

2018 KAMES International Conference

***The Middle East  
in an Era of Transition,  
Reorganization of the Regional  
Order and the Search  
for Partnership***

**Date** OCT 12 Fri. – OCT 14 Sun, 2018

**Venue** International Conference Hall – Minerva Complex, HUFS  
& President Hotel

**Host** Korean Association of Middle East Studies (KAMES)

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by the Korean Government.

2018 KAMES International Conference

The Middle East in an Era of Transition,  
Reorganization of the Regional Order and the Search for Partnership

## PROGRAM

### The 1st Day—October 12(Fri.), 2018(President Hotel)

16:00–18:00 Round Table

19:00–21:00 Welcoming Dinner(Venue: Brahms Hall (19F), President Hotel)

### The 2nd Day—October 13(Sat.), 2018(HUFS)

09:00–09:30 Registration

09:30–10:00 Opening Session

International Conference Hall – Minerva Complex (B2F)

Moderator: Kim, Kangsuk (Dankook Univ., Korea)

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International Conference Hall – Minerva Complex (B2F)

Moderator: Lee, In-seop, Vice President of KAMES

18:00–20:00 Dinner

Sky Lounge (13F), Main Building / HUFS

## **The 3rd Day – October 14(Sun.), 2018(President Hotel)**

09:00–10:00 Round Table

# Opening Ceremony

Moderator: Kim, Kangsuk(Dankook Univ., Korea)

## » Opening Address

- Park, Jae Won (President, KAMES)
- Yun, Eun Kyeong (Chairperson,  
Organizing Committee)

## » Welcoming Address

- Hong, Jin-wook (Director-General,  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs)





**Park, Jae Won**  
**President,**  
**Korean Association of Middle East Studies**

It is my great honor and privilege to host the 2018 KAMES (Korean Association of Middle East Studies) International Conference. The International Conference is an annual academic event that the KAMES has been organizing since it was founded in 1979. A number of Korean and international scholars, researchers, diplomats, and guests have contributed to the success of the conference. Today, the KAMES expects the conference to yield more fruitful discussions.

The Middle East and North Africa, as well as the East Asia, is a very dynamic region. Its natural resources are the engine of global economy, and its political developments make great impacts on world politics. With so much important news frequently coming out from the region, there seems to be no lack of topics and themes for Middle East studies.

The theme of this year's conference is "The Middle East in an Era of Transition: Reorganization of the Regional Order and the Search for Partnership." The conference consists of specialized sessions for diverse fields: politics, society, economy, history, language, and culture of the Middle East. In every session, scholars will discuss new trends coming from the continuously changing Middle East. I am confident that scholarly analyses will broaden the horizons of understanding on the Middle East, and the conference will contribute to making cooperative relations among scholars in the field of the Middle East studies and other regional studies.

I would like to mention that this conference could not have been organized without the devotion of the Organizing Committee members, who worked tirelessly for months to make this conference possible. I truly appreciate that the committee chair Prof. Yun, Eun Kyeong, who could not attend the ceremony due to an important mission, and all the colleagues exerted tremendous efforts to make this conference possible. I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to them.

I sincerely thank all the international guests for being here with the KAMES, and I wish they can enjoy the beauty of the most pleasant season in Korea.

Thank you very much.







**Yun, Eun Kyeong**  
**Chairperson,**  
**the Organizing Committee of International**  
**Conference,**  
**Korean Association of Middle East Studies**

Assalāmu ‘Alaykum!

Honorable professors and scholars, and distinguished researchers and guests and participants, and Mr. Hong, Jin-Wook, director general of ministry of foreign affairs and ladies and gentlemen, good morning.

I’m Yun, Eun-Kyeong, the chairperson of the Organizing Committee of International Conference, KAMES. First of all, I’d like to express warm welcome to all honorable guests and participants of 2018 KAMES International Conference, “The Middle East in an Era of Transition, Reorganization of the Regional Order and the Search for Partnership”.

