belnap, 2006; Huntley, 2018; Palmer, 2007; Ryding, 2013; S'Hiri, 2013). For some, CA is an “ideologically and logistically controversial rival to MSA” (S'Hiri, 2013, p. 17). In a study of attitudes among Arab teachers of Arabic at U.K. institutions, Featherstone (2018) reported that some educators believe that students should be introduced only to MSA; they deemed their own CA variety as “chaotic” and devoid of any grammar” (p. 71). For them, CA is also “private” and “intimate” and should be reserved for those who speak the language as a “mother tongue” (p. 57).

Excluding CA from Arabic L2 curricula has resulted in learners acquiring a variety that is not spoken in everyday situations. In describing this practice, Ryding (2013, 2018) uses the term

“reverse privileging,” whereby the secondary and more formal discourse (MSA) is introduced prior to the primary, day-to-day discourse (CA). This creates a “fake model of oral proficiency” (Al-Batal, 1995, p. 123)—a “blanket approach” that “shelters Arabic students from the linguistic reality of multiple skills” (Ryding, 2013, p. 76).

This MSA-only approach becomes especially problematic in light of two recent shifts in the field of teaching Arabic as a foreign language (TAFL). The first is the change in Arabic learner profiles. Findings from recent surveys indicate a growing interest among Arabic learners to travel to Arab countries and communicate with Arabic speakers (Abuhakema, 2004; Belnap, 2006; Husseinali, 2006) and enroll in programs abroad (Al-Batal & Belnap, 2006). Other studies of learners of both MSA and CA show that the majority agree that learning a variety of CA alongside MSA is important (Huntley, 2018; Isleem, 2018; Zaki & Palmer, 2018) and “empowering” (Al-Batal & Glakas, 2018). In S’Hiri’s (2013) study of 371 learners enrolled in programs abroad, the percentage of participants who thought that learning a spoken variety was “extremely important” increased from 59% (pre-program) to 86% (post-program), while the percentage of those who thought that it was not very important dropped from 8% to 1%. Other studies reported that the ability to use local CA varieties while studying abroad granted learners unique opportunities to understand and access local cultures (see S’Hiri, 2013, 2015a, 2015b).

The second shift in TAFL is the changing linguistic scene of Arab countries. Technology, media, and increasing cross-dialectal communication have catalyzed drastic changes in Arabic use over the past few decades (Al-Batal, 2018; Belnap, 2018; Isleem, 2018). Notably, the scope of CA use in domains previously reserved for MSA has expanded amid increasingly multidialectal and multilingual Arabic-speaking communities. Mixing between MSA and CA has also become common, even in very formal settings. “[M]ixing has become so common that a student who wants

to deal with the modern Arab world needs a feel for the full continuum of Arabic,” Belnap (2018, p. 49) remarks.

Mixing MSA and CA to various degrees is a long-documented linguistic practice by Arabic speakers (see Badawi, 1973; Blanc, 1960; Meiseles, 1980). This mixture has typically been referred to as “the Middle Language” (Mejdell, 2000, 2011), “Formal Spoken Arabic” (Ryding, 1991), and, more widely, “Educated Spoken Arabic” (ESA; Mitchell, 1978). According to Ryding (2018), attaining “communicative competence equivalent to that of an ‘educated native speaker’ (the term generally used to refer to the highest functional skill in proficiency testing) in Arabic, means that the goals are complex in ways unparalleled in other languages” (p. 13). Further complications stem from the fact that there is no shared CA variety across Arab countries, though there are “prestige” varieties called “educated regional vernaculars”<sup>3</sup> (Ryding, 2018).

These shifts have necessitated that Arabic L2 instructors and curriculum planners adopt approaches other than the MSA-only method in ways that will cultivate learner awareness of the sociolinguistic realities of Arabic use. Certain L2 Arabic practitioners and researchers have long argued that MSA and CA should be treated as components of one integrated linguistic system, just as they are used by Arabic speakers. These arguments were translated into the L2 Arabic classroom through the integrated approach (IA); in the IA, MSA and a variety of CA are introduced to learners as early as in their first semesters<sup>4</sup> (Al-Batal, 1992, 1995, 2018; Al-Batal & Belnap, 2006, Youness, 1995, 2018).

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<sup>3</sup> These vernaculars have typically been the ones incorporated in programs that teach CA.

<sup>4</sup> Programs adopting the IA have developed different formats that best meet their needs and teaching philosophies.

While there seems to be increasing agreement on the necessity of teaching both MSA and CA<sup>5</sup>, some questions remain. Will learners be cognitively overloaded by the integration of two Arabic varieties with such marked differences? Will they be confused as to the appropriate use of each variety? Will this approach negatively affect their competency in one variety (or both)? Given the lack of relevant research, these questions necessitate investigations of the learning processes of IA learners, including their output (i.e., spoken and written language productions).

The current study seeks to address this issue by exploring the development and use of MSA and CA reflected in the speech productions of learners who have undergone IA training. The following research questions guided the study:

1. What features of MSA and CA do IA-trained learners display in their speech productions throughout their studies of Arabic?
2. What patterns in MSA and CA use do the learners' speech productions show throughout their studies?

## **Method**

### **Participants**

The participants ( $N = 70$ ) were L2 Arabic learners enrolled in a major Arabic program at a large university in the United States. The participants were enrolled in first-, second-, and third-year Arabic courses (Figure 1). They were of typical university student age and studied a variety of majors.

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<sup>5</sup> The most recent guidelines by American Association on the Teaching of Foreign Languages (ACTFL) acknowledge the multiglossic reality of Arabic. In the Arabic Consensus Project, published by the ACTFL in 2012, the following statement was made: "In the ACTFL test protocol, Arabic is considered to be one language represented by a continuum from all colloquial to all MSA, and a combination of mixes along the continuum...An ACTFL OPI rating recognizes a speaker's overall functional ability in Arabic" (p. 1).




Figure 1: The study's participant profile.

The participant sample came from six sections of intensive Arabic (Table 1). First- and second-year participants came from multiple sections. Sections of the same level followed common syllabi and course objectives. These sections also shared a daily activity schedule and took the same exams. All of the courses used the same textbook series, *Al-kitaab fii ta'allum al-'arabiyya*, which focuses on MSA, Levantine CA (LCA), and Egyptian CA (ECA). Table 1 provides an overview of the participants' sections, the type of Arabic training they received, and the hours of instruction given to each.

Table 1. Overview of participants' sections, training types, and number of hours of instruction.

Group	No. of sections	Training Type	Semester	Hours of Instruction
1 <sup>st</sup> year Arabic I: Novice High <sup>6</sup>	3	MSA & LCA (2)	Fall 2013	6 hours per week for 15 weeks (90 hours)
		MSA & ECA (1)		
2 <sup>nd</sup> year Arabic II: Intermediate Mid	2	MSA & LCA (1)	Spring 2014	5 hours per week for 15 weeks (75 hours)
		MSA & ECA (1)		
3 <sup>rd</sup> year Arabic I: Advanced Low	1	MSA & LCA	Summer 2011	15 hours per week for 5 weeks (75 hours)

<sup>6</sup> The proficiency levels are based on ACTFL proficiency guidelines.

The participants were exposed to input in MSA and LCA or MSA and ECA<sup>7</sup> through the textbooks, teacher and learner speech, and other authentic and semi-authentic texts. The textbooks offer vocabulary words, grammatical explanations, and activities in all three varieties. Learners carry out tasks depending on the appropriate context of use for each variety (e.g., formal writing is done in MSA). The Appendix provides a sample vocabulary chart and language drill from the first-year Arabic class. Throughout their studies, learners may shift from learning one CA variety to the other due to class switching or for their own reasons.

### Study Design and Tasks

The current study adopted an exploratory, descriptive approach (see Ellis, Basturkmen, & Loewen, 2002). Therefore, it sought to detect emerging patterns in the learners' productions without experimental manipulation. It therefore relied on tasks that had been designed as part of the course work in order to provide an ecologically valid representation of the participants' learning. All of the participants' productions were made during the final two weeks of the academic semesters. Table 2 provides an overview of the study tasks.

Table 2. Overview of the study tasks.

Group	No. of tasks	Type of task	Time of data collection
1 <sup>st</sup> Year Arabic I	2	Recordings of a Picture Description Task	Week 13
		Interviews	Week 15
2 <sup>nd</sup> Year Arabic II	1	Presentations	Week 15
3 <sup>rd</sup> Year Arabic I	2	Presentations	Week 5
		Skits	Week 5

<sup>7</sup> After the current study was conducted, this program started to offer Moroccan CA through the same textbook series (accompanying online materials).

## Tasks

The studied speech productions came from course tasks. Productions from first-year participants came from two tasks. The first task involved recordings of a picture description task, and the second (administered at the end-of-course interviews) involved spontaneous student-interviewer interactions revolving around course themes (e.g., studies, daily routine, hobbies).

Productions from second-year participants came from end-of-course presentations. The task involved a 4-5 minute presentations on a topic of interest. The course instructor directed the students to use MSA and CA as deemed appropriate.

The productions from third-year participants were drawn from end-of-course presentations and skits. The presentation task involved a 10- to 12-minute presentation on a topic of interest, and the skit involved a 7- to 10-minute dialogue. All of the tasks required learners to produce as many course language structures and vocabulary items as possible.

## Procedure

Earlier in the semester, the researcher contacted course instructors about studying recorded productions submitted by the students<sup>8</sup>. Consent forms were e-mailed to the students for permission to analyze their productions. Data collection was performed after the end of the respective semesters, with the exception of data from first-year students, which came from a larger study conducted in the final weeks of the program.

## Data Analysis

The first research question was approached quantitatively with descriptive statistics, and the second qualitatively. The latter involved a data-driven, multi-step analysis using a grounded

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<sup>8</sup> For assessment purposes, recording students' end-of-course presentations and interviews is a standard practice at this program.

theory approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Emerging major themes were identified during the initial data analysis (e.g. MSA features and shared MSA-CA features<sup>9</sup>). Next, a second round of data analysis was carried out and subcategories were created (e.g. MSA verbs, LCA lexis). Instances of the data were then grouped according to their relevant subcategories in a process of categorical aggregation (Creswell 2007). The frequency of occurrence and manner of use for each item within the subcategories were tallied, and patterns were established. The analysis was conducted as an “iterative process” (Lynch, 1996), as the coded themes were continually revisited based the information emerging in the data.

Verbs, negation markers, and conjunctions have been selected for presentation in this paper. These features are highly frequent “diglossic variables,” i.e. variables that have distinct CA and MSA variants (Mejdell, 2011), and display marked differences between CA and MSA. A quarter of the productions in each task were also analyzed for the use of lexis<sup>10</sup>. Table 10.3 provides examples of categories and subcategories from the data analysis.

In analyzing the verbs, verb vowelizing and the presence or lack of LCA and ECA prefixes that denote a time frame (i.e., the present-tense aspectual marker *ba* or the future-tense marker <sup>11</sup>*ha*) determined verb categorization (see Table 10.3). However, vowelizing was not considered in the analysis of a lexis as long as the word stem (i.e., consonantal and long-vowel structure) remained intact and was a form used in both MSA and CA. For example, the word *kitaab* (book) was categorized as a shared MSA-CA word, regardless of whether the speaker used the LCA pronunciation *ktaab* or the MSA pronunciation *kitaab*.

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<sup>9</sup> Shared MSA-CA features are originally MSA ones, but are also used in CA.

<sup>10</sup> The conjunction *wa* (and), a shared MSA-CA word, was removed from data analysis. Given its high frequency, it was expected to skew the data.

<sup>11</sup> The International Journal of Middle East Studies transliteration system is used here.



Table 3. Examples of categories and subcategories in data analysis.

Feature Categorization	Verbs		Negation Markers		Conjunctions		Lexis	
MSA	I speak <sup>12</sup>	<i>atakallam</i>	Not	<i>lā/laisa</i>	but	<i>lākin</i>	tomorrow	<i>ghadan</i>
CA	I go	<i>brūḥ</i>		<i>mish\mū</i>	but	<i>bas</i>	a lot	<i>awi</i>
Shared CA-MSA	they were	<i>kānū</i>	I didn't have	<i>mā kān 'indī</i>	or	<i>aw</i>	simple	<i>basīt</i>

Data analysis also involved looking into the types of code-switches observed in the productions following Muysken's (2000) categorization of code-switching processes: insertion, alternation, and congruent lexicalization. The study also adopted a fourth category: repair (i.e. when "an utterance begun in one variety and subsequently aborted and recast in another with an 'overlapping' portion of the utterance repeated in both varieties" (Leddy-Cecere, 2018, p. 205).

## Results

The current study addressed two research questions: 1) what features from MSA and CA do IA-trained learners display in their speech productions? and 2) what patterns do the speech productions show in MSA and CA use? The data shows several patterns within and between the years of Arabic studies. The participants code-switched between MSA and CA in their use of words, phrases, and sentences. As they advanced in their Arabic study, their code-switches seemed more systematic, and reflected an evolving sense of register. Their productions also showed patterns found in the speech of Arabic and bilingual speakers. The findings are presented below.

<sup>12</sup> Similar to the textbook series in the program of focus, blue font is used to refer to MSA features, green font for ECA, purple for LCA, and black for common MSA-CA.

### Research Question 1: MSA and CA Feature Use Across Years of Arabic Studies

Overall, the participants used MSA, CA, and shared MSA-CA features. The frequency of use of these features varied by type and year of Arabic study. Table 4 shows the percentages of use of the features of focus. Table 5 displays the percentages of the use of lexis.

Table 4. The percentages of use of MSA, CA, and shared MSA-CA features.

Year of Study	Verbs				Negation Markers			Conjunctions		
	MSA	CA	Shared	Mixed	MSA	CA	Shared	MSA	CA	Shared
1 <sup>st</sup> year	87.5	12.5	-	-	34	66	-	15.39	79.49	15.2
2 <sup>nd</sup> year	81.68	12.6	2.1	3.62	22.5	65	12.5	50.4	36.1	13.5
3 <sup>rd</sup> -year presentations	97	1	2	-	86	14	-	52.72	7.61	39.67
3 <sup>rd</sup> -year skits	16	82	2	-	32.32	62.63	5.05	15.05	58.25	26.7

The use of MSA features seemed to expand as learners increased in their Arabic studies.

In first-year, the participants showed a preference for CA features. However, MSA verbs predominated their productions (87.5% of total verb use compared to 12.5% for CA). 25.5% of the verbs had the aspectual marker *ba*. This marker, a distinct aspect of verb use in ECA and LCA, is attached to the verbs as a prefix expressing habitual actions. 27% of first-year participants consistently used *ba* in their verbs, while 16% affixed this prefix to some verbs (but not others) within the same utterance.

In second-year productions, MSA verbs continued to be used more frequently than CA (81.68% and 12.6%, respectively). The aspectual marker *ba* only appeared in the productions of five participants, with an average of two instances in each production. Some verbs with a mixture of MSA and CA features were also observed (3.62%). Compared to first-year

productions, MSA conjunctions became more frequent than those of CA (50.4% and 36.1%, respectively). Remarkably, however, CA negation markers were still more frequent (22.5% and 65%, respectively).

In third-year productions, the frequency of feature use varied by task type. In the presentations, MSA use predominated the features, while CA features were more frequent in the skits. Remarkably, MSA verb use was as high as 97% of the total verb use in the presentations (1% of CA verb use). The aspectual marker *ba* only appeared twice in the entire data sample of third-year participants.

Table 5. The percentages of the use of lexis across years of Arabic study.

Year of Study	Lexis		
	MSA	CA	Shared
1 <sup>st</sup> year	18.5	21.24	60.26
2 <sup>nd</sup> year	23.52	13.1	63.38
3 <sup>rd</sup> -year presentations	33.4	4.68	61.92
3 <sup>rd</sup> -year skits	5.9	47.16	46.94

Unlike the grammatical features, the lexis was predominantly shared between MSA and CA across the years of Arabic study. Similar to the trend of grammatical feature use, the lexis was more frequent in CA in first-year productions and in MSA in second-year productions. In third-year, the frequency of use was determined by the task, with more frequent MSA lexis in the presentations and more frequent CA lexis in the skits.

## Research Question 2: Patterns in MSA and CA Use Across the Years of Arabic Studies

Several patterns were observed in the participants' productions. The participants showed patterns of code-switching documented in Arabic and bilingual speech, and the systematicity of their code-switching increased across the years of Arabic study with an emerging sense of register. The following subsections present these patterns.

### *First-year Productions*

First-year participants code-switched between MSA and CA. Most of their switches were intrasentential insertions (i.e. an element, e.g., a word or a phrase, from one variety is inserted into an overall structure in the other variety). Alternations (that is, a shift from one language to the other which involves a syntactic unit) were also observed in the data, mostly within sentences. No repairs were detected. Examples 1 and 2 demonstrate insertion and alternation, respectively.

1. *bas atadhakkar al-kalimāt fī hāthā aṣ-ṣaf.*

*but I remember the words in this class.*

2. *biddi ashūf usratī fī bait 'ā'latī.*

*I want to see my family in home my family*

*I want to see my family in my family home.*

Some instances of word-level hybridization were also observed in the productions of four students. This pattern involved CA prefixes attached to MSA verbs. In Example 3, the participant used the LCA future-tense marker *ha* (will, going to<sup>4</sup>) and pronounced verbs in an MSA fashion.

3. *shū ḥa' 'mal bil wīkend? mumkin ḥaaruuḥ 'al jim.*

*What I'm going to do on the wīkend? May be I'll go to the gym.*

*What am I going to do on the weekend? I may go to the gym.*

Notably, first-year participants had the most between-participant and within-participant variation in their code-switches compared to other years of Arabic study. For example, 16% of the participants affixed the CA aspectual marker *ba* to certain verbs (but not others) within the same utterance. In Example 4, the participant used *ba* in the first occurrence of the verb *arūḥ* (I go) but dropped this prefix in a subsequent use of the same verb within the same utterance. The participant also used two other verbs without *ba*.

1. bil wīkend anā brūh<sup>13</sup> ‘a baitī fī saipres...bil masā anā arūḥ ‘al-mall  
on the wīkend I go to my home in Cypress...in the evening, I go to the mall.

On the weekend, I go to my home in Cypress. In the evening, I go to the mall.

Similarly, when MSA negation markers and conjunctions were used in first-year productions, CA ones were usually found within the same sentence, as shown in Example 5 below.

5. wa alān lā...lā... ma ‘andiish fuṣūl.  
And now no...no...no I have not classes.

And now, no...no...I don’t have classes.

### *Second-year Productions*

Second-year productions marked the beginning of more consistent variation in the use of MSA and CA. They showed an increased use of MSA and shared MSA-CA features compared to the first-year participants. Insertions were still prevalent in the data, especially with specific CA conjunctions (e.g. *minshān*, because of) and content morphemes such as the dummy verb *fī* (there is). However, more instances of alternations, including intersentential alternations, and congruent lexicalizations (i.e. a language structure shared between the two languages with

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<sup>13</sup> The first-person prefix *a* is deleted here due to assimilation.

elements from both languages) were found compared to first-year participants. No instances of repair or word-level hybridization were observed in the data. Example 6 below provides an example of congruent lexicalization. The participant here uses the LCA future marker *rāḥ* (will, going to) with MSA verbs.

6. *rāḥ atakallam* ‘an Iceland *liannu rāḥ ’usāfir ilā* Iceland *hāthā aṣ- ṣ aif*.

*will I speak about Iceland because will I travel to Iceland this summer*

*I will speak about Iceland because I will travel to Iceland this summer.*

While variations in MSA and CA use still exist in the data with regard to the use of the diglossic features of focus, some patterns differentiated second-year participants from their first-year counterparts. For example, a category of verbs not observed in the first-year (nor third-year) participants’ speech emerged. It involved a mixed use of MSA and CA in the same verb (3.62% of verbs). For instance, the mixed verb *ya ’ūl ūn* (they say) involves an MSA conjugation and LCA/ECA pronunciation of the consonant *qāf* as a glottal stop.

Interestingly, all of the participants consistently pronounced key words in their presentations with a with a distinct MSA enunciation (e.g. culture, politics, independence, injustice, immigration, etc.). On the other hand, the participants pronounced words referring to day-to-day items such as country names and food items with CA enunciation.

Another pattern in MSA and CA use involved shifting to CA when expressing opinions, providing clarifications, or reporting sayings, as shown in Examples 7 and 8.

7. *wil arḍ ktīr ḥilwe*.

*and the land is very beautiful.*

*And the land is very beautiful.*

8. *fī al-bidāya hātha kān gharīb binnisba lī bas aṣdiqāī aloulī hādā*

In the beginning this was strange for me but my friends told me this  
 kān ṭabī'ī.

was normal

In the beginning, this was strange for me, but my friends told me that this was normal.

### *Third-year Productions*

Third-year participants were the most systematic in their use of language features in the data sample. MSA was the dominant variety in the presentations, while CA was more dominant in the skits. Code-switches in the formal presentations were mostly insertions of some conjunctions (e.g., *bas*, only or but). 64% of the participants used limited spoken features (e.g. day-to-day items such as food, city names, and sports teams, as was the case with second-year participants), and about 29% used none. Insertions in the skits were mostly MSA verbs (16% of verb usage). Strikingly, not a single complete sentence in CA was used in the formal presentations, nor was a complete sentence in MSA used in the skits. No word-level hybridization was found in the data.

This strict adherence to MSA and shared MSA-CA use was not only observed in the formal presentations, but also in the spontaneous question-and-answer component that followed each presentation, as shown in Example 9.

9. A: *kaifa aththaqāfa al-faransiyya al'ān fā al-jazā'ir*

How is culture French now in Algeria

How is French culture in Algeria now?

B: *bisabab at-taghyīrāt al-latī qāmat fīha...al-ḥukūma fī*

Because of the changes which did in it the government in

*as-sab'īnāt ash-shabāb al-yaūm yatakallam fī al-'rabiyya akthar.*

the seventies youths today speak in Arabic more

Because of the changes that the government made in the seventies, youths now speak in Arabic more.

Contrary to second-year participants, when explaining an idea, the participants used MSA and shared MSA-CA features, as in Example 10.

1. al-mar'a al-ghāliya ya'nī al-mar'a min aṭṭabaqa al-'āliya kānat imra'a  
 woman precious meaning the woman from the class high was a woman  
 talbas an-niqāb aw hijab  
 wore the niqab or hijab

The precious<sup>14</sup> woman, meaning a high-class woman, was woman who wore a niqab or a hijab.

Notably, repairs emerged at this stage; in several instances, when the participants used a feature in CA, it was immediately followed by its MSA variant. In one of these instances, for example, a participant used the LCA verb *ba'ref* (I know) but immediately used the MSA variant *a'ref* without the *ba*.

## Discussion

The current study raised two research questions: 1) what features from MSA and CA do IA-trained learners display in their speech productions across their years of Arabic studies? and 2) what patterns do the speech productions show in MSA and CA use. The following subsections discuss the findings.

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<sup>14</sup> The participant hear might have meant “esteemed.”



### Research Question 1: MSA and CA Feature Use Across Years of Arabic Studies

Using MSA, CA, and shared MSA-CA features was the overarching finding of the study. The frequency of these features varied by feature type and the year of Arabic study. With the exception of verbs, first-year participants showed a preference for CA features (including lexis). These findings are expected given the training provided in first-year Arabic I. This training emphasizes day-to-day topics that directly affect learners, which are typically conducted in CA (e.g., interests, daily routines, families, studies, etc.).

A lot of the input to which learners are exposed to in first-year Arabic, especially through teacher's speech and audiovisual materials, is presented in CA. In a study of the speech of 20 Arabic teachers in adopting the IA, including 12 from the same program where the data of the current study were collected,<sup>15</sup> Najour (2018)<sup>16</sup> found an “overwhelming predominance” of CA in the speech of first-year instructors, and reported that the observed instructors rarely used more than two consecutive sentences in MSA. In addition, first-year training emphasizes speaking more strongly than writing, which leads to more frequent CA use.

However, MSA verbs were more frequent in first-year productions. As carriers of action, one could argue that verbs may call for more formal ways of expression, especially in an end-of-course conversation with an instructor (Task 2). This finding may thus indicate an emerging sense of register that would necessitate the use of certain formal features (verbs, in this case). In addition, the CA aspectual marker *ba* attached to present-tense verbs might have seemed less salient, and therefore redundant, especially given that tense is already embedded in the verbs through other prefixes and suffixes<sup>17</sup>. As documented in SLA, morphosyntactic features are

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<sup>15</sup> This study involved 100 hours of recorded or observed Arabic classes.

<sup>16</sup> Najour (2018) is the only study of which the author is aware that investigates the speech of instructors of Arabic in an IA program.

especially hard for learners to notice, process, and acquire (e.g., Cintrón-Valentín & N. Ellis, 2016; N. Ellis, 2006, 2018; Lowen & Sato, 2018).

Expectedly, MSA verbs in second-year productions continued to be more frequent than those of CA (81.68% and 12.6%, respectively). In fact, it is at this stage that a more noticeable shift in MSA was noted, which continued to increase in the formal presentations of third-year participants. This finding is expected given the shift in training in second-year Arabic. In this year (and more so in third-year), students are more widely trained in reading and writing (usually done in MSA). They are also engaged in discussions of abstract topics such as Arab history, traditions, literature, and media. Najour (2018) reported that topics covered in more advanced classes invited an increased use of MSA by instructors and were a trigger for code-switching to MSA (see Bassiouney [2006; 2009] for similar observations among Arabic speakers).

Interestingly, however, CA negation markers were more frequent in the data of second-year participants than those of MSA (65% and 22.5%, respectively). This finding could be explained by findings from Najour (2018), who found that negation triggered instructors' code-switches to CA, which might have influenced the learners. The participants' might have also been more comfortable in using CA negation markers (fixed forms that do not require conjugations) or as necessitated by the specific content that they were negating. For example, one student used the MSA negation marker *laisa* (not) in an utterance that presented historical information, but shifted to CA negation when he changed the whole discourse to CA as he was explaining an idea.

In third-year formal presentations, however, MSA and shared MSA-CA features predominated across the board (see Table 4), including in the spontaneous question-and-answer component that followed each presentation (see Example 9 above). This finding could be

interpreted as an indication of the over-consciousness of the register manifested through strict adherence to MSA and shared MSA-CA features, unlike Arabic speakers who mix MSA and CA even in very formal settings (see above).

Finally, unlike other features, shared MSA-CA lexis was more frequent than that of MSA and CA across years of Arabic study. This is an expected finding given the large shared lexicon between MSA and CA (Ryding, 1991; Younes, 2015, 2018). Lexis was more frequent in CA than MSA in first-year productions and in MSA in second-year productions. In third-year, the task (i.e., the context represented in the task) determined the variety of choice.

### **Research Question 2: Patterns in MSA and CA Use Across the years of Arabic studies**

Several patterns were observed in the participants' productions, some of which are found in the code-switches of bilingual and Arabic speakers at diglossic code-switching<sup>18</sup>. As the participants advanced in their Arabic studies, the systematicity of their code-switches increased. The following subsections discuss these patterns.

#### *First-year productions*

First-year participants code-switched between MSA and CA. Most of the switches were intrasentential insertions followed by alternations. These two processes have been documented in the speech of bilingual speakers (see, e.g., Muysken, 2000). They also resonate with findings from Leddy-Cecere's (2018) stage 1 participants (four first-year students and one second-year student).

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<sup>18</sup> While Bassiouney (2009) notes that both "code-switching" and "diglossic code-switching" could be used for the same purpose, and remarks that "there may still be peculiarities of diglossic switching that are due to the specifics of diglossia seen as a case of prolonged intimate contact between two varieties of what is perceived as a single language" (p. 86).

These switches, however, did not seem diglossic in nature. Given the participants' beginning level of proficiency and their varying competence levels in MSA and CA, systematic code-switching in which speakers effectively draw on the associations of each variety (i.e. rhetorical code-switching) cannot be expected. According to Muysken and colleagues, insertions could represent "asymmetry" in the proficiency level of the speakers in two languages.

Accordingly, it could be argued that these mixes merely reflected forms that were learned and readily available in the participants' active knowledge. This conclusion is supported by the lack of repairs in first-year data. Several participants in Leddy-Cecere (2018) also reported that "they preferred—at least in the initial phases of their studies—to acquire a single form of a given item that 'works,' and then move on to acquire a second item, rather than investing the time to learn two variants of the same word (p. 206).

In addition, it could be argued that the participants did not feel the need or pressure to actively learn both MSA and CA variants. Najour (2018) reported that 18 out of the 20 participant instructors noted that they were not bothered by the students' mixing of registers because it does not "impede communication." They remarked that such mixing is expected, and "the ability to code-switch appropriately is a skill that requires time" (p. 311).

It is, therefore, not surprising that first-year participants had the most variation between and within participants. It could be argued that when simultaneously exposed to two varieties, learners of Arabic go through processes that are similar to those observed in prolonged dialect contact whereby the speakers show extreme inter and intraspeaker variability in the process of *koineization* (e.g., Al-Wer, 2007; Trudgill, 1998; Trudgill, Gordon, Lewis & MacLagan, 2000; Holes, 2004).

Nevertheless, some sort of systematicity was starting to emerge in first-year productions. In addition to the predominant use of MSA verbs, some instances of congruent lexicalization started to appear in the data in the form of word-level hybridization<sup>19</sup> (Mejdell, 2011), which appeared in the productions of four students. This pattern involved CA prefixes attached to MSA verbs, a pattern documented in ESA. In an analysis of speeches of the late Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser—well known as a powerful public speaker—Holes (1993) reported instances in which Nasser attached the CA marker *ha* to MSA verbs (e.g., *hanuqātil*, We will fight). Similarly, Bassiouney (2006; 2009) reported the frequency of use of the aspectual marker *ba* attached as a prefix to MSA verbs in her analysis of university lectures, political speeches, and mosque sermons in Egypt.

### *Second-year Productions*

Second-year productions marked a decrease in interspeaker and intraspeaker variations. More instances of intersentential alternations and congruent lexicalizations appeared in the data (also see Leddy-Cecere, 2018). These findings could be interpreted by the participants' evolving Arabic competence, and their ability to sustain MSA at the level of the sentence.

A striking pattern was the emergence of diglossic code-switching. For example, code-switches to CA were made when expressing opinions, providing clarifications, or reporting sayings, as documented in ESA. Holes (1993) reported that Nasser employed MSA to express more abstract and impersonal concepts, but shifted to ECA to express concrete ideas that were “strongly associated with the personalization of issues” (p. 35). Bassiouney (2006, 2009) also

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<sup>19</sup>According to Mejdell (2011), “Congruent lexicalization presents itself in Arabic diglossic mixing, with its high degree of structural and syntactic congruence between codes, although not complete overlapping” (p. 32). Muysken (2000) considers congruent lexicalization as specifically applicable to languages that are typologically similar (including a standard form and a dialect of a language).

reported that the former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak used MSA when assuming the role of the president (i.e., a more formal role) but shifted to ECA when attempting to indicate closeness to the audience. Further, Najour (2018) found that the reiteration of a previous utterance was a trigger for code-switching (MSA to CA or vice versa). Another aspect of diglossic code-switching was the participants' frequent use of MSA and shared MSA-CA lexis in a formal context, and their consistent pronunciation of key words with distinct MSA enunciation, both patterns observed in ESA (Bassiouny, 2009; Mejdell, 2000).

Interestingly, no instances of repair were found in the data. The participants might have developed some sort of comfort with their use of CA, even within a formal presentation, as typical in ESA. The task instructions given to the students might have also suggested a relaxed attitude toward mixing MSA and CA. Word-level hybridization was not observed at this stage, but some mixed MSA-CA verbs (3.62%) appeared. This mixing resulted in forms that do not exist in MSA or CA. This observation is documented in dialect contact (e.g., Al-Wer, 2007) and in the process of developing L2 competence. It is not uncommon for L2 learners to use non-nativelike features as they advance toward target-like production (Gass & Selinker 2008).

### *Third-year Productions*

Third-year participants were the most systematic in their use of language features. Compared to the first- and second-year participants, their productions seemed to roughly correspond to the third stage of the dialect contact, i.e. the formation of a focused variety (see Leddy-Cecere, 2018). The participants had predominant use of MSA in their formal presentations, and a predominant use of CA in their informal skits.

The findings above could be interpreted by the participants' evolving competence and sense of register. For example, repairs emerged at this stage, with examples of immediate shifts from CA features to their MSA variants (MSA to CA repairs in the skits). Accordingly, unlike the pattern observed in second-year presentations, where speakers shifted to CA when expressing opinions or offering clarifications, third-year participants strictly adhered to MSA and shared MSA-CA features when performing these functions. The participants might have overestimated the predominance of MSA in Arabic speakers' formal speech, which could evolve as the participants continue to advance their studies in Arabic toward superior levels of proficiency. The participants, however, showed a more native-like pattern reflected in their use of CA lexis in reference to day-to-day items (as was the case with second-year participants).

### **Conclusion**

The current study explored the MSA and CA features and patterns that IA-trained learners display in their speech productions across their years of Arabic studies. The participants switched between MSA and CA, and showed increasing systematicity across their years of Arabic studies. The findings suggest that learners of Arabic are able to accommodate the simultaneous learning of MSA and CA when provided with supportive conditions.

Such conditions include explicitly raising learners' awareness of the complexities and nuances of real-life Arabic use, building on the similarities between MSA and CA, and explaining the logic of the differences. Learners also need to be reassured that the coexisting features of MSA and CA reflect an on-going process of language development. As Belnap (2018) remarks, "[the learners'] entire undergraduate experience helps them see Arabic as one seamless continuum of resources to be enjoyed and adroitly employed as they grow in true communicative competence and therefore confidence" (p. 50). Accordingly, some errors, especially in the beginning stages of

Arabic learning, should be tolerated. According to Al-Batal (2018), “like all aspects of language acquisition, feedback and encouragement from the teachers and the belief in the students’ ability to master this skill will help students to mix naturally” (p. 19).

Finally, the coexistence of varieties in the Arabic learners’ speech should be celebrated as an indication of the richness of their linguistic system’s and of the successful utilization of linguistic resources. If true communicative competence in Arabic is to be achieved, learners need to be exposed to an authentic representation of the sociolinguistic reality of Arabic use. Further research into this unique L2 learning experience with larger learner samples and more advanced levels of Arabic studies will provide insights not only into L2 Arabic acquisition, but also for the entire field of SLA.

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### Appendix: A Sample Vocabulary Chart and Language Drill

Meaning	المعنى	المصري	الشامي	الفُصحى
year			سنة	سنة
really?! or For real?!				صحيح؟!
age				عُمر
she works		يَتَشَغَلُ	يَتَشَغَلُ	تَعْمَلُ
he works		يَشْتَغَلُ	يَشْتَغَلُ	يَعْمَلُ
address			عنوان	عنوان
Egyptian		مَصرِيّ / مَصرِيّة	مَصرِيّ / مَصرِيّة	مَصرِيّ / مَصرِيّة
who?		مَن؟	مَن؟	مَن؟
area, region		مَنطَقة	مَنطَقة	مَنطَقة
the same				نَفس ال ..
father				والِد
my father		أبَا ، وَالِدِي	أبَا	والِدِي
mother				والِدة
my mother		أُمَا ، وَالِدَتِي	أُمَا	والِدَتِي

عايزة تشربي شاي؟ بدك تشربي شاي؟ Do you want to drink some tea?

١. أحب أدرس ..... ولا أحب أدرس .....
٢. عندي ..... و .....  
عندك ..... ؟
٣. أحب ..... و .....  
ولا أحب ..... و .....
٤. أشرب ..... و .....  
ولا أشرب .....
٥. أحب اشوف ..... بحب اشوف .....
٦. ما باحبش اشوف ..... ما بحب اشوف .....
٧. عايز اسكن في ..... بدني اسكن ب .....
٨. مش عايز اشتغل في ..... ما بدني اشتغل ب .....

## Phrase in Arabic and Indonesian Language: A Contrastive”

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### ABSTRACT

Difference of phrase structure between one’s mother tongue and a foreign language may bring about some systematic errors, as similarities may ease learners in acquiring correct structure. This study is about differences and similarities in phrase construction in Arabic and Indonesian. The study uses contrastive analysis on ways of constructing phrases in each language. Findings of this study reveal that some phrase structure constructions are similar. Differences are not only due structural aspect but also by difference in cultural concept and expression. This study implies that errors are predictable in Indonesian learners’ construction of phrases and translation production of Arabic phrases which are different from Indonesian construction of phrases.

**Keywords:** *contrastive analysis, phrases, Arabic, Indonesian language*

### A. INTRODUCTION

Learning foreign language differs from first language, so does method, curriculum, and implementation. Based on second language study, the most importance of linguistic, most researchers have studied first and bilingual agreed that bilingual is harder effort and challenging. And also Arabic language, because Arabic is foreign language in Indonesia. People study Arabic because Arabic is basic source of Islam, that is Holy Qur’an, Hadith, and as global language. Except that, as subject in schools, they want to study Islam more deep also interested in study Arabic. So, Arabic beginner learners need method that easier to study foreign language, especially Arabic.

Every language has its unique that is phoneme, morpheme, and syntax: In Indonesia, Arabic is one of foreign language that studied from elementary school until university, in formal education and non formal education. Because, study Arabic is for understanding holy qur’an and as global language

Linguistic consists of phonology, morphology, syntax, semantic, pragmatic, and discourse analysis. All these kinds in linguistic have purpose and function each other.

Grammar is elements of language that consist of forms and principles. The elements that include grammar include phoneme, word, clause phrase, sentence, and discourse. Grammar consists of two that are form and meaning. Thus, language is the relationship between form and meaning. First, form consists of two, are: phoneme that studied by phonology; and structure includes morpheme, phrase, clause, and discourse. Phrase is a part from syntax, some non predicative words that have certain structure

Phrase is unfamiliar for Arabic researchers in Indonesia, so does in Arab it self. It is unfamiliar because Syntax book in Arabic does not state phrase. Furthermore, there is not any chapter that discuss phrase. But, it not means, there is not any phrase in Arabic. Phrase discussed in many *nahwu* books.

Contrastive linguistic was a solution from learning language problem, that was appeared a half era ago. One of the most important that discussed it, was about contrastive analysis.

Contrastive analysis is study of two or more languages that to know the similar and the different between them generally or other discussions. As example, contrast between Arabic and Indonesia or France and Indonesia, is contrasted from phonology, morphology, syntax, semantic, and descriptive linguistic aspect. If two languages investigated with accurate method, mean these two languages investigated with contrastive approach and reveal the different of them, so known the problem in study a language. Contrastive analysis uses as technique to predict these problems and avoid the difficulties in study second language.

Arabic as holy qur'an and worship language for the million moslems, and also uses in international forum. So, many people in Indonesia study Arabic. But, Arabic phrase differs from Indonesia. Then, many Arabic learners feel difficult because the different between Arabic structure and Indonesian structure, so does phrase. But if Arabic structure and Indonesian structure equals will make them easier to study Arabic.

According to journal that has written by Miftahur Rohim entitled "Analisis Kontrastif Bahasa Indonesia dan Bahasa Arab berdasarkan Kala, Jumlah dan Persona", published by Jurnal Sastra Indonesia Vol. 2 No. 1 2013, the result has stated that, first there are the different between in tenses even past, present, and continuous. Next result



has the different between singular and plural. But this journal discusses about phrase structure in Arabic and Indonesian.

Next, journal has written by Rosita Hasan entitled “Implikasi Analisis Kontrastif Kalimat Bahasa Arab dan Bahasa Indonesia dalam Meningkatkan Pemahaman Siswa” published by Jurnal Shaut Al-Arabiyah Vol. 6 No. 1, 2018; has revealed that some of similar and different sentence in Arabic and Indonesian that has used contrastive technique. Before the students have not gotten contrastive analysis yet, the mean score of them has 46,3. Then, after they have gotten contrastive analysis, their mean score has 70,8. Thus, contrastive analysis indicates effective to improve students’ ability to make sentences in Arabic. But this journal uses experimental study, while Rosita’s has been used qualitative descriptive.

Next, based on journal has written by Isra Mirdayanti, Najmuddin Abd. Safa and Kaharuddin entitled “Analisis Kontrastif Pembentukan Verba Bahasa Arab dan Bahasa Indonesia serta Implikasinya dalam Pembelajaran Bahasa Arab” published by Jurnal Ilmu Budaya Vol. 6 No. 2, 2018; revealed that contrastive analysis not only given effects for Arabic learning, but also Indonesian learning, especially Indonesian for foreigners (Arabic people). It has stated contrastive analysis helped Arabic learning for Indonesian and also Arabic people. Thus, This journal hopes can gigantic advantages for these two languages learning too.

Then, according journal according journal has written by Farida Rahman entitled “Aljins allughawi fil Arabiyah wal Indunisiyyah Dirasah Tahliliyah Taqabuliyah” published by journal Nady al-Adab Vol. 4 No. 1, 2018; revealed that there has similar and different in gender in study Arabic and Indonesian language. There have 2 similar, and 4 different. According Farida contrastive analysis has improved Arabic education in Indonesia. This journal also hopes can develop material and easier to understand bilingual language of Arabic learners.

Then, journal has written by Tajudin Nur entitled “Analisis Kontrastif Perspektif Bahasa dan Budaya terhadap Distingsi Gender Maskulin Versus Feminim dalam Bahasa Arab dan Bahasa Indonesia” published by Humaniora Vol. 23 No. 3, 2011; revealed that gender in Arabic has dominated by grammatical and the application has been noted and fit to structure. Meanwhile, gender in Indonesia by dominated by lexical and its

application has not noted and not fit structure. Tajudin's journal stated that the difference of culture between Arabic and Indonesia has one of factor the difference of structure. Thus, this journal predicts term of phrase is more general than grammar in Arabic and Indonesia. And it is also why this journal conducts.

## B. METHOD

This journal used contrastive analysis. Contrastive analysis was as study of different bilingual languages, to known the similarities and the differences between them of linguistic or generally. It also used descriptive qualitative method.

Technique collection data that used are documentation of Arabic and Indonesian dictionaries, Arabic and Indonesian books, and articles. Then, the data analyzed by contrasting between Arabic phrase and Indonesian.

This journal used linguistic analysis for analyzing data. First, the data collected by choosing one theme in various books. Then the data analyzed by contrastive analysis. The analysis steps that used in this journal as follows:

1. Choose structures or elements of native and target language that analyzed
2. Fit the structures and elements of native and target language that described elements of second language
3. Predict structures and elements of native and target language that for language learning.

## C. THEORETICAL REVIEW

### 1. Phrase in Arabic

*Ibarah* is two or more words that connects and have certain meaning or statement that has some meanings. (Emil Yakub: 2006: 297)

*Tarkib* is combination of some elements that connects and has function in sentence, or form of syntax in single word, means that the combination can change with one word. (Hasanain: 1984: 164).

In addition, *murakkab* is two or more words, even its perfect *faidah murakkab* or not. This journal discusses about unperfect *murakkab* that non predicative. Because, perfect *murakkab* is equal with clause structure that already has been predicative. Example (الطَّالِبُ مُجْتَهِدٌ).

Based on the definitions above, this journal limited the term of *murakkab* as below.

#### a. *Murakkab Idhafi*

*Murakkab Idhafi* is word consists of *mudhaf* and *mudhaf ilaih*. *Idhafah* divided into two are: *ma'nawiyah* and *lafziyah*. Example: (كِتَابُ زَيْدٍ) called *idhafah ma'nawiyah* because the meaning of "اللام". While, *idhafah lafziyah* is the literal *idhafah* and has not context meaning.

b. *Murakkab bayani*

*Murakkab bayani* is two word that the first word describes the second word. Based on Arabic theory, there is the word relates other follow word. *Murakkab bayani* divided into three kinds are *murakkab washfi*, *murakkab taukidi*, and *murakkab badali*.

1) *Murakkab washfi* is two words consist of adjective and the word that adjective.

Example: (التلميذ المجتهد)

2) *Murakkab taukidi* is two words repetition as strengthener the word. Example: (القوم كلهم)

3) *Murakkab badali* is two words that one of them as apposition. Example: (مُحَمَّدٌ بْنُ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ)

c. *Murakkab athfi*

*Murakkab athfi* is two or more words that separates with conjugation or *athaf* letter, for example (طَالِبٌ وَطَالِبَةٌ). Conjugation or *athaf* letter in Arabic consists of ten words are (

(الواو والفاء وثم وحتى وأو وأم وأما وبل ولا ولكن

d. *Murakkab mazji*

*Murakkab mazji* is two word that becomes a word, example: (حضر موت). If *murakkab mazji* is 'alam (name), then position in *i'rab* is *ism alladzi la yansharif*, such as (حضر موت). If *murakkab mazji* is not 'alam (name), so both of them are *mabni 'ala fath* such as (صباح مساء)

e. *Murakkab adadi*

*Murakkab adadi* is part of *murakkab mazji*, and each groups there is conjugation "الواو" that imply. While, numeral (عشرون) till (تسعة وتسعين) is not *murakkab adadi* because *huruf athaf* does not hide, but it is a part of *murakkab athfi*. A word (أحد عشر) from the word (أَحَدٌ وَعَشْرٌ). Then, *waw* letter is deleted and it becomes two words into one word.

f. *Murakkab syibhul jumlah*

*Syibhul jumlah* is *jar majrur* and *zaraf*, named *syibhul jumlah* because expert of *nahwu* stated that there is a relationship between every *jar majrur* and *zharaf*, and it deleted is implicit *fi'il* or *syibh fi'il* because fit context of sentence.

*Jar* is *amil* that make *jar isim* with *huruf jar*. While, *majrur* is *isim* that *mu'rab* because *jar*, for example (على الكرسي). *Zharaf* also called *maf'ul fih*, but if the mean shows place of the activity happens called *zharaf makan*, for example (تحت المكتب).

2. Phrase in Indonesian

Every word or phrase in a sentence has function that connects with word or another sentence. Function is syntax means that connects with list of word or phrase in sentence. Major syntax is predicate, subject, object complement and adverb. Phrase in Indonesian divided into some categories. First, based on position, these phrases called coordinative phrases if they equals; if they not. They called by *subordinatif* phrase. If the phrase can change all the elements of it, called *endosentrik* phrase. If both elements are one, called *eksosentrik* phrase. And thus based on the category, consists of nominal phrase, verbal phrase, adjective phrase, and prepositional phrase.

a. *Subordinatif* nominal phrase or called as *atributif endosentrik* phrase (Ramlan: 2005: 143) consists of nominal and nominal, nominal and verbal, nominal and adjective, nominal and adverb, and nominal and numerical.

Examples:

- Buku Zahra
  - Pisau cukur
  - Sekolah dasar
  - Banyak uang
  - Hanya nasi
  - Empat buah bangku
- b. Coordinative nominal phrase is two words that have pair from relational antonym. Examples:
- Ayah ibu
  - Guru murid
  - Siang malam

The meaning of coordinative nominal phrase stated that between these two words can add conjugation. Examples:

- Ayah dan ibu
  - Saudara dan saudari
  - Lautan dan daratan
- c. Appositive phrase is additional adverb about someone's identity or thing that refers to him/her. Examples:
- Ahmad, anak Pak Sastro
  - Profesor Mujiburrahman, Rektor UIN Antasari
- d. Adjective phrase also has coordinative category like nominal phrase. There are two adjective words that partner from relational antonym. It can also add conjugation "dan" between these two words. Examples:
- Baik buruk
  - Besar kecil
- e. *Subordinatif* adjective phrase is two words consist of adjective and nominal, adjective and adjective, also adjective and adverb. Examples:
- Merah darah
  - Tidak malas
  - Cukup baik
- f. Prepositional phrase is *eksosentrik* phrase that consists of preposition and nominal, called directive *eksosentrik* phrase too. Preposition is function word. There are prepositional and *eksosentris* phrase causes preposition strings up in *eksosentris* phrase. It divides into two components are: root and tree. Directive *eksosentris* phrase has various structures, meanings, and functions in a sentence, for examples:
- Di atas meja
  - Ke sekolah
- g. In addition, there is also non directive *eksosentrik* phrase that consists of *artikulus* and nominal, for examples:
- Si kaya
  - Sang pembimbing
  - Para ulama

### 3. Contrastive Analysis Study

This method appeared after world war II purposed for learn foreign language and also scientific communication, introduces culture between nations, and shares experience. A scientific movement that constructed by Charles Fries and Robert Lado of Machan University in United States stated that it is need to cross study between language learners and English language. This phenomenon many discussed when expert of applied linguistic concerned applied Linguistic center in America in 1960's. It said that classic and modern at the same time. First, it is classic because the first Nahwu experts that shown such as Sibawaihi, Ibnu Jinni, etc. Next, it is modern because this recently developed in 1960's.

Contrastive Analysis is one of linguistic branch that investigates language system by contrasting different two languages to know the similarities and the differences generally or, of its language; and not from one language family. For example between Arabic and Indonesian, or France and Indonesian that contrasts with phonology, morphology, syntax, semantic, and descriptive linguistic.

Contrastive Analysis is brunch of applied linguistic, is contrasts grammar by pedagogic application. There is a different study of contrast between America and Europe. In America, contrast study dominated by applied linguistic. In addition, in Europe contrast study dominated by applied theoretic study. But these aspects are important each other.

Contrastive Analysis based on the balance and the contrastive of bilingual that not one family language. Then it is analyzed by elements of both languages. First it is native language and second is target language that studied to know the difficulties in learning foreign language.

Contrastive analysis does not contrast between one language to others, but contrast between structure to other language structure in phonology, morphology, and semantic aspects.

This journal aimed to understand the announcement and anxiety in Arabic learning as a foreign language. Based on Arabic linguistic, the data are structure and manuscript that actually differs from language in learning, various languages that caused by spreading of speakers. And Study about Arabic can give unique knowledge for pupils.

Massofa stated that contrastive is a part of mistakes. Here, will discuss the mistakes based on prominently, cause to know mistakes by contrasting between FL and SL.

A long time a go, contrastive analysis was belief as potential guide to second language teaching. Based on contrastive analysis hypothesis, the difficulties or mistakes when second language used, can be known by describing the contrastive or by searching similar between first and second language.

All the problems in learning language even it's the different grammar or language itself, without ignore equal word.

The purposes of contrastive are:

1. Checks the differences and the similarities between these two languages
2. Knows the problems when teach foreign language, and describes these problems.
3. Give advantages to develop foreign language learning material.

#### **D. FINDING AND DISCUSSION**

This journal discussed about border and the differences between phrase in Indonesia and Arabic. As known, languages have basic form even its' writing and its' speaking aspects. Indonesian language like Arabic also has border and different phrase.

Previous study has not discussed specific phrase in Arabic and Indonesian yet. Because according to Imam Asrori, the term of “phrase” is rarely used when studying nahwu or structure in Arabic.

This journal discussed about border and the different of phrase in Arabic and Indonesian. It hopes for Arabic learner easier to study Arabic with compare *murakkab* structure that same with structure in Indonesia. It is not only to know equal word, but also to know all the structures in Arabic that fit to structure in Indonesia. And the last, it knows the differences even from its structure or vocabularies.

As cited in this journal, the definition of phrase is “*murakkabat*”. Then, the discussion of “*murakkabat*” limited into “*murakkabat ghair tam*”, that is *idhafi*, *bayani*: *washfi*, *taukidi*, dan *badali*; *athfi*, *mazji*, *adadi*, and *syibhul jumlah*.

Then, phrase in Indonesian; this journal limited to *subordinatif* nominal, appositive phrase, coordinative adjective phrase, *subordinatif* adjective phrase, prepositional phrase, and non directive *eksosentrik* phrase.

#### 1. Border aspects of Arabic and Indonesia phrase.

This journal found out the phrase categories had equals and the differences. After that, these categories contrasted by grouping which are equal phrases and which are different phrases in Arabic and Indonesian as followed:

- a. *Murakkab idhafi* equaled with *subordinatif* nominal phrase. ( بَابُ الْفَصْلِ ), was the example of *murakkab idhafi*. And (pintu kelas) was the example of *subordinatif* nominal phrase. Both of them consisted of nominal+ nominal.
- b. *Murakkab washfi* equaled with *subordinatif* adjective phrase. ( الطَّالِبَةُ الْمُجْتَهِدَةُ ) was the example of *murakkab washfi*. And “siswi rajin” was the example of *subordinatif* adjective phrase. Both of them consisted of nominal and adjective.
- c. *Murakkab badali* equaled with appositive phrase. ( مُحَمَّدٌ بْنُ عَبْدِ اللَّهِ ) was the example of *murakkab badali*. And “Muhammad anak Abdullah” was the example of appositive phrase. Both of them consisted of nominal and appositive nominal.
- d. *Murakkab athfi* equaled with coordinative nominal phrase, ( طَالِبٌ وَطَالِبَةٌ ) was the example of *murakkab athfi* and “siswa dan siswi” was the example coordinative nominal phrase. Both of them consisted of nominal and nominal and added “dan”.
- e. *Murakkab syibhul jumlah* equaled with prepositional phrase. ( عَلَى الْكُرْسِيِّ ) was the example of *murakkab syibhul jumlah jar majrur*, while “di atas kursi” was the example of prepositional phrase. Next, ( حَوْلَ الْمَدْرَسَةِ ) was the example of *syibhul jumlah zharaf*, “di sekitar sekolah” was the example of prepositional phrase. Both of them consisted of preposition and nominal.

#### 2. The different phrase aspect in Arabic and in Indonesian.

In addition, between Arabic phrases and Indonesian phrases also had the differences, as followed:

- a. *Murakkab idhafi* differed of *subordinatif* nominal phrase from the meaning and word order. Such as *murakkab idhafi* ( خَيْرُ النَّاسِ ) in Indonesia is “manusia terbaik”. In Arabic it consisted of *isim* and *isim*, and was mean “من”. While in Indonesian, it consisted of nominal and adjective. Another example was ( إِنَّهُ الْأَخ ),



that in Arabic was mean “اللام”. While in Indonesian it was not phrase, but only one single word.

- b. *Subordinatif* nominal phrase differed of word in Arabic. For example, “rumah sakit” was subordinatif nominal phrase, while (مُسْتَشْفَى) was not phrase, but only one single word.
- c. *Murakkab washfi* distinguished with *subordinatif* nominal. For the example, (اللُّغَةُ الْعَرَبِيَّةُ) in Indonesian was “bahasa Arab”. In Arabic it consisted of *isim* and *sifat*, while in Indonesia it consisted of nominal and nominal.
- d. *Murakkab athfi* distinguished with coordinative nominal phrase. It must added *huruf athaf* “و” or “وَ” between two words such as (أَخٌ وَأُخْتُ). While, in coordinative nominal phrase might it was deleted such as “saudara dan saudari”, and so did coordinative adjective phrase.
- e. *Murakkab taukidi* had not equaled and distinguished words in Indonesia.
- f. *Murakkab adadi*, in Arabic consisted of two implicit numbers that had *huruf athaf* was disappeared and made the two words became like one single word, for example (خَمْسَةُ عَشَرَ). While numerical phrase consisted of number and nominal, for example: “lima buku”.
- g. *Murakkab mazji* had not equaled and distinguished words in Indonesia.
- h. Non directive *eksosentrik* phrase had not equaled and distinguished words in Arabic.

Based on the differences above, there has distinguished between vocabularies and culture in Arabic and Indonesian.

### 3. Mistaking and Complicating of Arabic Learning

The complicating that has faced out by the pupils in Indonesia is they had not known structure in Arabic and Indonesian partly. *Kaidah Nahwiyah* has grammatically or types’ sentences (sentences’ form science). Even though, they mastered grammar in Indonesia but they have difficult to find the comparison in Indonesia. Thus, theory mastered but it has still difficult for them. Like *tarkib idhafi* and *tarkib washfi*, pupils has still made mistake to compare them.

This journal discussed bias of word structure in a sentence, like *isim* and *isim* and the others. This form caused pupils made mistakes when they studied foreign language, includes negation and conjugation, also *idhafah* and *na’at man’ut*.

Learners also actually wanted to use *murakkab washfi* but they used *murakkab idhafi*, because they thought it was like subordinatif nominal phrase. And they did it accidentally. Because they has still felt difficult to distinguish which is *murakkab idhafi* and which is *murakkab washfi*.

This also happened to coordinative phrase. Students still has mistakes when use *murakkab athfi*. Because in Indonesia, the conjugation “dan” might disappeared when use coordinative phrase. But in Arabic, they must use *huruf athaf* when use *murakkab athfi*.

The finding in this journal has hoped for teachers to know predict the mistakes that students has made. Next, teacher also has hoped to use contrastive analysis when Arabic teaching and learning in order to make easier for the students to understand

and master phrase structure in Arabic. And teacher also hopes can used inductive approach when teach Arabic grammar.

## E. CLOSURE

Based on the finding, so it could be concluded that with applying contractive analysis, can be known students' mistake that they might made in Arabic learning. It also hopes can make students feel easier when they study Arabic by fitting Arabic phrase with Indonesian phrase in order to mastered phrase structure or *murakkabat*.

Analysis contrastive is very benefit to improved second language learning. Furthermore, it is also very benefit to develop the language, masters other nation countries through linguistic contrastive. The last, it also helps more accurate translation of native language.

And it is hoped there is future research about analysis contrastive is not only about theory but also in other kinds of studies.

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# **The Effects of Basic Psychological Needs Satisfaction on Arabic language Acquisition in a Short-Term Intensive Arabic Camp**

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## **Abstract**

The purpose of this study is to investigate effects of the satisfaction of basic psychological needs (competence, autonomy, and relatedness) on Arabic language acquisition during “the Intensive Arabic Camp in Rurikei.” The Camp activities ran for approximately one week in 2015 and again in 2016 in Rurikei, a suburb of Kyoto, Japan. One of the goals was to offer the participants basic psychological needs satisfaction, as defined by the self-determination theory. Arabic language acquisition during the Camp was measured using the results of written and oral examinations, which were conducted before and after the Camp. The authors’ previous studies show that the participants’ needs satisfaction generally increased due to the methods utilized in the Camp (Sumi & Sumi, 2019). Data were gathered from 95 participants in the Camp, who were mostly university students in Japan.

The written examination scores from after the Camp demonstrated positive results regarding the satisfaction of autonomy and competence during the Camp; and the oral examination scores from after the Camp indicated the satisfaction of competence and relatedness during the Camp. These results suggest that the methods used within the Camp to increase basic psychological needs satisfaction also may enhance the participants’ motivation to learn Arabic, which in turn elevates the degree of their Arabic language acquisition.

Key words: Arabic language acquisition, Arabic learning, short-term intensive Arabic camp, basic psychological needs, self-determination theory

## **1. Introduction**

### **1.1 The Intensive Arabic Camp in Rurikei**

The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between the satisfaction of basic psychological needs (competence, autonomy, and relatedness) and Arabic language acquisition during “the Intensive Arabic Camp in Rurikei” (referred to as the Camp below: Sumi & Sumi, 2018, 2019). The Camp was held for university students in Rurikei in Kyoto Prefecture, Japan in 2015 and again in 2016; the duration each time was about one week. Approximately 50 students participated in the Camp each year. Having voluntarily applied to attend the Camp, they agreed to make a pledge that they would use only Arabic 24 hours a day during the Camp, both inside and outside of class. Apart from the first and last day, the daily schedule of the Camp consisted of three 90-minute classes and one 90-minute cultural activity per day. The participants were divided into three levels: 3, 2, and 1 (3 is the highest); level 1 was further divided into two classes: 1B and 1A. The Camp was designed to elevate the satisfaction of the participants’ basic psychological needs, as defined by the self-determination theory.

### **1.2 Basic psychological needs as defined by the self-determination theory**

As a theory of human motivation, personality development, and well-being in social contexts, the self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000a, 2000b) has recently been attracting notable attention. Based on this theory, satisfying basic psychological needs is indispensable for internalizing motivation and also for psychological development, integrity, and well-being (Black & Deci, 2000). Conversely, thwarting of these needs will result in decreasing motivation and well-being, which in turn may lead to poor academic outcomes (Deci & Ryan, 2012; Deci, Vallerand, Pelletier, & Ryan, 1991; Ryan, 1995; Vansteenkiste, Ryan, & Deci, 2008). The self-determination theory is backed by evidence from many studies (Deci & Ryan, 2012; Niemiec & Ryan, 2009).

The self-determination theory maintains that human beings have three basic psychological needs: competence, autonomy, and relatedness (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000b, 2017). Competence refers to the need to experience oneself as effective in one's

interactions with the environments. For example, students satisfy their competence when they succeed in difficult tasks or assignments in their academic setting. Autonomy refers to the need to feel volitional and authentic in one's actions. For example, students satisfy their autonomy when they determinedly pursue a chosen field of school work according to their own free will. (Niemic & Ryan, 2009). Relatedness refers to the need to experience oneself as connected to others and have meaningful relationships with them. For example, students satisfy their relatedness when they help each other or are assisted by their teachers and/or family members with their studies.

### **1.3 Basic psychological needs satisfaction in the Camp**

According to the self-determination theory, support provided by teachers of basic psychological needs satisfaction promotes student motivation and elevates academic performance (Deci et al., 1991; Niemic & Ryan, 2009). Self-determination theory research shows that both intrinsic motivation and autonomous types of extrinsic motivation enhance engagement and promote optimal learning in educational settings (Niemic & Ryan, 2009). In particular, students with teachers who support their autonomy (compared to controlling teachers) are more likely to reach higher academic achievements and deeper conceptual understanding (Reeve, Bolt, & Cai, 1999). In accordance with these studies, the Camp was designed to provide an educational environment which promotes the participants' basic psychological needs satisfaction to stimulate autonomous motivation, comprising intrinsic motivation and autonomous types of extrinsic motivation (Niemic & Ryan, 2009; Mageau & Vallerand, 2003). The following situations were created for the participants to enhance their basic psychological needs satisfaction: (1) to (7) were for autonomy satisfaction, (8) to (10) were for competence satisfaction, and (11) to (13) were for relatedness satisfaction.

- (1) The instructors gave a certain amount of homework to the students, which required an hour or two hours of preparation but also allowed them to review their lessons on their own. In other words, the students had to do some homework given by the instructors, but they could choose to study other things as well to elevate their Arabic language ability (Mageau & Vallerand, 2003; Ringeisen & Burgermeister, 2015).

- (2) The instructors provided a general subject when they assigned an Arabic composition as homework or required the preparation of an oral presentation, but allowed the students to select a specific subject within the general subject. For example, one of the instructors assigned sports as a general subject, and the students were able to select either football, swimming, or skiing as a specific subject (Mageau & Vallerand, 2003; Ringeisen & Burgermeister, 2015).
- (3) The director/instructor of the Camp created a webpage to announce the aims of the Camp, its content in detail, and its pledge system, so that the students could fully understand these before applying. The director/instructor also reminded them of these points in the opening ceremony (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Mageau & Vallerand, 2003; Niemiec & Ryan, 2009; Reeve, Jang, Hardre, & Omura, 2002).
- (4) The director/instructor announced at the end of breakfast on the fourth day that some students had spoken in Japanese, thus violating the pledge. She said the students were supposed to be here to acquire Arabic, but that these students may have forgotten that. She reminded them of their mutual desire to improve their Arabic, which would help them to attain their own goals (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Mageau & Vallerand, 2003; Niemiec & Ryan, 2009; Reeve et al., 2002). This action by the director also supported other students in the Camp, who felt that observing the pledge was necessary so that the majority of the students would not be distracted (Mageau & Vallerand, 2003).
- (5) A few students wanted to change the level to which they were assigned following their placement oral examination, i.e., they desired to move to a lower level. The director listened to their views and agreed to move them (Mageau & Vallerand, 2003; Reeve, 2002; Ringeisen & Burgermeister, 2015).
- (6) The students chose their own themes, structures, and wording for presentations in class, and they practiced skits of their own design; they chose topics and their own structure while writing compositions in Arabic (within the given broad subject of the class); and they chose what to do in the talent show, which was performed by the class members at

the end of the Camp. (Mageau & Vallerand, 2003; Ringeisen & Burgermeister, 2015).

- (7) The students were able to go to the study room every night and seek assistance from the instructors, if they wished, on their own initiative (Mageau & Vallerand, 2003; Reeve, 2002; Ringeisen & Burgermeister, 2015).
- (8) A list of Arabic words and sample sentences were sent to the participants a few weeks prior to the Camp, in order to alleviate their possible performance anxiety while in the Camp (Mageau & Vallerand, 2003; Reeve, 2002; Ringeisen & Burgermeister, 2015).
- (9) During the Camp, the instructors always tried to provide positive evaluations and encouragement to the participants (Deci, Spiegel, Ryan, Koestner, & Kauffman, 1982; Reeve, 2002).
- (10) The instructors were ready to answer questions and to help the participants in the study room at night, so that the participants could attend classes and activities with confidence (Mageau & Vallerand, 2003; Reeve, 2002).
- (11) The Camp was designed to gather university students whose goal was to improve their Arabic language skill as part of a group and while living together with Japanese instructors and native speakers of Arabic in one house for 24 hours; this encouraged them to feel a sense of belonging (Niemic & Ryan, 2009).
- (12) The relationships among the participants and the instructors were promoted via abundant opportunities to display cooperation, empathy, and solidarity, and through learning activities such as the practice of skits, dialogues, and group presentations (Niemic & Ryan, 2009; Ringeisen & Burgermeister, 2015).
- (13) The Camp included cultural activities, such as dancing, singing, and acting, which were socially binding activities (Niemic & Ryan, 2009; Standage, Duda, & Ntoumanis, 2006).

#### **1.4 The Purpose of This Study**

Support of the participants' basic psychological needs satisfaction within the Camp was found to be appropriate (Sumi & Sumi, 2019); during the Camp, the participants' needs satisfaction increased generally. However, it was necessary to clarify the degrees of effect exerted on the participants' Arabic language acquisition by their increased needs satisfaction.

This study aimed to examine these effects. The data used by Sumi & Sumi (2019) were examined to assess the effects. Ethical clearance for the study was obtained from the ethical committees of the institutions involved in the study. The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this study.

## **2. Methods**

Questionnaire data were obtained from 45 participants who attended the Camp in 2015 and 50 participants who attended in 2016. Most of them were university students in Japan. With a mean age of 21.95 ( $SD = 8.17$ , range 18 to 68 years), they were comprised of 59 women and 36 men. Informed consent was gained from all the respondents prior to the start of necessary work (procedure). Two kinds of data were obtained. One was for basic psychological needs satisfaction, and the other was for degree of Arabic language acquisition.

The data for basic psychological needs satisfaction was collected via questionnaires administered once before and once after the Camp. Both were conducted at the venue of the Camp. The questionnaire before the Camp consisted of three open questions about basic psychological needs satisfaction during their Arabic language learning experiences up to that time. The questionnaire after the Camp consisted of three open questions asking about basic psychological needs satisfaction during the Camp. These questions are presented in Table 1.

**<Table 1> Open questions**

Basic needs	Before the Camp	After the Camp
Competence	How satisfied were you with exercising and expressing your capacities in Arabic learning until now?	During this Camp, how satisfied were you with exercising and expressing your capacities?
Autonomy	How satisfied were you with autonomously choosing and practicing during your Arabic learning until now?	During this Camp, how satisfied were you with autonomously choosing and practicing?
Relatedness	How satisfied were you regarding connecting and interacting with others while learning Arabic until now?	During this Camp, how satisfied were you regarding connecting and interacting?

The participants' answers were rated using a scale of 1 to 10: 1 represents no satisfaction of the need, and 10 represents considerable satisfaction. This rating process was conducted by two professors who fully understand the theory of basic psychological needs satisfaction. The averages of the two raters' scores were used as the data for the analyses.

Degree of the participants' Arabic language acquisition was assessed using written examinations and oral examinations which were produced by all the instructors. All the participants were required to take these examinations before and after the Camp so that the increase in the participants' Arabic language ability during the Camp could be measured. The examinations before and after the Camp were different in content but the same in structure and level. The written examinations were given scores from 0 to 100, and oral examinations were scored on a 5-point scale. To examine the effects of the Camp, scores were obtained by subtracting the examination score before the Camp from that after the Camp.

### **3. Results**

Table 2 presents examples of participant responses concerning the satisfaction of their basic needs before and during the Camp. Table 3 shows means, standard deviations, and range of the variables. There were statistically significant differences between before and during the Camp in all the needs satisfaction ratings ( $ps < 0.01$ ). The basic needs satisfaction ratings



during the Camp were higher than those before the Camp. These results were also reported by Sumi & Sumi (2018). The scores for both examinations after the Camp were statistically significantly higher than those before the Camp ( $p < 0.01$ ).

Correlations between the scores for satisfaction of basic needs and the examinations are shown in Table 4. The scores for the examinations before the Camp were not statistically significantly correlated with the scores for satisfaction before the Camp. Additionally, there were almost no statistically significant correlations between the scores for satisfaction during the Camp and the examinations before the Camp. In contrast, there were nearly statistically significant correlations between the scores for satisfaction during the Camp and the scores obtained by subtracting the examination score before the Camp from that after the Camp.

**<Table 2> Examples of participant responses concerning basic psychological needs satisfaction**

Basic psychological needs	Need satisfaction before the Camp	Need satisfaction during the Camp
Competence	Because I learn what I like, I carried out the given tasks. I found confidence in my understanding.	Under the strict rule of "Arabic only," the opportunities to display my ability to use Arabic increased.
Autonomy	I chose to learn Arabic by my own will. I have willingly learned Arabic, asking my teachers for instruction.	I moved my learning forward myself and decided everything except the content of the classes.
Relatedness	People who study Arabic generally possess a sense of purpose and an eagerness to study; therefore, they had a good influence on me.	I was very stimulated by people who are superior to me [in skill]. It was a good camp because I had friends who tried to use Arabic at all times.

**<Table 3 > Means, standard deviations, and range**

		Means	SD	Range
Basic psycho- logical needs	Before the Camp			
	Autonomy satisfaction	7.16	2.17	2.0 – 10.0
	Competence satisfaction	5.56	1.60	2.5 – 9.0
	Relatedness satisfaction	6.35	2.34	1.0 – 9.5
	During the Camp			
	Autonomy satisfaction	8.56	1.33	4.5 – 10.0
	Competence satisfaction	7.39	1.53	3.5 – 10.0
	Relatedness satisfaction	8.55	1.49	3.5 – 10.0
Exam.	Before the Camp			
	Written exam.	53.07	20.46	16.0 – 95.0
	Oral exam.	1.75	0.63	1.0 – 3.0
	After the Camp			
	Written exam.	57.87	16.88	17.5 – 100.0
	Oral exam.	2.42	0.81	1.0 – 4.5
	Difference			
	Written exam.	5.15	12.06	-20.5 – 32.5
	Oral exam.	0.74	0.50	0.0 – 2.0

Note. SD: standard deviations. Difference: scores were obtained by subtracting the examination score before the Camp from that after the Camp.

**<Table 4> Correlations between basic needs satisfaction and the examination scores**

basic psychological needs satisfaction	Before the Camp		After the Camp		Difference	
	Written	Oral	Written	Oral	Written	Oral
	exam.	exam.	exam.	exam.	exam.	exam.
Before the Camp						
Autonomy satisfaction	-0.03	0.05	-0.09	0.01	0.06	0.08
Competence satisfaction	0.06	0.17	-0.07	0.13	0.10	0.17
Relatedness satisfaction	0.13	0.08	0.14	0.08	-0.06	-0.04
During the Camp						
Autonomy satisfaction	0.11	0.20*	0.13	0.21*	0.17	0.27**
Competence satisfaction	0.09	0.22*	0.10	0.19	0.25**	0.35**
Relatedness satisfaction	0.03	0.10	-0.03	0.09	0.21*	0.22*

Note. Difference: scores were obtained by subtracting the examination score before the Camp from that after the Camp. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Multiple regression analyses were conducted to examine relationships between the scores for the examinations and satisfaction before the Camp. The examination scores before the Camp were regressed on scores for the three basic needs satisfaction before the Camp. Table 5 presents the results of the multiple regression analyses. There were no significant regression coefficients for the basic needs satisfaction. The coefficients of determination ( $R^2$ ) were not significant, indicating that the variation in both scores for the examinations before the Camp could not be accounted for by the scores for the three basic needs satisfaction before the Camp.

**<Table 5> Multiple regression analyses**

Independent variable before the Camp	Dependent variable					
	Written exam. before the Camp			Oral exam. before the Camp		
	$\beta$	Partial r	$R^2$	$\beta$	Partial r	$R^2$
Autonomy satisfaction	-0.06	-0.06	0.021	-0.05	-0.04	0.029
Competence satisfaction	0.07	0.06		-0.07	-0.06	
Relatedness satisfaction	0.12	0.11		0.15	0.14	

Note.  $\beta$ : standardized regression coefficient. Partial r: correlation coefficient with the dependent variable controlling for other independent variables.  $R^2$ : coefficient of determination.

Hierarchical regression analyses were performed to clarify the extent to which the scores for the basic needs satisfaction explained the variance in the examination scores after the Camp. The dependent variables were the written and the oral examination scores after the Camp. The corresponding examination score before the Camp for the dependent variable was first entered into the regression equation in each analysis to control for this variable. Next, age and sex were entered into the regression equation in each analysis to control for the dependent variable. Sex was coded 0 for men and 1 for women as a dummy variable. Finally, the scores for the basic needs satisfaction after the Camp were entered into the regression equation.

Table 6 shows the results of the hierarchical regression analyses. There were very high and positive relationships between the examination scores before the Camp and those after the Camp ( $r_s > 0.80$ ). After controlling for the examination score before the Camp, age and sex significantly accounted for the variance in both the examination scores before the Camp. The written examination scores after the Camp tended to be weakly and negatively correlated with age. Men tended to have somewhat higher scores for the written and the oral examinations after the Camp than women. The scores for satisfaction of autonomy and competence during the Camp contributed a low but significant variance in the written examination scores after the Camp (2.2% and 1.6%, respectively), after controlling for the written examination scores before the Camp, age, and sex. The scores for the two needs satisfaction were weakly and positively correlated with the written examination scores after the Camp. In contrast, the scores for satisfaction of competence and relatedness during the Camp contributed a low but significant variance in the oral examination scores after the Camp (1.3% and 1.4%, respectively), after controlling for the oral examination scores before the Camp, age, and sex. The scores for needs satisfaction were weakly and positively correlated with the oral examination scores after the Camp.

#### **4. Discussion**

This study mainly aimed to examine the effects of satisfaction of basic psychological needs (competence, autonomy, and relatedness) on Arabic language acquisition during "the Intensive Arabic Camp in Rurikei." The participants' responses to the open questions about

their satisfaction before and during the Camp were quantified based on the definition of needs satisfaction proposed by the self-determination theory. Arabic language acquisition was assessed using scores from written and oral examinations, which were conducted twice, before and after the Camp.

**<Table 6> Hierarchical regression analyses**

Order of Entry	Independent Variable	$\beta$	Partial r	$R^2$	$R^2$ Change
Dependent Variable: Written exam after the Camp					
1	Written exam. before the Camp	0.78**	0.81**	0.634	0.634**
2	Age	-0.15*	-0.25*	0.667	0.034*
	Sex	-0.13*	-0.21*		
3	Autonomy satisfaction during the Camp	0.13*	0.23*	0.689	0.022*
1	Written exam. before the Camp	0.79**	0.81**	0.634	0.634**
2	Age	-0.12	-0.19	0.667	0.034*
	Sex	-0.13*	-0.23*		
3	Competence satisfaction of during the Camp	0.13*	0.22*	0.683	0.016*
1	Written exam. before the Camp	0.80**	0.81**	0.634	0.634**
2	Age	-0.14*	-0.23*	0.667	0.034*
	Sex	-0.14*	-0.23*		
3	Relatedness satisfaction of during the Camp	0.06	0.11	0.671	0.004
Dependent Variable: Oral exam after the Camp					
1	Oral exam. before the Camp	0.80**	0.83**	0.677	0.677**
2	Age	-0.02	-0.03	0.700	0.023*
	Sex	-0.14*	-0.25*		
3	Autonomy satisfaction of during the Camp	0.08	0.15	0.707	0.007
1	Oral exam. before the Camp	0.80**	0.83**	0.677	0.677**
2	Age	0.02	0.03	0.700	0.023*
	Sex	-0.15*	-0.26*		
3	Competence satisfaction of during the Camp	0.12*	0.21*	0.713	0.013*
1	Oral exam. before the Camp	0.82**	0.83**	0.677	0.677**
2	Age	-0.01	-0.01	0.700	0.023*

	Sex	-0.15*	-0.27*		
3	Relatedness satisfaction of during the Camp	0.15*	0.20*	0.714	0.014*

Note.  $\beta$ : standardized regression coefficient in the third order of entry. Partial r: correlation coefficient with the dependent variable controlling for other independent variables in the third order of entry.  $R^2$ : coefficient of determination.  $R^2$  Change: difference in  $R^2$  between the previous and the present order of entry. \* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ .

The participants' scores for both the written and oral examinations after the Camp exceeded those before the Camp. Likewise, as already reported by Sumi & Sumi (2019), the participants' satisfaction during the Camp was high and exceeded the ratings from before the Camp. The Camp appears to have succeeded in increasing the degree of the participants' Arabic language acquisition, as well as their basic psychological needs satisfaction.

The correlation and multiple regression analyses indicated that there were no relationships between scores for the examinations and basic needs satisfaction before the Camp (Table 4 and 5). These results are inconsistent with the predictions of self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000b, 2017), which suggest a positive correlation between learning achievements and basic needs satisfaction. However, the degree of the participants' Arabic language acquisition before the Camp may be more strongly influenced by something other than basic psychological needs satisfaction because the students had a variety of backgrounds and experiences regarding Arabic learning.

As the results of the hierarchical regression analyses (Table 6), the younger participants achieved higher written examination scores (Table 6). Additionally, the results show that male participants achieved higher scores in both the written and oral examinations. Although the relationships between the examination scores and basic needs satisfaction were weak, the reason for this tendency should be examined in a future study because the tendency is interesting.

There were positive relationships between the written examination scores after the Camp and satisfaction of autonomy and competence during the Camp, and between the oral examination scores after the Camp and satisfaction of competence and relatedness during the Camp. Generally, those participants who had higher basic psychological needs satisfaction during the Camp increased their degree of Arabic language acquisition. However, the

relationships between needs satisfaction and Arabic acquisition were weak. In addition, there were no relationships between the written examination scores after the Camp and satisfaction of relatedness during the Camp, or between the oral examination scores after the Camp and satisfaction of autonomy during the Camp. Yet, in general, the present findings support predictions based on the self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000a, 2000b). Thus, the methods used within the Camp to enhance basic psychological needs satisfaction appear to enhance the participants' autonomous motivation to learn Arabic and to increase their degree of Arabic language acquisition. Further study is needed to examine specific changes in the participants' autonomous motivation during the Camp. It is also still necessary to clarify the relationships between autonomous motivation and the degree of Arabic language acquisition during the Camp.

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### **Conflicts of Interest**

The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this paper.

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# Session III-1: Politics

Room 101

16:40-18:20	<b>Chair</b> Rovshan IBRAHIMOV (HUFS)
	○ <b>Presenter</b> CHOE, Young Chol (Sungkyunkwan University) "Mohammad bin Salman and Saudi Arabia's Next Kingship Succession"
	<b>Discussant</b> HONG, Mijung (Dankook University)
	○ <b>Presenter</b> Sayed GHONEIM (Institute for Global Security & Defense Affairs) "All Fingers Are on the Triggers and No One Wants War: US-Iranian Crisis and Possible Ramifications on East Asia"
	<b>Discussant</b> KIM, Aejung (HUFS)
	○ <b>Presenter</b> Rahman SHAHHUSEYNLI (MOFA, Azerbaijan) "The Protracted Conflict at a Crossroad-Nagorno-Karabakh as a Policy Determinant for Azerbaijan: In the Context of Geopolitical Dynamism in the Middle East"
	<b>Discussant</b> KIM, Sang Cheol (HUFS)



# **Mohammad bin Salman and Saudi Arabia's Next Kingship Succession**

- ❖ **2019 KAMES International Conference**
- ❖ **November 23, 2019 16:40-18:40**
- ❖ **Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS)**

## **Presentation Outline**

- **Introduction: King Salman's appointment of his son, Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), as his heir**
- **The case of King Saud's attempt to change the succession order from seniority to primogeniture: failed**
- **King Salman's attempt to change the succession order from seniority to primogeniture**
- **Mohammed bin Salman and Challenges**
- **Prospects to MbS' survival and enthronement**

## **Introduction**

- **On June 21, 2017, Saudi Arabia's King Salman appointed his son, Mohammed bin Salman, as his heir, changing the succession order from seniority to primogeniture**
- **MbS has pushed for his ambitious radical socio-economic reforms including Saudi Vision 2030**
- **Faces at challenges and criticisms: Jamal Khashoggi's murder, foreign policy decisions on Yemen, Qatar, Iran and Israel**
- **Successful in consolidating power and neutralizing resistance and challenge with alliance, co-optation, and coercion (fear)**
- **Prospects to MbS' survival and enthronement: positive in short term, uncertain in long term**

## **The Case of King Saud**

- **On King Abdulaziz's 1953 decree: the 'eldest' (seniority) among the able (meritocratic) sons of Abdulaziz should be king**
- **1953, the then Crown Prince Saud was declared King and his brother Faysal became Crown Prince and Prime Minister**
- **Revealing his intention to succeed the throne to one of his sons, Saud had appointed his sons to the key state posts: Minister of Defense (Fahd), Commander of the Royal Guard (Musaid), Commander of the National Guard (Khalid), Commander of the Special Guard (Sa'ad)**

## **Domestic Policy Failure**

- **King Saud's sons were too young, inexperienced, & unsuited to carry out that functions.**
- **This led to government policy failures; corruption; and poor financial management.**
- **King Saud's sons were too young, inexperienced, & unsuited to carry out that functions.**
- **This led to government policy failures; corruption; poor financial management. The foreign debt, in 1953-1958 period, doubled.**
- **It greatly aggravated public opinion in the ruling royal family.**

## **Foreign Policy Failure**

- **With the tide of Arab Nationalism, advocated by Nasser, the political and military influence of Egypt threatened the monarchy of the Saudi government in the civil war of Yemen, and Saud attempted to assassinate Nasser through the Syrian army.**
- **But his conspiracy was pre-discovered and failed, and this case drove the King Saud into a corner.**

## **Ruling Royal Family, Religious Establishment and International Actors**

- Facing these domestic and foreign crisis situations, Saud has shown little ability for crisis management and problem solving.
- The royal luxury, wasteful expenditure, domestic and foreign policy failure heightened the discontent of the opposition camp in the royal family and developed into a frontal clash between King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal.
- Most of the princes and religious Ulama leadership supported the transfer of Saud's executive power to Faisal through the royal coup.