Recently, the Middle East is facing a transitional period that is moving in a new direction due to some significant changes. Therefore, 2018 KAMES International conference will provide a good opportunity to academic discussions for the scholars at the world level in order to view the multidimensional changes in the Middle East, which are moving in a new direction in important changes.

In this conference, many distinguished scholars are participating from Japan, Italy, Iran, Malaysia, Mongolia, Singapore, UAE, USA and Korea. So we hope this conference will be an important opportunity to understand the recent situation and academic trends in the Middle East in addition to exchanging opinions and information about the related studies.

Furthermore I expect that the information about the Middle Eastern studies will be accumulated in Korea through this conference, and that this conference will play a role in promoting future international, and intercultural cooperation between the scholars.

With this in mind, I wish 2018 KAMES International conference will be a memorable place for academic debates for all the participants.

Finally, I’d like to express deep appreciation once again to all the guests for the participation.

Thank you very much.





**Hong, Jin-wook**  
**Director-General**  
**Middle Eastern and African Affairs, Ministry**  
**of Foreign Affairs**

Mr. Park Jae-won, President of the Korean Association of Middle East Studies,  
Distinguished scholars and participants from home and abroad,  
Ladies and gentlemen,

It is an honor for me to be here today among such remarkable participants to speak on behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry is a proud co-host of this important event which, over the past 15 years, has grown into the pre-eminent forum in Korea for discussing key issues involving the Middle East and how this critically important region relates to Korea.

This year's topic – *The Middle East in an Era of Transition, Reorganization of the Regional Order, and the Search for Partnership* – is both timely and relevant. Timely because the political and economic landscape in the Middle East is changing in ways we have not yet seen, at a pace that we are perhaps not fully accustomed to. And relevant because the success or failure of the region's transformation efforts will depend in no small measure on the vitality of its partnerships with other countries – including Korea.

Many Middle East observers point to the Arab Spring as one of the most impactful events affecting the region in the past half century. Outcry over the death of a single young man in Tunisia quickly reverberated across the Middle East and North Africa, as the youth generation spoke out in unprecedented ways for a better life, more accountability, and real democratic governance. The protests raised hopes for a fundamental remodeling of the political structures of the region and resulted in the collapse of stubbornly durable authoritarian regimes. Democratic elections ushered in new governments in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya.

But the reality we see in the Middle East today is in many ways a far cry from what the protesters had envisioned. Civil war and social collapse have brought countries to the brink of humanitarian tragedy. The Syrian war has leveled an entire nation and resulted in incalculable deaths. The conflict in Yemen is at a stalemate and has no end in sight. It is easy to become pessimistic at what has transpired in the Middle East since those first protests erupted seven years ago. In fact, many pundits continue to paint a gloomy picture of the future of the Middle East, one where its people are held back by structural, economic, and cultural deficiencies.

But I believe that this prognosis is both wrong and unfair. Yes, the Middle East, like any other region, no doubt has its share of problems. But cynicism and fatalism are self-reinforcing and detrimental to progress. They also sow

the seeds for misunderstanding between the Middle East and the rest of the world.

I believe that we must zealously guard against punditry like this that zeroes in on the perceived peculiarities and disparateness of the Middle East and Islam. If the Middle East continues to struggle to find its voice for real and sustainable change, the region by no means stands alone. Distrust of free trade and multilateralism, animus against immigrants and refugees, skepticism over climate change, and deepening social and political polarization are more salient today across the world than ever before. If anything, these are global challenges that require us to work together.

Furthermore, I believe that we have an obligation to push back against the portrayal of a monolithic Middle East. While some countries are engulfed in conflict and hostilities, others are at the forefront of exciting innovation and change. Dubai is today one of the most chic and vibrant cities on earth. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Algeria and Kuwait have launched ambitious national development projects to wean the countries away from oil through economic diversification.

These transformations present challenges, as well as opportunities, for our mutual partnership. Korea and the Middle East can no longer rely solely on the antiquated model of cooperation that was formulated forty years ago which focuses on infrastructure development and power plant construction. The countries of the Middle East are eager to partner with Korea in novel areas like IT, capacity building, education, smart infrastructure, healthcare and renewable energy – and Korea must be both ready and willing to respond.