## **Frontal clash between King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal in 1958**

- Facing Saud, along with his bodyguards, fled to the Nasiriya Palace and, asked the Bedouin chiefs for support.
- Faisal requested Saud to transfer the king's actual executive power to him, and not to intervene in the Government affairs.
- When Saud rejected it, Faisal submitted his resignation letter as prime minister.

- **In this process, Faisal, an experienced and astute politician, mobilized the princes and persuaded the senior leaders of the royal family that Saud was an unqualified and incompetent ruler, while maintaining the close relationship with the U.S. Administration.**
- **On the other hand, he tried to give an impression that he supported reconciliation with Nasser, the relation, aggravated by Saud's assassination attempt of Nasser.**
- **He also signaled his support of the political reforms of the liberal princes, which were influenced by Nasser's Arab nationalism.**

- **On March 24, 1958, Fahad, a powerful leader of the Sudairi Seven, led the delegation of Princes to Saud and delivered the ultimatum:**
- **1) to transfer all administrative powers to Faisal,**
- **2) to avoid waste of state finances and indiscriminate spending,**
- **3) to remove the king's aides who participated in the Nasser assassination plot,**
- **4) the sons of Abdul Aziz and Saud's sons should be treated equally**



- **Saud asked for support from the US administration, but ignored.**
- **The overwhelming majority of royal family members were hostile to him. Even within the military he was unpopular.**
- **He eventually proclaimed a royal decree on March 31, 1958, to transfer the executive power to carry out domestic and foreign policies to the council of ministers and the chairman of the council of ministers.**
- **As a result, Faisal became the prime minister, supreme commander of the Saudi armed forces as well as the country's security and defense forces.**

### **Armed clash between King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal in 1964**

- **The 1962 Yemeni revolution provided an opportunity to strengthen his position. He appointed his allies to the key positions: Sultan (Defense Minister, replacing Saud's son Fahd); Fahad (Interior minister); Khalid (Deputy Prime Minister); and Abdullah (The National Guard Commander, replacing Saud's son Sa'ad).**
- **In March 1964, Saud and Faisal collided again. Saud set a barricade on his palace in Riyadh and mobilized the Royal Guard for a battle.**
- **Faisal surrounded the Royal Guard by using the National Guard, led by Abdallah. Saud expected the tribal leaders and the princes who followed him to stand on his side but no one, except his sons, reached out to help.**

- **70 princes signed a petition to Saud to transfer his authority to Faisal.**
- **The leading princes asked Ulama and Majlis al-Wukala to dethrone of Saud.**
- **The religious establishment judged that the King Saud did not have an ability to perform his state affairs, dealing with substantive qualifications as a king, not only in terms of his religiosity, but also in his ability to perform his executive function.**
- **On November 2, 1964, Saud was dethroned and exiled to Egypt with his sons.**

## **Muhammad bin Salman (MbS)**

- **MbS, born in 1985 (34), is the first son of King Salman from his third spouse, Fahda bint Falah, a granddaughter of Rakan bin Hithalayn, the Al Ajman tribe head.**
- **After graduating from the King Saud University (B.A. in Law), Mohammed bin Salman spent several years in the private sector before becoming personal aide to his father.**
- **MbS, a relatively unknown prior to his father's accession to the throne, quickly became the face of Saudi Arabia's socio-economic reforms.**
- **In 2016 he launched Vision 2030, an ambitious government road map for economic growth that aims to reduce the country's dependence on oil.**

## **World Views and Personality**

- **MbS' ideology: nationalist and populist, with a conservative attitude towards politics, and a liberal stance on socio-economic issues.**
- **Personality: 'some combination of ambition, vision, ego, youth, risk tolerance, insight and ruthlessness' (Byman and Pollack, 2019: 3).**
- **MbS, because of his ability to 'defy the pressure of both domestic politics and international circumstances' (Byman and Pollack, 2019: 2),**
- **could push the socio-economic reforms and take a radical and bold foreign policy on Yemen, Syria, Qatar, Iran and Israel.**
- **As a negative aspect: 'undisciplined and tempestuous' character with an overly simplistic view of power dynamics in the Middle East (*The Washington Post*, September 28, 2019).**

## **Public Office Career**

- **2009. Special advisor to his father Salman (Governor of Riyadh).**
- **2011. An advisor to Second Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense (His father Salman).**
- **2012. Deputy Chief of the Crown Prince(His father Salman)'s Court.**
- **2013. Chief of the Crown Prince's Court.**
- **In January 2015. Defense Minister and Secretary General of the Royal Court.**
- **In April 2015. Muhammad bin Nayef (MbN) and MbS became Crown Prince and Deputy Crown Prince.**

- **In June 2017, MbS was appointed Crown Prince, following his father's decision to depose Muhammad bin Nayef.**
- **U.S. President Donald Trump congratulated him on his ascension and the two leaders pledged close cooperation on security and economic issues.**
- **They also discussed the need to cut off support for terrorism, the diplomatic dispute with Qatar, and the push to secure peace between Israel and the Palestinians.**
- **National interests and world powers and regional actors: US (Trump), Russia (Putin), Iran, Turkey and Israel.**

### **Military Intervention in the Yemen War**

- **In late 2014, The rebel Houthis took control of northern Yemen.**
- **In March 2015, MbS, the Defense Minister, mobilized a pan-GCC coalition to intervene in the war, and Saudi Arabia began leading a coalition of countries allied against the Houthi rebels.**
- **While MbS wanted to sell the war as a quick win on Houthi rebels in Yemen but it became a long war of attrition with a high cost (tens billions of dollars) and heavy casualties (2015-May 2019, the number of total deaths of children is about 85,000).**
- **The Yemen war becomes MbS' quagmire.**

## **2017 Purge**

- In November 2017, King Salman decreed to establish an anti-corruption committee, headed by the crown prince.
- MbS ordered some 200 wealthy businessmen and princes to be placed under house arrest in Riyadh's Ritz Carlton hotel.
- Arrests of more than 40 princes and government ministers on corruption charges, including Prince Alwaleed bin Talal (prominent investor & businessman), Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah (head of the National Guard), and Prince Turki bin Abdullah (Riyadh governor)
- Some released after turning over assets but the others were in detention without charge or trial according to HRW report of 04 November 2019.

## **Assassination of Jamal Khashoggi**

- In October 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist and a critic of the crown prince was murdered at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.
- The U.S. CIA concluded with "high confidence" that MbS ordered Khashoggi's murder (*The Washington Post*, November 16, 2018).
- The US Senate Resolution No. 714, December 5, 2018: The U.S. Senate has "a high level of confidence that Mohammed bin Salman was complicit in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi," and urges "the United States Government and the international community to hold all parties, including Mohammed bin Salman, involved in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi accountable."

- **The Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur Agnes Callamard on the death of Jamal Khashoggi, appointed by the U.N. Human Rights Council (A/HRC/41/CRP.1, June 19, 2019, p.4):**
- **“The Special Rapporteur has determined that there is credible evidence, warranting further investigation of high-level Saudi Officials’ individual liability, including the Crown Prince’s.”**
- **In the PBC’s "60 Minutes" interview, MbS told that he takes “full responsibility” for the killing of journalist Jamal Khashoggi because it was committed by Saudi government employees but denied ordering the murder.**

### **Weakening of Independent ‘Power Fiefdoms’ for Senior Princes and Advancement of Centralization of State Institutions**

- **Former King Abdullah (Commander of the National Guard 1963-2010, 47 years), His son Mutaib (2010-2017, 7 years)**
- **Former Crown Prince Sultan (Minister of Defense 1962-2011, 49 years)**
- **Former Crown Prince Nayef (Minister of Interior, 1975-2012, 37 years), His son Muhammad (Assistant Interior Minister 1999-2004, Deputy Interior Minister 2004-2012, Interior Minister 2012-2017)**
- **Prince Saud (Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1975-2015, 40 years)**
- **King Salman (Governor of the Riyadh Region, 1962-2011, 49 years)**

## Saudi Arabia's Royal Family Tree



## Alternative Future Kings

- **Prince Muhammad bin Nayef: former Crown Prince and Interior Minister and son of the former Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz**
- **Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah: former head of the National Guard and son of the former King Abdullah**
- **Prince Ahmed bin Abdulaziz, former Interior Minister and the surviving last son of the King Abdulaziz ibn Saud**



## **Prospects to MbS' Survival and Ascension to the throne**

- **MbS' Strength:** Assertive and speedy decision-making; ability to build a coalition using the means of co-optation and sometimes a violent coercion; rich financial and political resources; weakening of the independent 'power fiefdoms' of the senior princes; advancement of centralization of state institutions at the higher level of the state organizations; and MbS controls all the security and military apparatus, the instruments of power even though the grip on the organizations could be limited and vulnerable.
- Since 2015, he has been successful to strengthen his power and outplay his rivals.

- **Vulnerability:** Poor performance in foreign policy on Yemen, Syria, and Qatar; excessive use of coercive means and human rights abuses, shown in the sacking process of the former crown prince Muhammad bin Nayef, 2017 purge, and the Khashoggi murder which stigmatized him.
- **Appointments of inexperienced young personnel to the important power positions.**
- **Loose alliance with the royal family members:** Minister of Interior, Prince Abdulaziz bin Saud (36) is the eldest son of Saud bin Nayef and the grandson of the former Crown Prince, Nayef bin Abdulaziz; Minister of the National Guard, Prince Abdullah bin Bandar (33); Governor of Mecca, Prince Khalid bin Faisal (79).



- **King Salman has sought to bolster MbS, appointing MbS' trusted allies and/or personnel to key offices and advising functions:**
  - **Prince Abdullah bin Bandar to the head of the National Guard,**
  - **A former finance minister, Ibrahim al-Assaf, to the Foreign Minister, Musaad al-Aiban,**
  - **An experienced technocrat to a new national security adviser since the killing of Khashoggi.**
- **The experienced and astute politician, Prince Khalid bin Faisal, also contributes to bolster him.**
- **Still, when the King Salman passes away, MbS could face at a critical challenge.**

- **Poor performance in foreign policy, 2017 purge, and the Khashoggi murder has aggravated the public opinion both in the U.S. Administration and within the Saudi royal family.**
- **A negative symptom of the relationship between King Salman and MbS?**
  - **“Shooting of king's guard deepens Saudi turmoil: Saudi Arabia.” (*The Times*, Sept. 30, 2019);**
  - **“Top Bodyguard to 2 Saudi Kings Is Shot Dead.” (*The New York Times*, Sept. 29, 2019).**

## **Concluding Remarks**

- **A success Korean model of Park Chung-hee in the 1960s or the failed model of King Saud's attempt to primogeniture in 1964?**
- **Prospects to MbS' survival and enthronement:**
  - **Positive in short term**
  - **But uncertain in long term**

**Thank you!**

Sunday, 24<sup>th</sup> of November 2019

### *Strategic Paper*

## **All Fingers Are on The Triggers And No One Wants War “US-Iranian Crisis and Possible Ramifications on East Asia”**

### **Introduction**

Since the "Cold War" Iran has become increasingly important to U.S. foreign policy; not only did the Middle Eastern country share a border with the Soviet Union – America’s new Cold War enemy – but it was also the most powerful player in an oil-rich region.

Currently, Iran practices provocative and aggressive attitudes in several places in the region, it aimed to produce the nuclear weapons. Iran enjoys a geostrategic location that controls Hormoz Strait having close sea boundaries with all Gulf countries. Militarily, Iran depends on its internal strategic depth compared with UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain, those countries which lack this advantage; therefore, these three countries always in need to secure their coasts and sea boundaries with Iran. Iran and Saudi Arabia seek to impose their will on each other by maximizing their influence and control in areas of conflict, or at least seeking to strike a balance between them. Iran sees Israel as the main enemy that must be balanced with the same weapon (nuclear weapon), it also gets ready for balance with Pakistan.

There’s no doubt that the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seized the opportunity exploiting the circumstances, or maybe he succeeded to pave the way for his strategy in the Middle East and his success in the Israeli elections.

On the other hand, the US President Donald Trump who seems to me builds his decisions on three main elements "The U.S economic profit, Obama is the worst and Trump is the best". Nobel Prize and second term in the White House were always main goals to strongest businessman.

### **The US-Iranian crisis**

#### **Background**

In 2008 Israel announced its situation against the Iranian nuclear armament that it would not allow it to continue, but Israel met a lot of obstacles specially when Barack Obama of the US Democratic Party became president of the United States in January 2009. President Obama in coordination with the other four permanent states in the United Nations Security council (UNSC), Europe Union (EU) and Germany increased negotiations with Iran until they could reach a final nuclear agreement so called “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)”. It’s

worth to be mentioned that Iran earlier succeeded in completing about 80% of its nuclear program. The JCPOA was posted on a separate electronic page at the White House official website. Accordingly, lifting sanctions on Iran and releasing its frozen assets started. On other side, the JCPOA was entirely against the will of Israel and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). I remember when the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, “Obama is an enemy to Israel”; however, Mr. Netanyahu increased the annual US military aids to Israel which became \$3.8 Billion.

In January 2017 the republican businessman Mr. Donald Trump was assigned to replace President Obama (his political archenemy) to turn things upside down with huge pressure from Israel and Saudi Arabia. President Trump decided to withdraw the US from the JCPOA and removed the electronic page containing the terms of the agreement from the White House website and announced the need for Iran to return to the negotiation table on the agreement (which Iran has completely rejected). President Trump administration continued their actions to isolate Iran and tighten sanctions against it in return for several charges, most notably that Iran supports instability in the region, interferes in the internal affairs of its countries and insists on the manufacture of banned plastic missiles.

But the remaining five countries of the JCPOA as well as the European Union, have insisted on continuing the nuclear deal with Iran. The Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offered documents to the United Nations to condemn Iran and its nuclear program in front of the international community.

President Trump, through a tight plan, increased the pace of economic sanctions on Iran. The US decided to punish any company that would deal with Iran, just as it had done with North Korea at an earlier time.

President Trump then called on the Gulf states to increase their oil production in preparation to decrease the oil price.

With the deteriorating economic situation of Iran in several areas it became possible to rush Iran to take aggressive action against its opponents. This possibility of taking aggressive actions by Iran has increased when Iran moved some of its naval forces towards the Strait of Hormuz, which controls the exit of the largest proportion of oil to the world, declaring that it may close the Strait as a strategic option against the pressure on them.

During the first week of May The U.S. said it's sending an aircraft carrier strike group and bomber force to the Middle East to send an “unmistakable message” to the Iranian regime, citing “a number of troubling and escalatory indications and warnings” it suggested were linked to Tehran. “The United States is not seeking war with the Iranian regime, but we are fully prepared to respond to any attack, whether by proxy, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or regular Iranian forces,” National Security Advisor John Bolton said in a statement.

Four B-52H Stratofortress bombers took off from the Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana to land at the US military base in Qatar. They have been deployed to the region within a carrier strike group centered around the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, a guided missile cruiser and four guided missile destroyers). The buildup of forces in the area, according to U.S. Central Command, reported by Military Times, is in response to “recent and clear” indications that Iranian or proxy forces were making preparations to “possibly attack American troops in the region.” CENTCOM reported that indications pointed to “threats on land and in the maritime” against U.S. forces.

**Apparently, the main US political strategic goals could be as follows**

- To deter Iran and major competitor powers; and proving the US power in the region.
- To force Iran to return to negotiate the JCPOA (nuclear agreement) with new US terms.
- To show that the US is ready in anticipation of any hostile action by Iran.
- To show that the US is ready in anticipation of Iran's failure to comply with US sanctions.
- Another possible strategic goal could be “a direct deterrence message to China”, who’s potentially supporting Iran’s situation (according to US expectations). It’s also worth to be mentioned that a big oil infrastructure in Iran was built by China, and any military action against Iran will threat the oil imported to China. However, the big oil infrastructure in Iran was built by China, and any military action against Iran will threat the oil imported to China.

**Tactical reactions**

On Sunday, 12th of May 2019, the UAE Foreign Ministry said four commercial ships (two Saudi oil tankers, one Emirati oil tanker and one Norwegian oil tanker) were subject to “sabotage operations” near the territorial waters of the United Arab Emirates in the Gulf of Oman, East of Fujairah, without causing casualties. Earlier the government of Fujairah denied media reports about blasts inside the port and said, “the facility was operating normally”. This was a respond to some Iranian affiliated news agencies which announced earlier on the same day that explosions were monitored near Fujairah seaport.

US President Donald Trump agreed to the request of the commander of the US Central Command (US CENTCOM) to deploy 1500 additional troops in the Gulf region. He confirmed the move of this force on Friday, May 24 for mostly protective role.

**The extra US force includes approximately 1,500 U.S. military personnel and consist of the next:**

- A fighter aircraft squadron to provide additional deterrence and depth to our aviation response options.
- A Patriot battalion to defend against missile threats.

- An additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft.
- An engineer element to provide force protection improvements throughout the region.

Later, on 13<sup>th</sup> of June 2019, two civilian oil tankers were hit in a suspected attack in the Gulf of Oman early on Thursday, causing oil prices to surge and raising the already heightened tensions in the region.

The tankers were struck in the same area where the US accused Iran of using naval mines to sabotage four other oil ships in an attack last month.

One of the tankers was carrying “Japan-related” cargo, and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Tehran.

One of the ships, the Norwegian-owned Front Altair, was “suspected of being hit by a torpedo”, according to Taiwan’s state-owned petrol company. The ship was on fire, its owners said.

The second tanker, Kokuka Courageous, was damaged in a “suspected attack” that breached the hull above the water line while on passage from Saudi Arabia to Singapore, according to Bernhard Schulte Ship management.

It seems that all of the above-mentioned forces, as well as the previously deployed forces, increase the defensive and fire capabilities, but not capabilities of ground invasion inside Iranian territory.

On another side, the Chargé d’Affaires of the US Embassy in Baghdad confirmed the US commitment to the Strategic Framework Agreement, including the prohibition of the use of Iraqi territory to attack any other country.

It’s worth to be mentioned that the US CENTCOM Area of Responsibility includes the Middle East, including Egypt in Africa, and Central Asia, most notably Afghanistan and Iraq; but it does not include Israel, which is considered in the area of responsibility of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) so far. Israel-Arab relations development may reconsider changes of the US future policies and strategies, especially with the development the map of alliances in the region.

In this regard, I envisage three possible scenarios could be behind these processes:

**First:** It’s worth to be reminded that the first Gulf War began because of provocations by some elements of the Iranian army loyal to the Islamic revolution, and on orders directly from the leader of the revolution (not away from Iran’s Islamic leadership), surpassing the leadership of the Iranian armed forces. Over the years, Iran has established several armed systems and militias in which they can compete the regular armed forces and the Iranian security services in their jurisdiction. These systems move much more freely than the official bodies, and it

possible that one of the sub-elements of these militias is involved in this operation. ***On a direct way, I think that the Iranian Revolutionary Guards is involved in these aggressive actions out of the Iranian government and its Armed Forces control.***

**Second:** By armed groups (terrorists) funded by one of the parties that seek to carry out a strong military strike against Iran, such as Israel or any other beneficiary.

**Third:** By terrorist groups aiming the outbreak of a major war in the region to prepare the conditions for the resumption of its activities.

All of the three expectations are preliminary and according to the information available by news agencies and official sources.

The US Central Command sees both attacks against commercial oil tankers in the southern Arabian Gulf and the Houthi's repeated attack against Saudi Arabia as a "tactical action", and it's not logic to respond with strategic strikes using B-52H bombers or F-35. For example.

### **Political reactions**

On Tuesday, 07th of May Iran announced its partial withdrawal from the nuclear deal (JCPOA) signed with world powers in 2015, a year after Donald Trump pulled out of the agreement. It means it may continue in its nuclear program.

On Wednesday, 15th of May U.S. ordered partial evacuation of its Embassy in Baghdad, it urged 'non-emergency' staff to go out of Iraq avoiding. Other European countries also warned their embassies. The USA warning was not a preparatory phase before declaring war against Iran; it was security warning fearing of possible kidnapping risk and aggressive actions could be taken against the embassy and the consulates in Iraq by pro-Iranian armed elements.

During third week of May Iran's Foreign Minister Iran's Zarif started his visits to Beijing and Tokyo in an effort to save 2015 Nuclear Accord and seeking support for Tehran's political situation. On the other hand, Tokyo, Doha and Swiss are paying efforts to mediate between Washington and Tehran to calm the situation down.

On Saturday, 18th of May Saudi Arabia declared that the kingdom and other Arab countries have agreed to a request from the United States to redeploy U.S. forces in the Gulf. KSA confirmed that it's not to do an action that help facilitate a war with Iran, but 'to thwart possible Iranian attacks.

This action was a step to for Trump's call for international navy forces deployment in the Gulf to protect, secure and tighten control Hormuz strait and other key strategic areas and objectives. UK supported Trump call, but EU and Asian allies were in different positions that do not agree with Trump decisions, but they have to comply to them.

### **Possibility of War against Iran**

***Seven actions taken by the US and its allies before the outbreak of war***

From the above, I believe that Trump and his administration planned, in coordination with Netanyahu, to implement five main measures against Iran in attempts to persuade Iran to return to the negotiating table on the nuclear agreement before adopting the most dangerous and the least likely course of action (the war on Iran). The Five measures are as follows:

**First:** US provided Saudi Arabia with huge arms deals starting from 2017. This action is a clear step for war preparedness; Israel always demanded the US to do so to support its strategy (Israel, Sunni Arab states and US to confront their common enemy which is Iran).

**Second:** Israel tried strongly in the UN to condemn Iran that it has the complete intention to produce a nuclear weapon.

**Third:** US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JSPOA).

**Fourth:** US Listed the Iranian Revolutionary Guards as a terrorist organization.

**Fifth:** Deploying US forces in the Gulf (navy, air and air defense forces with the size of a huge firepower in addition to subordinate forces).

**Sixth:** Arab League and GCC summits ended with escalation against Iran.

Seventh: US decision to deploy other forces of 1500 personnel in the Gulf.

#### **Obstacles to the possibility of war**

First: Unsuitable security environment for war in the region.

**Second:** Defeating Iran expands the chaos to all region (Chaos in Afghanistan will affect Iran).  
Increased rivalries.

**Third:** Trump was and still keen to get Nobel Prize; and to win his second term as the US president; however, since January 2017 Trump has repeatedly stated that the US would never involve in any war doing the same mistakes of the previous US presidents.

**Fourth:** Unbalanced internal strategic depth and number of targets (ie, between Iran & UAE).

**Fifth:** Military escalation may lead to an inclusive war against Iran; bearing in mind that defeating Iran will expand chaos from Afghanistan to the heart of the ME and Asia.

**Sixth:** Denying war by EU and the international community.

#### **On the other hand, continued strikes inside Saudi Arabia send messages by Iran;**

- Iran has turned to the action corner, not reaction, ready to dictate its conditions.
- Any sanctions on Iran may exhaust its people but strengthen the Iranian regime.
- The Gulf states capabilities are within Iran's reach. No choice but retreat and negotiate with ne conditions.



- Launching a single US strike against Iran from any Gulf state land will meet a quick military reaction to the same land; UAE will be the biggest loser in this case.
- KSA will never respond to any strike aggressively, just buy more weapons.
- These all are taken very tactfully by the powerful Russian propaganda machine; it's severely damaging the US reputation among the peoples of the ME.

### **Possible ramifications on East Asia**

- Taking into account the relationship between the pace of economic and industrial growth in East Asia and the increasing demand for oil, will severely affect the energy security in the ME and will lead to affect oil & gas importing countries in East Asia specially countries that rely more on the GCC countries and Iran.
- Impacts on the maritime movement security in the region will lead to the increase of economic and military burdens on the East Asian countries who may find themselves obliged to start or increase their military presence in the Middle East in various forms and locations. They will try to ensure the security of transit vessels in the Arab region and to address the threats against the security of energy.
- Qatar split will lead more to divided relations between East Asia with Qatar on a hand and with KSA side on another hand.
- Fleeing terrorist elements from ME to Central Asian and Southeast Asian countries, specifically Afghanistan, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, may expand their spread to East Asia.
- The current US policies may lead to possible economic cooperation between China, ROK, Japan and some EU countries.

### **Final Remarks and Future Perspective;**

#### **On the Middle East level:**

- If Iran will have a nuclear weapon, other countries in the region will seek to have it too, specially KSA.
- Possibility of military actions against Iran, specially from a land of small bordering countries became more difficult.
- Increased sanctions will strengthen the Iranian regime and lead for more aggressive actions in the region.
- Deploying military ships to Hormuz strait (as requested by the US) will provoke Iran and may consider the deployed military ships as a hostile action against it, based on that,

national diplomacies might have to have more coordination with other partners in this issue.

- The planned balance of the negotiation table between the US and Iran seems to be changing.

#### **On the international level:**

- It seems that President Trump is preferring the US internal interest rather than traditional big alliances; so that, more regional alliances with key countries in the areas of interest are required.
- Russian and Chinese diplomacies are gaining, or at least sharing, the US's allies; the powerful Russian propaganda machine is playing a big role in this issue.
- To avoid more instability, the U.S. and China will have to initiate inclusive negotiations trying to put forward a new map of influence to share/ divide economic, political and security influence in a balanced way through clear agreements between two Great Powers (G2).
- However, Indian existence in several aspects is expected in the Middle East, which could be in frame of "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy - FOIP", bearing in mind that the biggest labor in the region is Indian.

#### **Conclusion**

Although all try to avoid the war, it's also difficult to speak about de-escalation of the crisis when maximum pressure is already put on Iran. Sanctions are escalating so high and tight. Iran will continue its hostile actions in the region and its pressure on the international community regarding the JSPOA. In the time that Europe lost the momentum to react, the US is trying to trap other countries in the conflict by demanding some involvement of those nations to protect the sea lines of communications. Even if Trump seems not to be committed for war, everything is put in place to force him to launch a strike. There will be a trigger. The question is when; specially that Iran and its proxies did not stop their hostile actions in the region?

**Sayed Ghoneim, Major General (retired)**

Fellow, Nasser Higher Military Academy

Chairman, IGSDA

[www.igsda.org](http://www.igsda.org)

02<sup>nd</sup> of November 2019



## **Sources**

Personal multinational networks and relations.

Officials working in the Egyptian embassies all over the world.

Other open sources.

# The Protracted Conflict at a Crossroad - Nagorno-Karabakh as a Policy Determinant for Azerbaijan: In the Context of Geopolitical Dynamism in the Middle East

Rahman **SHAHHUSEYNLI**  
MOFA, Azerbaijan

- No material received -



# Session III-2: Culture & Society

Room 503

16:40-18:20	<p><b>Chair</b> LEE Hee-Soo (Hanyang University)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Erina IWASAKI (Sophia University)          "Groundwater Development in Dakhla Oasis in Western Desert (Egypt): History of Wells in Rashda Village"  <b>Discussant</b> NAM, Ok-jeong (Dankook University)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Farrah SHEIKH (Konkuk University)          "Korean Muslims: Shaping Islamic Discourse and Identities Online"  <b>Discussant</b> SUNG, Il Kwang (Konkuk University)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> JEONG, Jin Han (HUFS)          "Tracing Wāqwāq: How Medieval Authors in the Islamic World Amalgamated Diverse Ancient and Medieval Geographies"  <b>Discussant</b> SONG, Kyung Keun (Myongji University)</p>
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> AHN, Sunghun (Gachon University)          "Social Conflict and Controversy in Korean Society over the Yemeni Refugee Issue"  <b>Discussant</b> Asmaiel MERSHAM (HUFS)</p>



# Groundwater Development in Dakhla Oasis in Western Desert (Egypt) – History of Wells in Rashda Village

Erina Iwasaki

Sophia University, Faculty of Foreign Studies

## 1. Introduction

The livelihood in an oasis depends on groundwater drawn from wells. Hence, the oasis has a well-centred society determined by the nature of the well. In other words, the nature of the well determines the pattern of landholding, cultivation, and social relations between the villagers.

This paper examines the development of well drilling in Rashda village in Dakhla Oasis. Rashda village is one of the villages in Dakhla Oasis and depends on the Nubian Aquifer for their water resource, as do the other villages.

Although water use differs by region according to the history, politics, and economy, the main water problems are the same around the world. By focusing on the wells drilled in Rashda village, this paper attempts to understand how the universal issue of the relationship between humans and water changed with technological development.



Map 1 Location of Dakhla Oasis

(Source) Google map





Map 2 Location of Rashda village

(Source) Google map

## 2. Wells and boring until the beginning of the twentieth century

Little is known regarding the ancient methods of extracting water. Many of the wells in Dakhla Oasis date back to the Roman era, but many ancient wells are completely filled with sands, and no information could be found to understand the ancient method of drilling. However, geologist H. J. Llewellyn Beadnell, who travelled to Dakhla Oasis and spent nine years from 1896 to 1905 in the Libyan Desert (Western Desert), observed in those days that the well-sinking method consisted of a combination of the ancient boring method and modern boring practices.

The local method at the time of Beadnell at the beginning of the twentieth century was similar to the ancient or traditional boring practice. It consisted of sinking a rectangular shaft that was usually 2 metres square made of Acacia tree. It could usually be continued to a depth of about 30 metres” (Beadnell 1909: 189).

The modern boring practices consisted of the **hand drilling rigs** and **American steam rigs**, both of which use a steel casing that can dig up to 200 to 300 metres. These practices were probably introduced in Dakhla Oasis at the end of the nineteenth century. The modern methods were first introduced by Hassan Effendi, a servant of a French engineer Lefevre who was sent to Dakhla Oasis by the Egyptian government to instruct the inhabitants on the use of modern drilling methods (Beadnell 1909).

According to Beadnell, using the hand drilling rig was the method used with the hand machines and is the same as the traditional method in principle (Beadnell 1909: 196–197). On the other hand, the steam rigs are of American manufacture and the design usually employed in the United States' oil-fields. In this method, a heavy weight is suspended from a cable and worked by steam power to give a rapid succession of blows to cut out a circular hole through the hardest of rocks (Beadnell 1909: 196–197). However, these boring methods were expensive, and it was difficult to maintain and repair the wells. In particular, the steam rigs necessitated skilled drillers with the difficulty of repair, and the initial cost was high.

As Beadnell observed, the modern technology of **rotary drilling** was introduced in the mid-nineteenth century, and the number of wells drilled with modern technology was already starting to increase at the beginning of the twentieth century. The improvement of the boring method led to the construction of many new wells.

Beadnell lamented that the local villagers quickly learned the new method and promiscuously sunk "a great number of new bores, without regard to the probable effects on the older wells irrigating the existing palm-groves and cultivated lands, with the result that, more especially in the oasis of Dakhla, a great deal of harm was done. Whole districts suffered a general lowering of the water level, with many of the wells ceasing to flow altogether. This was the direct outcome of the excessive number of new bores put down in certain districts where the inhabitants were sufficiently rich and influential to get and retain possession of the majority of the newly-imported boring-rigs" (Beadnell 1909: 188).

### **3. Deep-well boring since the mid-twentieth century**

The number of deep wells has increased drastically since the mid-twentieth century. Introduction of the **deep-depth drilling machine** enabled the drilling of wells up to one thousand metres, and the development of a groundwater probe made it easier to search for groundwater. Moreover, the power pumps diffused the water supply more than the method of drawing water using the animal power of camels and cows.

Thus, the development of technology after the mid-twentieth century enabled the discharging of a large amount of water that could not have been imagined previously. However, the development of well-drilling technology has transitioned the well-drilling actors from the local communities and farmers to the state and large enterprises. This transition has occurred because drilling a deep well and discharging water from it requires a large amount of money; therefore, the actors are limited to those who have a large capital.

In Egypt, the governmental project of New Valley Project was begun in 1958 in the Western Desert. This project was a large land reclamation project that includes irrigation and rural infrastructure constructions and was conducted until the 1970s. In the 1980s, the East Oweinat Rural Development Plan, which was another large-scale project, started in the

southern part of the Western Desert. This project was funded by the government and now implemented by private companies.

The problems of the rapid development of deep wells were already indicated in the 1970s: e.g., the decrease in the artesian water pressure increased the need for lifting water by mechanical devices. Modern pumping was not yet started in Dakhla Oasis, but it was relatively common in the north and south areas of Kharga Oasis and used the diesel-operated, shaft-driven pumps obtained from the United States, India, and Denmark (Clarke 1979: 52). Thus, pumping costs have increased as the water level has decreased. Recently, the government has begun installing solar energy pumps in the Western Desert to solve the problem of needing pumping fuel.

#### **4 End of the 1950s to the 1970s: Government wells**

The turning point of the relationship between humans and water came at the end of the 1950s. The turning point produced the shift from the relationship of human relying on water to that of human relying on technology.

The aforementioned New Valley Project started in the Western Desert in 1958 that led to the diffusion of modern rigs with the construction and reclamation of the New Valley in that same year. This project aimed at reclaiming 12,600 square metres of desert land by drilling the wells and intended to move 4 million persons from the old valley of the Nile River. Many new villages were created to accommodate the youth who graduated from universities (graduates). At the same time, this project was a part of the land reform under the socialist reform after the 1952 Revolution and aimed at integrated rural development under the land reclamation scheme in the Gamal Abdel Nasser era. Therefore, not only new villages but also old villages were covered by the project.

The wells drilled for these projects are called **government wells** and are under the strict control of the government. In fact, the General Authority of Desert Development managed the land reclamation projects, including the drilling of government wells.

In Rashda, the desert land dispersed between the irrigated lands were reclaimed, and the wells were drilled by the General Authority of Desert Development. The wells are currently owned and managed by the Irrigation Authority under the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation.

Since the government wells are drilled as part of the New Valley land reclamation project scheme, the reclaimed land is given to beneficiaries, who are usually chosen according to the criteria of being impoverished or landless villagers. Each beneficiary receives 4 or 5 feddans of land leased from the government and an equal right to water.

Although the water right is given to the beneficiaries, the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation affects the decisions and management. Farmers oversee the management and distribution, but they are under the supervision of the Ministry.

Government wells generally have a depth ranging from 800 to 1,200 metres and are supposed to last for 50 years. Many of them were drilled at the time of the construction campaign in the New Valley. At the time of drilling, they were artesian wells, but the 'deep pump' was installed later. Also, the number of wells increased, especially after 2000, to replace or supplement the older wells that had decreased water discharge. Most of those drilled after 2000 have a depth greater than 700 metres. Compared to the initial wells that had a depth of approximately 500 metres, the well depth has increased.

For instance, Well No.3 Irrigation District was started by drilling a well in 1959, called Well No.3. This Well No.3 was an artesian well with a depth of 500 metres and ceased to discharge water completely in 1995. During the late 1980s, four wells were drilled to maintain the water discharge level. They were dug deeper compared to the initial Well No.3: Well No.3-5 in 1988 has a depth of 833 metres, Well No.3-7 in 1999 had a depth of 530 metres, Well No.3-12 in



2004 had a depth of 1046 metres, and Well No.3-17 in 2008 had a depth of 739 metres (Photo 1) . Moreover, all wells except for Well No.3-12 were artesian wells originally, but with the decrease in the water level, they were changed to deep-pump wells.

Photo 1 Government well No.3-12 in Rashda Village

## 5. Since the 1980s: Investment wells and surface springs

In the mid-1970s, the government stopped doing large-scale rural socialist development projects. Instead, groundwater drilling and land reclamation projects were operated by private companies and investors under the economic liberalization policy of Sadat. The development under Mubarak since 1990s is also similar. Megaprojects such as the Toshka project and the East Oweinat project were launched by large public and private companies, the army, and foreign investors, especially from the Gulf countries.

Economic liberalization also affected the well drilling in Rashda village. In 1995, the Ministry of Irrigation authorized to deliver licenses of drilling a well with a depth less than 300 metres to the individuals and companies. Since then, many small investors who are mostly relatively wealthy villagers dug shallow wells. These wells are called **investment wells** or **surface springs** according to the license and their depth.

Investment wells are exploited by one or several individuals (investors) under a scheme of the General Authority for Investment that began in 1995. This organization is an affiliate of

the Ministry of Investment. An individual who wants to start an agricultural business may dig a well after obtaining permission from this organization.

The first two investment wells were drilled in 1996. These wells were drilled by individuals and have a depth of 500 metres. By law, the depths of investment wells must be 300 metres, and the area of irrigation of each well is defined as 10 feddans. Actual depths and areas are often larger. Many wells have a depth of 500 metres or less and are supposed to last for 20 to 30 years. There are 10 wells of this type in Rashda, covering a total area of approximately 950 feddans as of 2009.

Investment wells have an image of being for investors or businessmen, from the outside. However, in the case of Rashda, the investors are mostly small investors who are native villagers in the middle-income category. They are generally co-owned by individuals, and their irrigated land is privately owned after being leased for 10 years from the government.



Photo 2 Investment well in Mut city

Surface springs (*'ain sathi*) are popularly recognized as springs that flow up by themselves, although their depth is generally between 120 and 150 metres. They are drilled with permission from the Land Reclamation Fund. They are individually or collectively owned and managed by the farmers. Their irrigated land is leased to cultivators by the government, which owns the land. By law, a surface spring's irrigated area is defined as 10 feddans. There are about 25 springs of this type as of 2009.



Surface spring in Rashda village

### **Conclusions - Change in the Human-and-Water Relationship**

Until the first half of the twentieth century, the villagers' lives depended on the water accessibility that was limited and unstable. In a sense, the life of those days was one determined by the water.

The drastic change of the human relationship with groundwater occurred with the development of modern technology since the late 1950s. The modern technology enabled the assurance of water discharge by digging deeper (government well) or digging a shallow well more easily (investment well, surface spring). Since then, the vertical and horizontal exploitations of the groundwater took place by the deep-well drilling machines and the development of pumping technology. The technology of water discharge enabled the discharge of a large amount of groundwater and the ability to overcome water deficiency, as did the human control of the Nile River.

What does the shift from the traditional local wells to the governmental wells and investment wells as well as surface springs imply? First, the development of well-drilling technology has transitioned the well-drilling actors from the local communities and farmers to the state and large enterprises. Second, the shift from the relationship of human relying on water to that of human relying on technology.

A consequence of the increased drilling since then is the lowering of the groundwater level. An informant and other farmers, recalling their childhood during the beginning of the 1990s, said that the artesian wells had functioned well up to that period. The water even came out so strong that it was difficult to close the valve, but since then, it has become easy to do so. Today, all the artesian wells are dried up, and the water can be discharged only by pumping.



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## Acknowledgement

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## Korean Muslims: Shaping Islamic Discourse and Identities Online<sup>i</sup>

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### **Extended Abstract**

As noted by Peter Morey, successful relationships are based on trust, a useful lens for viewing relations between Muslims and non-Muslims at this challenging moment of history.<sup>ii</sup> As Yaqin, Morey and Soliman highlight, Muslims are facing a general climate of mistrust, misunderstanding and Islamophobia; this is particularly true for Muslims living as minorities in multicultural societies.<sup>iii</sup> In this global context, I will demonstrate how Korean Muslim youth have taken to social networking sites (henceforth SNS) to challenge stereotypes related to Islam. By uploading images of their daily lives, posts sharing basic Islamic knowledge or actively engaging in online chat streams, young Korean Muslims are using the power of the internet to assert their position in wider Korean society, emphasizing that they are not persons who have embraced “foreignness” but are dynamic agents re-working what it means to be Korean through their conversions to Islam.

There are no official census figures for Muslims in Korea although it is estimated Muslims make up approximately 0.4% of the total population. It has been suggested that around 150,000 – 200,000 Muslims exist in Korea with approximately 30,000-45,000 being indigenous Korean Muslims.<sup>iv</sup> These low figures help to delineate the status of Korean Muslims in wider society as tiny minority, and helps to frame the context in which Korean Muslims are toiling for recognition and acceptance.

The relationship between Muslims, the Internet and social media has been probed deeply by scholars focusing on “*jihad*,” terrorism, online radicalization and security-related narratives.<sup>v</sup> Others have looked at the role of social media in social movements such as the Arab Spring.<sup>vi</sup> Furthermore, there is a growing body of literature that documents the ways in which Muslims are using social networking sites to develop themselves as “influencers” in different Muslim societies.<sup>vii</sup> However, few studies examine the ways in which Muslims use Facebook, chiefly Facebook private messages (as this section of the app is usually inaccessible to the public) to



challenge and interact with Islamophobic tropes as part of active efforts to carve out a space for themselves in society through social media *dawah* (invitation to Islam/ proselytization-related activities) activism.

This study is concerned with the intersections between *dawah*, Facebook and identity construction amongst Korean Muslim youth. Research questions explored in this study include: How are Korean Muslims using Facebook to assert their place in society? Where does the concept of *dawah* fit into Korean Muslim identity construction? To what extent are Korean Muslim online activities impacting society offline? As part of a wider research project on Korean Muslim converts and their processes of identity constructions through conversion to Islam, this study contributes to scholarship on Muslim minority studies by incorporating East Asian, specifically Korean, voices to the field. The inclusion of Islam within Korea's religious landscape further encourages diversity and creativity in the ways that we re-imagine conceptualizations of Korean identities, widening the scope of Korean Studies.

Eva F. Nisa has conducted valuable research on the *dawah* activities of Indonesian Muslim youth through Instagram,<sup>viii</sup> and Nasya Bahfen investigates how American and Australian Muslim minorities use social media to negotiate their identities.<sup>ix</sup> This article draws from those approaches and shares insights from ethnographic research (participant observation, fieldnotes, interviews and case study collection) conducted with a group of Korean Muslim youth aged 20-35 years, who have constructed a Korean-language Facebook page to connect with Korean society. Using their unique position as indigenous Korean Muslims, the interviewees and individuals discussed in this paper attempt to build better relationships with society by answering questions about Islam and their own everyday lives. In doing so, I will demonstrate the ways in which Korean Muslim youth express agency, as they attempt to subvert existing negative perceptions about Islam and assert their own place in Korean society.

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i This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2018S1A6A3A03043497).

ii Peter Morey, "Introduction: Muslims, Trust and Multiculturalism" in *Muslims, Trust and Multiculturalism: New Directions*, ed. Amina Yaqin, Peter Morey and Asmaa Soliman (Palgrave, 2018) 2-4.

iii Amina Yaqin, Peter Morey and Asmaa Soliman, eds. *Muslims, Trust and Multiculturalism: New Directions*, (Palgrave, 2018).

iii Several scholars have probed Muslim use of social media. Studies that tend to focus on conflicts, jihad, terrorism and radicalization narratives include works by Gary R. Bunt, *Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments*. (London: Pluto Press, 2003). Also see Oz Sultan, "Combatting the Rise of ISIS 2.0 and Terrorism 3.0," *The Cyber Defense Review* 2, no. 3 (2017) 42-44. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26267384>. And J. West Levi, "#jihad: Understanding Social Media as a Weapon," *Security Challenges* 12, no. 2 (2016). 9-26. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465604>.

iv The Korea Muslim Federation (KMF) estimates that 30,000 Muslims in Korea are indigenous Korean Muslims on their website: <http://www.koreaislam.org>. K'wŏn Jeeyun suggests that there are 150,000 Muslims in Korea with 45,000 being indigenous Korean Muslims:

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- Jeeyun K'wŏn, "The Rise of Korean Islam: Migration and Da'wa," (Middle East Institute, 2014) [https://www.mei.edu/publications/rise-korean-islam-migration-and-dawa#\\_ftn1](https://www.mei.edu/publications/rise-korean-islam-migration-and-dawa#_ftn1). A 2018 media report by Korea Expose approximates Muslims in Korea at around 200,000 with around 30,000 Korean Muslims. See Ben Jackson, "How Influential Is Islam in South Korea?" Korea Expose, January 19 2018 <https://www.koreaexpose.com/how-influential-islam-south-korea/>
- v Bunt, *Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber Islamic Environments*. 2003. Sultan, "Combating the Rise of ISIS 2.0 and Terrorism 3.0." 2017. Levi "jihad: Understanding Social Media as a Weapon." 2017.
- vi See Manuel Castells, *Networks of Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), Magdalena Karolak, 'Online Aesthetics of Martyrdom: A Study of the Bahraini' eds. Noha Mellor & Khalil Rinnawi, *Political Islam and Global Media: The Boundaries of Religious Identity*. (London: Routledge, 2016), 67-85. And Nouredine Miladi, 'Social Media as a New Identity Battleground: The Cultural Comeback in Tunisia after the Revolution of 14 January 2011,' Eds. Noha Mellor & Khalil Rinnawi, *Political Islam and Global Media: The Boundaries of Religious Identity*. (London: Routledge, 2016), 34-47.
- vii See Emma Baulch and Alila Pramiyanti, "Hijabers on Instagram: Using Visual Social Media to Construct the Ideal Muslim Woman," *Social Media and Society*. (Oct-Dec, 2018): 1-5. Also see Nur Leila Khalid, Sheila Yvonne Jayasainan and Nurzihan Hassim, "Social media influencers - shaping consumption culture among Malaysian youth," *SHS Web of Conferences* 53, 02008 (2018):1-12. And Annisa R. Beta, "Young Muslim Women as Digital Citizens in Indonesia – Advocating Conservative Religious Outlook." *Perspective* 39 (Yusof Ishak Institute, 2019): 1-9.
- viii Eva F. Nisa, "Creative and Lucrative Da'wa: The Visual Culture of Instagram amongst Female Muslim Youth in Indonesia" *Asiascape: Digital Asia* 5 (2018): 69-75.
- ix Nasya Bahfen, "The Individual and the Ummah: The Use of Social Media by Muslim Minority Communities in Australia and the United States," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 38, 1, (2018): 119-131.

# **Tracing Wāqwāq: How medieval authors in the Islamic world amalgamated diverse ancient and medieval geographies**

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1

## **Contents**

- Introduction & Literature Review
- What is Wāqwāq? And why it is important?
- In what sense Wāqwāq has been regarded as Japan?
- But why the others doubted the sameness of Wāqwāq as Japan?
- Why Japan was less noteworthy than Silla in medieval Muslims' eyes?
- What occurred confusion of the location of Wāqwāq?
- Aftermath of the confusion
- Conclusion

2

## Wāqwāq in Islamic geography




3

## In what aspects is Wāqwāq important?

- The task to prior discussion medieval Islamic concepts about East Asia
- Deciding the eastern end of the pre-modern Afro-Eurasia
- Unless Wāqwāq was Japan, Japan had been absent in most of medieval Islamic sources, unlike Silla's abundant presence in it.
- In case of Wāqwāq out of Japan, some of current research of Korean history referred to Islamic sources demands reconsider.
- Abstract meaning of Korea in medieval Muslims' geography and cosmology
- Medieval Muslims' concepts of Muslim diaspora over East Asia

4

## موقع جزر الواق واق ضمن خارطة العالم كما تصورها ابن الفقيه



5

## Wāqwāq in the world geography

صورة الدنيا على خمسة أجزاء كرأس الطير و الجناحين و الصدر و الذنب. فرأس الدنيا الصين، و خلف الصين أمة يقال لها واق واق، و وراء واق واق من الأمم ما لا يحصي إلا الله. و الجناح الأيمن الهند، و خلف الهند البحر، و ليس خلفه خلق. و الجناح الأيسر الخزر، و خلف الخزر أمتان، يقال لإحدهما منشك و ماشك، و خلف ماشك و منشك ياجوج و ماجوج من الأمم ما لا يعلمها إلا الله. و صدر الدنيا مكة و الحجاز و الشام و العراق و مصر. و الذنب من ذات الحمام إلى المغرب، و شرّ ما في الطير الذنب.

The world, shape of a bird, consisting of five part

Head: China; Right wing: India; Right Wing: Khazar; Tail: North Africa;

Chest: Mecca, Hijaz, Sham, Iraq, and Egypt

Wāqwāq locates beyond China

6

# Wāqwāq

Itself	World	East Asia	With Korea
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• An island or a bundle of islands</li> <li>• Dark skinned people under a naked queen</li> <li>• Gold, ebony, monkey...</li> <li>• Strange trees noising 'wāq'</li> <li>• Discrepancies among sources for it</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One of major places/regions in Islamic world geography</li> <li>• Tail or a wing of a bird shaped world</li> <li>• Africa? SE Asia? East Asia? South of Yemen? Two places?</li> <li>• Eastern end of the Indian Ocean</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• One of the only three places east of China with Sīlā and Yāqūt</li> <li>• Japan?</li> <li>• Islamic and pre-Islamic concepts about history of exchanges between the East and the West</li> <li>• History of Muslim diaspora over Asia</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Confusion and confluence with Silla</li> <li>• Historic dynamics and exchanges of Korea with the world</li> <li>• Korea in Islamic and Latin Geography and History</li> <li>• Korea in Persian narratives</li> </ul>

7

## Two Wāqwāqs along coasts of the world

البحر الكبير، الذي ليس في العالم بحر أكبر منه. و هو أخذ من المغرب إلى القلزم حتى يبلغ واق واق الصين، و واق واق الصين هو بخلاف واق واق اليمن، لأن واق واق اليمن يخرج منه ذهب سوء. و هذا البحر يمدّ من القلزم على وادي القرى حتى يبلغ بربر و عمان، و يمرّ إلى الديبل و المولتان حتى يبلغ جبل الصنف إلى الصين وطول هذا البحر من القلزم إلى الواقواق أربعة آلاف وخمسمائة فرسخ

- The Largest Sea in the world: North Africa > Red Sea > Indian Ocean > Mountain of Champa> China >Wāqwāq of China
- Wāqwāq of China ≠ Wāqwāq of Yemen
- From Red Sea to Wāqwāq of China: 4,500 *farsakhs* (approximately 14,500 medieval miles)

8

## Transmitting images between Wāqwāq and Sīlā

وفي مشارق الصين بلاد الواقواق وهي كثيرة الذهب حتى أن أهلها يتخذون سلاسل كلابهم وأطواق قرودهم من ذهب ويأتون بالقمص المنسوجة بالذهب للبيع وبالواقواق الأبنوس الجيد.  
وآخر الصين بازاء قانصو جبال كثيرة وملوك كثيرة وهي بلاد الشيلا

*al-Masālik wa-al-Mamālik* by Ibn Khurradādhbih

إلى جزائر الشيلا وهي كثيرة متقاربة بعضها من بعض وفيها مدينة تسمى الكيوه من دخلها من المسافرين استوطنها ولم يرد الخروج عنها لطيب ثراها وكثرة خيرها والذهب بها كثير جداً حتى أن أهلها يتخذون سلاسل كلابهم وأطواق

وكذلك في جزائر الواق واق مثل ذلك (سيلا) أعني من الذهب الكثير وإن التجار يدخلون إليها مع الطلاب ويسبكون الذهب فيها ويخرجونه من هناك مسبوكة وقد يخرجون ترابه فيذيبونه في بلادهم على الصنعة المعروفة بينهم وفي جزائر الواق واق الأبنوس الذي لا يفوقه شيء في الجودة.

*Nuzhat al-Mushtāq* by al-Idrīsī

9

## Name of Japan and Wāqwāq

- Wāqwāq is 倭國 (Waqkoku in Japanese, Wakok in ancient Chinese)?
- Claimed etymology of Wāqwāq: sound of tree (of which female looking fruits)
- Jazīrat al-Wāqwāq
- $K \neq q$
- Additional w
- No known other case of repeating a word for a place name in East Asia
- Etymological discrepancy
- Archipelago

10



## Location of Wāqwāq and Japan

- Where is east of China?
- Medieval marine border of China
- Historic extreme ends eastwards?
- Vietnam from Rome to Muslims
- At the extreme east of the Indian Ocean?
- Comparing Itineraries
- Wāqwāq(s) in the pre-modern maps



11

## Nature and human of Japan & Wāqwāq

- Mineral, Flora, Fauna
- Abundance of Gold and its export to Muslims
- Ebony and its export to Muslims
- Monkey and rims on its head
- Dark skinned and naked people
- Woven caddis and its exports to Muslims
- Naked queen
- Japanese Monkey in domestic and foreign records (golden rims)
- The initial Japanese gold mine and first export
- Ebony on Japanese territory
- Sīlā and Chinese: whites
- Caddis excluded from the list of Japanese exports
- Naked queen in Japanese history and her reception of foreigners?

12



## What occurred confusion of the location of Wāqwāq over the Indian Ocean?

- Misunderstandings of cartographic projections
- Concoctions of different intellectual traditions and data
- Inheritance from ancient Greek, Hindu, and Persian astronomy
- Linking irrelative experiences and imagination
- Wedging, modification, removal,... by later authors and draftsmen
- Interruption of wish and belief

13



## Legacy of Ptolemy's East Asia and projection



14

# Indo-Persian astronomy, geography,...


- *Jīz* of Ancient India > translation by Persians > application into Islamic geography > re-export



15


## Experience/imagination

- Administrative geography
- Travelogues and Periplus
- Maps and globes
- Muslim diaspora
- Observation and hearsay
- House of Wisdom
- Observatory
- Fairy and Myth



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## Creative geography, cartography, world view



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## Development of raw data

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- Little chance of direct experiences
- Pre-modern categorical division among fields and hyper leaps crossing genres
- Examples of intellectual distribution routes:
  - From Sulaymān al-Tājir via al-Sīrāfī referring to al-Mas'ūdī
  - From Khurradādhbih's *Masālik*
  - Al-Fazārī to al-Bīrūnī
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- History of East Asian dynamics in the eyes of Muslims there
- Diaspora in China from Silla, Japan, and the Islamic world
- Criteria of geographic records
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- Underdevelopment of long distance seafaring
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## Aftermath of the confusion

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# Thank you

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# **Social Conflict and Controversy in Korean Society**

## **over the Yemeni Refugee Issue**

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### **Introduction**

From December 2017 to May 2018, 561 Yemenis entered Jeju Special Self-Governing Province,<sup>1</sup> an autonomous administrative division of Korea which is also the country's largest island, located in the southernmost region. The refugees collectively applied for asylum in Korea. On June 13, 2018, a petition calling for 'constitutional amendment to the Refugee Act and the abolition of visa-free entry and permission for refugee applications due to illegal applications for refugee status on Jeju Island' was posted to the Blue House (Office of the Korean President)'s online petition system. This received widespread attention from Korean society, bringing the issue of Yemeni refugees in Jeju to the surface. By June 30, over 200,000 people had signed the petition against accepting refugees, and by the time it closed on July 13, the petition had 714,875 signatures.<sup>2</sup>

As a result of this the Korean government realized the severity of the situation and began to focus more attention on Yemeni refugees in Jeju. In addition, the issue was covered extensively by major media outlets as well as government and civic groups in both Korea and overseas (Seo 2018).<sup>3</sup> According to a poll conducted by a leading news outlet, only refugee rights advocates and a few progressive political parties in Korea supported accepting the refugees, while the majority of Koreans expressed serious concerns about them and had a negative view towards granting refugee status. They claimed that European society is being threatened by terrorism and violence due to the recent mass migration of Muslim refugees from Syria, and argued that accepting Yemeni Muslims in Korea would place Korean society at the risk of terrorism and violence.

These arguments have spread out without any verification, leading to expressions of Islamophobia and anti-Islam sentiment across Korean society that are unparalleled in Korean history. In this sense, the Yemeni refugee issue is the first incident in which anti-Islam sentiment in Korean society has appeared in such a collective form. Of course, Korean society was deeply affected by the murder of Kim Sun-il by Iraqi insurgents in 2004,<sup>4</sup> and the

abduction of Saemmul Church missionaries by the Afghani Taliban in 2007, but concerns about Islam have not been raised within Korean society until now.<sup>5</sup> However, on this occasion the number of people signing the petition against accepting Yemeni refugees on the Blue House website rapidly grew, causing a serious social controversy throughout Korean society.

Against this background, the main aim of this study is to examine how anti-Islam sentiment formed and spread in Korean society through the Yemeni refugee issue. In particular, this issue was accompanied by extreme expression of emotion, with a strong emphasis on the religious aspect of 'Muslim' refugees rather than their political situation 'refugees.' Accordingly, the main questions of this study are as follow; (1) How was anti-Yemeni refugee sentiment created and how did it spread throughout Korean society? (2) What were the social causes that constituted the opposition to accepting Yemeni refugees, and how were these causes collectively expressed? (3) What is the social meaning of the collective exclusion of Muslim Yemen refugees from Korean society (4) How will Korean society and the government prepare for potential groups of refugees in the future, as shown in the Yemeni refugee issue?

This incident shows that Korean society is still reluctant to accept cultural 'outsiders,' and that Islam is still perceived in Korea as a 'heterogeneous' religion. Accordingly, this study will also treat the response from Christians, who represent the largest mainstream religion in Korea. Furthermore, this research aims to overcome social distortions and prejudice against Islam and Muslim refugees, and examine what it means for Muslim 'outsiders' to coexist within Korean society.

## **Study Method and Literature Review**

In analyzing these social conflict factors, this study mainly employed Moore's classification of conflict components, as illustrated in his book *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*. He divides the causes of conflict into five categories: data conflict, interest conflict, value conflict, structural conflict, and relationship conflict. Mayer's identity conflict, as outlined in his book *The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: A Practitioner's Guide*, was also added. Mayer's identity conflict was added to Moore's five categories in light of the fact that many Muslim Yemenis collectively applied for refugee status in Jeju Island, which created a cultural clash between the asylum seekers and Korean society (Park, Tae-Soon 2018: 15-24).

First, Structural conflict is caused by the internal and external structures surrounding stakeholders, and is closely related to social, political and economic structures as well as



distorted systems and customs. Value conflict relates to differences in perception of values, ideologies, religions and cultures, and often arise when there is a clash among individuals or groups from different cultural or social backgrounds. Identity conflict is expressed when individual and group identities are misused or distorted politically and socially due to religion, language or race. Interest conflict is expressed when there are more people or groups seeking resources and positions than what is available. To overcome these conflicts, a rational decision making agency or fair distribution system is needed (Moore 2003). Data conflict is created when two parties have different views about the same event or phenomenon due to a lack of objective information or differences in understanding. Relationship conflict is expressed when relationships among individuals or social groups are negative or cut off due to distrust, misunderstanding and prejudice, mainly caused by a lack of communication, distortions and different views about roles or authority (Moore 2003). In this research, the issue of Korean Society's response to the Yemeni refugees in 2018 will be examined based on these components of social conflict.

To expand the scope of the discussion, this study examines the issue of Muslim refugees in the context of foreign migration to Korea as well.<sup>6</sup> This is because acceptance of refugees from Korean society is directly related to the government's migration policy. Most studies on Muslim refugees and migrants have been conducted in European and American academic circles. There is a long history of research on Muslim migration and communities in Europe and America. In particular, since many Arabs in the Middle East and North Africa collectively fled to Europe to escape regional wars and due to the Arab Spring and Syrian Civil War in 2011, studies have been conducted on Middle East refugees throughout all sectors including politics, the economy, society and culture.

At the same time, almost no research has been conducted on Muslim refugees or migrants in Korean academic circles. This is because unlike Europe and the US, Korea does not have a long history of Muslim migrants, and Muslim society in Korea is not large enough to have a political voice. Moreover, due to the diverse nationalities among Muslims, an organization or group that can represent their common interests has not been formed. Thus, research on Arabs and Muslims living in Korea is extremely scarce. The first attempt was in 1987 when Professor Cho Hee-Sun studied the social image of Arabs in Korea through "A Study on Korean Perceptions of Arab Society." Then in 2008, Professor Cho studied trends pertaining to Arab Muslims in Korea, including adaptation and assimilation, in "The Current Status and Social Network of Arab Muslim Migrants in Korean Society." That same year, she put forward an analytical model to study the assimilation process of Muslim migrants with a focus on Korea as a multicultural society through the paper "A Study on a Research Model for Muslim Migrants in Korean Society."

In addition, Kim Dae-Sung and five other researchers examined second-generation Muslim migrants in Korea, their perceptions of Korean society and level of assimilation in 2010,

through “A Study on Korean Attitudes and Perceptions towards Second Generation Muslim Migrants in Korea.” Moreover, Park Chul-Hyun in 2010 discussed the radicalization of Islam in Western society and examined the possibility of home-grown terrorism by Muslims in Korean society in his article “The Possibility of Home-grown Islamic Terrorism in South Korea.”

Other previous studies generally focus on the historical development of Muslim migration and Muslim communities in Korean society. The issue of Yemeni refugees in Jeju has been reviewed by three studies; Oh, Seung-Jin (2018), “A Study on the Korean Practice of Refugee Recognition and Some Recommendations.”; Lee, Sung-Wook (2018), “A Preliminary Study for Public Opinion Against Yemeni Refugee and Political Decisions.”; and Go, Kwang-Suk (2018), “A Christian Understanding of Refugees and the Korean Church’s Response.”<sup>7</sup> These studies approach the issue from a legal and national security perspective. However, no studies have been conducted to date on social controversy and the social integration of Muslim migrants in Korean society. Therefore, unlike previous studies, this study is significant in that it deals with the formation and spread of anti-Muslim sentiment that has been taking place in Korean society for the first time. Furthermore, this study can be differentiated from previous studies in that it seeks to examine the possibility of social integration based on coexistence by overcoming social distortions and prejudices against Muslim refugees.

## **Background and Development of the Yemeni Refugee Issue in Korean Society**

The Korean government established the Special Act on the Establishment of Jeju Special Self-Governing Province and the Development of Free International City in February 2006 to promote Jeju Island as an international base in Northeast Asia and a free international city. According to this statute, Jeju Island was upgraded from a metropolitan council to ‘Jeju Self-Governing Province,’ and was granted financial autonomy and the authority to exercise legislative and administrative power without intervention from the central government (The Digital Local Culture Encyclopedia of Korea 2018). Thereafter, Jeju Special Self-Governing Province significantly relaxed a number of administrative regulations to develop the tourism, education and healthcare industries as well as advanced industries like Information Technology and Biological Technology.

In particular, Jeju Island has maintained a visa-free entry system for foreign tourists since 2002 to help promote the tourism industry and attract more foreign tourists. The main target of this system is Chinese tourists, who have been visiting Korea in greater numbers since the 2000s. Chinese people, as well as foreigners from another 180 countries (excluding State Sponsors of Terrorism), can stay on Jeju Island for a month without a visa (Jeju Province 2014). Moreover, in an effort to fight global terrorism, the Korean government designated 11 countries including Ghana, Nigeria, Libya, Macedonia, Sudan, Syria, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq,

Cuba, and Palestine as ‘countries not allowed visa-free entry into Jeju’ and did not allow tourists from these countries to enter without a visa. This system remained in place up until May 2018, when the Yemeni refugee issue broke out.

Jeju Island began operating low-priced direct flights between Kuala Lumpur and Jeju Island in December 2017 to attract more Malaysians, who alongside Chinese tourists are a rapidly growing tourist group for Korea. As a result of this, Yemenis that had fled to Malaysia from the civil war in Yemen began to arrive in Jeju Island en masse via the cheap direct flights, with 561 Yemenis on Jeju Island as of May 2018 (Kang 2018). These Yemenis had come to Malaysia because Malaysia is one of the few countries that permitted Yemenis to enter without a visa. However, Malaysia is not a signatory to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and did not have a system for approving refugees, so the Yemenis could not apply for refugee status in Malaysia. When the direct flights between Kuala Lumpur and Jeju were launched, many Yemenis asylum seekers swept into Jeju Island. With regard to this issue, a petition against accepting Yemeni refugees was posted on the Blue House’s online petition system in May, and this issue rapidly garnered attention, turning into a great social problem in Korea. Accordingly, the Korean government added Yemen to the list of countries not allowed visa-free entry into Jeju on June 1, 2018 to keep the controversy from flaring up. Since then, the entry of further Yemenis into Jeju Island has been blocked (Kim, Ge-Yeun 2018).<sup>8</sup>

Since the petition about Yemeni refugees in Jeju was first posted on the Blue House’s online petition system on June 13, 2018, the issue has been the subject of great controversy in Korean society. After coming to power in May 2017, the Moon Jae-in administration opened an online petition system on the Blue House website to communicate with citizens.<sup>9</sup> Since then, many socially sensitive issues have been raised on the system, but the petition against accepting Yemeni refugees on Jeju Island recorded the biggest number of signatures to date, with over 710,000 people signing the petition by July 13, the last day of the petition (Han, Heran 2018).<sup>10</sup>

Astounded by this response, major news outlets in Korea began to cover this issue. They conducted a poll from May to July to examine public opinion, and the result revealed a clear objection among Koreans to accepting Yemeni refugees. In a JoongAng Ilbo poll conducted on 1,000 respondents in August 2018, 27% felt favorable toward the possibility of accepting Muslim Yemeni refugees, whereas 66% gave a negative response. The most common reason for refusing the refugees was ‘public order and safety such as terrorism and crime’ (55.4%), followed by ‘inflow of Islamic culture and culture clashes’ (18.3%) and ‘an increase in taxes and the socioeconomic burden’ (15.8%). In another poll conducted by Gallup Korea on 1,002 respondents in July, 11% responded that the country should ‘accept as many refugees as possible,’ while 62% responded ‘accept a minimum number of refugees based on strict screening,’ 20% responded ‘deport the refugees instead of accepting them,’ and 6% said ‘do not know or refuse to respond’ (Yoo 2018b).’

Civic groups in Korea also showed opposing views about accepting Yemeni refugees. Those against accepting Yemeni refugees claimed that the safety of Korean citizens must come first, and thus the Refugee Act and visa-free entry system to Jeju Island must be abolished. Most of them were right-wing conservatives who argued that the government should not accept 'unverified strangers' into Korean society and expose citizens to risk. They also claimed that it is unclear whether the true goal of the Yemenis is to seek asylum or get a job, and that they are incompatible with Korean society because their faith makes them likely to follow the doctrines of Islam instead of Korean laws (Jang 2018). The National Action for Refugees, one of the major anti-refugee organizations, held nationwide protests against accepting Yemeni refugees, arguing that they should be refused entry for reasons such as cultural conflicts, terrorism and threats to public order. They also claimed that in to prevent a future influx of Muslim refugees, it is necessary to abolish the visa-free entry system, rewrite the vague language on refugee applications in the current Refugee Act to be more concrete, and delete the clauses that stipulate shortening the refugee screening period and providing financial aid to asylum seekers (Kim, Ji-Hyun 2018).

On the contrary, civic groups who advocate accepting Yemeni refugees argued that these arguments needlessly promote anti-Islam sentiment, and demanded an active response from the government. In particular, human rights groups in Korea criticized the Moon Jae-in administration, a center-left government, for merely going through the motions instead of actively implementing the provisions of the 2013 Refugee Act.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, they pointed out that by being too strict on refugee screening, the Korean government is treating asylum seekers as potential criminals, exacerbating misunderstandings and concerns about refugees among Korean citizens (Park, Tae-Soon 2018). They also demanded that the government take strong action against those spreading rumors or inciting negative sentiment about asylum seekers. The Refugee Network, one of the major civic groups related to refugees in Korea, claimed, "Turning down refugees doesn't lead to better safety or human rights for locals, or deprive us of our jobs. The government has merely put on a show by establishing the Refugee Act, without actually implementing any refugee-friendly policies. We urge the government to come up with a refugee policy that treats human rights as a top priority (Park, Byung-Kuk 2018)."

President Moon of the ruling Democratic Party of Korea ordered the Ministry of Justice to look into the issue, and the Ministry of Justice gave a briefing on June 29, 2018, promising that they would carry out the refugee screening strictly, accurately and promptly and announcing that they would also thoroughly evaluate any risk of terrorism or violent crime through stringent background checks. Moreover, the Ministry also claimed that they would amend the Refugee Act so that no one abuses the refugee system, increase the number of refugee screening judges, and 'establish a task force to collect and analyze the refugee situation in countries with refugees.' The Ministry also announced a plan to 'drastically simplify the procedures for appeal' by establishing 'refugee umpires' (Ministry of Justice 2018).'

The major political parties in Korea have adopted the following stances towards the issue of Yemeni refugees. With the progressive Justice Party as a notable exception, both the center-left ruling Democratic Party of Korea and the center-right Liberty Korea Party, the main opposition party, seem focused on preventing abuse of refugee applications and strengthening screening standards. Rather than stating an official position, these parties have clarified their position indirectly through individual members because of the potential political consequences of adopting an official stance. However, Kim Jong-dae of the minor Justice Party associated the aversion to Yemeni refugees with sentiment towards North Koreans, stating "It appears that this country, which is shunning 500 refugees for ideological and religious differences, has no interest in embracing North Korean residents as well." He added, "We will never be open to North Korea or become the next Germany, Sweden or Finland if we maintain an attitude of pariah capitalism that refuses to accept multiple cultures, discriminates against strangers, is intolerant of weak states, obsesses over short-term benefits, fears development in a true sense and has lost its community spirit due to discrimination and polarization (Ryu, Ho 2017)."

However, the Democratic Party of Korea and other center-left parties have demanded that this issue be resolved at a government level rather than through parties, because publicly supporting the acceptance of refugees is likely to inflame public opinion. The conservative opposition parties have tried to turn this into a political issue, but the government refuses to accept it as such because of the political consequences, instead stating a theoretical view that they will make decisions about refugees based on legal standards (Yoo, Ji-man 2018).

## **Social Conflict and Controversy in Korean Society over Yemeni Refugee Issue**

### *Structural Conflict and Controversy: Inadequate Systems for Muslim Migration Policy*

The issue of Yemeni refugees was greatly influenced by a lack of social policies for Muslim migrants, who are both religiously and culturally 'outsiders' in Korean society, as well as prejudice against these migrants. In other words, Korean society has never paid much attention to Muslim migrants before. The Korean government has never established a social integration policy for them. In this situation, the sudden appearance of a large number of Muslim refugees led to confusion in Korean society, creating controversy over measures to deal with them.

Foreign migrants began to enter Korean society amidst rapid globalization the 1990s when migrants from different countries, cultures and races moved to Korea. There were many

Western migrants with high incomes, but the most noticeable newcomers were low-income migrants from the Middle East and other Asian countries that work as laborers. The Korean government accepted many laborers from the Middle East and other Asian countries to supplement the workforce for low-income manual labor that was referred to as '3D' jobs. The number of international marriages between foreigners and Koreans also increased rapidly. The number of Muslims, although small, also grew at a rapid pace. When the industrial trainee system was introduced in the 1990s, many Muslim workers from the Middle East and Asia came to Korea, resulting in a rapid increase in the Muslim population (Yoo, Hee-Jung 2013: 3-9). There are no official statistics, but it is estimated that there are approximately 143,500 foreign Muslims living in Korea, accounting for 10% of the total 1.756 million foreigners. If the approximately 35,000 Korean Muslims are included, the total number of Muslims in Korea is 200,000 (Cho, Young-Hee 2016: 7-9).

Compared to the rapid increase in Muslim migrants, Korea's social policies and level of social acceptance remains inadequate. Europe, which has a long history of interaction with Muslim countries in the Middle East, has systematically pursued a policy of social acceptance towards Muslim migrants. The United Kingdom, with a long history of Muslim communities, has traditionally pursued a policy of multiculturalism policy which acknowledges the indigenous culture and religious customs of migrants and accepts them as part of an integrated society, although this has varied depending on the party in power. For example, the multiculturalism policy was implemented in force when the Labor Party was in power, whereas it declined during Conservative Party rule. Moreover, multiculturalism has been in decline due to the September 11 attacks in 2001, the London subway bombings and a series of terrorist attacks by a radical Islamist group in 2005 (Kim, Dae-Sung 2010: 63-93). France, which has a Muslim community like many other European countries including the UK, initially pursued a policy of assimilation based on integrating a non-mainstream culture into the mainstream culture within the same society, but adopted a multicultural policy in the 1990s. In particular, since the French riots of October 2005, the French government decided that the assimilation policy was not very effective and thus turned to multiculturalism (Kim, Joon-Kwan 2015: 240-245).

Table 1. Comparison of values between assimilation and multiculturalism

Category	Assimilation	Multiculturalism
<b>Cultural orientation</b>	Seeking homogeneity	Seeking heterogeneity
<b>Incentive policy</b>	Focused on assimilation	Focused on participation
<b>Policy focus</b>	Prevention of discrimination against migrants	Protection of migrant rights
<b>Perception of migrants</b>	Target of integration	Diverse members of society
<b>Government role</b>	Passive	Active

Source: Kim 2015, 250.

On the other hand, Korean society does not have a defined social integration policy for Muslim migrants. This is because the Muslim immigrant community in Korea is small and consists of a variety of different nationalities, which makes it difficult to establish a policy for migrants from specific countries. For that reason, the Korean government has not established a clear policy direction for Muslim migrants. According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) developed by the British Council of the UK and Migration Policy Group of Belgium to evaluate the level of social integration among migrants in each country, as of 2015 Korea had generally adopted a one-way policy of assimilation that integrates migrants into its own culture (Lee, Chang-Won 2017: 76-78). According to the IOM Migration Research & Training Centre report in 2016, among the four general stages of Muslim community development in European society (Stage 1: initial pioneers, Stage 2: chain migration, Stage 3: family migration, Stage 4: emergence of second-generation Muslims), the Muslim community in Korea is shifting from initial pioneers to chain migration as existing migrants invite their family and close friends to join them. Accordingly, social awareness of foreign migrants is generally low in Korean society, and the Muslim community is not yet as fully developed as in Europe (Cho, Young-Hee 2016: 7-9).

Meanwhile, in recent times Korean society has adopted a rather negative perception toward foreign migrants. According to Yoon In-jin's study "Characteristics and Changes in Korean Perceptions of Multicultural Minorities," Koreans' perceptions of foreign migrants has changed from 'paternalism' to apathy over the last five years. For example, to the question "Should Korea be a multiracial and multicultural nation instead of a racially and culturally

homogenous nation?" 60.6% responded 'yes' in 2010, but this percentage decreased to 49.6% in 2015. Moreover, as increased contact between Koreans and migrants led to social problems such as competition for jobs, sham marriages/divorces, culture clashes and crime in the 2010s, there has been an expansion in negative sentiment towards migrants through 'multicultural fatigue' and 'multicultural repulsion.' In this respect, Korean society generally has a negative perception towards Muslim migrants as well (Kim, Joong-Kwan 2016: 21-25).

Thus, along with emotional hostility toward foreign migrants, a lack of national policies for Muslim migrants has also served as a cause in the spread of anti-Islam sentiment in Korea. In particular, the issue of Yemeni refugees has arisen at a time when the Muslim community in Korea has yet to secure a place for itself as part of Korean society, which has led to the backlash and confusion. This means it is necessary to establish a systematic policy for Muslim migrants at a national level. There is currently no specific evidence that the lack of a policy on Muslim migrants has caused the social conflict over the Yemeni refugees in Jeju. Nevertheless, this is a cause that is likely to lead to prejudice and misunderstandings about existing Muslim migrants in Korea, and intensify social conflict and negative opinions about Muslim migrants and refugees that may arrive in the future.

#### *Value and Identity Conflicts and Controversy: Religious Values between Korean Society and Islam*

With regard to the Yemeni refugees, the lack of understanding about the values and doctrines of a different religion has been a key cause that intensified social conflicts in Korean society. In terms of religious influence and number of believers, the mainstream religions in Korea are Christianity, Buddhism and Confucianism. On the other hand, Islam is far below Christianity or Buddhism in terms of number of believers and religious influence (Statistics Korea 2015).<sup>12</sup> Among these three religions, it was Christianity, especially Protestants, that took the most aggressive stance against refugees. While other religions such as Buddhism also expressed concerns, the resistance was not as systematic or unanimous as that from the Korean Protestant community.

Among Protestants, the more conservative and evangelical elements were strongly opposed to accepting Yemeni Muslim refugees, pointing out the differences in religious values between Christianity and Islam, as well as the doctrinal aggression in Islam. They demonstrated strong hostility towards any expansion of Islam in Korea (Cho, Hee-Sun 2014: 290-291).<sup>13</sup> Based on a perspective of Christian fundamentalism, these Protestant organizations view Islam as a threat. Of course, some progressive Protestant organizations have insisted on mutual respect and coexistence with Islam, but remain greatly outnumbered



(Jung, Soo-Dong 2018). Therefore, the most vocal objections to Yemeni refugees were raised by conservative Protestant organizations in Korea. For example, they argued, “Islam is a religion of domination and control instead of coexistence, an exclusive religion that leads to collective ghettos”, “Muslims never give up what they own, nor do they seek to innovate or change,” and “Even moderate Muslims are bound to follow the aggressive doctrines of Islam, which is why we must stop the religion from entering Korea (Yoo, Ji-Man 2018).”

The Korea Association of Church Communication, a typical conservative Protestant organization, released a statement on the Yemeni refugees in Jeju Island on May 17, 2018, which echoes the perspective of many conservative Korean Protestant organizations toward Islam. “In particular, the nationality and religion of those who applied for refugee status in Korea are highly likely to stir up great controversy in Korean society, and thus we must keep an eye on them. As we all know, Islamic terrorism is a complicated issue that should not be overlooked or overshadowed by a humanitarian viewpoint. The majority of murders and terrorist attacks around the world are committed by Muslims (Korean Association of Church Communication 2018). Europe’s multicultural policy has failed because of Islam. This is because European countries failed to properly prepare for the problems that would be caused by Muslim refugees, and did not have adequate solutions once this became a social problem. We must learn from Europe’s example. The Korean government must provide a clear position about its ‘multicultural policy’ and come up with thorough measures to deal with the refugees that are now swarming into Korea. We must avoid following in the footsteps of Europe’s failure due to some lame concept of ‘paternalism’ (Korean Association of Church Communication 2018).”

As indicated in this statement, Korean conservative Protestant organizations believe that “The majority of murders and terrorist attacks are committed by Muslims” and argue that “Islamic terrorism is a complicated issue that should not be overlooked,” thereby almost equating Islam with terrorism. They also claim that the European multicultural policy on Muslims has failed, and that the presence of Muslim refugees in Europe has led to social anxiety. Accordingly, they conclude that Europe’s social integration policy has failed due to ‘paternalism,’ and Korea must not follow in their footsteps. They call on the Korean government to take ‘thorough measures.’ In particular, the Islam Countermeasures Committee of the Presbyterian Church in Korea (HapDong, one of the biggest Christian churches in Korea) argued that “Korean churches must be protected from the threat of Islam,” and that “Korean churches must learn about the true nature of Islam and take drastic measures to expand the country of God” (Kim, In-Ae 2018).

These controversies over religious doctrines and values drove the social and legal disputes toward religious conflict by emphasizing ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslims’ rather than the refugee aspect. Due to the large numbers of Protestant Christians in Korea and the church’s dominant position relative to the Korean Muslim community, their views had a strong political and

social impact, thereby serving as a catalyst in driving anti-Islamic sentiment. As can be seen from the expansion of Islamic religious influence and the Muslim community's political influence in European society, the aforementioned arguments are based on the concern that, if Korean society accepts Yemeni refugees, it will also face an expansion of Islamic influence that mirrors what has happened in Europe (Kim, Su-Wan 2016: 193-200)<sup>14</sup>. They claim that this will threaten the social identity of Christianity that has built up over a long time in Korean society, and even result in culture clashes between Christianity and Islam. In this respect, the Yemeni refugee issue is the first case in which religious identity controversy has been a part of social issue in Korean society (Cho, Young-Hee 2016: 7-9).

### *Interest Conflict and Controversy: Economic Effects of Refugee Inflows and Financial Support Policies*

Socioeconomic interests are one of the most realistic conflict causes. In Korea, financial report for refugees has been discussed in terms of social privileges, with some arguing that the financial support offered to refugees is excessive compared to the support policies for low-income groups in Korea. In addition to this, there are concerns that the inflow of refugees will encroach upon the domestic labor market, replacing many of the jobs held by locals.

There is still controversy in academic circles about the economic impact of refugees. In the EU, there was a massive inflow of Syrian refugees after the Syrian Civil War in 2011. This has influenced the EU economy in many ways including domestic demand, employment, current account balance, real wages, government debt and fiscal balances. In terms of positive effects, the increase in public expenditure positively affects economic growth in the short run. According to the European Commission, the impact of refugee inflow on the combined GDP of EU member states was 0.14-0.21% in 2016 and 0.18-0.26% in 2017. In particular, there was a greater positive impact on GDP when refugees were less skilled than locals. Moreover, according to a study by the French National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) that analyzed the economic impact of refugees in 15 European countries such as Germany, France, UK, the Netherlands, Denmark and Italy over 30 years from 1985 to 2015, GDP increased after asylum seekers were granted refugee status, and tax revenue also jumped by more than 15%. In Western Europe, the refugees helped to fill shortfalls in the labor force caused by population aging and generally worked in jobs that locals avoided, thereby slightly reducing the overall unemployment rate (Park, Se-Jun 2018).

On the other hand, in Central and Eastern Europe, which are less receptive to refugees than countries in Western Europe, research has found a number of negative impacts. The real wages of laborers in these regions decreased due to the inflow of refugees, causing a decline

in come level and the current account balance (Lee, Hyun-Jin 2015: 6). According to a study by Professor Kim Joong-kwan, “The prompt and optimized economic input from refugees after effective education and training may contribute to increased economic growth potential.” However, he also noted that “If social integration in the host country is forced and the issue of reverse discrimination is raised by underprivileged groups in the host country, it can lead to social unrest,” thereby exerting a negative impact on the overall national economy. Kim also argued that the latter phenomenon is on the rise in Europe at the moment. In this sense, refugee inflow can have both positive and negative impacts on the economy of host countries (Kim, Jung-Kwan 2016: 21-46). Despite the fact that there is evidence on both sides, the issue of Yemeni refugees in Jeju Island has led to a greater focus on the negatives rather than the positives. Without accurate statistics about the economic activities of foreign migrants living in Korea, this negative perception of the economic impact of refugees played a crucial role in intensifying the anti-Muslim sentiment.

#### *Data and Relationship Conflicts and Controversy: misinformation of Data and Lack of Communication*

The direct causes that turned this issue into a large social problem were data conflict due to differences in interests and relationship conflict due to a lack of communication. These conflicts were mainly caused by the production and promulgation of fake news about Yemeni refugees, and misuse of information. The most typical example was the government’s support policy for Yemenis in Jeju. Those against granting the Yemenis refugee status argue that the government is providing too much support for asylum seekers. In particular, they strongly criticize the subsidization of living costs for refugees. Under this system, the government provides a certain amount of money every month for a certain period of time so that people undergoing the screening process for refugee applications can sustain themselves. Asylum seekers can apply for this financial support within six months of the application date.