To this end, the relevant Korean government agencies, and above all my bureau – the Bureau of Middle Eastern and African Affairs – are forging ahead with what I would like to dub Korea's Middle East Policy 2.0. We have already established strategic partnerships with UAE, Algeria, and others. The Saudi-Korea Vision 2030 Committee is pursuing 40 concrete areas for cooperation across five key industrial sectors, from investment and SMEs to capacity building and healthcare. These represent comprehensive efforts to diversify and elevate the partnerships to new levels.

At the same time, I want to remind ourselves that true and lasting partnerships can only emerge from mutual understanding that comes through continuous people-to-people engagement. There can be no short cuts to friendship. This is why I am genuinely heartened by the rising popularity of Korean pop culture in the Middle East, and the heightened interest among Koreans to experience firsthand the richness of Middle Eastern culture and hospitality.

As participants of this conference, we all have a responsibility to help bring our peoples and regions closer together. I hope you will leave the discussions today with a better understanding of Korea and the Middle East, and why this enduring partnership matters so much.

Shukran Jazilan.

2018 KAMES International Conference

The Middle East in an Era of Transition,  
Reorganization of the Regional Order and the Search for Partnership

# Keynote Speech

Moderator: Kim, Kangsuk(Dankook Univ., Korea)

» A NEW MIDDLE EAST?

– James L. Gelvin (UCLA, USA)





# A New Middle East?

James L. Gelvin ( UCLA, USA)

The phrase, “New Middle East,” in its current meaning was first used by Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice in 2006. She used it to refer to the Middle East that the Bush administration expected to emerge in the wake of the American invasion of Iraq. According to Rice and the rest of the Bush cabinet, the American invasion would create a democratic Iraq which will become an inspiration to the rest of the region. Kings and dictators will heed the call of democracy and open up their governments.

The reality was quite different: Besides leaving close to 4,500 Americans and an estimated half million Iraqis dead, the American invasion created a weak, inefficient, and corrupt government in Iraq. As for democratic transition, *The Economist Intelligence Unit* ranks Iraq near the category of full blown authoritarianism.

But Rice was correct in one sense: The American invasion of Iraq *was* one of two events that created the New Middle East. The other event that created the New Middle East took place seven years later.

As is well known, the Arab uprisings began in Tunisia in December 2010, then spread to all but four of the member states of the Arab League. Called early on by pundits the “Arab Spring,” the uprisings, which began with the promise of human rights, democratic transition, and social and economic justice, soon confounded the initial optimism that accompanied their outbreak:

- In Egypt and all the monarchies, the forces of reaction snuffed out the demands for change.
- In some places—Egypt, Bahrain—government oppression went from bad to worse.
- Syria’s bloodbath shows no sign of abating. For that matter, neither does Libya’s nor Yemen’s.
- In Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, even Tunisia and the Sinai, the weakening of regimes or the diversion of their attention created an environment in which violent Islamist groups might breed.
- In the most brutal war zones—Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iraq—entire towns and cities have been laid waste, their populations scattered.
- And Saudi-Iranian competition, along with American and Russian repositioning, has fanned the flames of intra-state and inter-state conflict.

These, then, are some of the contours of the “New Middle East.” The opening of a new chapter in contemporary Middle Eastern history raises a number of questions for scholars and policymakers. Among them are the following:

- What will be the long-term legacy of the protests and uprisings of 2010-2011? Should we view those protests and uprisings as an aberrant and singular event, or do they represent a tectonic shift in popular attitudes toward governance, political community, and social and economic justice?
- What is the combined legacy of the glorification of neo-liberal values, the broadening and deepening of communitarian attachments, sustained political violence, and dispersion on the civic fabric and psychic constitution of the inhabitants of the Middle East?
- What is the future of political Islam? Will moderate Islamist groups continue to work within their respective systems, or have recent events demonstrated that such activities and moderation are pointless? And what is the future of the radical fringe of the Islamist tendency? What will the demise of the caliphate mean for the future of ISIS and other jihadi currents? Will it strengthen or weaken them?
- How will recent events affect the state system? While it does not appear that the state system in the Middle East as a whole is under threat, what does the disintegration of structures of governance in Syria, Yemen, Libya—and the concomitant rise of sectarianism and warlordism there—mean for their futures and the futures of their neighbors?
- What does the repositioning of great powers mean for international relations of the New Middle East? It appears that after a half century of dominance in the region, the American moment has waned. Are we headed toward multipolarity in the region, and, considering the region's political and economic state, does it still matter?
- How about intraregional dynamics? The defining regional dynamic today is the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Will that competition continue to rend the region through proxy wars, will the competition escalate, or might some form of détente be effected, as the Obama administration sought to establish?
- What will be the place of the New Middle East in the Global Economy? The Arab Middle East is, next to sub-Saharan Africa, currently the least globalized region on earth. Is there potential for a region whose two major exports are oil and unemployed youths?
- What is the future of national economies in the region? Since 1976, when Egypt was compelled to implement neo-liberal policies for the first time, the domain of neo-liberalism has only expanded in the region, resulting in hybrid economies, crony capitalism, widening income inequality, higher levels of poverty and unemployment, and popular resistance. Since global economic institutions appear to be one-trick ponies, can there be any relief for the beleaguered populations of the region?
- Finally, what will the New Middle East mean for those beleaguered populations? What I am referring to is “human security”—what the United Nations Development Program defines as “the liberation of human beings from those intense, extensive, prolonged and comprehensive threats to which their lives and freedom are vulnerable.” People in the Middle East are now facing—and will continue to face—numerous challenges to their security, from bad governance and political violence, population growth, environmental degradation and climate change, to the subjugation of women, inadequate access to education and healthcare, unemployment and economic stagnation, poverty, and physical displacement. Might something be done to alleviate these problems, or is a continued downward spiral inevitable?



The answers to these questions will define the course of the New Middle East. It is, of course, impossible to answer all of them in a single lecture. I shall therefore limit my remarks to a handful of the most important issues: Syria, ISIS, Saudi Arabia v. Iran, and human security in an age of violence and neo-liberalism.



# 1st Session. Politics (1)

**Moderator: Hah, Byoung Joo(PUFS, Korea)**

» **President Trump' s decision to recognise Jerusalem as the  
Capital of Israel: Implications for the Palestinians and the  
broader Middle East**

- Victor Matthew Kattan (National Univ. of Singapore, Singapore)
- Discussant: Sung, Il Kwang (Konkuk Univ., Korea)

» **The Succession of Saudi Arabia's Kingship:  
A Case Study of 2005**

- Choi, Young-chol (Seoul Jangsin Univ., Korea)
- Discussant: Lee Hyo-bun (HUFS, Korea)

» **The Politics of Everyday Desires: Bananas, Dubai and the  
Revolution in Libya**

- Matteo Capasso (European Univ. Institute, Italy)
- Discussant: Paik Seung Hoon (HUFS, Korea)



# President Trump's decision to recognise Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel: Implications for the Palestinians and the broader Middle East

Victor Matthew Kattan (National Univ. of Singapore, Singapore)

## Abstract

President Trump's decision to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel has emboldened the government of Israel to take further steps to corner the Palestinians into accepting Israel's presence in East Jerusalem and the settlement blocs as a fait accompli. This was reflected, most recently, in the adoption by Israel's legislature of The Nation State Law, which does not only apply to Israel, but also to parts of the occupied West Bank. In addition, there have been discussions in Israel about annexing Areas C of the West Bank. Annexing this territory, approximately 61 percent of the territory of the West Bank, would sharply curtail the ability of the Palestinian Authority to establish a sovereign and independent state. Trump's decision to recognise Jerusalem has also caused a rift in the Arab world between the 'moderate' Sunni Arab states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Jordan) and Qatar, Turkey, Iran, and Syria.

## Introduction

President Trump's statement recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel has upset decades of Middle East peace-making efforts.<sup>1</sup> This is because Jerusalem is a permanent status issue that was supposed to be resolved in final status negotiations between the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Government of Israel (GOI). It would appear that the decision to recognise Jerusalem was designed to put pressure on the Palestinians to make concessions to Israel in any future peace negotiations. Israel also appears to be preparing to take unilateral measures in which Abu Dis, a suburb of Jerusalem that is located behind the separation barrier, becomes the future capital of a Palestinian entity, rather than the Old City of Jerusalem, which the PA claims. Removing Abu Dis and adjacent Palestinian neighbourhoods from Jerusalem's municipal boundary by transferring them to the territory of a future Palestinian 'state', would also change the demographics of the city, by decreasing its Arab population, and concurrently increasing its Jewish population.<sup>2</sup> The move to redraw Jerusalem's boundaries appears to have been coordinated with President Trump. On the same day the amendment was passed, Trump tweeted: 'We have taken Jerusalem, the toughest part of the negotiation, off the table'.<sup>3</sup>

President Trump's decision to recognise Jerusalem as Israel's capital has fulfilled his election promise and satisfied his electoral base. Trump has also succeeded in cornering the Palestinians by reducing their options with a view to forcing them to compromise. However, on this occasion, President Trump may have gone too far. His decision to close the PLO Mission in Washington; to cut further aid to the PA, including to essential hospital services, and to the UN Refugee Agency for Palestinian Refugees; and to designate Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh a 'Specially Designated Global Terrorist' may lead to the collapse of the PA –

especially given concerns about the health of Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas and the lack of any clear successor or a political system that could effectively deal with the transition.

### **Trump's decision to recognise Jerusalem**

Although in his statement recognising Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, Trump said the US was 'not taking a position on any final-status issues, including the specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem', this was belied by his Tweet which said that he had taken Jerusalem 'off the table'. Trump also made no mention of the specific boundaries of Palestinian sovereignty, other than to say that he wanted an agreement that would be 'a great deal for the Israelis and a great deal for the Palestinians'.<sup>4</sup> On 14 May, amidst demonstrations in Gaza, the new US embassy in Jerusalem was opened in a former US consular office located in the Arnona neighbourhood of Jerusalem<sup>5</sup> in the demilitarized zone beyond the 1967 Green Line.

Admittedly, Trump's 6 December 2017 statement was ambiguous, and was to some extent uncontroversial, since he said he was not taking a position on final status issues. Accordingly, some scholars, including the present author, had expected the US president to follow up with something about Palestinian claims at a later stage,<sup>6</sup> but Trump never availed himself of the opportunity: the US has said nothing about Palestinian rights to the city.

### **The international community reacts**

The US decision to move its embassy to Jerusalem was condemned by the PA, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN). The Arab League described the US recognition of Jerusalem as a serious breach of international law.<sup>7</sup> The OIC called the recognition 'an attack on the historical, legal, natural and national rights of the Palestinian people' and demanded that Trump retract his recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital city.<sup>8</sup> The EU Council stated that it would 'not recognise any changes to the pre-1967 borders including with regard to Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties'.<sup>9</sup> The UN General Assembly voted in favour of a resolution affirming that 'any decisions and actions which purport to have altered the character, status or demographic composition of the Holy City of Jerusalem have no legal effect, are null and void and must be rescinded in compliance with relevant resolutions of the Security Council, and in this regard, calls upon all States to refrain from the establishment of diplomatic missions in the Holy City of Jerusalem, pursuant to resolution 478 (1980) of the Security Council'.<sup>10</sup>

### **Israel takes steps to annex the West Bank**

On 6 February 2017, Israel's parliament, the Knesset passed The Judea and Samaria Settlement Regulation Law to retroactively legalize Israeli settlements in Area C of the West Bank. The law was passed by 60 votes to 52. According to the law, the land on which the settlements are built will remain that of the legal owners, but their usage will be expropriated by the state. In exchange, Palestinian owners will be compensated at a rate of 125%, or receive alternate lands (whenever possible). The law has had the effect of retroactively 'legalizing' 4,000 settler homes and has been attacked by Israel's Left as the first step toward 'de facto annexation'. As observed by *The Jerusalem Post*: 'That territory is considered to be outside the Knesset's purview and such an action could be viewed as an initial application of sovereignty'.<sup>11</sup>