In this case, those using refugee support facilities receive KRW 216,450 (USD 192.57) a month, while non-users of such facilities receive KRW 432,900 (USD 3,851.42) a month. Moreover, if they are granted refugee status, they become beneficiaries of the National Basic Livelihood Security System and receive KRW 1.38 million (USD 1,227.76) a month. Once they are granted refugee status, they enjoy almost the same level of benefits as Korean citizens. For example, approximately KRW 20 million (1,779.36 dollars) is provided to pay the deposit on a rental property as part of an initial settlement fund for refugees. Refugees are also eligible for medical services and social security benefits when they pay taxes and join the national health insurance program (The Emergency Welfare Assistance Law).<sup>15</sup>

Table 2. Subsidization of living costs for refugee applicants in 2018 (month/KRW)

(1 USD = 1.124 KRW, July 13, 2018)

No. of household members	One-person household	Two-person household	Three-person household	Four-person household	Five-person household
Non-users of refugee support facilities	432,900	737,200	953,900	1,170,400	1,386,900
Users of refugee support facilities	216,450	368,600	476,950	585,200	693,450

Source: The Emergency Welfare Assistance Law. Living costs are subsidized for up to five household members. Amendment to 2018 subsidization of living costs.

However, anti-refugee groups argue that such support policies are excessive compared to the financial support given to low-income Koreans. They claim that the government should look after nationals first before offering any economic benefits to foreigners. These financial privileges provide an incentive for more refugees to come and add to social turmoil. Accordingly, they believe that government support for refugees should be abolished. Furthermore, they argue that it is wrong for the government to provide a job placement service for refugees when Korean society is suffering from severe unemployment issues (Ou, Kyung-Mook 2018). In fact, these objections are based on misunderstandings and incorrect data. In fact, not all asylum seekers receive financial support just by applying for living costs. Over 300 Yemeni refugees applied, but not a single one actually passed the screening. As for employment benefits, refugees can only get a job six months after applying for refugee status, and most of the Yemenis struggled to find employment outside of manual labor. Furthermore, asylum seekers that were not given refugee status but granted a temporary stay on humanitarian grounds because they cannot return home due to political circumstances can also perform manual jobs without receiving any financial support. They receive the same treatment as other foreigners living in Korea and pay taxes according to their income, so it is incorrect to claim that they are using up taxpayer money (Park, Kwang-Soo 2018).

Some argue that the asylum seekers may appeal if they are not accepted in the first screening, and can even appeal again if they are ‘rejected’ for a second time. In this case it

takes about 3-5 years on average until the final results come out, during which they are highly likely to remain in Korea through employment. By civil law, employment is not permitted for six months after applying for refugee status, but considering the fact that refugees need to sustain themselves, the Korean government has permitted temporary employment in the restaurant business and primary industries. However, only 228 out of 466 Yemenis living in Jeju were employed as of July 22, while the rest had given up on employment or been dismissed. Moreover, Yemenis who could not afford living expenses stayed in facilities provided by civic groups in Jeju or homes provided by individual citizens (Go, Sung-Ski 2018). In addition to this, unconfirmed rumors about the possibility of social crimes committed by Muslim refugees spread via the internet and social networking service. Some examples include: "There will be more crime if we accept Muslim refugees," "Islam has a culture of gang rape and a high rate of sex crimes," and "Accepting Muslim refugees will 'Islamize' Korean society, thereby increasing leading to more crime by Muslims" (Im, Hyun Kyung 2018).

However, it is necessary to examine these arguments more closely. According to the report 'Foreign Crime Trends and Characteristics in Official Statistics' released by the Korean Institute of Criminology in 2017, a comparison of crime rates between Koreans and foreigners over five years from 2011 to 2015 showed that the overall crime rate for Koreans is higher, but the rate was higher among foreigners for violent crimes such as murder and robbery (Han 2018b).<sup>16</sup> By nationality, Mongolians had the highest crime rate amongst foreigners, followed by Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, Russians and Chinese. There are currently no accurate statistics about crimes committed by Muslims because the survey did not look at the religion foreigners. However, by making an educated guess based on the major religion of each country, it can be inferred that the crime rate of foreigners from Muslim countries is not very high.

Moreover, human rights groups in Korea also point out that concerns about an increase in crime by Muslims is a fallacy based on sweeping generalizations. In other words, an increase in crime rates by foreigners is a natural phenomenon caused globalization, and the sexist elements of Islam are also present in other religions. Furthermore, they argue that violent acts committed by Muslim refugees in Europe turned out to be unconfirmed and fake news in many cases. Korean society is currently experiencing strange phenomenon due to the collective and sudden appearance of Yemeni Muslim refugees, and emotional fears about this issue have been amplified by unconfirmed information and news. In particular, data conflicts were severe because there are many cases in which it is impossible to actually check the facts. Moreover, it is difficult to manage data conflicts because they occur among a large number of unspecified persons. With regard to the Yemeni refugees in Jeju, data conflicts were exacerbated through the spread and reproduction of false data.

## Conclusions and Implications

This is the first case in which Koreans have shown a collective response toward Muslim refugees. There have been many cases in which foreigners applied for refugee status, but the Yemeni refugees in Jeju Island is the first time that a large number of individuals have applied collectively. This is why Korean society reacted with a spontaneous and emotional response spurred by anti-Islamic sentiment. When the government's final screening of Yemeni refugee applicants was complete, only two of the 484 applicants were officially granted refugee status. Most of the remaining Yemenis were granted humanitarian stay permits and are staying in Korea temporarily.

A number of social conflicts and controversy had an impact on the anti-Yemeni refugee issue, including inadequate government policies for Muslim migrants, the lack of a social consensus about social integration, misunderstandings about financial support policies for refugees, negative perceptions about the socioeconomic effects of refugee inflow, and concerns over lack of common features between the norms of Korean society and the religious values of Islam. It is clear that many of these social conflicts were rooted in Korean society's closed-minded attitude toward other cultures, races and religions.

Since the Arab Spring in 2011, the Middle East has suffered the most severe conflict in the world. In particular, the Syrian Civil War and Yemeni Civil War are driving a large number of refugees to migrate to Europe, and some of them are even coming to Korea. Korea already has a history of successfully accepting refugees after communists took power in Vietnam in the 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless, the Yemeni refugees in Jeju Island differed from Vietnamese refugees, causing substantial social controversy in Korean society. The number of Muslim immigrants, including Yemeni refugees, will likely continue to increase in Korean society. In this respect, this incident has raised some serious questions about how outsiders can socially integrate into Korean society. In particular, the fact that the majority of the Yemenis are Muslims intensified social conflicts by focusing attention on the religious aspect rather than the refugee aspect. This incident has caused misunderstandings and prejudice about Islam and Muslim to rise to the surface, and these sentiments were spread through the press and social media without any verification or fact checking. As a result, not a single Yemeni has been granted refugee status in Jeju.

This is likely to have a negative impact on Muslims that are living in Korea as members of society. With so many refugees seeking asylum worldwide, it is clear that Korea will not be an exception. With isolationism and ethnocentrism intensifying across the world, Korea will also come under considerable pressure, which could result in collective exclusion of outsiders. In order to preemptively handle the severe social conflicts currently faced by European society as a result of refugee inflows, and ensure that outsiders are able to become true members of

Korean society, a social consensus must be reached and more consideration must be given to cultural diversity. In particular, as part of efforts to achieve social integration, it is necessary to establish a social integration policy and clear strategy at a national level. In an era of globalization, the emergence of refugees worldwide requires active intervention at a government level - it cannot be solved on an individual or social level. In this respect, the issue of Yemeni refugees in Jeju is an incident that has clearly revealed the underlying attitude of Korean society towards those who are different, and tested the ability of Korean society and the Korean government to cope with this global issue.

- <sup>1</sup> Jeju Island is located in the southernmost part of Korea and is the biggest island in Korea. It is an autonomous administrative division that consists of nine inhabited islands, including the main island Jeju, and 55 uninhabited islands. The official name is Jeju Special Self-Governing Province, but in this study it is referred to as Jeju Island for convenience (Jeju Special Self-Governing Province website).
- <sup>2</sup> As of December 12, 2018, the Korean government had granted refugee status to two out of 484 applicants this year after three rounds of screening, while 412 had obtained a humanitarian stay permit, and 56 were not recognized as refugees. A further 14 had given up on the application.
- <sup>3</sup> The technical legal status of the Yemenis in Jeju is asylum seekers. However, domestic and international media and academia generally refer to asylum seekers from Syrian and Yemeni as refugees, so this study also refers to them as refugees for convenience.
- <sup>4</sup> On June 22, 2004, Kim Sun-il, who was working for Gana General Trading Company, a Korean military supplies contractor that provided various supplies to the US Army in Iraq, was kidnapped and killed by insurgents in Iraq (Doosan Encyclopedia).
- <sup>5</sup> On July 19, 2007, 23 missionaries from Saemmul Church from Korea were captured and held hostage by the Taliban in Afghanistan, during which two men were executed and the remaining 21 were released one by one. All hostages were eventually released by August 30, 42 days after the abduction (Doosan Encyclopedia).
- <sup>6</sup> In distinguishing refugees from migrants, the former is a legal concept that generally refers to those who entered the after escaping from persecution and have been granted refugee status through relevant procedures. The latter is more of a realistic concept than legal, referring to those with foreign citizenship or nationality that entered Korea of their own volition.
- <sup>7</sup> Oh, Seung-Jin. 2018. "A Study on the Korean Practice of Refugee Recognition and Some Recommendations." *Law Kyung Hee Journal*, 53(3): 389~414. Lee, Sung-Wook. 2018. "A Preliminary Study on Public Opinion Against Yemeni Refugees and the Political Decision." *International Journal of Contents*, 18(10): 121-133. Go, Kwang-Suk. 2018. "A Christian Understanding of "Refugees" and the Response of the Korean Church." *Gospel and Missionary*, Vol. 43.
- <sup>8</sup> The Korean government designated Yemen as a country not allowed visa-free entry on June 1, 2018 in the wake of the Yemeni refugee issue. Accordingly, as of August 2018, 24 countries are not allowed visa-free entry, including Yemen, Egypt, Gambia, Senegal, Bangladesh, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Somalia, Uzbekistan, Nepal, Cameroon, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar (Kim 2018a).
- <sup>9</sup> The Moon Jae-in administration came to power in May 2017, led by the Democratic Party of Korea, which is a center-left political party in Korea. The Democratic Party of Korea won the presidential election held in 2017 by defeating the Liberty Korea Party, the traditional center-right party that competed against it. The political orientation of the Moon administration is center-left reformist.

- <sup>10</sup> The official title of the petition registered on the Blue House's online petition system is 'Petition for constitutional amendment to the Refugee Act and the abolition of visa-free entry and permission for refugee applications due to illegal applications for refugee status on Jeju Island.' It stated "It is questionable whether the refugees applying are really refugees, and why they came all the way to Korea instead of Europe, which is much closer" and requested the Korean government to "reconsider entry permits for refugees and improve the Refugee Act because public order and the safety of nationals must come first" (Han 2018a).
- <sup>11</sup> Korea joined the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees in 1992 and was the first in Asia to enact a Refugee Act in July 2013. The number of asylum seekers in Korea is constantly increasing, with 423 in 2010, 1011 in 2011, 1043 in 2012, 1574 in 2013, and 2896 in 2014. The refugee acceptance rate is 4.2%, which is far below the 38% average among UN nations. Over 760 Syrian refugees applied for asylum between 1994 and late July 2015 in Korea, and the Korean government granted asylum to only three of them, while granting a humanitarian stay to another 570 (Park 2018d).
- <sup>12</sup> According to 2015 Statistics Korea data, 21.55 million out of 49,052,389 people are religious, making up 43% of the entire population. Most of them are Protestants (9.67 million, 19%), followed by Buddhists (7.61 million, 15%), Catholics (3.89 million, 7.9%), and other religious minorities like Won Buddhism and Cheondogyo (1.1%). The number of non-religious people is 27.48 million, which is 57% of the population. There are no official statistics about the Muslim population in Korea, but estimates range from 40,000-150,000 depending on religious institution or Muslim group. Islam is also excluded from the government's Population and Housing Census by religion (Statistics Korea 2015).
- <sup>13</sup> Cho's study on the perceptions and attitude of Koreans toward Muslims (Study on Korean Attitude and Perceptions towards Second Generation Muslim Migrants of Korea: based on Survey Research, 2010) also showed that among Protestants, Catholics, Buddhists and non-religious people, Protestants had the most negative perceptions toward second-generation Muslims in Korea. Their negative perception was much stronger than people from other religions, using expressions such as "pitiful," "detestable," "hateful," and "unpleasant." On the other hand, Catholics and Buddhists had a higher rate of positive responses including "respectable," "friendly," and "comfortable." (Cho 2014, 290-291).
- <sup>14</sup> It was found that Koreans had more negative views about Arabs and Islam. According to Professor Kim's study in 2016, a survey on 563 Koreans revealed that 75% of the respondents thought of terrorism, war and disputed territory as images of Arab and Islam, 71% associated Islam with a devoted religious life, 50% with oil-rich countries, 33% with a barren natural environment, 21% with economic reconstruction, and 15% with sexual discrimination and feudal societies. Moreover, the detailed images of 'terrorism, war and disputed territory' included terrorist groups (Taliban, Al-Qaeda), Arab-Israeli conflict, the September 11 attacks and Osama bin Laden, and Islamic extremism. The detailed images of 'devoted religious life' included fasting during Ramadan, Hajj, and devoted and pious belief. This shows that Koreans generally do not have a positive perception toward Islam (Kim 2016, 193-213).
- <sup>15</sup> The biggest problem is when foreigners that come to Korea for economic reasons repeatedly apply for refugee status to extend their stay in Korea. Foreigners that have stayed in Korea for at least three months can receive benefits from the National Health Service regardless of income, and some foreigners abuse this system to receive medical treatment at a low cost in Korea.
- <sup>16</sup> The foreigner crime rate accounted for 0.5% (9,103 persons) of all crimes in 2004, but increased to 1.5% (27,436 persons) in 2011, 1.7% (28,456 persons) in 2014, and 2.4% (35,443 persons) in 2015. According to the report 'Types of Foreigner Crime' by the National Police Agency in 2017, the crime rate of foreigners is increasing. Currently, the National Police Agency's foreigner crime rate survey does not include crime rate by religion (Han 2018b).



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# Session III-3: Education, Language & Literature

Room 606

16:40-18:20	<b>Chair</b> Salaheldin Abdelaziz Ali <b>ELGEBILY</b> (HUFS)
	<p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Ghazi Khader Ali <b>Alzanahreh</b> (HUFS) "Derivation in Arabic, Linguistic Root and Origin of Derivatives"</p> <p><b>Discussant</b> Nagwa Khalaf <b>KHODIRI</b> (Myongji University)</p> <p>○ <b>Presenter</b> Sohyla Mohesni <b>NEJAD</b> (Imam Sadiq University) "The reality of teaching Arabic speaking skills to non-native speakers at the bachelor level from the point of view of students and methods of treatment in Arabic language departments"</p> <p><b>Discussant</b> Ahmed Sayed Mohamed <b>NOGODALLAH</b> (Dankook University)</p>



## الاشتقاق في العربية والجذر اللغوي وأصل المشتقات

### Derivation in Arabic, Linguistic Root and Origin of Derivatives

غازي خضر علي الزناهره

Ghazi Khader Ali Alzanahreh

#### ١. المقدمة

تستخدم العربية طرقاً مختلفة في تنمية ألفاظها، منها الترجمة والتعريب والنقل المجازي والنحت والاشتقاق الذي يعدّ باب العربية الأوسع في تنمية ألفاظها، ويعود ذلك الى عوامل عديدة منها قدرة العربية الفائقة على استخدام العمليات الصرفية المختلفة، وعلى رأسها التحول الداخلي لبنية الكلمة، وقد اهتم الباحثون قديماً وحديثاً بالاشتقاق، وأفردوه بالتأليف .

#### ٢. الاشتقاق في اللغة وفي الاصطلاح

لعل الإشارات الأولى لمصطلح الاشتقاق كان على جانب من السّعة سببت الاضطراب والغموض في مفهوم الاشتقاق وحدوده، ومردّ ذلك عدم استقرار علوم العربية من جهة، وعدم استقرار المصطلح العلمي من جهة أخرى. فمن متشدد قائل: بأن لا اشتقاق البتة في اللغة، إلى متسامح قائل: كل لفظتين متفتحتين معنى ومادة أصلية، فإحدهما مشتقة من الأخرى، إلى معتدل قائل: بعض الكلام مشتق وبعضه غير مشتق. وهؤلاء هم جمهور علماء اللغة.

والاشتقاق في اللغة هو الانصداع والظهور والتفرّق، وهو مأخوذ من الشقّ<sup>١</sup>، والشقّ : هو الصدع . وشقّ النبات : أول ما تنفطر عنه الأرض، وشقّ ناب الصبي : أول ما يظهر منه ، وشقّ ناب البعير أي طلع

<sup>١</sup> انظر: معجم الصحاح، مادة: شق، وانظر أيضاً معجم لسان العرب: مادة: شق

وظهر، وشقّ فلان العصا، أي فارق الجماعة، واشتقاق الكلام: الأخذ به يميناً وشمالاً<sup>1</sup>. فالمعنى اللغوي يدور حول الانصداع والظهور والتشقق وهي معاني وثيقة الصلة بالمعنى الاصطلاحي للاشتقاق .

وأما الاشتقاق في الاصطلاح، فله تعريفات عدة جمع السيوطي في كتابه المزهري بعضها من تعريفات اللغويين القدامى، منها أن "الاشتقاق أخذ صيغة من أخرى مع اتفاقهما معنى ومادة أصلية، وهيئة تركيب لها، ليدل بالثانية على معنى الأصل بزيادة مفيدة لأجلها اختلف حروفاً وهيئة كضارب من ضرب وحذر من حذر<sup>2</sup> " .

ونجد أغلب الباحثين العرب المحدثين يقومون بترديد معظم التعريفات التي ذكرها السيوطي بصياغة لغوية حديثة دون أن يضيفوا إليها شيئاً<sup>3</sup>. غير أن ثمة بعض الباحثين العرب المحدثين من قدّم مقارنة جديدة وفهما لغويا معاصرا لآلية الاشتقاق وعرفها تعريفاً أدق نسبياً من القدماء .

وقد اتفق علماء اللغة القدامى والمحدثون على تحديد مفهوم عام للاشتقاق، وهو : انتزاع لفظ من لفظ آخر بشرط مناسبتها لفظاً ومعنى تغايرهما في الصيغة، كما أن له معاني اصطلاحية تتسع دلالاتها وتضيق باختلاف الاختصاص. فهو "أخذ كلمة من كلمة أو أكثر مع تناسب بين المأخوذ والمأخوذ منه في اللفظ والمعنى جميعاً<sup>4</sup> "، أو هو: "استخدام الحركات في صوغ الكلمات من المادة على أساس قياس مطوّر<sup>5</sup> " ، وتوسع آخرون في مفهوم الاشتقاق ليخرج به من معناه الصرفي إلى المعنى اللغوي ويجعل الصرف جزءاً من الاشتقاق، فيرى أن الاشتقاق يكون في الحرف واللفظ في الجملة زيادة أو إنقاصاً، نحتاً

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<sup>1</sup> انظر: معجم الصحاح، مادة: شقق، وانظر أيضاً معجم لسان العرب: مادة: شقق

<sup>2</sup> انظر: السيوطي، جلال الدين عبد الرحمن بن كمال الدين، (ت911هـ-1505م)، المزهري في علوم اللغة وأنواعها، تحقيق: محمد أحمد جاد المولى ومحمد أبو الفضل إبراهيم ومحمد علي البجاوي، ط3، مكتبة التراث القاهرة، ج1، ص346). وهذا الاشتقاق يصطلح العلماء عليه بأنه الاشتقاق الأصغر، تمييزاً له عن الاشتقاق الأكبر .

<sup>3</sup> عرف عبد الله أمين الاشتقاق بأنه "أخذ كلمة من كلمة أو أكثر مع تناسب بين المأخوذ والمأخوذ منه في اللفظ والمعنى" ، (مجلة مجمع اللغة العربية بالقاهرة، مجلد 381/1) وعرفه فؤاد حنا طرزي (الاشتقاق، ص:19) بأنه "أخذ لفظ من آخر أصل منه يشترك معه في الأحرف الأصول وترتيبها". وهذان التعريفان لا يختلفان كثيراً عن تعريف أحد اللغويين القدماء وهو أبو البقاء الكفوي (616 هـ) الذي قال: "الاشتقاق رد كلمة إلى أخرى لتناسبهما في اللفظ والمعنى، وهو أصل خواص كلام العرب، فإنهم أطبقوا علاناً التفرقة بين اللفظ العربي والعجمي بصحة الاشتقاق " .

<sup>4</sup> أمين، عبد الله، الاشتقاق، ص2.

<sup>5</sup> شاهين، عبد الصبور، العربية لغة العلوم والتقنية، ص260.

أو قلبا توليدا أو اختراعا<sup>1</sup>. وهو بتفصيل أكثر: "طريقة في تنمية اللغة وتوسيعها تقوم على تحويل العناصر الموجودة في اللغة، وتولدها توليداً طبيعياً يحمل ميسم الأصل أو المادة الأصلية ويدور حوله، ويتصرف على هيئات مختلفة متنوعة توسيعية، تنظر إلى معنى الأصل العام، ولكنها تتخصص عنه بألوان دقيقة من الدلالات" 2 .

لقد كان الصرف جزءا من النحو ثم بدأ يأخذ شكلا مستقلا منذ أيام ابن جني، واستقر رأي الصرفيين على حصر المشتقات بسبعة أبنية، هي: اسم الفاعل واسم المفعول والصفة المشبهة وأفعل التفضيل، وزاد الصرفيون عليها اسمي الزمان والمكان وصيغ المبالغة واسم الآلة.

وقد وسع علماء اللغة المتأخرون مفهوم الاشتقاق، فيرى إبراهيم أنيس "أن كل أفراد المجموعة من الكلمات المشتركة في الحروف الأصلية، وهي المعنى العام، يمكن أن تسمى مشتقات" 3 ، وعلى هذا فالاشتقاق يشمل المشتقات الثمانية والمصدر الميمي ومصدر الثلاثي وغير الثلاثي والتصغير وجمع التكسير والأمر والمضارع وأبنية الأفعال الزائدة والمبني للمجهول والتأنيث بالصيغة " لا بإضافة اللاحقة" 4 ، وهي، بعد، وجهة نظر تُحترم، ولكننا لا نأخذ بها، ونرى حصر المشتقات في ما استقر عليه الجَمّ الغفير من الصرفيين، لأنه الرأي الأشهر ولفائدته التعليمية والعملية.

وصبجي الصالح يعرّف الاشتقاق بأنه "توليد بعض الألفاظ من بعض، والرجوع بها إلى أصل واحد يحدد مادتها ويوحى بمعناها المشترك الأصيل مثلما يوحى بمعناها الخاص الجديد" 5. وهو بهذا الفهم ، كما يقول محمد أوكمضان<sup>6</sup> "بدد كثيرا من أوهام القدماء التي لفوا بها الاشتقاق، وحاول الرد على المغالين

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<sup>1</sup> دراز، طنطاوي، ظاهرة الاشتقاق، ص 51.

<sup>2</sup> الموسى، نهاد، النحت في اللغة العربية، ص 30 .

<sup>3</sup> أنيس، إبراهيم، طرق تنمية الألفاظ في العربية، القاهرة ، ص 44.

<sup>4</sup> عبابنة، جعفر، أصل الاشتقاق أم آليته، ص 104.

<sup>5</sup> الصالح، صبجي، دراسات في فقه اللغة، ص 174.

<sup>6</sup> أوكمضان، محمد، تطور الأبنية الصرفية ودورها في إغناء اللغة العربية، ص 1.



المنكرين للاشتقاق جملة زاعمين أن "الكلم كله أصل"، كما رد على الذين قالوا على النقيض من ذلك بأن "كل الكلم مشتق"1.

ثم هو ينتصر للرأى القائل بأن أصل المشتقات هي الأسماء لا الأفعال، ولا سيما أسماء الأعيان، ودليله في ذلك أن الحسي أسبق في الوجود من المعنوي المجرد"2.

أما عبد الصبور شاهين فيعرف الاشتقاق بأنه "صوغ كلمة فرعية من كلمة أصلية على أساس قياس فرعي، كاشتقاق الصفات وأسماء الزمان والمكان ونحوها... وبناء على هذا التعريف يصبح المصدر والفعل الماضي-كلاهما صورا اشتقاقية لا أصلا اشتقاقيا كما ذهب القدماء"3. والرأى الراجح هو أن الاشتقاق في اللغة العربية وفي غيرها من اللغات السامية يعتمد في الغالب على صوغ المفردات انطلاقا من جذور تتألف من ثلاثة صوامت (مثال: ض-ر-ب).

ويرتبط المعنى الرئيسي للكلمة بالأصوات الصامتة، أما الأصوات المتحركة فهي لا تعبر في الكلمة الا عن تحوير هذا المعنى وتعديله... ويتعلق معنى الكلمة بالأصوات الصامتة، وفي عدد كبير جدا من الكلمات، يحمل المعنى ثلاثة أصوات صامتة فيها...4. وهذا الجذر أو الأصل الثلاثي يفيد معنى عاما مشتركا بين عدد المفردات التي تنفرع عنه. وتلحق بالأصل زوائد لتخصيص معناه العام ولتمييز الدلالات المتفرعة بعضها عن بعض، بإضافة الصوائت القصيرة (الحركات) 5 أو الطويلة (حروف المد) (مثال: ض - ر - ب = ضرب = ضارب) أو بتضعف أحد الصوامت الأصلية (كما في فعل) أو بغير ذلك من التغييرات. وهكذا تتشكل مفردات اللغة العربية وتتنامى متفرعة من أصول ثلاثية الصوامت تصاغ وفق صيغ صرفية مطردة الدلالة في الغالب. وهكذا تتشكل مفردات اللغة العربية وتتنامى متفرعة من أصول ثلاثية الصوامت تصاغ وفق صيغ صرفية مطردة الدلالة في الغالب.

<sup>1</sup> الصالح، صبحي، المرجع السابق، ص 175 .

<sup>2</sup> الصالح، صبحي، المرجع السابق، ص 180.

<sup>3</sup> شاهين، عبد الصبور، اللغة العربية لغة العلوم والتقنية، ص 260 .

<sup>4</sup> بروكلمان، كارل، فقه اللغات السامية، ترجمة: رمضان عبد التواب، ص 14-15.

<sup>5</sup> فطن بعض أئمة اللغة القدامى إلى أن "الحركات هي في الحقيقة "حروف"، فابن جني تناول هذا الموضوع في باب من كتابه "الخصائص" أسماء: باب في مضارعة الحروف للحركات، ومما جاء فيه أن "الحركة حرف صغير، ألا ترى أن من متقدمي القوم من كان يسمى الضمة الواو الصغيرة والكسرة الباء الصغيرة و الفتحة الألف الصغيرة. ويؤكد ذلك عندك أنك متى أشبعت ومطلت الحركة أنشأت بعدها حرفا من جنسها...". (الخصائص، ج 2، ص 315).

### III. أنواع الاشتقاق

لقد اختلف علماء اللغة القدامى والمحدثون في عدد أنواع المشتقات وفي أسمائها، فتحدث العلماء القدامى عن الاشتقاق الذي يعني انتزاع لفظ من آخر مع الاشتراك في اللفظ والمعنى وترتيب الأحرف، ويفهم من هذا أن المقصود هو الاشتقاق العام، وسنقصر حديثنا هنا على هذا النوع من الاشتقاق.

ويطلق على هذا الاشتقاق أسماء أخرى كالاشتقاق الأصغر والاشتقاق الصرفي والاشتقاق الصغير. وهذا النوع هو أشهر أنواع الاشتقاق، وهذا الضرب من الاشتقاق هو أهم وسيلة في زيادة اللغة العربية ثروة وغنى، لأنه يجعلها قادرة دائماً على التجدد ومسيرة تطور الحياة وتقدم الحضارة .

### IV. الاشتقاق ودوره في تنمية ألفاظ اللغة

الاشتقاق في العربية ظاهرة مطردة يتم بآلية معينة معروفة بإضافة مجموعة من اللواحق أو حروف الزيادة التي تجمعها كلمة (سألتمونيها) إلى أصل المادة، فيجتمع المعنى العام لأصل المادة إضافة إلى معنى الزيادة "على أن المعنى العام للمادة قد يصيبه مع مر الزمن وتداول العصور تبدل بالتخصيص أو التعميم أو بالانتقال إلى معنى مجاور، وقد يجتمع المعنيان القديم والحديث في المادة، وقد يهمل القديم فيصبح أصلاً تاريخياً ويبقى المعنى الجديد"<sup>1</sup>. وعناصر الاشتقاق ثلاثة : الجذر وحروف الزيادة والصيغة

### V. مادة الكلمة (الجذر اللغوي)

لقد جاءت فكرة الجذر في العربية من الخليل بن أحمد الفراهيدي التي على أساسها قامت فكرة التقاليب التي استخدمها في معجم العين، وهو ما يطلق عليه المادة الخام " وهي المادة التي تتألف في الغالب من ثلاثة حروف ساكنة لا يمكن النطق بها، وليس لها دلالة وظيفية وهي ما يسمى أحياناً بالأصل الثلاثي أو الجذر الثلاثي، فهي مادة خام لم تتشكل، فلا هي بالفعل ولا هي بالمصدر"<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> المبارك، محمد، فقه اللغة وخصائص العربية، ص76.

<sup>2</sup> أنيس، إبراهيم، طرق تنمية الألفاظ في العربية، ص 42 .

وحول فكرة الجذر ظهرت نظريتان تبحثان في التطور اللغوي وأصل المشتقات، هما:

### نظرية الثنائية

لقد أبدى عدد من قدامى اللغويين كالخليل وسيبويه وأبي علي الفارسي وابن جني ملاحظات كثيرة حول هذا الموضوع، وكان ابن جني أبينهم وأوسعهم نظراً وأوضحهم بحثاً فقد بسط ما لاحظته من صلات بين الألفاظ المشتركة في حرفين أو حرف واحد مع تشابه الحروف الأخرى مثل "أزّ ، هزّ" و " قسم ، قصم " و " خضم ، قضم" و "قد ، قط" وسار على أثره عدد من الباحثين القدامى والمحدثين كجرجي زيدان وانستانس الكرمللي ومرمرجي الدومنيكي " وخرجوا من ذلك بنظرات متقاربة في أصل الألفاظ العربية وتاريخ نشوئها وتكونها "1.

وأكثر الذين يقولون بالأصل الثنائي للألفاظ العربية يرون أن هذه الأصول الثنائية نشأت عن حكاية الأصوات الطبيعية المقارنة للفعل أو الحدث الذي تدل عليه تلك الأصول، ف (قط) حكاية للصوت المقترن بالقطع و(قص) للصوت الذي ترجع إليه معاني (قص، قصم، قصر) .

وقد لاقت هذه النظرية الكثير من النقد، لأن اللغة العربية استقرت على الأساس الثلاثي وأن الأصل الثنائي مرحلة تاريخية لم يعد البحث فيها مجدياً إلا ضمن هذا الاعتبار، لكون أصل اللغة خارج مجال علم اللغة، أي كونه فكرة غير علمية.

ومما يوهن هذا التعميم صعوبة رد معظم الكلمات الى أصول ثنائية، كما أن اختلاف اللهجات العربية قد أسهم في انتشار هذه الظاهرة<sup>2</sup>. وقد اتخذ بعضهم منها موضوعاً للتندر بالقول: " لا يمكنني أن أسلم أن رجلاً أصله (رج) وقرداً أصلها (قر) وفيلاً أصلها (في) كما يقولون"<sup>3</sup>.

## VI. أصل المشتقات

<sup>1</sup> المبارك، محمد المبارك، المرجع السابق، ص 87.

<sup>2</sup> انظر: عمايرة، إسماعيل، بحوث في الاستشراق واللغة، ص 278.

<sup>3</sup> انظر: أمين، عبد الله، المرجع السابق، ص 159.

كانت قضية أصل الاشتقاق قضية خلافية بين البصريين والكوفيين، وكانت فكرة الأصالة والفرعية سواء للمصدر أم للفعل من القضايا التي اختلفت حولها علماء النحو، فذهب البصريون إلى أن المصدر هو الأصل والفعل فرع عليه. على حين يرى الكوفيون أن الفعل الماضي هو الأصل، وأن المصدر فرع عليه. وقد عرض ابن الأنباري لهذا الاختلاف في كتابه الإنصاف في المسألة التاسعة والعشرين<sup>1</sup>.

ومن أدلة البصريين على أولية المصدر وأنه هو الأصل، أنه لا يتضمن إلا الحدث فهو البسيط الذي ينشأ أولاً، أما الفعل فهو مركب لأنه يتضمن الحدث والزمن، ويرى الكوفيون أن دلالة الفعل محسوسة، في حين أن دلالة المصدر مجردة، والدلالة المحسوسة أسبق في الوجود، على حين وقف بعض المحدثين ضد النظريتين، ويرى تمام حسان أن ثمة صعوبات تقوم دون الاقتناع برأي البصريين، وبرأي الكوفيين على حد سواء، ويتساءل مم اشتق الفعل ( يدع ) الذي لا ماضي له، وهو مشتق على رغم ذلك، فما أصل اشتقاقه إذاً؟<sup>2</sup>

ومن أدلة البصريين وجود مصادر في العربية لا أفعال لها كالرجولة والأنوثة والأبوة والأمومة والبنوة وغيرها، فلو كان المصدر مأخوذاً من الفعل لكان لكل مصدر فعل، وحين بطل أن يكون الفعل هو الأصل تعين أن يكون المصدر هو الأصل.

وواضح من هذا الاستدلال أنه يقوم على فرضية أن المصدر أو الفعل هو الأصل والآخر هو الفرع، فإذا بطل أحدهما أن يكون الأصل، كان الآخر هو الأصل. وهذا افتراض غير صحيح لأن تاريخ اللغة لا يثبت ذلك.

وكما وجدنا مصادر لا أفعال لها، فإن ثمة أفعالا لا مصادر لها في العربية، نحو: يَدْرُ وفعل الأمر "هَبْ" والأفعال الجامدة، نحو: ليس وعسى ونعم وبئس.

ومن أدلة البصريين أيضاً وجود مصادر جارية على غير ألفاظ أفعالها كالكرامة والعدول والمصادر السماعية. وكذلك استدل البصريون على أصلية المصدر بوجود المصدر بحروفه ومعناه في جميع أنواع الفعل مع عدم وجود معنى الفعل في المصدر.

<sup>1</sup> انظر: ابن الأنباري، عبد الرحمن، الإنصاف في مسائل الخلاف، ص 192-201.

<sup>2</sup> انظر: حسان، تمام حسان، اللغة العربية: معناها ومبناها، ص 167.

ويلاحظ هنا أن منهج البصريين في الاستدلال هو منهج كلامي، ويعود إلى التأثير بالمنطق العقلي، ولا شك أن اللغة لها منطقتها الخاص بها.

وبعد هذا الاستعراض الموجز لأهم آراء البصريين، فمن الجدير بالذكر أن بعض المعاصرين وجَّهوا سهام نقدهم إلى رأي البصريين؛ إذ إن العرب لم تقتصر على الاشتقاق من أسماء المعاني، بل إنهم اشتقوا من أسماء الأعيان، فاشتقوا من الفلس والذهب والفضة والبحر والتلج، واشتقوا من أسماء الأعيان المعربة، فقالوا: هندس ودرهم والجَم1.

ومما وُجه من نقد إلى رأي البصريين أن بعض الأفعال لها عدة مصادر، فمثلا الفعل "وجد" مصدره للمطلوب "وجود"، وللضالة "وجدان"، وللغضب "موجدة" و"وجدان"، وفي الغنى "وجد" و"جدة"، ولأخذ الحديث "الوجادة"، فمن أي هذه المصادر أُشتق الفعل "وجد"2.

ويرى عبد الله أمين أنه على الرغم من شيوع رأي البصريين بأن المصدر هو أصل المشتقات بين العاملين في المجال اللغوي، فإن قواعد الاشتقاق وضعت في كتب النحو والصرف لاشتقاق المصادر والمشتقات المشهورة اشتقت من الأفعال، ولم يوضع شيء من هذه القواعد لاشتقاق الأفعال وهذه المشتقات من المصادر، وهذا الواقع موافق تمام الموافقة قول الكوفيين ومخالف كل المخالفة قول البصريين، وعلى هذا يكون أصل المشتقات بالقول المصدر وأصلها بالعمل الفعل3.

أما الكوفيون فإن أهم ما احتجوا به هو أن المصدر يعتل تبعا لاعتلال الفعل، وصحته تبعا لصحة الفعل، فيقال: قام قياما، فَيُعَل "القيام" لاعتلال "قام"، ويقال: قاوم قواما فيصح المصدر لصحة الفعل.

وهذا الاستدلال لا يصلح دليلا لإثبات رأيهم في أصلية الفعل وفرعية المصدر، فضلا عن وجود بعض المصادر التي لا تُعَل لاعتلال أفعالها، نحو: وعد يعد وعدا، ووزن يزن وزنا، وكال يكيل كيلا، ومال يميل ميلا.

<sup>1</sup> الشهابي، المصطلحات العلمية في اللغة العربية، القاهرة، 1955، ص12.

<sup>2</sup> جواد، مصطفى، المباحث اللغوية في العراق، القاهرة، 1955، ص 13 و14.

<sup>3</sup> أمين، عبد الله، المرجع السابق، ص 14.

ويستدل الكوفيون أيضا بأن الفعل يعمل في المصدر، ولما كان كذلك فإن رتبة العامل، عند الكوفيين، قبل رتبة المعمول. وواضح أن هذا الاستدلال ينطلق من نظرية العامل في النحو، وهي نظرية تقوم على أساس المنطق العقلي.

ويتضح لدينا أن أدلة الكوفيين الذين يرون أن الفعل هو أصل الاشتقاق لا تختلف عن أدلة البصريين في تأثر المدرستين بالمنهج الكلامي الذي سيطر على دراسات القرن الرابع الهجري<sup>1</sup>.

وما زال الخلاف بين البصريين والكوفيين حول أصل الاشتقاق؛ هل المصدر هو الأصل أم الفعل، يجد صده عند اللغويين العرب، فها هو مصطفى جواد يرى أن مذهب الكوفيين أقرب إلى ما تبنته المدرسة اللغوية الحديثة في أن "أسماء الأعيان" هي مبدأ الاشتقاق، وذلك لأن "الفعل يجري مجرى المادة لكونه مشهودا وهو سابق للمصدر وأظهر منه للشهادة والإحساس فلا يكون "سير" إلا بعد أن يكون "سار، وهو مشهود ومحسوس به، و"السير" اسم له ودليل عليه"<sup>2</sup>

ويرى مهدي المخزومي إلى أن ما أخذ به الباحثون المحدثون قريب من رأي الكوفيين، ويقول "إن كون الفعل هو الأصل في الاشتقاق هو ما كان عليه أكثر الباحثين مستأنسين بنتائج الدرس اللغوي المقارن، وبما تيسر لهم الوقوف عليه من معرفة بالفصائل اللغوية المختلفة"<sup>3</sup>.

ويرى عبد الهادي الفضلي أن آخر ما توصل إليه اللغويون المحدثون في مسألة أصل الاشتقاق هو أن أسماء الأعيان أو أسماء المعاني الحسية هي أصل الاشتقاق<sup>4</sup>.

والرأي الراجح أن الاشتقاق في العربية وفي غيرها من اللغات السامية يعتمد في الغالب على صوغ المفردات انطلاقا من جذور تتألف من ثلاثة صوامت (مثال: ض-ر-ب). وهذا الجذر أو الأصل الثلاثي يفيد معنى عاما مشتركا بين عدد المفردات التي تتفرع عنه. وتلحق بالأصل زوائد لتخصيص معناه العام ولتمييز الدلالات المتفرعة بعضها عن بعض، بإضافة الصوائت القصيرة (الحركات) أو الطويلة (حروف المد) (مثال: ض - ر - ب = ضرب = ضارب) أو بتضعيف أحد الصوامت الأصلية (كما في فعّل)

<sup>1</sup> الفضلي، عبد الهادي، دراسات في الفعل، ص36.

<sup>2</sup> جواد، مصطفى، المباحث اللغوية في العراق، ص15.

<sup>3</sup> المخزومي، مهدي، في النحو العربي، ص 104

<sup>4</sup> الفضلي، عبد الهادي، المرجع السابق، ص40.

أو بغير ذلك من التغييرات. وهكذا تتشكل مفردات اللغة العربية وتتنامى متفرعة من أصول ثلاثية الصوامت تصاغ وفق صيغ صرفية مطردة الدلالة في الغالب.

ويرى المستشرق الألماني بروكلمان :<sup>1</sup> "أن ما يميز فصيلة اللغات السامية هو ... رجحان الأصوات الصامتة فيها على الأصوات المتحركة. ويرتبط المعنى الرئيسي للكلمة في ذهن الساميين بالأصوات الصامتة، أما الأصوات المتحركة فهي لا تعبر في الكلمة إلا عن تحويل هذا المعنى وتعديله... ويتعلق معنى الكلمة بالأصوات الصامتة، وفي عدد كبير جداً من الكلمات، يحمل المعنى ثلاثة أصوات صامتة فيها..."<sup>1</sup>.