On 31 December 2017, the Likud Central Committee voted in favour of a resolution calling on the party's leaders to annex parts of the West Bank.<sup>12</sup> Annexation is favoured by Gideon Sa'ar and Naftali Bennet, often mentioned as potential successors to Netanyahu. Sa'ar has said that he supports applying Israeli law to all Jewish settlements in the West Bank.<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, opposition leader Avi Gabbay favours withdrawing from the West Bank, but he would likely insist on keeping the settlements blocs around Jerusalem in exchange for land swaps with the Palestinians elsewhere.<sup>14</sup> However, a taskforce comprised of members of a network of over 275 retired generals from all of Israel's security services opposes the move.<sup>15</sup>

### **Israel amends its Basic Law on Jerusalem**

On 2 January 2018, the Knesset amended its Basic Law on Jerusalem, originally passed on 30 July 1980, which states that 'Jerusalem, complete and united, is the capital of Israel'.<sup>16</sup> Previously, according to Israeli law, a supermajority (80 votes) was necessary for the Knesset to approve the transfer of areas within Jerusalem's municipality to a future country—such as Jordan or Palestine—but now this supermajority requirement can be amended by another amending Basic Law adopted with a simple majority of 61 votes.<sup>17</sup> In other words, the new law makes it easier to transfer parts of Jerusalem to a future state.

It has been reported that Abu Dis, which lies outside the perimeter of the separation wall that Israel has constructed, and which itself is contrary to international law,<sup>18</sup> might become the future capital of a Palestinian state (as opposed to East Jerusalem) were Israel to recognize such a state (by no means a foregone conclusion).<sup>19</sup> In exchange for 'ceding' this territory, Israel would 'absorb' the settlement blocs located around Jerusalem.<sup>20</sup>

### **The Nation State Law**

On 19 July 2018, Israel's legislature passed The Nation State Law. Like Israel's law on Jerusalem, the Nation State Law is a Basic Law, which makes it part of Israel's Constitution. The Nation State Law was passed by 62 votes to 55 after a heated eight-hour debate.<sup>21</sup> Section 1 (C) of the law provides that the right of national self-determination in the state of Israel is *exclusive* to the Jewish people.<sup>22</sup> Given that Israel annexed East Jerusalem, which under Israel law, is an integral part of the Jewish state, the only reasonable interpretation of The Nation State Law is to conclude that only the Jewish people have a right of self-determination in East Jerusalem, even though 60 per cent of the population of East Jerusalem is Arab.<sup>23</sup> It would appear that The Nation State Law, when read in conjunction with the amendment to Israel's Basic Law, may be a prelude to unilateral moves by Israel, in which it redraws its municipal borders to the perimeter of the separation barrier enclosing the Jewish settlement blocs. If this were to transpire, then Israeli Jews would form a majority of the population of East Jerusalem.

### **Implications for the Palestinians**

The PA is facing the biggest test of its legitimacy in its short twenty-five year history. Since Trump recognised Jerusalem, the PA has refused to engage with the US over its much touted 'deal of the century'. This stance appears to have upset US negotiators Jason Greenblatt and Jared Kushner who engaged in a war of words in the Israeli press with Sa'eb Erekat, the

Secretary-General of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the chief Palestinian negotiator.<sup>24</sup> The US has since double downed on the Palestinians and cut more than \$200 million in aid to the PA and \$25 million in aid for cancer and kidney dialysis treatment for Palestinians in East Jerusalem's hospitals.<sup>25</sup> This is in addition to the aid cut to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees. John Bolton, the US National Security Adviser, also announced the closure of the PLO mission in Washington and threatened further measures if the International Criminal Court opens an investigation into Israel war crimes.

The strategy is clear: the US is trying to back the Palestinians into a corner until they submit to their 'new peace plan', which appears to have removed Jerusalem and the refugee file from the final status negotiations with Israel. It also appears from public statements that the US may have also removed the issue of Palestinian statehood from the table as it has been talking about a confederation with Jordan, reviving an old Likud plan from the 1970s.

### **Implications for the broader Middle East**

Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appears to have capitalised on pre-existing divisions in the Arab world that deteriorated further during the 'Arab Spring' by persuading Trump to recognise Jerusalem, which caused a rift in the Arab world between the 'moderate' Sunni Arab states (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Jordan) and Qatar, Turkey, Iran, and Syria/Lebanon. In the short term, and contrary to what he believes, President Trump's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital has set back the prospect of peace and may have also derailed back channel discussions between Saudi and Israeli intelligence officials about confronting Iran in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, since Riyadh cannot afford to publicly associate itself so closely with the US and Israel on Jerusalem as it undermines its leadership in the Muslim world. As Prince Turki al-Faisal warned in *The LA Times*, Trump's reckless action united Arab nationalists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Saudi Arabia's arch foe and rival Iran.<sup>26</sup>

The Arab country most concerned about Trump's peace plan is undoubtedly Jordan. 'Israel is waging a war on the idea of an independent Palestinian state, and Jordan fears losing its national identity' warned Zvi Ba'el in the Israeli newspaper *Haaretz*.<sup>27</sup> According to Ba'el, confederation is an Israeli idea that has been discussed with Greenblat and Kushner and was presented to King Abdullah II of Jordan. The plan calls for Jordanian security forces to be in charge of protecting the West Bank (excluding Jerusalem) and the border between Israel and the confederation. Presumably, the confederation agreement would need to be signed by the PA and Jordan, although it is not clear whether a joint parliament and constitution would be established or whether the Palestinian component would have the status of a state.

Unsurprisingly, Jordan has rejected the plan: it has no desire to act as Israel's subcontractor in the West Bank and it has not given up on its claim to act as custodian of the Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. Israel wants Egypt to assume control of the Gaza Strip as it has welcomed greater Egyptian surveillance of Hamas there. But, for the same reasons that Jordan will not agree to take control of the West Bank, Egypt will likely say 'no thank you'.

### **A car crash waiting to happen**

We are approaching a tipping point in the long running Arab-Israeli dispute where the choices for all sides are bad. Like a bull in a china shop, President Trump's decision to recognise



Jerusalem – one of the thorniest and most contested of issues – as Israel’s capital, far from contributing to peace, has emboldened Israel’s Right to take further steps to entrench its control of the West Bank making it virtually impossible for the Palestinians to establish a state.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Statement by President Trump on Jerusalem, 6 December 2017, at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-jerusalem/>

<sup>2</sup> See Raphael Ahren, ‘By backing ‘Greater Jerusalem’ bill, is PM leaning toward annexing settlements?’ *Times of Israel*, 5 October 2017 at <https://www.timesofisrael.com/by-backing-greater-jerusalem-bill-is-pm-leaning-toward-annexing-settlements/>.

<sup>3</sup> See Trump’s tweets on 2 January 2018 at <https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump>

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Amir Tibon, ‘Report: U.S. Ambassador in Israel Will Work Out of Consular Office Building in Jerusalem by 2019,’ *Haaretz*, 19 January 2018 at <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/report-u-s-ambassador-in-israel-will-work-from-j-lem-office-building-1.5746733>

<sup>6</sup> See Victor Kattan, ‘Running to the UN Won’t Bring a Palestinian State Closer. Abbas Has to Bite the Bullet and Talk to Trump,’ *Haaretz*, 18 December 2017, <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/forget-the-un-abbas-has-to-bite-the-bullet-and-talk-to-trump-1.5628984>

<sup>7</sup> See Resolution 8221 adopted by the Extraordinary Session of the Council of the League of Arab States at Ministerial Level on the U.S. declaration to recognize Jerusalem as capital of the Israeli occupation state and to move its embassy to Jerusalem. (R. 8221 – Ex. S. – 09/12/2017).