### نظرية الاشتقاق من الجوهر

ولبعض المُحدثين رأي مخالف في أصل الاشتقاق، ويقرر أن أصل المشتقات شيء آخر لا هو المصدر ولا هو الفعل، وأن الفعل مقدم على المصدر وعلى جميع المشتقات في النشأة، وأن هذه المشتقات جميعاً ومعها المصدر مشتقة من الفعل بعد اشتقاق الفعل من أصل المشتقات، وهي أسماء المعاني - من غير مصادر - وأسماء الأعيان والأصوات.<sup>2</sup>

والمقصود بأسماء المعاني : العدد وأسماء الزمان، أما أسماء الأعيان فتمثلها أسماء الأمكنة والأقارب والقبائل وأعضاء الجسم وقد سرد عبد الله أمين كثيراً من الأسماء الحسية التي تم اشتقاق الأفعال منها ثم أسماء الأصوات وحروف المعاني كـ " سوف ولولا ونعم " يليها حروف المباني وهي حروف الهجاء كاشتقاقهم من ( التاء التأتأة ومن الفاء الفأفة ومن النون التتوين ) وهذه الحروف هي حكاية للأصوات.<sup>3</sup>

ويعتبر علماء اللغة الاشتقاق من أسماء الأصوات موغلاً في القدم، إذ إن أول ما عبّر عنه الإنسان بلسانه كان محاكاة لما تلقىه الطبيعة على سمعه من أصوات ثم نمت اللغة بالتراكيب وتطوّرت على النحو الذي نعهده.

<sup>1</sup> بروكلمان، كارل، فقه اللغات السامية، ص 14-15.

<sup>2</sup> انظر: أمين، عبد الله، المصدر السابق، ص 14.

<sup>3</sup> انظر: أمين، عبد الله، المصدر السابق، ص 14.

ويذهب الأستاذ عبد الله أمين الى أن ثمة مرحلة وسطى بين المشتق ( الاسم ) والمشتقة منه ( الاسم ) تتمثل في الفعل، إذ يجد في أغلب ما سبق أفعالاً تم اشتقاق تلك الأسماء منها، يقول: "قَرَسَ فلان يفرس فروسه وفراصة إذا حذق أمر الخيل وهو يفتَرَس إذا كان يرى الناس أنه فارس على الخيل"<sup>1</sup>.

ويقول في موضع آخر " أَلَفَ العدد وآلفه جعله أَلَفًا وآلفوا صاروا أَلَفًا، وثنيته اثنيه ثنيا صرت معه ثانياً وثنيّت الشيء : جعلته اثنين وثَلَّثَ القوم أثَلَّثتهم إذا كنت ثالثهم"<sup>2</sup>. وفي الاشتقاق من أسماء الأزمنة: "أُلِيْلُوا : دخلوا في الليل ."

ويرى أن أسماء الأعيان ليست مأخوذة من غيرها كالمصدر والأفعال، فالفعل ( تَأَبَّلَ ) أي اتخذ إبلاً لا يمكن أن يكون وضع قبل لفظ (الإبل) نفسه، ويحتج لذلك بأن أسماء الأعيان ليس لها موازين معينة ولا طرق اشتقاق معبّدة يمكن أن توضع لها أقيسة مطردة كالأسماء التي تؤخذ من غيرها. وإنما الممكن أن يكون غيرها من المشتقات كالمصدر والأفعال قد أخذ منها، إذ لكل منها موازين معينة وطرق في الأخذ مطردة، ومن الأدلة كذلك أن العرب عربوا أسماء أعجمية ثم اشتقوا منها مصادر وأفعالاً ومشتقات، ولا يعقل أن يكون العرب قد اشتقوا كل ذلك من مواد الأسماء الأعجمية قبل أن يعربوها، ولما كان تعريب الاسم سابقاً بطبعه لاشتقاق الأفعال والمصادر والمشتقات منه دلّ ذلك دلالة قطعية على أن العرب اشتقوا من أسماء الأعيان .

### الأبنية والأوزان

ويذهب بعض الباحثين المحدثين إلى أن أصل المشتقات كلّها هو الجذر اللغوي، ومن أبرز من ذهب إلى هذا الرأي إبراهيم أنيس وتمام حسّان وطنطاوي دراز وجعفر عابنة، حيث إن الواقع اللغوي يؤيد أن القاسم المشترك بين تشكيلات المادة اللغوية الواحدة هي أصوات الجذر، وهذا يفضي إلى البحث في الصيغ والأوزان التي تصب في قوالب لغوية تُسمى الأبنية والأوزان التي تعطي الكلمة وظيفتها، ومن الجذر والبناء أو الصيغة معاً نصل إلى الغاية من الاشتقاق، وهو معنى الكلمة أو دلالتها المعجمية أو

<sup>1</sup> انظر: أمين، عبد الله ، المصدر السابق، ص100.

<sup>2</sup> انظر: أمين، عبد الله، المصدر السابق، ص13.



الاجتماعية، وهذه الأوزان تُعين المتعلم على معرفة جزء من معنى الكلمة، فيمكنه معرفة معنى الكلمة من خلال الصيغة وإن لم يعرف معنى الجذر .

وتصنيف الألفاظ ضمن مبان لها دلالة وظيفية ومعنوية له قيمة كبيرة في البناء اللغوي، ولا تخفى حاجة النحو إلى أشكال ومعاني الصيغ الصرفية المختلفة كاسم الفاعل والمفعول وغيرهما .

ومن ناحية أخرى، فإن هذه الصيغ وسيلة إثراء للغة، فعن طريقها يتأتى إضافة كلمة جديدة في اللغة. فإذا أردنا التعبير عن معنى من المعاني نظرنا في الصيغ الصرفية، وفي ما تدل عليه كل صيغة من المعاني، فإذا وجدنا المعنى الذي نريده صُغنا الكلمة الجديدة على مثال هذه الصيغة . ومن الواضح أن العناصر القابلة للتحويل والتطور اللغة هي الأسماء والأفعال، لأنها ذات صيغ أو ما يسمى بالقائمة المفتوحة. أما العناصر الأخرى كالضمائر والأدوات، وهي تمثل، القائمة المغلقة، فلا تخضع للصياغة الاشتقاقية ولا يأتي إثراء اللغة عن طريقها، بل هي مبان مغلقة ومعانيها وظيفية وصورها ثابتة. ومما يجدر ذكره أن لحركات الحروف منزلة كمنزلة الزوائد، وكثيرا ما يتغير معنى الكلمة وصيغتها بتغير الحركات من غير زيادة أو نقصان في الحروف ، ذلك أن الحركات ليست إلا حروف مد قصيرة .

## VII. آلية الاشتقاق

تتلخص آلية الاشتقاق، بأن الكلمة المشتقة تتحلل إلى عنصرين أساسيين هما : الجذر والصيغة . والجذر هو مجموعة من الصوامت أو شبه الصوامت تتكرر في العائلة الاشتقاقية الواحدة بترتيب واحد لا يتغير، ويحمل الجذر المعنى المعجمي العام الذي تشترك فيه كل أفراد العائلة الاشتقاقية الواحدة . أما الصيغة، فهي قالب أو بناء تتوزع فيه حروف الجذر وحروف الزيادة وتشكيلات الحركات والسكنات، وهي تدل على معنى معجمي خاص مستفاد من المعنى المعجمي العام الذي يفيد الجذر. وعلى هذا فالآلية الاشتقاق تعني الطريقة التي تتوزع فيها حروف الجذر وحروف الزيادة والحركات على الصيغة اللغوية الواحدة المناسبة للمعنى المراد التعبير عنه .

وقد لاحظ كثير من الدارسين أن العمليات الصرفية التي تتبعها اللغة في اشتقاقها العام ثلاث هي : الإلصاق والتحوّل الداخلي والتضعيف .

والإلصاق يكون بزيادة حرف أو أكثر على الجذر، وتكون هذه الزيادة بأول الكلمة أو وسطها أو آخرها. وجعلوا اللواصق على نوعين : لواصق دلالية ولواصق اشتقاقية. وأما اللواصق الدلالية، فيقصد بها ما يتصل بالكلمة من إضافات تفيد معنى زائدا عليها ولا تُعدّ جزءاً من بنيتها، كالسين الدالة على الاستقبال في الفعل المضارع، ولاصقة العدد مثنى أو جمعا. ويقصدون باللواصق الاشتقاقية تلك اللواصق التي تتصل بأشكال الاشتقاق الداخلية في صوغ الكلمات، بحيث تصبح اللاصقة جزءاً من بنية الكلمة مثل : لواصق المضارعة، ولاصقة الميم التي تؤدي دوراً مهماً في المشتقات كما في اسم المفعول واسم الفاعل وغيرهما.

وأما التحول الداخلي، فيُقصد به بناء الكلمات بوساطة الحركات، وتتشترك حروف الزيادة في هذا البناء كما في اشتقاق اسم الفاعل من الفعل الثلاثي، والتضعيف معناه أن يُضعف أحد حروف الجذر، وغالبا ما يكون الحرف الثاني لأداء معانٍ وأغراض إضافية للكلمة، ومن أمثله درّب ودرّس.

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## واقع تدريس مهارة المحادثة العربية للناطقين بغيرها على مستوى البكالوريوس من وجهة نظر الطلاب وطرق معالجتها في أقسام اللغة العربية

سهيلا محسني نجاد<sup>1</sup>

### الملخص

يتطلب تعليم اللغة العربية تمكين الطلاب من المهارات اللغوية التي تحقق لهم هدفهم من التعليم، ومن بين هذه المهارات مهارة المحادثة التي تمثل إحدى مهارات الانتاج اللغوي، ومهارة أساسية من المهارات اللغوية، حيث يصعب على متعلمي اللغة التقدم في المهارات الأخرى؛ الاستماع، والقراءة، والكتابة ما لم يتقنوا مهارة المحادثة، وهناك علاقة وثيقة تربط هذه المهارات بعضها ببعض، فالمرء في أثناء استماعه أو حديثه، أو قراءته أو كتابته يستهدف إما إلقاء فكرة أو استقبال فكرة، ولا بد أن يكتسب مهارة تجاه تسلسل الأفكار وترابطه. ونظراً للضعف اللغوي للمهارات الأربع ولا سيما مهارة المحادثة في المناهج الدراسية لتعليم اللغة العربية في أقسام اللغة العربية في الجامعات الإيرانية، تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى تحديد الضعف اللغوي في المحادثة، والأسباب المؤثرة في ضعف محادثة طلاب الجامعة وذلك بالإجابة على السؤالين التاليين: ما أهم التحديات التي تعيق تعليم وتعلم مهارة المحادثة؟ وما أهم الحلول المقترحة لمعالجة من هذه المشكلة؟ واعتمد البحث على المنهج الوصفي التحليلي لمناسبتة لموضوع البحث، وتم اجراء الدراسة الميدانية باستخدام برنامج الحزمة الإحصائية للعلوم الاجتماعية على عينة تشمل ٤٥٠ طالباً وطالبة في مرحلة البكالوريوس من عشر جامعات حكومية إيرانية. ومن أهم النتائج التي توصل إليها البحث، تحديد النقص اللغوي لمهارة المحادثة، وتقديم اقتراحات بضرورة تبني رؤية منسجمة لعناصر المنهج الدراسي وذلك من خلال تقوية دوافع الطلاب لتعليم العربية، وضرورة إعداد وتأهيل كوادر تدريسية مناسبة تواكب التطورات العلمية الحديثة، وتطوير المناهج والكتب الدراسية، وتوفير الإمكانيات وتجهيز الصفوف بالوسائل التعليمية اللازمة.

### الكلمات المفتاحية

تعليم العربية للناطقين بغيرها، المهارات اللغوية، مهارة المحادثة، أقسام اللغة العربية في الجامعات الإيرانية.

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## المقدمة

ازدادت أهمية تعليم اللغة العربية في العالم بعد التصديق على مرسوم الأمم المتحدة الصادر في ١٩٧٣ م ومفاده: " أن اللغة العربية من اللغات الرسمية جنباً إلى جنب مع اللغات الانجليزية، والفرنسية، والروسية، والاسبانية، والصينية وفق القرار المرقم بـ (د/٢٨/٣١٩٠) <sup>١</sup> الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة، وهي لغة رسمية في ٢٢ بلداً عربياً، وتنتشر في أكثر من ٣٠ بلد عربي وغير عربي كلغة ثانية، ويتحدث بها حوالي ٢٥٦ مليون فرد في العالم، إضافة إلى انتشارها في الدول الآسيوية والأوروبية والأمريكية، ويتحدث بها أكثر من نصف مليار في العالم كلغة أولى في طقوسهم الدينية اليومية <sup>٢</sup>. والهدف الرئيس لتعليم وتعلم أي لغة هو الاتصال بناطقي هذه اللغة بعد إجادتها، والمحادثة هي المهارة الأساسية في تعلم أي اللغة سواء أكانت لغة أولى أو ثانية أو أجنبية، حيث إنها هي المرآة التي تنعكس عليها مهارات اللغة كلها وعناصرها. وباعتبار أن اللغة العربية هي لغة الاسلام والمسلمين منذ بزوغ الاسلام وبها نزل القرآن الكريم، ونظراً لأنها أقدم لغة حية في العالم، وهي اللغة التي يمارسها مئات الملايين طقوسهم الدينية، نجد أن الاهتمام باللغة العربية تجاوز الدوافع الدينية إلى الدوافع الخاصة مثل الاتصالية والمهنية والاقتصادية والسياسية، ولا نستطيع تجاهل أهمية اللغة العربية بالنسبة للإيرانيين بسبب التعايش والتواصل مع العرب منذ مئات السنين، فقد أتقنوا هذه اللغة وكان لهم الدور العظيم في نشر علومها والتبحر فيها، حيث كان لهم دور متميز في تقدم الحضارة الاسلامية واتساعها شرقاً وغرباً، ولم تتوقف هذه الأهمية في تلك العصور، بل امتدت إلى عصرنا الحالي، فوجود العلاقات الاقتصادية والسياسية والاستراتيجية المتزايدة بين ايران والبلدان العربية أدى إلى زيادة أهميتها في البرامج التعليمية في ايران.

وقد بُذلت جهود كثيرة في ايران لتعليم اللغة العربية وآدابها فنجد تدريس التلاميذ اللغة العربية من بداية المرحلة الاعدادية إلى نهاية المرحلة الثانوية، وكذلك تأسيس الكثير من أقسام اللغة العربية وآدابها في الجامعات الأهلية والحكومية، وتخريج آلاف الطلاب من هذه الاقسام دون الحصول على عمل مناسب، ولكن مازال هناك قصوراً في هذا المجال، ولم يتحقق الهدف من تعليم اللغة العربية، حيث أدى ذلك إلى قلة الاقبال على تعلم هذه اللغة من ناحية وشكوى الطلاب من عدم جدوى وصعوبة هذا اللغة من ناحية أخرى.

ونظراً لأهمية تعليم اللغة العربية للناطقين بغيرها، وبصورة خاصة تعليم المحادثة العربية. فقد ظهرت في السنوات الأخيرة أي منذ ٢٠١٠م بوادر الاهتمام بالمهارات اللغوية في تعليم اللغة العربية للناطقين بغيرها، حيث خطت بعض الجامعات والمؤسسات التعليمية الأهلية خطوات ناجحة في سبيل تعليم اللغة العربية طبق المناهج الحديثة والمعاصرة كلغة ثانية، وحاول الباحثون والأساتذة الخوض في هذا المجال من خلال كتابة مقالات وعمل دراسات حديثة وتأليف الكتب التعليمية.

### ١. مشكلة البحث

طبق آخر الاحصائيات وصل عدد الجامعات المؤسسة لأقسام اللغة العربية في حدود ٥٢ جامعة، وبالتالي تخريج آلاف الطلاب في جميع المستويات من أقسام اللغة العربية وآدابها، (المشروع العلمي الجامع لإيران، ٢٨١). لذلك فإن أهم مشكلة تعاني منها أقسام اللغة العربية شكوى الأساتذة والطلاب من ضعف الأداء الوظيفي للمهارات الأربع وخاصة مهارة المحادثة، فالنقص اللغوي الذي يعاني منه الطلبة الإيرانيون الدارسون للغة العربية من جهة، وعدم اعتماد المناهج التعليمية للأساليب التدريسية الحديثة والمستجدة في

<sup>١</sup> <https://t.co/Ewc5mToTDJ>

<sup>٢</sup> [www.Lasportal.org](http://www.Lasportal.org)

<sup>٣</sup> المشروع العلمي الجامع لإيران وهو برنامج جامع خطط لرسم الخطة العلمية لعشرين سنة قادمة للبلد، ويتضمن المشروع آراء عدة من الأساتذة والمتخصصين في فرع اللغة العربية

مجال التعليم، نشأت الحاجة إلى إعادة النظر في الطرق المعتمدة للتدريس في المنهج الدراسي في قسم اللغة العربية على المستوى الجامعي في مرحلة البكالوريوس، ومن هذا المنطلق قامت الباحثة بالتطرق إلى واقع مهارة المحادثة العربية والنقص اللغوي الذي يعاني منه، وطرق التدريس المتبعة في تدريس هذه المهارة.

## ٢. هدف وأسئلة البحث

لما كانت دراستنا تختص بمهارة المحادثة في المناهج الدراسية لتعليم اللغة العربية في أقسام اللغة العربية في الجامعات الإيرانية، هدفت دراستنا إلى تحديد واقع تدريس مهارة المحادثة العربية للناطقين بغيرها على مستوى البكالوريوس، والأسباب المؤثرة في ضعف هذه المهارة من وجهة نظر الطلاب في قسم اللغة العربية في الجامعات الإيرانية، من خلال تطبيق الدراسة الميدانية.

لذلك تحاول هذه الدراسة الإجابة عن الأسئلة الآتية:

١. ما أهم التحديات المرتبطة بطرق تدريس الأساتذة التي تعيق تعليم وتعلم مهارة المحادثة من خلال وجهة نظر الطلاب؟ ويمكن الإجابة على هذا السؤال من خلال:  
ألف) ما هي نسبة النقص اللغوي الذي يعاني منه الطلبة الإيرانيون؟  
ب) ما هي طرق التدريس الشائعة وغير الشائعة التي يتبعها الأساتذة في التدريس؟  
٢. ما هي أهم الحلول المقترحة لمعالجة مهارة المحادثة؟

## ٣. منهج البحث

اعتمد البحث المنهج الوصفي التحليلي، وتم اجراء الدراسة الميدانية باستخدام برنامج الحزمة الإحصائية للعلوم الاجتماعية على عينة تشمل ٤٥٠ طالباً وطالبة من عشر جامعات حكومية إيرانية، ويتمثل مجتمع الدراسة الحالي في طلاب الجامعة فرع اللغة العربية وآدابها، فعدد الطلبة في مستوى البكالوريوس حوالي ٦٠٠٠ طالب وطالبة في ٥٢ جامعة حكومية وأهلية تقريباً (المشروع العلمي الجامع لإيران، ٢٠١٢م: ٢٧٩).

أما عينة الدارسة فتمثلت في عينة الطلاب: عينة عشوائية طبقية من طلاب اللغة العربية وآدابها في عشر جامعات إيرانية وعددهم ٤٥٠ طالب وطالبة.

وقد فضلت الباحثة اختيار عينتها بالطريقة العشوائية الطبقية، لأنها تلائم طبيعة البحث الحالي، حيث تم تطبيقها على كتل بشرية تنتمي لمناطق جغرافية مختلفة موزعة في أنحاء ايران من شمال وجنوب وشرق وغرب. لتحقيق أهداف الدراسة، واعتمدت الباحثة على الاستبانة، كأداة لها، لجمع بعض المعلومات من مجتمع الدارسة. وللتأكد من ثبات أداة الدراسة أشارت النتائج الى حصول محاور الاستبانة على درجة معامل كرونباخ<sup>١</sup> للطلاب ٨٩,٤ %.

وتم قياس المحاور من خلال استخدام معيار ليكارت المكون من ٤ درجات، وتم تحديد درجة المحاور قليل، قليل جداً، متوسط، كثير، كثير جداً. وكلما اقتربت الإجابة من الدرجة النهائية ٤ كان ذلك دليل على ارتفاع الدرجة أو المعدل، وكلما اقتربت الدرجة من ١ وصفر دل على انخفاض المعدل.

## حدود البحث:

الحدود الموضوعية:

<sup>1</sup> Cronbach,s alpha

- ✓ تقتصر هذه الدراسة على تبیین الوضع الحالي لمقدرة الطلاب في مهارة المحادثة.
- ✓ تقتصر هذه الدراسة على الأساليب الشائعة وغير الشائعة للمدرسين في صفوف مهارة المحادثة.
- ✓ تقتصر هذه الدراسة على طرح حلول عملية لحل مشكلة النقص اللغوي لمهارة المحادثة.
- ✓ تطبق هذه الدراسة على طالبات الفصل الثامن، حيث اجتاز الطلاب مقررات الصرف والنحو والمحادثة والاستماع في الجامعات الإيرانية الحدود المكانية:

- ✓ تم تطبيق الدراسة في العشر جامعات حكومية وأهلية بطهران والمدن الأخرى في ایران. الحدود الزمانية:

- ✓ استغرقت الدراسة العام الدراسي السنة الدراسية (٢٠١٧-٢٠١٨) الذي تم فيه بناء الإطار النظري وتصميم التجربة وتطبيقها واستخلاص النتائج.

### الدراسات السابقة:

تعد الدراسات والأبحاث منطلقاً للباحث للتعرف على اللبّات التي لم تكتمل بعد في مجال بحثه العلمي ليقوم باستكمال ما يستطيعه منها، ويمهد الطريق لمن بعده ليساهموا في ذلك البحث العلمي، وبناء على ذلك قام الباحث باستعراض بعض الأبحاث والدراسات ذات العلاقة بـ ١- تعليم مهارة المحادثة للناطقين بغيرها. ٢- المنهج التواصلي في تعليم المهارات اللغوية، وكانت على النحو التالي:

- **دراسة محسنی نجاد، سهیلا (٢٠١٨)** " دور استراتيجية "لعب الأدوار في رفع كفاءة مهارة المحادثة العربية لطلاب مرحلة اليسانس جامعة الامام الصادق(ع) باستخدام استراتيجية التعليم لدى المدرسين" وهدفت المقالة إلى دراسة أثر استراتيجية لعب الأدوار في رفع كفاءة المحادثة العربية لدى متعلمي العربية للناطقين بغيرها، على أساس الاتجاه التواصلي وباستخدام استراتيجيات تعليم المدرس، واستنتجت الدراسة ارتفاع مستوى كفاءة المحادثة للمجموعة التجريبية مقارنة بالمجموعة الضابطة. وكذلك اثر هذه الاستراتيجية في رفع مستوى القدرات الموقفية والعاطفية لدى الطلبة. تقدم الدراسة السابقة نموذج من نشاط خاص لرفع مستوى المحادثة، ولكن دراستنا توضح الوضع الموجود وتطرح طرق حل المشكلة.

- **دراسة جلانی، مریم (٢٠١٥)** "نحو تدريس اللغة العربية للناطقين بغيرها تواصلياً (دراسة تنظيرية)"، هدف الدراسة هو اقتراح المدخل التواصلي في تعليم اللغة الاجنبية باعتبار التواصل هو الوظيفة الأساسية للغة، والمدخل التواصلي يشجع المتعلمين على توليد عبارات صحيحة لغوية ومقبولة اجتماعياً. واستنتجت الدراسة أن يتسم المدخل التواصلي بالشمول في تدريس المهارات الاربع. و صلاحية المدخل التواصلي على جميع المستويات. والمدخل التواصلي مفضل و محبوب لدى المتعلمين لأنه يحقق رغباتهم. تفيدنا الدراسة السابقة في دراستنا النظرية في تعليم المهارات ضمن المدخل التواصلي.

- **دراسة عبد القادر ايليغا، داود وعلى البسومي، حسين (٢٠١٤)** "المحادثة في اللغة العربية، طرق تعليمها وأساليب معالجة مشكلاتها لدى الطلبة الأجانب" جاءت هذه الدراسة للوقوف على الطرق المناسبة لتدريس مهارة المحادثة العربية وتقديم الحلول المناسبة والعملية لمعالجة ضعف الطلبة. معظم الطرق مناسبة وذلك لما فيها من أساليب واجراءات وأنشطة متنوعة تكسب الطلبة مهارة



التعبير وتدريبهم على التواصل مع غيرهم. الدراسة السابقة دراسة نظرية ولكن دراستنا دراسة ميدانية.

- **دراسة طهماسبي وآخرين (٢٠١٤)** "تعليم الأهداف الجامعية العامة للمحادثة العربية على أساس المفهوم التطبيقي لمدخل محور- العمل" هدف الدراسة هو دراسة القدرات اللازمة لتعلم اللغة العربية في مجال الاستماع و المحادثة، واستخدام طريقه تركيبي في تعليم اللغة العربية، وكذلك تقويم الطرق في التدريس. ١- التعرف على الثقافة العربية كعامل مؤثر جداً في تعلم المحادثة العربية. ٢- استخدام الصور و الافلام لتقوية قدرة التعلم للطلاب. ٣- الاستخدام العملي للغة، يؤدي إلى تقوية الدافع في تعلم اللغة العربية. تعتمد هذه الدراسة على الدراسات النظرية و لم تتوصل إلى هذه النتيجة عن طريق الدراسات الميدانية، لذلك تحتاج إلى دراسات دقيقة أكثر لتحديد النتائج المستخلصة.
- **دراسة صينية تشوغ، هان (٢٠١١)** "منهج التعليم التواصلي و تطبيقه في أعمال تدريس اللغة العربية مؤتمر نثارابازگا پنگاجاران في اللغة العربية"، هدفت الدراسة إلى توضيح دور منهج التعليم التواصلي في عملية تدريس اللغة العربية، وكشف آفاق تطبيقه في أعمال التعليم لاختصاص اللغة العربية بالجامعات والمعاهد العليا الصينية. واستنتجت الدراسة بمعرفة نقائص المناهج التعليمية التقليدية، وتوصلت إلى خصائص منهج التعليم التواصلي. ومعرفة الآثار الايجابية لتطبيق منهج التعليم التواصلي في أعمال التدريس لتكوين كفاءة الطلاب التواصلية. الدراسة السابقة عرضتها نظرياً، ولكن دراستنا تحاول أن تتجاوز المواضيع النظرية وإجراء الدراسات الميدانية لإثبات أهمية المدخل التواصلي نظرياً و عملياً.

- **دراسة ماليزية كنتيا نيجروم، آري (٢٠١٠)** " تعليم مهارة الكلام لدى الاطفال بالمدخل الاتصالي عند ديل هيمس "Dell Hymes" هدفت الدراسة التعرف على المدخل الاتصالي عند "ديل هيمس". وكيفيه تعلم اللغة طبق المدخل التواصلي للأطفال. وتوصلت النتائج إلى تعليم الكلام في ضوء المدخل الاتصالي لأنه ينمي نطق الحروف عند الاطفال. ويعلم الكلام في ضوء المدخل الاتصالي ينمي عند التلاميذ القدرة على استخدام الوقفة المناسبة و الحركات الجسمية المعبرة و الوسائل المساعدة. و هذه الدراسة تشبه دراستنا الحالية من حيث تطبيق المدخل التواصلي في مهارة المحادثة إلا أن الدراسة السابقة تؤكد على الخصائص النظرية من حيث سمات المدخل، وأهدافه و أهم عناصره ووسائل التعليم المختصة به وهي خاصة بالأطفال، أما دراستنا الحالية فتتضمن تفاصيل أدق في النقص اللغوي وأساليب التدريس الشائعة الأساتذة ومختصة بطلاب الجامعة.
- **دراسة فقيه، خواجه بن عمر (٢٠٠٩)** "مستوى تطبيق إجراءات تدريس مهارة التحدث باللغة الانجليزية وفق المقاربة التواصلية" هدفت الدراسة إلى تطبيق مدرسة المرحلة المتوسطة لاجراءات تدريس مهارة التحدث باللغة الانجليزية وضرورة تعليم مهارة المحادثة طبق المقاربة التواصلية في المدرسة. وتوصلت النتائج إلى أن التحليلات الإحصائية تدل على انخفاض المستوى العام لعينة الدراسة في تدريس المحادثة. ومستوي تعلم التحدث باللغة الانجليزية لايزال منخفض على الرغم من الدورات التعليمية للمدرسين. تختلف هذه الدراسة عن دراستنا من حيث إنها في مجال اللغة الانجليزية وثانياً تركز على أداء المدرسين، ودارستنا في مجال اللغة العربية ، ومستوى الدارسين و على هذا يمكننا الاستفادة من نتائج هذه الدراسة و توصياتها في تحسين مستوى أداء الطلاب في المحادثة العربية.

تؤكد دراستنا على مهارة المحادثة بين الطلاب من أجل رفع كفاءات اللغة العربية لديهم. لأن الباحثين يعتقدون أن تطوير المهارات اللغوية يكون إثر تطور مهارة المحادثة باستخدام الاتجاه التواصلي. وما أضافته هذه الدراسة تتمثل في تبين المقدرة اللغوية للطلاب، وكشف أساليب التدريس المتبعة للأساتذة عن طريق الدراسة الميدانية، ومحاولة إيجاد الحلول لها.

#### ٤. الإطار النظري للبحث

٤-١ مستوى تعليم اللغة العربية على المستوى الجامعي  
بعد سن المادة ١٦ من القانون الأساسي نلاحظ تأسيس أقسام اللغة العربية وآدابها في الكثير من الجامعات الحكومية والأهلية سواء في طهران أو في أنحاء إيران، وذلك في المستويات المختلفة من البكالوريوس إلى الماجستير والدكتوراه حيث قامت أكثر من ٣٠ جامعة في أرجاء إيران بعد الثورة الإسلامية بتخريج آلاف الطلاب في جميع المستويات من أقسام اللغة العربية.

والواقع أن عدد الطلبة في مستوى البكالوريوس حوالي ٦٠٠٠ طالب وطالبة تقريباً في ٥٢ جامعة حكومية وأهلية، ومجموع الوحدات الدراسية لهذا القسم ١٣٦ وحدة، والتي تشمل ٢١ وحدة من الدروس العامة، و٣٤ وحدة من الدروس الاختصاصية، و٨١ وحدة تمثل متطلبات القسم حيث تم إعادة النظر والتصديق على الوحدات الدراسية في سنة ٢٠١٠م (المشروع العلمي الجامع لإيران، ٢٠١٢م: ٢٧٩). وعند ملاحظة الكتيب الخاص لمتطلبات الدروس على مستوى البكالوريوس من قبل المجلس الأعلى لتخطيط البرامج في وزارة العلوم والبحوث، يمكن تصنيف الوحدات، من حيث المهارات اللغوية الأربع على الصورة التالية في جدول (١) كما يلي :

جدول (١) تصنيف الدروس من حيث المهارات اللغوية الأربع			
مهارة المحادثة	مهارة الاستماع	مهارة القراءة	مهارة الكتابة
٦ وحدات	٦ وحدات	٦ وحدات	١٤ وحدات

وعند تبديل الوحدات الدراسية إلى نسب مئوية نلاحظ ما يلي في جدول (٢):

جدول (٢) النسب المئوية				
النسب المئوية من حيث متطلبات الجامعة	مهارة المحادثة	مهارة الاستماع	مهارة القراءة	مهارة الكتابة
٦ وحدات	٦ وحدات	٦ وحدات	٦ وحدات	١٤ وحدة
٤/٤٪	٤/٤٪	٤/٤٪	٤/٤٪	٣/١٠٪
من حيث متطلبات الوحدات العامة والكلية والقسم ١٣٦ وحدة دراسية				

تشغل دروس المحادثة والاستماع والقراءة العربية على التوالي نسبة ٤/٤٪، بينما تشغل دروس الكتابة ٣/١٠٪ من مجموع كل الوحدات الدراسية. وبناءً على ذلك، فهل يمكن لطلاب البكالوريوس ان يتحدثوا بطلاقة ويكتبوا ويترجموا بمهارة مع هذا الكم القليل من الوحدات الدراسية؟

وللإجابة على هذا السؤال إذا أخذنا الواقع بنظر الاعتبار، فإن ضعف الطلاب لا يقتصر على مرحلة البكالوريوس في التحدث والكتابة والترجمة فقط بل من المؤسف جداً أنه يمتد إلى خريجي مرحلتي الماجستير والدكتوراه فهم يعانون من هذا الضعف أيضاً هذا من ناحية، ومن ناحية أخرى هل تم تحقيق الهدف من تأسيس أقسام اللغة العربية في الجامعات؟ وقد أيد هذا الضعف الدكتور رسولي في مقالته «مصادر الخلل في تعليم اللغة العربية في الجامعات الإيرانية» «لقد فشلت أقسام اللغة العربية في الجامعات من تحقيق الأهداف المنشودة من تأسيس فروع اللغة العربية، حيث تم إعداد وتربية طلاب ذوي مستويات متدنية» (رسولي، ٢٠٠٥م: ٥٧).

وفي الحقيقة لا يمكن ارجاع تدني مستوى طلاب قسم اللغة العربية إلى عدد الوحدات الدراسية فقط، بل هناك عناصر المنهج الدراسي مثل دوافع الطلاب، ومستوى الأساتذة، وطرق التدريس المتبعة، والكتب المقررة، وعدد من العوامل التي سنتحدث عنها في المحاور القادمة من هذا البحث ان شاء الله.

#### ٤-٢ الأساليب والطرق التدريسية

شهد تاريخ التعلم اللغوي ظهور عدد من طرق تعليم اللغة، تمخض عنها ظهور طرائق وأساليب تدريسية تنسجم مع المنحى أوذلك، ولا يعني ذلك سيادة طريقة ما في حقبة معينة، فكثيرا ما كانت الحقبة الواحدة تشهد أكثر من منحى تعليمي لغوي، وبالتالي أكثر من طريقة من طرائق العلم اللغوي، كما لا يعني ذلك أن كل طريقة تتمتع بخصائص ومواصفات تتفرد بها دون غيرها، فكثيرا ما تشترك أكثر من طريقة في مواصفات بعينها، وتتميز بمواصفات خاصة بها. فمن أقدم الطرائق التي استخدمت في تعليم اللغات الأجنبية طريقة النحو والترجمة<sup>١</sup>، وتعرف بالطريقة الكلاسيكية<sup>٢</sup>، شاعت في الثمانينيات والتسعينيات من القرن التاسع عشر، واستخدمت في تعليم اللغات القديمة كالإغريقية واللاتينية، وما تزال أشكالها المعدلة تُستخدم في عدد من بلاد العالم. ويتحدد هدف هذه الطريقة في تدريس قواعد اللغة الأجنبية، ودفع الطلبة إلى حفظها واستظهارها من خلال الترجمة بين اللغتين: الأم والأجنبية، إذ تولي اهتمامها بتنمية مهارتي القراءة والكتابة في اللغة الأجنبية دون المهارات الأخرى (Richards , 2006).

وعلى الرغم من شيوع طريقة النحو والترجمة لعدد من السنين في ميدان تعليم اللغة الأجنبية، إلا أنها تعرضت لعدد من الانتقادات، حيث يشير ريتشارد وروجرز (م.ن)، أن لا أساس نظريا لهذه الطريقة، فما هي سوى ممارسات تستخدم في السياقات التي لا يكون التحدث باللغة الأم هدفاً للمتعلمين، وإنما يتحدد في فهم النصوص الأدبية وتذوقها، تلك النصوص التي تكون غالبا من نتاج أفراد انصرف اهتمامهم إلى الأدب، وليست من نتاج علماء من مجال تعليم اللغات، أو من نتاج علماء علم اللغة التطبيقي، ومن الانتقادات التي وجهت لهذه الطريقة الاهتمام بمهارتي القراءة والكتابة. بينما تعطي أهمية محدودة لمهارتي الاستماع والمحادثة. كما فشلت هذه الطريقة في إثراء القدرات اللغوية الاتصالية لدى المتعلمين، وخلقت نوعا من الإحباط لديهم؛ مما جعلهم يحفظون أشياء لا حد لها من القواعد اللغوية والمفردات، إضافة إلى أنها قللت من دافعتهم نحو تعلم اللغة الأجنبية.

وفي الخمسينيات من القرن العشرين ظهرت الطريقة الصوتية اللغوية<sup>٣</sup> التي تعرف بطريقة مينشيان<sup>٤</sup> بهدف تنمية الكفايات الاتصالية الشفوية للمتعلمين، وحلت هذه الطريقة محل طريقة النحو والترجمة سالفة الذكر التي ركزت على تنمية الملكات العقلية والأدبية. وبخلاف طريقة النحو والترجمة، فإن لهذه الطريقة أساساً نظريا متينا في علم اللغة وعلم النفس، فقد تجذرت في نظرية التعلم القائمة على التوليف بين علماء اللغة، وعلماء النفس السلوكيين، وانتقلت من التركيز على مهارتي القراءة والكتابة إلى مهارتي الاستماع والمحادثة وتستند هذه الطريقة إلى النظرية السلوكية التي ترى أن تعلم اللغة يكون من خلال تكوين العادة بالإعادة والتكرار والتعزيز، إذ يُحدث المثير الخارجي استجابة داخلية لدى المتعلم، وأن تكرار التعزيز لهذا المثير من شأنه إيجاد استجابة محددة تصبح عادة فيما بعد (ريتشاردز وروجرز، ١٩٩٠: ٨٨، وينظر أيضا دايان لارسن، ٢٠٠٦: ٣٤).

وقد تعرضت الأصول النظرية للطريقة الصوتية اللغوية لانتقادات عدة بعد ظهور علماء اللغة في التسعينيات من القرن الماضي، إذ أبدى العالم الأمريكي تشومسكي Chomsky معارضة لمبادئ النظرية السلوكية،

<sup>1</sup> (GTM) Grammar Translation Method

<sup>2</sup> Method Classical

<sup>3</sup> Audio Lingual Method (ALM)

<sup>4</sup> Michigan Method

المتتمثلة في أن تعليم اللغة الإنسانية يتم من خلال التقليد والمحاكاة والتعزيز؛ لأن بإمكان الأطفال إنتاج عدد كبير من الكلمات والجمل والعبارات التي لم يسبق لهم أن سمعوها من قبل. وإضافة لذلك، يرى تشومسكي أن الإنسان لديه قدرة لغوية داخلية تؤهله لاكتساب اللغة، بحيث يكون قادراً على إتقان القواعد اللغوية والمجردة في سن مبكرة. ومن الانتقادات التي تعرضت إليها هذه الطريقة أيضاً أن المتعلمين في ظل هذه الطريقة غير قادرين على استخدام اللغة في المواقف الاتصالية الحقيقية خارج حدود الغرفة الصفية، كما أنهم يرون تعلم اللغة الأجنبية بهذه الطريقة مملاً، إضافة إلى إخفاقها في تنمية الكفاءة الاتصالية لزمن طويل المدى لدى المتعلمين (Brown, 2007).

#### ٤-٣ المدخل التواصلي

يركز المدخل التواصلي على أن اللغة أداة للتواصل، تظهر قيمتها ودلالاتها في تعبير الأفراد عن حاجاتهم وأغراضهم ضمن سياقات الحياة اليومية.

والهدف النهائي لمناهج تدريس اللغات الأجنبية هو الوصول الى الكفاءة التواصلية، والمهمة التواصلية وأغراضها هي الوحدة الأساسية لبناء الأنشطة والدروس، وتؤكد على ضرورة استعمال كل متعلم اللغة لغرض التواصل، والطلاقة مقدمة على الصحة اللغوية من حيث الاهمية كإستراتيجية تعليمية لتنمية الكفاءة التواصلية (الغالبى، ٢٠١٢م: ٢٤). إن معرفة النظام اللغوي من قواعد نحوية وصوتية وإملائية ومفردات لا تجعل بالضرورة الطالب قادراً على استعمال اللغة بفعالية (طعيمة وآخرون، ٢٠١٠م: ٤٢٧).

وتستطيع الباحثة دعم هذا الرأي بشكوى الأساتذة والطلاب من عدم قدرة المتعلمين على استخدام اللغة العربية للتواصل، رغم اتقانهم الممتاز للقواعد اللغوية، فالدارس الإيراني في قسم اللغة العربية يدرس قرابة ٨١ وحدة دراسية (متطلبات القسم) من النحو والصرف وتاريخ الأدب العربي القديم والحديث والشعر القديم والحديث والنثر الحديث والبلاغة والعروض والأدب المقارن والمدارس الأدبية وغيرها من الدروس، حيث تشكل نسبة ٦٠% من متطلبات الوحدات العامة والكلية والقسم، إلا أننا نلاحظ نقصاً لغوياً ملموساً عندهم في المهارات اللغوية الأربع.

فمفهوم المدخل التواصلي هو: «تعليم اللغة على الأسلوب التواصلي، و المقصود هو التعليم للغة العربية مؤسساً على المدخل التواصلي أو وظيفة اللغة، و يهدف هذا المدخل إلى تدريب الطالب على الاستخدام التلقائي والمبدع للغة وليس مجرد اجادة قواعدها» (طعيمة، ٢٠٠٦م: ٤٦).

#### ومن أهم مميزات الطريقة التواصلية:

- (١) التركيز على المعنى.
  - (٢) الكفاءة التواصلية هي الهدف المنشود.
  - (٣) مركزية المتعلم.
  - (٤) الطلاقة في التحدث.
  - (٥) إعطاء المتعلم الفرصة الكافية للتفاعل مع الآخرين.
  - (٦) تتمحور الحوارات حول الوظائف التواصلية في اللغة والدوافع الذاتية.
- ويركز المدخل التواصلي على العناصر التالية :

١- التطور الوظيفي و ليس التطور التركيبي و ذلك من خلال استخدام اللغة وليس دراستها أو التحدث عن مكوناتها.

٢- التسامح وقلة المحاسبات على الأخطاء اللغوية والتركيز على الطلاقة أكثر من الدقة في استخدام التراكيب النحوية.

٣- مركزية الطالب والمتعلم لأنه يقوم بانجاز جميع المهام اللغوية مع زملائه.

٤- يلعب الاستاذ أو المعلم دور الشاهد أو المساعد أو المسهل و المبسط للأمور.

**وأهم محاور أساليب التدريس التواصلية هي عبارة عن:**

١- استخدام أسلوب الحوار بدلاً من إلقاء المحاضرة.

٢- قيام الاستاذ باستخدام حركات الاشارات و الإيماءات لنقل المعاني .

٣- إيجاد الحركة و النشاط و الحيوية في الصف (قاعة الدرس).

٤- فهم واستيعاب المحتوى بدلاً من حفظه.

٥- ضرورة استخدام اللغة الثانية (العربية).

٦- التحدث بصورة جماعية ومناقشة الآراء في المواضيع العامة.

٧- أسلوب التقويم يقوم على تقويم المهارات الأربع.

٨- إجراء الحوار عن طريق تمثيل الأدوار المختلفة.

٩- عدم ذكر الأخطاء مباشرة، بل تسجيلها كملاحظات ويترك تصحيحها لما بعد نشاط الطالب .

١٠- ممارسة نشاطات جماعية مثل الألعاب والأغاني، والمحاكاة والتشبيه والمسرحية والمقابلة وغيرها من النشاطات.

١١- استخدام الوسائل التعليمية لتحسين عملية التعليم والتعلم مثل المختبر اللغوي، الأقراص المرنة واللوحات الايضاحية والصور والبطاقات الملونة والأفلام التعليمية.

١٢- التدريب على التراكيب بصورة وظيفية (م.ن، ٥٠٦).

**٤-٤ أهداف تدريس المدخل التواصلية في تعليم اللغة للناطقين بغيرها:**

١- التركيز على المعنى:

إن نجاح نشاط المهارة يتوقف على الاستاذ أن يجعل عملية التعلّم أكثر فاعلية في جعل المتعلّم يتفاعل من خلال تبادل المعاني، لأنها ذات دور فاعل في جعل المتعلّم يركز على المعنى لا على الصيغ والعبارات، وهذا سيمنح المتعلّم حرية اختيار المعاني والصيغ التي يختارها بنفسه، بحسب مقتضى الوضعية التعليمية وما يطرأ عليها.

## ٢- الكفاءة التواصلية :

الكفاءة التواصلية تتضمن المعرفة اللغوية والقدرة على توظيفها وتتعلق بعوامل مثل الكفاءة الاستراتيجية والتداولية والكفاءة اللغوية الاجتماعية والكفاءة النحوية.

## ٣- مركزية المتعلّم :

يحتاج المتعلّم أو الطالب إلى قدر كبير من التدريب لكون الأداء في المنهج التواصلية هو الهدف وهنا يقوم المعلم بدور المشاهد والملاحظ حول تطور المستوى المعرفي للمتعلّم وتقويمه، ويجب أن يتصف الصف بالنشاط والفاعلية وفي بعض الأوقات عليهم ترك مقاعدهم والتنقل داخل الصف الدراسي لإكمال مهامهم مع زملاءهم، وهذا يزيد من ثقة المتعلّمين بأنفسهم لأنهم يديرون عملية تعلّمهم بأنفسهم وليس المعلم.

## ٤- طلاقة المتعلّم:

إن الدقة والطلاقة تكون ضرورة في التعلّم والتحدث في أي لغة، ولكننا نجد الأسلوب النحوي الدقيق هو أكثر انتشاراً وأهمية من الطلاقة في عملية تعلّم اللغة العربية، في مرحلة تعلّم الطلاب يجب التسامح مع الأخطاء، وعلى المعلم التأكيد على أن الخطأ ليس ذنباً عظيماً ارتكبه الطالب، فالتأكيد إذن على الطلاقة وتصحيح الخطأ بعد ممارسة النشاط.

## ٥- تفاعل المتعلّم مع الآخرين:

العمل بطريقة المجموعات الصفية لها فوائد كثيرة:

١. المجموعة تقوي العمل التفاعلي في استخدام اللغة، فالعمل في إطار مجموعات تزيد من ثقة الطلاب بأنفسهم.

٢. العمل من خلال المجموعة يساعد على التفاعل اللغوي، فوجود الطلاب الأقوياء مع الضعفاء في مجموعات صغيرة يتحول الضعيف إلى طالب نشيط مع المجموعة وتتقدم المجموعة من حيث النشاط اللغوي.

٣. العمل في المجموعة يقوى الاستقلالية والانفرادية بالنشاط، ويستطيع المعلم عن طريق المجموعات الصغيرة انجاز الأهداف المنفصلة للطلاب.

## ٦- طريقة التدريس على أساس المدخل التواصلية:

١. تحديد أهداف وأسلوب التدريس في بداية الفصل الدراسي.

٢. تحديد معيار الدرجات والأنشطة في بداية الفصل الدراسي.

٣. تجنب التحدث باللغة الأم.

٤. إلزام التحدث باللغة العربية الفصحى.

٥. استخدام أسلوب الحوار بدلاً من المحاضرة.

٦. استخدام أسلوب السؤال والجواب في قاعة الدرس.

٧. استخدام الأمثلة الواقعية والعملية في قاعة الدرس.

٨. تدريس القواعد بصورتها العملية والوظيفية.

٩. التعليم عن طريق لعب الأدوار والتمثيل.

١٠. استخدام أسلوب المجموعات الطلابية.

١١. تقويم الطلاب بصورة دورية ومستمرة.

١٢. التركيز على التدريبات التواصلية.

١٣. التأكيد على ممارسة التدريبات بصورة وظيفية.
١٤. تدريس المهارات الأربع بشكل متكامل والتركيز على مهارة أو مهارتين في كل مستوى.
١٥. تجنب تصحيح الأخطاء في وقت النشاط نفسه.
- وقد تم جمع أساليب التدريس التواصلية من المصادر التالية: (بروان، ١٩٩٤م: ٢٦٠ وينظر طعيمة وآخرون، ٢٠١٠م: ٤٢ وينظر أيضا طعيمة والناقة، ٢٠٠٦م: ٢٥ وينظر طاهر حسين، ٢٠٠٢م: ٣٣٧ وكذلك ينظر الفوزان، ٢٠٠٩م: ١٩).

## ٥. نتائج البحث وتحليلها

### جواب السؤال الأول - ألف:

١. ما أهم التحديات المرتبطة بطرق تدريس الأساتذة التي تعيق تعليم وتعلم مهارة المحادثة من خلال وجهة نظر الطلاب؟ ويمكن الإجابة على هذا السؤال من خلال:
- ألف) ما هي نسبة النقص اللغوي الذي يعاني منه الطلبة الإيرانيون؟**
- نلاحظ النقص اللغوي للطلاب في مهارة المحادثة من حيث المحاور المرتبطة بالكفايات اللغوية والمهارات الفرعية حيث تم تقسيمها طبق محاورها المرقمة الخاصة وهذا ما يبينه لنا جدول (٣) كما يلي:

جدول (٣) النقص اللغوي في الكفايات اللغوية والمهارات الفرعية لمهارة المحادثة

المعدل	المحاور المرتبطة بالمهارات الفرعية	المحاور المرقمة	المعدل	المحاور المرتبطة بالكفايات اللغوية	المحاور المرقمة
١/٤٤	من الصعوبة حفظ المحادثة	١	٢/٣٨	من الصعوبة ايجاد المفردات للتحدث بالسرعة الكافية	٤
١/٢١	من الصعوبة ذكر البيانات الشخصية	٢	١/٩٢	من الصعوبة توصيل مفهوم الحديث إلى المخاطب	٥
١/٦٧	من الصعوبة السؤال من الدرس	٣	٢/٢٣	من الصعوبة توظيف القواعد في الجمل العملية	٦
١/٧٥	من الصعوبة الاجابة على الاسئلة الشفوية	١٠	٢/٤٥	من الصعوبة بيان وجهة النظر باللغة العربية	٧
٢/٢٠	من الصعوبة المشاركة في المناقشات الصفية	١١	١/٩٥	من الصعوبة الارتباط مع الاستاذ و الزملاء على الرغم من تعلم المفردات و الاساليب	٨
١/٨٧	من الصعوبة تمييز الافكار و الرؤى في المحاضرات	١٢	١/٦٠	من الصعوبة تلفظ و نطق الكلمات العربية	٩
٢/٤٤	من الصعوبة تبادل الآراء في الموضوعات الخاصة	١٣	-	-	-



متوسط المعدل	٢/٠٨	متوسط المعدل	١/٧٩
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من خلال وجهة نظر الطلاب في جدول (٣) فإنهم يعتقدون أنهم يعانون من النقص اللغوي في الكفايات اللغوية ٢/٠٨ بنسبة أعلى من المهارات الفرعية ١/٧٩، وقد حقق محور الصعوبة في بيان وجهة النظر باللغة العربية و الصعوبة في ايجاد المفردات المناسبة للتحدث بالسرعة الكافية أعلى نسبة في الكفايات اللغوية، وفي المقابل نجد أن محور الصعوبة في تبادل الآراء في الموضوعات الخاصة والمشاركة في المناقشات الصفية حقق أعلى معدل في الصعوبة.

١. تم قياس معدل تكرار المحاور الأكثر صعوبة لطلاب قسم اللغة العربية لمتغير اجتياز الوحدات الدراسية للمحادثة العربية في جدول (٤) حيث تم اختيار الخمس المحاور الأكثر صعوبة في هذه المهارة.

**جدول (٤) اختيار الخمس المحاور الأكثر صعوبة في مهارة المحادثة**

المحاور	محاور مهارة المحادثة	التكرار
٧	من الصعوبة التعبير عن الآراء باللغة العربية.	٢/٣٩
٤	من الصعوبة ايجاد المفردات المناسبة للتحدث.	٢/٢٩
٦	من الصعوبة استخدام القواعد العملية في الجملة.	٢/٣٥
١٢	من الصعوبة المحاضرة الشفوية.	٢/٢١
١٣	من الصعوبة تبادل الآراء في الموضوعات الخاصة.	٢/٠٠

يلاحظ في جدول (٤) صعوبة المحاور في مهارة المحادثة لطلاب اللغة العربية طبق أولويتها في المحور لطلاب اجتياز ٨ وحدات في المحاور ٧ و ٤ و ٦ و ١٢ و ١٣ على التوالي .

٢. تم قياس معدل تكرار المحاور الأكثر صعوبة لطلاب قسم اللغة العربية لمتغير اختيار القسم طبق الأولوية في جدول (٥) كما يلي :

**جدول (٥) المحاور الأكثر صعوبة لطلاب فرع اللغة العربية لمتغير اختيار فرع اللغة طبق الأولوية**

المحاور	محاور مهارة المحادثة	طبق الأولوية	عدم اختيار طبق الأولوية
٤	من الصعوبة ايجاد المفردات المناسبة للتحدث.	٢/٣٨	٢/٦٨
٦	من الصعوبة استخدام القواعد العملية في الجملة.	٢/٠١	٢/٦٩
٧	من الصعوبة التعبير عن الآراء باللغة العربية.	٢/٢٦	٢/٨٣
١٢	من الصعوبة المحاضرة الشفوية.	٢/٣٤	٢/٦٦
١٣	من الصعوبة تبادل الآراء في الموضوعات الخاصة.	٢/٠٩	٢/٣٩

يلاحظ في جدول (٥) صعوبة المحاور في مهارة المحادثة لطلاب الذين اختاروا اللغة العربية طبق أولويتهم في المحاور ١٢ و ٧ و ٤ و ١٣ و ٦ على التوالي، ولطلاب الذين لم يختاروا اللغة العربية طبق الأولوية في المحاور ٧ و ٦ و ٤ و ١٢ و ١٣ على التوالي.



٣. تم قياس معدل تكرار المحاور الأكثر صعوبة لطلاب قسم اللغة العربية لمتغير الجنس من حيث الذكور و الإناث فنلاحظ جدول (٦) كما يلي:

جدول (٦) معدل مهارة المحادثة مع الجنس

المحاور	محاو مهارة المحادثة	الإناث	الذكور
٤	من الصعوبة في ايجاد المفردات المناسبة للتحدث	٢/٤٦	٢/١٩
٦	من الصعوبة في استخدام القواعد العملية في الجملة	٢/٣٢	٢/٠٣
٧	من الصعوبة في التعبير عن الآراء باللغة العربية	٢/٥٤	٢/٢٦
١٢	من الصعوبة المحاضرة الشفوية	٢/٤٩	٢/٣١
١٣	من الصعوبة تبادل الآراء الموضوعات الخاصة	٢/٢٢	٢/١٧

يُلاحظ صعوبة المحاور في جدول (٦) لمهارة المحادثة لطلاب للذكور والإناث حيث نجد أن الإناث لديهم صعوبة في المحاور ٧ و ١٢ و ٤ و ٦ و ١٣ على التوالي، والذكور في المحاور ١٢ و ٧ و ٤ و ٣ و ٦ إلى التوالي. حيث حازت معظم المحاور على معدل أعلى من النصف في التقويم.

#### جواب السؤال الأول - ب:

(ب) ما هي طرق التدريس الشائعة وغير الشائعة للأساتذة؟

جواب السؤال الأول النشاطات التعليمية التي يتبعها مدرسي اللغة العربية للناطقين بغيرها في تدريس اللغة العربية للناطقين بغيرها من خلال وجهة نظر الطلاب في جدول (٧):

جدول (٧) أساليب تدريس الأساتذة في الفصل بشكل عام

الترتيب	البنود	المتوسط
١	تبيين أهداف وأسلوب التدريس في بداية الفصل الدراسي.	3.2290
٢	تقويم مراحل التعليم في اطار الواجبات والامتحانات الصفية المستمرة.	3.1222
٣	لهجة الاستاذ العربية الفصحى في التدريس.	3.3169
٤	عدم استخدام اللغة الفارسية في الفصل.	2.8322
٥	ضرورة استخدام اللغة الثانية (العربية) في الصف.	2.9268
٦	استخدام أسلوب المحادثة بدلا من المحاضرة.	3.1497
٧	اسلوب التدريس يقوم على أساس المناقشة والسؤال والجواب.	2.9263
٨	الاستفادة من الحركات والاشارات في نقل المفاهيم.	3.0413
٩	استخدام الأمثلة الواقعية والتطبيقية لإفهام الطلاب .	3.1689
١٠	التأكيد على تلفظ المفردات باللغة العربية الصحيحة.	3.2677
١١	تدريس القواعد بالشكل التقليدي.	2.8545
١٢	يؤكد الاستاذ على الفهم الكلي للنص المسموع بدلا من فهم كلمة كلمة.	3.0117
١٣	التعلم بواسطة الألعاب وتمثيل الادوار في تعليم المحادثة.	2.4518
١٤	التحدث بصورة جماعية ومناقشة الآراء في المواضيع العامة.	2.6667
١٥	تقويم مراحل التعليم في اطار الواجبات والامتحانات الصفية المستمرة.	2.9157
١٦	تساعد الواجبات والامتحانات على الفهم والتوسع في المهارات اللغوية الأربع.	3.0487
١٧	يقيس التقويم فهم الطالب أكثر من محفوظاته.	2.9557
١٨	يلزم التقويم استخدام المهارات الاربع.	2.9468

الترتيب	البند	المتوسط
١٩	يصحح الأستاذ الأخطاء في نفس الوقت.	3.3219
٢٠	يلزم أسلوب التدريس تقوية المهارات اللغوية الأربع.	3.0093
٢١	تقويم الواجبات بدقة متناهية.	2.9560
٢٢	يطلع الأستاذ الطلاب على نتائج تقويم الواجبات والامتحانات.	2.9404

● الأساليب الأكثر شيوعاً في جدول (٨) كمايلي:

جدول (٨) أكثر الأساليب شيوعاً في تدريس الأساتذة لدرس المحادثة العربية

رقم المحاور	المحاور	المعدل
٣	لهجة الأستاذ العربية الفصحى في التدريس	٣/٣١
١٩	يصحح الأستاذ الأخطاء في نفس الوقت	٣/٣٠
١٠	التأكيد على تلفظ المفردات باللغة العربية الصحيحة	٣/٢٦
١	تبيين أهداف وأسلوب التدريس في بداية الفصل الدراسي	٣/٢٢
٩	استخدام الأمثلة الواقعية والمفهومة	٣/١٦

أشار غالبية الطلاب إلى أن الأساتذة استخدموا هذه الأساليب بمستوى فوق المتوسط، فإذا كان مجموع المعدل ٤ نقاط، فإن معظم المحاور حققت معدل فوق المتوسط ، فقد حاز محور التحدث باللهجة العربية الفصحى من أولويات الأساليب المستخدمة، وحاز محور تصحيح الأخطاء على المرتبة الثانية، ويليه محور التأكيد على تلفظ المفردات باللغة العربية، ورابعاً التأكيد على تبيين أهداف وأسلوب التدريس في بداية الفصل الدراسي، وأخيراً استخدام الأمثلة الواقعية والمفهومة.

● الأساليب غير الشائعة في تدريس الأساتذة من وجهة نظر الطلاب في جدول (٩):

جدول (٩) الأساليب غير الشائعة في تدريس الأساتذة

رقم المحاور	المحاور	المعدل
١٣	التعلم بواسطة الألعاب والادوار في تعليم المحادثة.	٢/٤٥
١٤	التحدث بصورة جماعية ومناقشة الآراء في المواضيع العامة.	٢/٦٦
٤	عدم استخدام اللغة الفارسية في الفصل.	٢/٨٣
١١	تدريس القواعد بالشكل التقليدي.	٢/٨٥
١٥	تقويم مراحل التعليم في اطار الواجبات والامتحانات الصفية المستمرة.	٢/٩١

أشار أغلبية الطلاب إلى الأساليب غير الشائعة في تدريس العربية فقد حازت المحاور التالية على أقل المعدلات في جدول أساليب التدريس، فالمحور رقم ١٣ من أهم المحاور ما يستخدم نادراً في الصف، وهو التعلم بواسطة الألعاب والأدوار، وحاز محور ١٤ على المرتبة الثانية وهو عدم شيوع التحدث بصورة المحادثات الجماعية ومناقشة الآراء في المواضيع العامة، وبعدها عدم استخدام اللغة الفارسية في الفصل، وكذلك تدريس القواعد بصورة تقليدية والنسبة القليلة كانت تقويم مراحل التعليم في اطار الواجبات والامتحانات الصفية المستمرة.

### تحليل النتائج

يرى غالبية الطلاب أن مهارة المحادثة من أصعب المهارات، ونلاحظ أيضاً النقص اللغوي في مهارة المحادثة في محاور الكفايات اللغوية أعلى من محاور المهارات الفرعية فصعوبة الطلاب تتمثل في عدم

ايجاد المفردات المناسبة للتحدث بالسرعة الكافية وكذلك عدم القدرة في توصيل مفهوم الحديث إلى المخاطب وصعوبة الطالب في توظيف القواعد في الجمل العملية واليومية.

أولاً : عند قياس المقدرة اللغوية للطلاب تم تحديد النسبة المئوية للنقص اللغوي في مهارة المحادثة بنسبة ٧٥,٣٩%، وهي نسبة عالية جداً، ويرجع ذلك إلى الأسباب التالية:

١- قلة وحدات المحادثة فهي ٦ وحدات من مجموع ١٣٦ وحدة أي بنسبة ٤,٤% بالمئة لقسم اللغة العربية و أدابها .

٢- قلة الساعات المخصصة لتلك المادة المحادثة.

٣- ما أشار الطلاب في هذا المجال هو تحدث الأساتذة باللغة(الأم) الفارسية، وعدم إلزام الطلاب التحدث بالعربية.

٤- عدم تميز الصفوف الدراسية للمحادثة بالجاذبية والنشاط لأن الاستاذ يقوم باستخدام الأساليب التقليدية في التدريس ويتجنب التطرق للأساليب الحديثة مثل إجراء المناقشات الحرة والتمثيلات في الصف، و عدم وجود الابتكار في هذه الصفوف.

٥- ومن أهم الأسباب التي تطرق إليها الطلاب هو ضعف الثقة بالنفس و سوء معاملة الأساتذة و استهزائهم بالطلاب مما سبب ضعفهم اللغوي في التواصل والتحدث خوفاً من الخطأ لذلك يُفضل معظم الطلاب السكوت عن التحدث المصاحب للأخطاء الكثيرة .

و نلاحظ بشكل عام ضعف الطلاب في مهارة المحادثة وذلك بسبب عدم توفر بعض أساليب تدريس المدخل التواصلية كما ذكرناها سابقاً مثل :

١. عدم إلزام الأساتذة باستخدام اللغة العربية بالصف .
٢. كذلك تصحيح الأخطاء في نفس الوقت لأداء نشاط الطالب ، فيكون تدخل المدرس للتصحيح إحباطاً لجهود المتعلم ويسبب له القلق والتوتر مما يعيقه عن إكمال المشاركة في الفصل.
٣. الأهم من ذلك عدم توفر قاعات مناسبة وواسعة للصف مما يحد حركة ونشاط المدرس وبالتالي يؤدي إلى شعور الطلاب بالكسل والخمول.
٤. عدم وجود الوسائل التعليمية المساعدة ، فلا تحوى على مختبرات لغوية، ولا توجد في هذه المختبرات الأجهزة المناسبة والحديثة لاستخدامها في المحادثة.
٥. عدم تخصيص الأساتذة من ذوى اللهجة العربية في هذه الدروس.
٦. العوامل المهمة أيضاً المتسببة في تدني مستوى الطلاب في مهارة المحادثة هي ضعف الطلاب في مهارة الاستماع وذلك بسبب ارتباط المهارتين مع بعض.

٧. كذلك افتقار المحتوى الأكاديمي المناسب للمناهج الدراسية التالية :

- الف) عدم اختصاص المناهج الدراسية بأقسام خاصة للأصوات ، و بالتالي تجاهل الأساتذة لتدريس الأصوات و تلفظ الحروف في هذه المناهج .
- ب) عدم توفر الوسائل التعليمية مثل الأفلام و الأقراص المرنة .
- ج) عدم توفر الأجهزة الفنية المتطورة في المختبر اللغوي .

من الملاحظ أن أكثر المحاور صعوبة للطلاب في المحادثة كانت كما يلي:

- ١- إيجاد المفردات المناسبة للتحدث.
  - ٢- صعوبة استخدام القواعد العملية في الجملة.
  - ٣- كذلك صعوبة التعبير عن الآراء .
  - ٤- الصعوبة أيضا في المحاضرة الشفوية و تبادل الآراء .
- وأهم الملاحظات في هذا المجال هي :
- (الف) من الملاحظ أنه تقل صعوبة هذه المحاور، للطلاب كلما اجتازوا وحدات دراسية أكثر، و هذا أمر طبيعي فكلما كثر عدد الدروس في مجال المحادثة والمختبر والانشاء ارتفعت قدرة الطلبة في التمكن من اللغة .
- (ب) نلاحظ في الدافع لإختيار قسم اللغة العربية ، صعوبة هذه المحاور بمعدل أعلى للطلاب الذين لم يكن لديهم دافع في اختيار هذا القسم و هذا امر طبيعي فلا نستطيع اجبار الطالب على دراسة و فهم دروس هو في الأصل لا يحبها ولم يختارها .
- (ج) ضعف الطلاب في التواصل مع الآخرين بسبب الخوف والقلق من الخطأ أمام الآخرين.
- (د) ضعف عناصر المدخل التواصل في مجال محادثة الطلاب من إيجاد المفردات المناسبة ، واستخدام التراكيب النحوية بشكل وظيفي، وعدم القدرة على التعبير عن الآراء في المحادثة الشفوية .
- أما بالنسبة لأساليب وطرق التدريس للأساتذة فقد أكد الطلاب علي:

١. لهجة الاستاذ العربية الفصحى ويفضل أن يكون الاستاذ من مواليد الدول العربية هذا من وجهة نظر الطلاب، لكون الطالب يشعر بطمأنينة أكثر لأنه يتلقى العربية باللهجة الصحيحة.
٢. من الامور المهمة للطلاب هو معرفة أهداف وأسلوب التدريس في بداية الفصل الدراسي وهذا الأمر طبيعي حتى يستطيع أن يتعامل مع الدرس والاستاذ بسهولة أكثر، فلو كان هذا الأمر غامضا للطلاب فانه سيواجه صعوبة في كيفية اجتياز هذه المادة، أما من حيث الاستاذ يهتم بأن يعرف الطالب بما سيدرسه وما هو أسلوب التدريس حتى يتم الحجة عليه ،ولا سبيل لتلمص أو إدعاء عدم التنبه لأهداف الاستاذ في الدرس.

٣. إن الأساتذة يقومون بتصحيح الأخطاء في نفس الوقت وهو من الأساليب الأكثر شيوعاً التي أشار إليها الطلاب وهذا الأمر له تأثير سلبي عليهم ، فيسبب الاضطراب والارتباك ولا يستطيع الطالب الاستمرار في الإجابة .
٤. يؤكد الطلاب على التلفظ الصحيح للمفردات باعتبار أنه معيار أساس للتحدث باللهجة العربية الصحيحة.
٥. يؤكد الطلاب على استخدام الأمثلة الواقعية لأنها تزيد من فهم وإدراكهم للدرس وكذلك تساعد في تثبيت المعلومات.
٦. الأساتذة يشجعون الطلاب على المناقشة لأنها تزيد من ثقة الطلاب بأنفسهم وهي مهمة في موضوع تعليم العربية .
٧. الاعلان عن تقويم الطلاب وهذا الأمر مهم جداً للطلاب في معرفة كيفية الحصول على الدرجة .
٨. من الأساليب الجذابة والممتعة للطلاب هو قيام الدرس على السؤال والجواب والمشاركة من قبل الأستاذ والطلاب ، لأنه يساعد على فهم المعلومة وعدم الشعور بالتعب والملل وأن الطالب قد ساهم في المنهج الدراسي .

#### جواب السؤال الثاني:

٢. ما هي أهم الحلول المقترحة لمعالجة مشكلة النقص اللغوي في مهارة المحادثة؟

أولاً : تغيير النظرة العامة من قبل المجتمع الإيراني للغة العربية.

١- النظرة التي ينظرها المجتمع الإيراني إلى أن اللغة العربية ليست اللغة المقصودة بل النظرة تكمن في مكانة الدول العربية والنظرة السلبية التي يحملها عنهم ، على اعتبار أن هؤلاء العرب مجموعة من الشعوب الثرية التي لا تتميز إلا بوجود النفط وأنها دول صغيرة ولا حول لا قوة لها في الخريطة العالمية، على العكس منها ما للغة الانجليزية، وللدول الأجنبية من نظرة ايجابية بسبب التطور العلمي والتقني التي حققتها هذه الدول.

٢- يعتقد الطلاب والتلاميذ أن تعلم لغة أجنبية واحدة تكفي والأولوية للغة الانجليزية (رسولي : ١٣٨٣ ، ش ٢) ، والدليل على ذلك اهتمام الأسر بتعليم اللغة الانجليزية لأبنائها منذ الصغر وإمتلاء مراكز تعليم اللغة الأجنبية بهؤلاء الطلاب.

٣- عدم وجود فرص عمل مناسبة لهذا الفرع و يقتفي الخريج بأن يعمل مدرساً في المدرسة .

ثانياً : تقوية دافع الطلاب لتعلم اللغة العربية وآدابها .

١- تدني المستوى العلمي لبعض الطلاب، وبالتالي اختيار هذا القسم من آخر أولوياتهم ، لذا نجد عدم وجود الدافع الكافي للدراسة في هذا القسم. فعلى أقسام اللغة العربية تبين وتوضيح الجدوى من تعلم هذه اللغة

أولاً بسبب أنها لغة الدين الاسلامي، وثانياً من المهم تقوية روابطنا وعلاقتنا بالدول المجاورة العربية، حيث يمكن إقامة علاقات اقتصادية وثقافية واجتماعية مع هذه الدول.

٢- محاولة إيجاد بيئة عربية مشابهة للبيئة الحقيقية العربية، لأن من أسباب الضعف هو عدم وجود الارتباط الكافي بالبيئة العربية والطلاب لا يتحدثون بها إلا بالصفوف الدراسية، وبالتالي انعدام التواصل بينهم وبين هذه اللغة .

٣- توفير الفرص للقيام برحلات للدول العربية للتعرف على البيئة والثقافة العربية وإيجاد الدافع الكافي للطلاب لممارسة هذه اللغة.

### ثالثاً: تعزيز العوامل المؤثرة في كفاءة الأساتذة .

#### ١- تشجيع الأساتذة على اجتياز الدورات التعليمية على مستوى داخل وخارج البلاد:

توفير ورش لرفع الكفاءة العلمية في التدريس، والاهتمام بالطرق التعليمية الحديثة، وكذلك المشاركة في المؤتمرات العلمية خاصة خارج البلاد والارتباط بالأساتذة العرب ومحاولة التعرف على الأساليب والمصادر الجديدة في مجال تعليم العربية وبالتالي رفع مستوى التدريس في الصف.

#### ٢- رفع مستوى الاستاذ من الناحية التعليمية :

- ١- توسيع دائرة معلوماته في مجال الثقافة العربية.
- ٢- التزود بالمواد التعليمية المقررة ، وعدم الاكتفاء بالكتب والملزمات لسنوات طويلة دون محاولة تجديدها .
- ٣- التزود بالمعرفة الكافية باللغة العربية في مجال مهارة المحادثة العملية.
- ٤- تقوية المعلومات المختصة بالمصادر العلمية المتوفرة و المتاحة .

#### ٣- رفع مستوى الأستاذ من حيث الأداء :

- ١- تقويته في القدرة على التلفظ الصحيح وبلهجة عربية .
- ٢- تقويته في السلاطة في التحدث باللغة العربية.
- ٣- تقويته في المعرفة الكافية باللغة الوظيفية وعدم الاكتفاء باللغة التعليمية.
- ٤- إلزام الطلاب التحدث باللغة العربية .

#### ٤- رفع مستوى الأستاذ من حيث أسلوب التدريس :

- ١- تشجيعه الالتزام بأسلوب التدريس في دروس المحادثة والاستماع والقراءة والكتابة .
- ٢- التخطيط المناسب والمفيد للحصة فيكون هناك تنظيم من خلال تدريسه للمادة، والسماح للطلاب بالتحدث والمناقشة،.

٣- الاهتمام بالطلبة ومتابعة مدى قيامهم بإنجاز واجباتهم الصفية واللاصفية .

٤- التشدد بالنسبة لحضور الطلاب أو غيابهم .

٥- تخصيص الوقت المناسب للتمرين والممارسة.

٦- تحقيق الانسجام والتناسق بين الأساتذة في أساليب التدريس.

#### ٥- اختيار الأستاذ من حيث الشخصية المتميزة:

١- عدم الجلوس والوثبات في مكان واحد، ومحاولة اضعاف النشاط والحركة والحيوية على الصف .

٢- إيجاد الحافز للطلاب والتحدث عن إيجابيات هذه اللغة وجدواها .

٣- القدرة على ايجاد الارتباط والتواصل مع طلاب القسم.

٤- تخصيص أساتذة من ذوي التجربة والخبرة.

٥- عدم تهكم وسخرية الأستاذ من أخطاء الطلاب بل تقبلها برحابة صدر.

#### رابعاً: العوامل المرتبطة بالمحتوى الأكاديمي للمنهج الدراسي:

١- توفير كتب جذابة وملونة ومصورة لتعليم اللغة العربية.

٢- اهتمام المؤلفين بالمهارات اللغوية الأربع في الكتاب.

٣- إقتناء الكتب العربية المحتوية على المهارات اللغوية.

٤- التزود بالكتب المتضمنة للملحقات مثل دفتر التطبيقات، ودليل للمعلم، والأقراص المرنة، وكتيبات خاصة للقراءة، وكتاب خاص لمشاهدة الافلام وغيرها من الملحقات.

٥- إقتناء الكتب التعليمية المتضمنة على التدريبات بأنواعها الثلاث من تدريبات إلهة، ومعنوية وتواصلية، وتخصيص متعادل للتدريبات فيها.

#### خامساً: إتاحة الوسائل التعليمية.

١- توفير الوسائل التعليمية والايضاحية، تجهيز الجامعات بالمختبرات اللغوية المجهزة بالمعدات الحديثة، والحواسيب الإلهة.

٢- توفير الأشرطة والأقراص المرنة الحديثة والتي تناسب العصر الراهن، وعدم استخدام الاستاذ لبعض التسجيلات التي مضى عليها الزمن.

#### و الملاحظة المهمة التي يجب اضافتها

وهي أن الطالب جزء من العملية التعليمية، وبحسب الدراسة التي توصلت إليها الباحثة هو أن ضعف مستوى خريجي أقسام اللغة العربية في مستوى البكالوريوس لا يعني أن الطالب يعاني من المستوى المتدني

في هذا الفرع، بل المشكلة الأساسية تكمن في العوامل التي عرضناها ومعظمها من العناصر المهمة في المدخل التواصلية وافتقار المنهج الدراسي إلى الأساليب الحديثة وبالتالي ضعف الدافع لديه، وخاصة إننا نرى بعض طلاب الجامعات وخاصة الحكومية من ذوي الرتب والمستويات العالية عند إنتسابهم لأقسام اللغة العربية وآدابها يصابون بالإحباط، وضعف الدافع لتعلم هذه اللغة وبالتالي تدني المستوى التعليمي لهم، وفي المقابل نؤكد على أهمية دور الاستاذ في العملية التعليمية فهو المحور الأساس الذي يستطيع أن يغير حال الطالب مهما كانت الوسائل المتاحة أو المحتوى الأكاديمي للمنهج ضعيفة.

## التوصيات

أهم التوصيات المقترحة:

- ١- تزويد مدرس اللغة العربية للناطقين بغيرها بالمراجع و الكتب التي تناقش قضايا تعليم اللغة الثانية، و تعريفهم بالإتجاهات الحديثة في تعليم اللغة الثانية كعلم اللغة النظري، و علم اللغة التطبيقي و علم اللغة الاجتماعي، والنفسى .
- ٢- تأهيل المدرسين المتخصصين في مجال تعليم العربية كلغة ثانية، وتدريبهم على استخدام الأنشطة التعليمية في عملية التدريس، و عقد ندوات ودورات دورية لتدريب المتعلمين .
- ٣- محاولة إعداد منهج تعليمي خاص للناطقين بغيرها بحيث يكون مناسباً للبلد الذي سوف تعلم به اللغة العربية.
- ٤- محاولة إعداد منهج من ذوي الاختصاص والخبرة والمعرفة والتجربة بصورة جماعية و ليس فردية.
- ٥- الاهتمام بشكل متوازن بعناصر المنهج من أهداف وطرائق التدريس، ووسائل تعليمية، وأساليب التقويم، وأنشطة تعليمية.
- ٦- إعداد مناهج تعليم اللغة العربية، في ضوء أهداف تربوية واضحة ومحددة، عامة وخاصة وسلوكية.
- ٧- ملائمة المنهج للمتعلمين من حيث الأهداف، والعمر والخلفية اللغوية والثقافية، والمستوى العلمي.
- ٨- محاولة جعل المتعلم محور العملية التعليمية وليس المعلم أو الكتاب.
- ٩- محاولة عدم استخدام اللغة الوسيطة واللهجة المحلية في تعليم اللغة العربية، إلا عند الضرورة .
- ١٠- الاهتمام بالأنشطة غير الصفية في تعليم العربية مثل مشاهدة الأفلام، التمثيل و لعب الأدوار، تمثيل المسرحيات، الألعاب وغيرها.
- ١١- الاهتمام بمحتويات المنهج بحيث تحتوى موضوعاته على نصوص تمثل قضايا العصر الاجتماعي والثقافية والحضارية والثقافية.
- ١٢- عرض مفاهيم الثقافة العربية الإسلامية بأساليب شائقة جذابة و مقنعة .
- ١٣- إحتواء المادة التعليمية على المفردات والتراكيب والنصوص والتدريبات ومواكبتها للتطورات العلمية والتقنية.
- ١٤- النظر إلى تعليم قواعد اللغة باعتبارها وسيلة و ليست غاية بذاتها.



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# Participants' Short Biography

## Opening Session

### ❑ Opening Address: LEE, In-Seop (President of KAMES)

Prof. Inseop Lee is the President of Korean Association of the Middle East Studies, KAMES. He holds a BA in Arabic from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, Korea and achieved his PhD on Arabic linguistics at Univ. of Jordan. He served as the dean of Graduate School of Interpretation and Translation, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies and President of Korea Association of Arabic Language and Literature.

### ❑ Welcoming Remarks: JANG, Se-Won (Director of GCC Institute, Dankook University)

Se-Won Chang is a professor at Dankook University. He is the director of the GCC Institute at Dankook University. He received his PhD in Arabic Language and Literature from the University of Jordan. His area of interests includes Arabic interpretation and translation and Arab-Islam Culture.

### ❑ Congratulatory Remarks

### ○ HONG, Jin Wook (Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ROK)

Mr. Hong Jin-wook is the Director-General for African and Middle Eastern Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea. He holds B.A. in Economics, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea. He later obtained Master's degrees in Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea and University of California, San Diego, U.S.A. He served as director of Public Diplomacy Division and minister-counsellor at Korean Embassy in the Italian Republic.

### ○ Adel Mohammad ADAILEH (Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the ROK)

#### - Education:

- \* 1997 ~ 1999 Ph.D. in International Relations, International Economic Academy of Bucharest, Romania
- \* 1984 ~ 1985 M.A. in International Studies, Ohio University, Ohio, USA
- \* 1977 ~ 1980 B.A. in Political Science, University of Jordan, Amman, Jordan

#### - Professional Experience:

- \* Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the Republic of Korea (2016.8.10.~)
- \* Director of Asian Department at MOFA, Jordan
- \* Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to the Republic of Azerbaijan

○ Hidemitsu **KUROKI** (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)

Hidemitsu Kuroki is Professor at Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA), Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. His specialty is Ottoman and modern history of Syria and Lebanon. He has been Head of Japan Center for Middle Eastern Studies, ILCAA's research station in Beirut, since 2006, and is a member of board of directors of Japan Association for Middle East Studies (President 2017-18). Besides works in Japanese, his publications include; H. Kuroki (ed.), *Human Mobility and Multiethnic Coexistence in Middle Eastern Urban Societies 1, 2* (Tokyo, 2015, 2018); "Neither "Western" nor "Orthodox": Establishing Greek Catholic identity in the Ottoman Empire and beyond," in K.Fukasawa et al. (eds.), *Religious Interaction in Europe and the Mediterranean World: Coexistence and Dialogue from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Centuries* (London, 2017); "Account Books of Oppression and Bargaining: the Struggle for Justice and Profit in Ottoman Aleppo, 1784-90" in P. Sluglett & S. Weber (eds.), *Syria and Bilad al-Sham Under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul-Karim Rafeq* (Leiden, 2010); H. Kuroki (ed.), *The Influence of Human Mobility in Muslim Societies* (London, 2003); "The 1819-20 Aleppo Disturbance As Reported by a French Dragoman," *Mediterranean World* 16 (2001).

□ **Keynote Address:** Anoush **EHTESHAMI** (Professor, Durham University)

Professor Anoush Ehteshami is Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University. He is the Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Chair in International Relations and Director of the HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Programme in International Relations, Regional Politics and Security. He is, further, Director of the Institute for Middle Eastern & Islamic Studies (IMEIS) at Durham, one of the oldest and noted centres of excellence in Middle Eastern studies in Europe. He acts as Co-director (2016-2021) of the £3.9 million AHRC-funded Open Worlds Initiative entitled *Cross-Language Dynamics: Reshaping Community*. Previously (2006-2016), he acted as Joint Director of the nationally (RCUK)-funded Durham-Edinburgh-Manchester Universities' research and training Centre for the Advanced Study of the Arab World (CASAW).

He was Durham University's first Dean of Internationalization, 2009-2011, and was the founding Head of the School of Government and International Affairs (2004-9). He has been a Fellow of the World Economic Forum, and served as a member of the WEF's foremost body, the Global Agenda Councils, 2010-12, focusing on energy. He was Vice-President and Chair of Council of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES) 2000-2003. He is Editor of two major book series on the Middle East and the wider Muslim world, and is member of Editorial Board of seven international journals.

He also has over 90 articles in learned journals and edited volumes to his name. His current research agenda revolves around five over-arching themes: The Asian balance of power in the post-Cold War era; The 'Asianization' of the international system; Foreign and security policies of Middle East states since the end of the Cold War; The Arab region in transition: Role of state and non-state actors; Good governance in the Middle East.

## Session I

### Session I-1: Politics

#### ○ **Chair** Anoush **EHTESHAMI** (Durham University)

Professor Anoush Ehteshami is Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University. He is the Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Chair in International Relations and Director of the HH Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah Programme in International Relations, Regional Politics and Security. He is, further, Director of the Institute for Middle Eastern & Islamic Studies (IMEIS) at Durham, one of the oldest and noted centres of excellence in Middle Eastern studies in Europe. He acts as Co-director (2016-2021) of the £3.9 million AHRC-funded Open Worlds Initiative entitled Cross-Language Dynamics: Reshaping Community. Previously (2006-2016), he acted as Joint Director of the nationally (RCUK)-funded Durham-Edinburgh-Manchester Universities' research and training Centre for the Advanced Study of the Arab World (CASAW).

He was Durham University's first Dean of Internationalization, 2009-2011, and was the founding Head of the School of Government and International Affairs (2004-9). He has been a Fellow of the World Economic Forum, and served as a member of the WEF's foremost body, the Global Agenda Councils, 2010-12, focusing on energy. He was Vice-President and Chair of Council of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES) 2000-2003. He is Editor of two major book series on the Middle East and the wider Muslim world, and is member of Editorial Board of seven international journals.

He also has over 90 articles in learned journals and edited volumes to his name. His current research agenda revolves around five over-arching themes: The Asian balance of power in the post-Cold War era; The 'Asianization' of the international system; Foreign and security policies of Middle East states since the end of the Cold War; The Arab region in transition: Role of state and non-state actors; Good governance in the Middle East.

#### ○ **Presenter** Güljanat **KURMANGALIYEVA ERCİLASUN** (Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Univ.)

Güljanat KURMANGALIYEVA ERCİLASUN is a Professor at the Department of Modern Turkic Studies, Languages and Literatures, Faculty of Letters at Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University, Ankara. She holds a BA in History and MS in Political Science from the Middle East Technical University, Turkey. She earned her Ph.D. in History from the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University, Kyrgyzstan.

Kurmangaliyeva Ercilasun's publications are mainly on various aspects of political and social history of the Kazakhs and Kyrgyzs; especially the Soviet period; intelligentsia; collectivization; religion; women and family institutions, also on oral history and memory studies. Her current research focuses on the history of the Central Asian societies in the 19th and 20th centuries, till the contemporary period.

#### ○ **Presenter** Saleh A. **ALMANI** (King Saud University)

- Prof. SALEH A. ALMANI (أ. د. صالح عبدالرحمن المانع)
- Former Senior Consultant, Ministry of Higher Education, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (2010- 2016)
- Former Dean, College of Law and Political Science, King Saud University (2003 - 2006)
  - \* Founding Dean, College of Law and Political Science 2006- 2009.
  - \* Professor of Political Science, KSU, 1997- -2010.
- Editor, King Saud University Journal, College of Administrative Sciences, 2000- 2003.

- Member, King Saud University Academic Council, 2000-2003
- Former Adviser to the Secretary-General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Riyadh.
- Education:
  - \* MA in Political Science, California State University, 1976.
  - \* PhD in International Relations (with distinction), The University of Southern California, 1981

○ **Presenter** Narayanappa **JANARDHAN** (Emirates Diplomatic Academy)

With over 20 years of regional expertise, Dr N. Janardhan analyzes and unravels the evolving multi-dimensional partnerships between the countries of the Gulf and Asia. As Senior Research Fellow at the Emirates Diplomatic Academy, Abu Dhabi, he also offers diplomats a MA course on Asian foreign policies.

His academic publications include – A New Gulf Security Architecture: Prospects and Challenges for an Asian Role (ed., Gerlach); India and the Gulf: What Next? (ed., Gulf Research Center Cambridge); and Boom amid Gloom: Spirit of Possibility in the 21st Century Gulf (Ithaca). With a PhD from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, Dr Janardhan is Managing Assistant Editor of the Journal of Arabian Studies (Routledge).

In his previous stints, he has served as a political analyst in government and private institutions in the United Arab Emirates and India. He is also an avid sportsperson.

○ **Presenter** LEE, Changju (Ajou University) & **PAIK**, Seunghoon (HUFS)

<LEE, Changju (Ajou University) >

Changju LEE is a Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and Diplomacy in Ajou University. And he is a Visiting Researcher at the China Policy Institute(CPI) in Ajou University. He got his PhD degree on Diplomacy at Fudan University in Shanghai, and worked as a researcher at Korea Maritime Institute and Sejong Institute. He studies on Connectivity and the Belt & Road Initiative based on Political Economy and Logistics. He published some books. His representative book is entitled “All of BRI”. He continues to study the current situation of Connectivity based on literature search and field works.

<PAIK, Seunghoon (HUFS) >

Seunghoon Paik is a Researcher at the Middle East Institute of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Previously, he has worked as an Assistant Researcher at the Department of European & African Studies, Institute of Foreign Affairs & National Security (IFANS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul, Korea. He got his PhD degree on Middle East International Relation at Durham University and worked as non-resident researcher at Washington D.C. based think tank Global Risk Intelligence. He taught at National Diplomacy Academy, Seoul National University and currently teaches at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Korea

○ **Presenter** Robert **LAWRENCE** (Dongduk Women's University)

Robert Lawrence is a native of the state of Virginia in the United States, but finished high school in Oklahoma. At the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, he finished a degree in Political Science while minoring in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies. While living in South Korea as an English teacher, he met his wife to be and chose to pursue graduate studies at the Korean University of Foreign Studies where he received his M.A. in Political Science with a concentration in Politics of the Middle East and his Ph.D. in Area Studies of the Middle East and Africa. He is currently living in Seoul, working as an Assistant Professor of English at Dongduk Women’s University, and happily married with a year-old son.

## Session I-2: Culture & Society

### ○ **Chair OH**, Chong Jin (HUFS)

Dr. Chong Jin OH is a professor in the Department of Turkish and Azerbaijani Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He is also serving as a Dean of International Affairs. He received his Ph.D. degree in 2006 from Bilkent University in International Relations, and his Master's degree was received from Eastern Mediterranean University in International Relations (2002).

He also has written various articles in learned journals and edited volumes to his name. His recent articles include: "The Ideal-typical Welfare Regime for Asians: A comparative Study based on Culture and Values (The International Journal of Interdisciplinary Social and Community Studies, vol.8,2014; SCOPUS)", "Interdependency of Business Cycle between Turkey and the Selected Central Asian Countries (Journal of Social Sciences of the Turkic World, vol. 81, 2017; SSCI)", and "The Ottoman Empire and the Crimean Khanate in the North Caucasus: A Case Study of Ottoman Crimean Relations in the Mid-Sixteenth Century (Turkish Historical Review, vol.9, 2018; A&HCI)."

His area of interest includes Turkey-ROK Relations, Turkey-Middle East Relations, and the Middle East and Central Asia Politics in general.

### ○ **Presenter Hidemitsu KUROKI** (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)

Hidemitsu Kuroki is Professor at Research Institute for Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa (ILCAA), Tokyo University of Foreign Studies. His specialty is Ottoman and modern history of Syria and Lebanon. He has been Head of Japan Center for Middle Eastern Studies, ILCAA's research station in Beirut, since 2006, and is a member of board of directors of Japan Association for Middle East Studies (President 2017-18). Besides works in Japanese, his publications include; H. Kuroki (ed.), Human Mobility and Multiethnic Coexistence in Middle Eastern Urban Societies 1, 2 (Tokyo, 2015, 2018); "Neither "Western" nor "Orthodox": Establishing Greek Catholic identity in the Ottoman Empire and beyond," in K.Fukasawa et al. (eds.), Religious Interaction in Europe and the Mediterranean World; Coexistence and Dialogue from the Twelfth to the Twentieth Centuries (London, 2017); "Account Books of Oppression and Bargaining: the Struggle for Justice and Profit in Ottoman Aleppo, 1784-90" in P. Sluglett & S. Weber (eds.), Syria and Bilad al-Sham Under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul-Karim Rafeq (Leiden, 2010); H. Kuroki (ed.), The Influence of Human Mobility in Muslim Societies (London, 2003); "The 1819-20 Aleppo Disturbance As Reported by a French Dragoman," Mediterranean World 16 (2001).

### ○ **Presenter KIM**, Suwan (HUFS)

Dr. KIM, Suwan is a professor of Department of Arabic Interpretation and Translation, and dean of Student Affairs and Human Resource Development, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, SEOUL, KOREA. She is also teaching at the Department of Middle East and African Studies at Graduate School of International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies.

Her main research fields are social and cross-cultural studies including Arab, Islam image and perception studies, behavior psychology, media and cultural business marketing in the Middle East. Prof. KIM, Suwan is a director board member of KAMES (Korea Association of Middle East Studies), KAIS (Korea Association of Islamic Studies) and WAHS (World Association of Hallyu Studies). She also was head of ABM (Arab



Business Marketing) Forum 2012 of Korea Chamber of Commerce and is currently executive board member of the Korean Association of Middle East Studies and in charge of the 2017 KAMES International Conference as the chairwoman of the organizing committee.

○ **Presenter** Suna Timur **AGILDERE** (Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Univ.) & Berna **DENGİZ** (Başkent Univ.)

<Suna Timur **AGILDERE** (Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University) >

Graduated from the Department of French Language and Literature, Hacettepe University in 1995, she was awarded with İhsan Doğramacı Award for High Accomplishment. She got her M.A. (1997) and Ph.D. (2000) degrees from Institute of Social Sciences at Hacettepe University. In 2006, she received her title as an associate professor in Translation Studies. In 2012, she was titled as Professor in Translation and Cultural Studies.

Dr. Suna Timur Ağıldere was Vice President in charge of Academic Affairs and International Relations of Gazi University (2016-2018). She is currently Dean of the Faculty of Letters of Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University. As the founding chairwoman, she is also in charge of Research Center for Mediterranean and African Civilizations at Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli University.

Her research interests are Mediterranean and North African Cultural Studies and Translation&Cultural Studies. In addition to being scientific adviser to the Presidency of the Turkish Republic for projects of African culture, she is a scientific member of the Atatürk Cultural Research Society, attached to the Ministry of Tourism and Culture of the Republic of Turkey.

<Berna **DENGİZ** (Başkent University) >

Dr. Berna Dengiz is a full professor in the Industrial Engineering Department at Başkent University. She has been serving as the Dean of Engineering Faculty of Baskent University since 2008. Starting from 2007, she chaired the accreditation commission of Engineering Faculty at Başkent University that accredited all engineering departments (Biomedical Engineering, Computer Engineering, Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Industrial Engineering and Mechanical Engineering ) through national and international accreditation process. Accreditation of all departments of our faculty is valid in many countries including America, Canada, Australia, Korea, Russia, China, India, Peru, Philippines, Singapore, all European Union countries.

Prior to becoming a professor at Baskent University, she was a professor in Industrial Engineering department at Gazi University, where she also served as Vice Dean (1996-2000) and Acting Dean (2000-2001) of Engineering and Architecture Faculty of Gazi University.

Dr. Dengiz conducts research in the fields of topology optimization of telecommunication and computer systems using heuristic optimization and the modeling of large scale complex industrial and energy systems by simulation or simulation optimization.

Her research in the above mentioned fields has been funded by Turkish Scientific and Technical Research Council (TÜBİTAK), and Government Planning Organization of Turkey (DPT). Her international research collaborations were funded by NSF (USA), NATO programs. She published her research results in distinguished journals such as IEEE Transaction on Reliability, IEEE Transaction on Evolutionary Computation, International Journal of Production Economics (IJPE), Simulation Practice and Theory, Journal of Operations Research Society (JORS), European Journal of Operation Research ( EJOR), OMEGA, Computers and Industrial Engineering, IIE Transactions among others which have garnered over 1500 citations (in web of science). Dr. Dengiz has also been a visiting professor at TU WIEN (Austria), Auburn University (USA), and The University of Pittsburgh (USA).

Dr. Dengiz received the “WORMS (Women in Operations Research and Management Science) 2011” award in the USA and “Leader Women in Science 2012” award by (TAUW) in Türkiye . Dr. Dengiz is a member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the Institute for Operations Research and Management Science (INFORMS).



○ **Presenter** Mesut **IDRIZ** (Sharjah University)

- Working Experience:

- \* Professor, Department of History and Islamic Civilization, College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, September 2018 – until the present.
- \* Professor, Islamic History and Civilization at the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Sakarya University, Sakarya, Turkey, September 2017 – August 2018.
- \* Adjunct Professor, Sociology of Law at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Mother Teresa University, Skopje, Macedonia, July 2017 till the present.
- \* Special Researcher [Non-Resident] at the Turkish Culture Studies Center, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai, China, January 2015 - December 2015.
- Acting Director, Sharjah International Foundation for the History of Arab and Muslim Sciences (SIFHAMS), University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, October 2018 – until the present.
- Chairperson, the Department of History and Islamic Civilization, College of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates, September 2018 – until the present.

- Education:

- \* Ph.D.: “International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC), International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM)”- Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, (March 2002). Field: Islamic Civilization (Muslim History & Institutions)
- \* M.A.: “International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC), International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM)”- Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, (September 1998).
- Fields of Interest: Comparative History of Civilizations; Law and Ethics; Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue; Euro-Asian History; Muslim History & Historiography; History of Islamic Arts; History of Islamic Civilization; History of the Ottoman Empire; Balkan Studies; Legal Institutions in Islam; Sociology of Islamic Law; Applied Islamic Law; Philosophy of Religion; Islamic Studies; History of Education in the Muslim world; Muslim Institutions; Poverty Alleviation in the Muslim World; Comparative History of Business and Finance: Muslim World and the West; History of the Muslim Political Institutions; International Relations; Political Science & Comparative Politics; Good Governance.

## Session II

### Session II-1: Economics

○ **Chair** LEE, Kwon Hyung (Korea Institute of International Economic Policy)

Kwon Hyung Lee is a research fellow of the Middle East and Africa team at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), a government-funded think-tank. He is also an Adjunct Professor teaching postgraduate courses in the field of Middle Eastern economy at Graduate School of International and Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Prior to joining the KIEP he analyzed market trends and industrial development in the automobile sector at Kia Motors' economic research institute. He also worked for Incheon Development Institute, Incheon Metropolitan City's think-tank, contributing to implementation of the City's industrial policies. His research at the KIEP focuses on industrial and energy policies in Middle Eastern countries as well as economic cooperation between Korea and the Middle East. His recent publications are on 'Financial Cooperation between Korea and the Middle East in the New Industrial and Financial Environment', 'Electricity Industrial Policies in the Middle East and their Implications for Korean Companies' and 'Lower Oil Prices and Economic Cooperation between Korea and the Middle East'. He holds Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Economics from Seoul National University and a PhD degree in Economics from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London.

○ **Presenter** LEE, Mansokku (State Univ. of New York) & SONG, Sang Hyun (Dankook Univ.)

<LEE, Mansokku (State Univ. of New York) >

Dr. Mansokku Lee is an associate professor of economics at State University of New York at Geneseo. He earned his bachelor's degree in economics from Korea University and his PhD in economics from University of Utah. His research interests are in political business cycle, business cycle synchronization, economic growth, and financial development.

<SONG, Sang Hyun (Dankook Univ.) >

Sang Hyun Song is a professor at Dankook University. He holds the chairs of department of Middle Eastern Studies. He received his PhD in Middle East Studies(History) from the Middle East Center at the University of Utah. His academic interests are Saudi oil policy, Rentierism, Economic Diversification in the GCC countries.

○ **Presenter** JUNG, Jae Wook (Korea Institute of International Economic Policy)

- Associate Research Fellow, Head of Team, Africa and the Middle East Team, Center for Area Studies

- Education:

\* Ph.D. in Economics, University of California, Davis, 2016

\* M.A. in Economics, Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea, 2009

- Working Experience:

\* 2013 Research Assistant for Professor Ina Simonovska and Professor Espen Henriksen, UC Davis

- \* 2008-2010 Research Assistant, Research and Education Group for a New Paradigm for the Korean Economic System (Supported by the Brain Korea 21, National Project of Korean Ministry of Education, Science and Technology), Seoul
- \* 2008 Assistant Researcher, Korea Institute for New Society, Seoul
- \* 2005 Research Assistant, Institute for Korean Unification Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul
- Major Fields of Concentration: International Trade, International Macroeconomics, Development Economics, Regional Economies of Africa and the Middle East

○ **Presenter** Jessie **MORITZ** (Australian National University)

- Employment:
  - \* 2018-present: Lecturer, Australian National University / Department: Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies (The Middle East and Central Asia), Research School of Social Sciences
  - \* 2017-2018 Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Princeton University
- Education:
  - \* 2012 - 2017 Doctor of Philosophy from the Australian National University
  - \* 2007 - 2011 Bachelor of Arts (First Class Honours) from the Australian National University
- Visiting Academic Positions and Fieldwork:
  - \* Mar 2018 Visiting Fellow, King Faisal Centre for Research and Islamic Studies, Riyadh
  - \* Oct 2013 - Jan 2014 Graduate Fellow, Gulf Studies Program, Qatar University
  - \* Jul - Aug 2013 Visiting Scholar, Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter

○ **Presenter** Moamen **GOUDA** (HUFS) & Shimaa **HANAFY** (HUFS)

<Moamen **GOUDA** (HUFS) >

- Academic Positions:
  - \* 09/2014 - Assistant Professor of Middle-East Economics, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS), Seoul, South Korea / Graduate School of International and Area Studies (GSIAS), Department of Middle East and African Studies & Department of International Development
  - \* 06/2007 - 02/2009 Assistant Lecturer, Department of International Business, German University in Cairo (GUC), Cairo, Egypt
  - \* 02/2007 - 06/2007 Assistant Lecturer, Department of Business and Economics Misr International University (MIU), Cairo, Egypt
- Education:
  - \* 04/2009 - 03/2014 Philipps-Universität Marburg, Germany / Doctorate (Dr. rer. Pol.), Economics
  - \* 09/2003 - 07/2006 Heriot-Watt University, Scotland, United Kingdom / Edinburgh Business School / Master of Business Administration (MBA)
  - \* 03/2004 - 05/2005 Cairo University, Cairo, Egypt / Euro-Mediterranean Studies Program / Master's Degree Coursework
  - \* 02/2001 - 05/2002 Arab Academy for Science, Technology & Maritime, Cairo, Egypt / Advanced Management Institute Master's Degree Coursework
- Research Fields: Political Economy of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), socioeconomics of Muslim-majority countries, Islamic Constitutionalism, and Economics of Crime and Terrorism.

<Shimaa **HANAFY** (HUFS) >

- Academic Positions:

- \* Since 03/2017 Assistant Professor of Development Economics. Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul, South Korea / Division of International Studies
- \* 10/2008 - 12/2014 Philipps-University Marburg, Germany / Department of Development Economics & Department of Macroeconomics, Program Coordinator and lecturer for the master's programs
- \* 10/2006 - 02/2008 University of Passau, Germany / Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Teaching assistant for microeconomics, macroeconomics, international economics & European economic integration

- Education:

- \* 01/2009 - 02/2016 Philipps-University Marburg, Germany Doctorate (Dr. rer. pol.) in Economics MAGKS PhD programme in Economics / Graduate courses in development economics, international economics, empirical methods, and econometrics.
- \* 10/2003 - 07/2008 University of Passau, Germany / Faculty of Economics and Business Administration / Degree: Diplom-Volkswirtin (equivalent to a combined Bachelor's and Master's degree in Economics)
- \* 09/1991- 05/2003 German School "Deutsche Schule der Borromäerinnen", Cairo, Egypt / Degree: German High School Certificate (Abitur)

- Research Fields: Political economy, institutional economics, development economics, international economics, MENA countries.

## **Session II-2: Culture & Society**

○ **Chair** SAH, Heeman (Chosun University)

- Professor Emeritus, The Arabic Department, Chosun University (1985-)
- Dean of College of Foreign Languages (2013-2015)
- President of Association of Korean Arabic Language & Literature (2006-2008)
- Education:
  - \* Graduated from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies(Arabic Depart.)
  - \* Obtained MD from Graduate School of Translation & Interpretation(English-Arabic)
  - \* Obtained Ph.D from Graduate School of HUFS(Arabic Lang. & Lit.)

○ **Presenter** KIM, Joong-Kwan (Dongguk University)

- Professor, College of Social Science, Dongguk Univ. Seoul, Korea
- Education:
  - \* Université de Tunis El- Manar, Faculté de Science Economiques et Gestion, Tunis, Tunisia (Ph. D. in Economics)
  - \* Dongguk University, Graduate School, Seoul, Korea (Ph. D. in Business Administration)
- Work Experiences:
  - \* Present, President, Korea Association of Global Culture Studies
  - Head, Islam Multi-culture Center In Dongguk University

Chairman, Arab Africa Association

Co-President of the Middle East Political, Economic and Social Research Council

Advisor of Korean Economy , KDI

- \* Jan. 2013 – Dec. 2013, President , Korea Association of Middle East Studies
- \* Feb. 1998 – Aug. 2011, Chief, Center for Middle Eastern Affairs
- \* Jan. 2001 – Dec. 2002, Director, Foreign Investment Service Center in Seoul

○ **Presenter EUM**, Ikran (Dankook University)

Ikran Eum received PhD in Middle East Studies at the Institute of Arab and Islamic Studies, University of Exeter, UK in 2004 under the supervision of Dr. Nadjé Al-Ali. She is currently working as assistant professor at the School of General Education, Dankook University in Korea. She gives lectures related to cultural and social studies in the Middle East both for the students as an academia and for the public including office workers and civil servants as an area specialists. She also participated as an advisor in various government bodies including Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Korea Tourism Organization, and Korea Institute for International Economic Policy.

Her current research interests are consumerism and Islam, halal, family and gender issues in the Gulf countries. She has published several books about Middle Eastern Muslim Culture, and they include Knowing the Gulf: Changing Arab Lifestyle and Emerging Women Power (2018), Taboo, Unseen seen Muslim women (2015), Islamic Marketing and Halal Business (2014), Halal, what is allowed: Arab food and Cultural code (2011), How to read cultural code among the Arabs through everyday life (2009), Marriage Culture and Gender in Islam (2007). Among the lists, two books are awarded from the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism as an excellent book of the year. Her books have contributed in introducing Middle Eastern and Arab Muslim culture in Korean readership.

○ **Presenter Mohamed ELASKARY** (HUFS) & **YUN**, Eun-Kyeong (HUFS)

<Mohamed **ELASKARY** (HUFS) >

- Career:

- \* Associate Professor of Arabic Interpretation, HUFS, South Korea, from Sept. 2013– Current
- \* Research Fellow, Laboratory Program for Korean Studies, South Korea, 2016-2017
- \* Acting Head of English Dept., Faculty of Islamic Studies for Girls, Luxor, Egypt, Oct. 2012-August 2013
- \* Lecturer in Comparative Literature, Faculty of Languages and Translation, Egypt, Dec. 2009-August 2013

- Education:

- \* PhD Degree 2008, IAIS, University of Exeter, UK
- \* Major: Comparative Literature / Minor: Mediterranean Studies
- \* BA Degree 1993, Faculty of Languages and Translation, Al-Azhar University, Cairo, Egypt / Major: English literature and Translation/ Minor: English-Arabic Translation

- Work Experience:

- \* Academic Advisor, Saudi Arabia Cultural Bureau, London, UK, Feb. 2009- Nov. 2009
- \* Freelance Translator- Interpreter, LanguageLine and Today Translations, London, UK, 2002-2009
- \* Freelance Journalist-translator, Al-Nidaa Al-Arabi and Sout El-Umah, Egypt, 1997-2001

<YUN, Eun-Kyeong (HUFS) >

Dr. Eun Kyeong Yun is a Professor in Department of Arabic at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS) in Seoul. She was Vice-Dean of the Faculty of Asian Languages and Cultures and Head of the Arabic Language Department at HUFS from 2016 to 2019, Feb., and Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the International Conference of the Korean Association of Middle Eastern Studies in 2018. She is currently Vice-President of the Korean Association of Foreign Language Education and Vice-President of the Korean Association of Islamic Studies. And she is also a member of the editorial committee of the journal of the Korean association of Arabic Language and Literature and a member of the Curriculum Development and Adjustment Committee and a member of the committee for writing Arabic textbooks for high school students of the Ministry of Education in the Republic of Korea.

She received her M.A. and ph. D in Arabic Linguistics from the Graduate School at HUFS. She started her career as a lecturer in Dept. of Arabic, HUFS. in 1991 and taught at several Korean universities (Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul National University, Chosun University). She was also affiliated to HUFS IMES(The Institute of the Middle East Studies) as a research fellow from 2002 to 2005. She has more than fifty publications and research papers in the fields of Arabic education, culture and language. Her area of interest includes Arabic socio-linguistics and Arab culture and teaching Arabic as a foreign language.

### **Session II-3: Education, Language & Literature**

○ **Chair** CHO, Hee Sun (Myeongji University)

Dr. Heesun Cho is a professor in the Myongji University (Department of Arabic Studies) in Seoul. She received her ph.D in National University of Tunisia. Her area of interest includes Muslim women's issues.

○ **Presenter** Hossein Samadi **BAHRAMI** (School of International Relations, MOFA, Iran)

- Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies
- Director of the Persian Language Departments
- Director of the Department of the International Languages
- Academic Achievements:
  - \* Ph.D. IN TEFL (Applied Linguistics and Language Teaching) (Allameh University Tehran, 2012)
  - \* MA In TEFL (Kharazmi University Tehran, 1992)
  - \* BA in English Language and Literature(Allame University Tehran, 1985)
  - \* Post Diploma in English and electronics (USA, Colorado, Denver, 1978)
  - \* Diploma in English Language (USA, Texas, San Antonio,1977)
- Teaching experience:
  - \* Teaching Persian Language (Reading Comprehension, Grammar, Listening and Speaking, Phonology, and Reading Press) at School of International Relations (1991 - now)
  - \* Teaching Persian Language Skills at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Sept.2014-Sept. 2015)
  - \* Teaching Action Research and Lesson Planning at Farhangiyen University in Tehran (2017- now)

○ **Presenter** Laila **FAMILIAR** (New York University, Abu Dhabi)

Dr. Laila Familiar is Senior Lecturer of Arabic at New York University Abu Dhabi, academic consultant for American Councils for International Education, teacher trainer, and recipient of the Texas Foreign Language Teaching Excellence Award (from The University of Texas at Austin).

She is the editor of two literature-based textbooks, *Sayyidi wa Habibi* (2013) and *Saaq al-Bambuu* (2016) for learners of Arabic, and Project Manager of *Khallina*, a website developed for the teaching and learning of Arab culture(s) through open source audiovisuals

At the moment, Dr. Laila Familiar is finishing a frequency dictionary specialized in the lexicon of contemporary Arabic fiction.

○ **Presenter** Lama **NASSIF** (Williams College)

Lama Nassif is Assistant Professor of Arabic Studies at Williams College where she teaches courses on Arabic language, second language acquisition, and sociolinguistics. Her research interests include noticing and attention in second language development, the interface between second language acquisition and pedagogy, and the integrated approach in teaching Arabic as a foreign language. Her current projects include research employing eye-tracking technology in investigating Arabic learners' noticing and acquisition of L2 verbal morphology, and a book manuscript [Under contract with Routledge] combining noticing and attention in SLA theory and research with pedagogical practices in the teaching of L2 Arabic grammar. She is also currently studying the simultaneous acquisition of Modern Standard Arabic and varieties of colloquial Arabic in light of learners' awareness of linguistic choices, mechanisms of code switching, and the development of their sociolinguistic competence.

○ **Presenter** Faisal **MUBARAK** (Antasari State Islamic University)

- Associate Professor, Antasari State Islamic University, Department of Arabic Studies, Feb. 2017 - Present.

- Education:

\* PhD in Arabic Literature, 2014 - Gunung Djati State Islamic University Bandung -Indonesia

\* MA in Arabic Studies and Islamic Civilization 2008 - National University of Malaysia.

\* BA in Islamic Studies, 2005- Islamic University of Madinah -Saudi Arabia.

\* BA in Arabic Literary, 2001-Kalijaga Islamic University Yogyakarta-Indonesia

- Research Interests: Arabic Studies, Literary Theory, Linguistic, Historical of the Middle East

○ **Presenter** Akiko M. **SUMI** (Kyoto Notre Dame Univ.) & Katsunori **SUMI** (Nagoya IT)

<Akiko M. **SUMI** (Kyoto Notre Dame Univ.) >

Akiko M. Sumi is a Professor at the Faculty of Language and Culture of Kyoto Notre Dame University (Japan) from 2010. She received her M.A. from University of Michigan, Ann Arbor and her Ph.D. from Indiana University, Bloomington. She has many publications related to classical Arabic literature and Arabic teaching and learning. Her publications include *Description in Classical Arabic Poetry* (Brill, 2004) and "Teaching and Learning Arabic in Japan" in *Handbook for Arabic Language Teaching Professionals in the 21st Century* (Routledge, 2018).

<Katsunori **SUMI** (Nagoya Institute of Technology ) >

Katsunori Sumi is a Professor of the Graduate School of Engineering at Nagoya Institute of Technology (Japan) from 2007. He received his Ph.D. from Nagoya Institute of Technology. He teaches Behavioral Science, Organizational Behavior, and Applied Psychology. He has many publications related to psychology in several international journals. He is currently engaged in the research on well-being and motivation. His latest publication includes an article in *Problem-Solving: Strategies, Challenges and Outcomes* (Nova Science, 2016).

## Session III

### Session III-1: Politics

#### ○ **Chair** Rovshan **IBRAHIMOV** (HUFS)

Rovshan Ibrahimov is Professor at the Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (South Korea), College of Oriental Studies. He has been working at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies since the March 2015. Between 1999-2014 Dr. Ibrahimov has worked at Qafqaz University (Azerbaijan) where had positions of Head of Department of International Relations (2003-2013), Head of Department of European Studies (2008-2010), Vice-rector on External Affairs (2011). In the period between 2011-2014, Head of Foreign Policy Analysis at the Center for Strategic Researches under the President of Azerbaijan Republic. Dr. Ibrahimov received his PhD from Ankara University (Turkey). He is author of a book; EU External Policy Towards the South Caucasus: How Far is it From Realizations? (Baku: SAM, 2013);, editor and author of book: Azerbaijan's Energy History and Policy: From Past Till Our Days, Energy and Azerbaijan: History, Strategy and Cooperation, ed. Rovshan Ibrahimov, (Baku: SAM, 2013), co-author of Dictionary of Energy Terms, (Baku:Qafqaz Universiteti Yayınları, 2014). and author of more than two hundred articles and comments in various academic journals and books. Scope of research interests: Energy policy, Energy Security, European Union, Foreign and Energy Policies of the former Soviet Union states, Turkish Foreign Policy.

#### ○ **Presenter** **CHOE**, Young Chol (Sungkyunkwan University)

Choe, Young Chol is a visiting professor at Sungkyunkwan University. He has served as a president of the Korean Association of Middle East Studies (KAMES), 2017, an executive director of The Korean Association of Middle East Studies (2003-2013, 2015~2017) and also an Editor-in-Chief, Korean Journal of Middle East Studies, 2015-2016. Previously, he had been an associate professor at Seoul Jangsin University (2007~2018). He has taught many different courses, including introduction to international relations, Middle East politics, society and culture in Israel, and Islamic Thoughts, Culture and Society in the Islam World. His research focuses on political reforms and Kingship succession in the GCC countries, American foreign policy toward Iraq since the 1990s, and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts. He has published many books, including The Formation of Modern Middle Eastern States and International Relations (Seoul: Seoul Jangsin University Press, 2014), Understanding Middle East Politics, I, II, III. (Coauthor), (Seoul, Hanulbooks, 2005-2006), Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in an Era of Transition, (Coauthor), (Seoul: Damon Story, 2019), The Formation and Development of Modern Middle East States, (Coauthor), (Seoul: Dahae, 2010), Hezbollah, Hamas and Israel (Coauthor), (Seoul: Dahae, 2011), The Formation and Development of Saudi Arabia, (Coauthor), (Seoul: Dahae, 2013) and Internal Conflicts of Middle Eastern States, (Coauthor), (Seoul: Dahae, 2013).

#### ○ **Presenter** Sayed **GHONEIM** (Institute for Global Security & Defense Affairs)

Ghoneim is a visiting scholar and guest speaker to: Belgian Royal Military Academy, Brussels; National Defense University, Taiwan; Defense University of Honduras; NATO Defense College, Middle East Faculty, Rome; Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology (RCAST) of University of Tokyo; American University in The Emirates, Dubai.



During his long service in the Egyptian Armed Forces: Locally, he served in several command & staff jobs including intelligence, planning & operations, training and educational jobs. His last position was Director of Planning and Operations at (strategic department level); Internationally, Senior National Representative of Egypt to the U.S. Central Command (Tampa, Florida); Chief of Staff at the UN Mission in Nepal (UNMIN); In other peacekeeping and humanitarian aids missions in Western Sahara and Rwanda.

Education: He obtained his (Master of Military Science) from General Command & Staff College of both Egypt and Pakistan, and his Bachelor of Business Administrations from Ain Shams University, Egypt; in addition to a diploma in political science (Defence Diplomacy and Security Studies) from RMCS at Cranfield University, England, UK. Ghoneim obtained his Fellowship Degree in Strategic Security Studies from Nasser Higher Military Academy of Egypt (\* PhD). Also, currently he's a PhD researcher in Political Science (Faculty of Commerce and Political Science at Port Said University), Egypt.

○ **Presenter** Rahman **SHAHHUSEYNLI** (MOFA, Azerbaijan)

- Professional Experience:

- \* [2014~present] Founding Director, Office of International Affairs, ADA University, Baku, Azerbaijan
- \* [2013~2014] Head of International Programs, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy, Baku, Azerbaijan
- \* [2011~2013] Lecturer, Doshisha University, Institute for the Liberal Arts; Kyoto, Japan
- \* [2009~2013] Supervisor / Trainer, Minoh City Office, Board of Education; Osaka, Japan
- \* [2008~2009] Visiting Research Fellow, Nagoya University, Graduate School of International Development; Nagoya, Japan
- \* [2007~2008] Faculty / Coordinator on the Far East Region, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy; Baku, Azerbaijan
- \* [2004~2007] Research Fellow, Osaka University, Center for International Security Studies and Policy; Osaka, Japan
- \* [2000~2002] Research Assistant, METU, Graduate School of Political Science and Public Administration; Ankara, Turkey

- Education:

- \* [2004~2007] Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) in International Public Policy, Osaka University, Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP); Japan
- \* [2002~2004] Master of Arts (M.A) in International Cooperation Studies, Nagoya University, Graduate School of International Development (GSID); Japan
- \* [2000~2002] Master of Science (M.S.) in Political Science and Public Administration, Middle East Technical University (METU), Graduate School of Political Science and Public Administration; Ankara
- \* [1994~1998] Bachelor of Arts (B.A.) in Political Science (High Honour), Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan

- Research Interests: Regional/area studies, East Asian politics, conflict and peace studies, public policy in resource-rich states

## Session III-2: Culture & Society

### ○ **Chair** LEE Hee-Soo (Hanyang University)

Dr. Hee Soo LEE is currently Distinguished Chair Professor in the Department of Cultural Anthropology of Hanyang University and the Director of Korea Institute of Islamic Culture. A well-known anthropologist of Islamic studies in Korea, he completed his BA and MA degrees at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Seoul and Ph.D. at the Istanbul University. He has conducted extensive field work in such Muslim countries as Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, Malaysia and Uzbekistan since 1979. He served as president of the Korean Association of Middle East Studies for 2008-2009. He continued his researches on Islamic-Middle East issues at such institutes as CERES (Tunisia), IRCICA (Istanbul), Marmara University (Turkey). He also pursued research at the University of Washington in 2002 and 2012 and University of Vienna in 2014 where he was a visiting professor. In addition, he serves as the advisor of MOFA, National Counterterrorism Center of Korea. His book entitled ISLAM sold out more than 230,000 copies. He is also author of 72 books including "Islam and Korean Culture", "Islam for Children", "Islamic Culture".

### ○ **Presenter** Erina IWASAKI (Sophia University)

- Head of Department of French Studies, Faculty of Foreign Studies, Sophia University (April 2017 - Now)
- Professor at Faculty of Foreign Studies, Sophia University (April 2013 - Now)
- Education:
  - \* Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan / Degree Ph.D. Economics, submitted in Dec.2005
  - \* Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan / Degree M.A. in Sociology, March 1993
- Professional Experiences:
  - \* April 2011 - March 2013 Associate Professor at Faculty of Arts and letters, Kyoritsu Women's University
  - \* April 2000 - March 2002 Post-Doctoral Fellowship of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS)
  - \* Feb 1994 - Feb 1996 Special Assistant of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Embassy of Japan at Tunisia

### ○ **Presenter** Farrah SHEIKH (Konkuk University)

- HK Research Professor, Academy of Mobility Humanities, Konkuk University, Seoul, South Korea
- Research Associate, SOAS Centre of Islamic Studies Muslim Minority Studies
- Education:
  - \* 2012-17 PhD Near and Middle East Studies School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London: Merit
  - \* 2008-9 MA Near and Middle Eastern Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London: Merit
- Academic Experience:
  - \* 04/18 - 09/18: Korea Foundation Field Research Fellow affiliated to Hanyang University
  - \* 07/17 -08/17: Visiting Scholar, Dept of Cultural Anthropology, Hanyang University
- Research Interests: My research interests are focused on notions of race, identity, integration, nationalism,

belonging and citizenship in the context of Multicultural and Muslim minority populations negotiating a post 9/11 landscape. My fields include England and South Korea.

○ **Presenter** JEONG, Jin Han (HUFS)

Jin-Han Jeong is a historian teaching ‘Understanding of Islamic Thoughts’ at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Korea). He was awarded his M.A. of History from University of Jordan, Amman and is going to receive his PhD soon from SOAS (School of Oriental and African Studies), University of London. He has published related to the inter-civilizational exchanges of the Islamic world and the Silk road. His research includes “Creating Medieval Islamic geography by using Korea”, “Expanding of the concept of the Silk Roads”, “The Medieval Islamic authors’ research on Jazirat al-Yaqt: Approaching ancient Indian and Persian knowledge”.

○ **Presenter** AHN, Sunghun (Gachon University)

- Research Professor, Gachon University Institute of Asian Culture, Gachon University
- Visiting Research Fellow, The Institute of The Middle East Studies (2017~)
- Education:
  - \* Ph.D., Department of International Area and Studies, Graduate School of International and Area Studies, 2012-2015, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS)
  - \* M.A., Department of Middle Eastern Studies, General Graduate School, 1993-1998, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS)
- Additional Professional Activities:
  - \* 1999~2005: Policy Sectary to the National Assemblyman
  - \* 1998: Researcher, The Korean Institute of Legislative Studies, Inc.
- Research Fields: The Middle Eastern Conflict, Terrorism in the MENA, Israeli Politics, Middle Eastern Politics

### **Session III-3: Education, Language & Literature**

○ **Chair** Salaheldin Abdelaziz Ali **ELGEBILY** (HUFS)

- Assistant professor at the Department of Arabic, Hankuk University for Foreign Studies.
- Specialized in modern Arabic literature and criticism, and interested in the Sociology of literature.
- He received his M.A. in dramatic structure of the modern Palestinian poetry in 2004 and his Ph.D. in heritage and modernism in the modern Arabic criticism in 2008 from Tanta University
- Worked in the Arts and Languages Unit, Bibliotheca Alexandrina, Egypt. (2010 - 2013)

○ **Presenter** Ghazi Khader Ali **Alzanahreh** (HUFS)

Dr. Ghazi Khader Ali Alzanahreh is a lecturer in the Graduate School of Translation and Interpretation Studies (Department of Korean-Arabic) at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS) in Seoul. He

graduated from University of Jordan from Arabic dipartment and he received his M.A. from Ankara University in Turkey and ph. D in Arabic from University of Jordan.

○ **Presenter** Sohyla Mohesni **NEJAD** (Imam Sadiq University)

She is a professor and faculty member at Imam Sadiq University/College of Women in Tehran, Iran 2010. She received her PhD in 2015 from Khwarizmi University in Tehran. Currently, she is responsible for the Department of Language Skills Conversation, Listening, Reading and also for teaching methods. She has almost 25 years of teaching experience in teaching conversation and listening. She is also a researcher at the Iran Language Institute from 2004.

She is a Member of the committee of writing the book of teaching Arabic language "Echo of life" 2006. And printed her book, " Teaching Methods for the Second Language, Teaching Arabic as the Communication Approach ", 2018. She has a book under publication "Open Dialogue" for the advanced conversation, publishing articles in refereed journals. She has participated in international conferences in Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq. It is also a scientific and literary revision "Journal of Studies in learning and teaching Arabic"

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□ Shin **YASUDA** (Secretary-General of JAMES)

Shin Yasuda is Associate Professor at Takasaki City University of Economics in Takasaki City, Gunma Prefecture in Japan. Yasuda received his Bachelor of Arts degree in history from Sophia University in Tokyo, Japan. He obtained his master's and Ph.D. degrees in area study from Graduate School of Asian and African Area Studies in Kyoto University, Japan. He is presently working at Department of Tourism Policy, Faculty of Regional Policy in Takasaki City University of Economics in Takasaki City, Gunma Prefecture in Japan. His research interests include Islamic tourism, religious tourism in Islamic countries, history of tourism in the Middle Eastern countries, and theoretical studies in religious tourism, anthropology of tourism and sociology of tourism.

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
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에쓰-오일이 소방영웅지킴이 프로그램으로 소방관을 돕고 있습니다  
순직 소방관 유자녀에게 학자금을 지원하고 부상 소방관에게 격려금을 지원하는 등  
우리 사회의 진정한 영웅을 지키기 위한 에쓰-오일의 노력은 계속됩니다