<sup>8</sup> See para. 1 of Final Communiqué of the Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference to consider the Situation in the wake of the US Administration’s recognition of the city of Al-Quds al-Sharif the so-called Capital of Israel, the Occupying Power, and the transfer of the US Embassy to Al-Quds (13 December 2017) at <https://www.oic-oci.org/docdown/?docID=1699&refID=1073>

<sup>9</sup> See European Council Meeting (14 December 2017) – Conclusions, Brussels, Co EUR 24, CONCL 7.

<sup>10</sup> See General Assembly Resolution ES-10/19, 19 December 2017 at [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/ES-10/19](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/ES-10/19)

<sup>11</sup> Tovah Lazaroff, ‘Knesset passes historic law legalizing 4,000 settler homes’, *The Jerusalem Post*, 6 February 2017, <https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Knesset-passes-historic-Settlements-Bill-480768>

<sup>12</sup> Jacob Magid, ‘Likud top body votes to urge annexing parts of the West Bank’, *Times of Israel*, 31 December 2017, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/likud-top-body-votes-to-annex-parts-of-the-west-bank/>

<sup>13</sup> See Gil Hoffman, ‘Gideon Sa’ar: Forming Palestinian state now would be “crazy”’, *The Jerusalem Post*, 31 January 2018 at <http://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Gideon-Saar-Forming-Palestinian-state-now-would-be-crazy-540357>

<sup>14</sup> Jonathan Lis, ‘Israeli Labor leader: If peace talks fail, Israel should withdraw from the West Bank without a deal’, *Haaretz*, 3 February 2018 at <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/avi-gabbay-if-peace-talks-fail-israel-should-withdraw-from-west-bank-1.5787196>. See also, Gill Hoffman, ‘Gabbay clarified position on settlements following left wing outrage’, *The Jerusalem Post*, 17 October 2017 at <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Zionist-Union-head-No-evacuating-settlements-507614>

<sup>15</sup> See Danny Yatom and Amnon Reshef, ‘A dangerous course Israel should avoid’, *The New York Times*, 2 February 2018 at <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/opinion/israel-settlement-palestine-solution.html>

<sup>16</sup> See Christopher S. Wren, ‘Israel Enacts a Law Making all of Jerusalem the Capital,’ *The New York Times*, 31 July 1980. For the text, see Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, [https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic10\\_eng.htm](https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic10_eng.htm).

<sup>17</sup> See Nir Hasson and Jonathan Lis, ‘The Israeli Right’s Vaunted Jerusalem Amendment Changes Nothing,’ *Haaretz*, 3 January 2018, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/premium-1.832780>; and, Lahav Harkov, ‘New 80-majority Jerusalem Bill Has Loophole Enabling City to be Divided,’ *The Jerusalem Post*, 2 January 2018, <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Right-wing-coalition-passes-law-allowing-Jerusalem-to-be-divided-522627>.

<sup>18</sup> The ICJ has already held that the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around Jerusalem, is contrary to international law. See *Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, advisory opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004*, at 201, para 163.

<sup>19</sup> It has been reported that the move would allow the Knesset to approve the transfer of Abu Dis, and adjacent Arab neighborhoods located behind the wall in East Jerusalem—outside the Old City—to a separate Palestinian entity under Israeli authority. The amendment makes it clear that the 1995 Interim Agreement (Oslo II)

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continues to apply. An unofficial translation of the new law is available at <http://knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/BasicLawJerusalem.pdf>.

<sup>20</sup> See Raphael Ahren, 'By Backing 'Greater Jerusalem' Bill, is PM Leaning Toward Annexing Settlements?' *Times of Israel*, 5 October 2017, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/by-backing-greater-jerusalem-bill-is-pm-leaning-toward-annexing-settlements/>.

<sup>21</sup> Victor Kattan, 'Move to give Jews special status sparks controversy', *The Straits Times*, 30 July 2018, <https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/move-to-give-jews-special-status-sparks-controversy>

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> See the study by The Jerusalem Institute (at p 22) here: <http://en.jerusalem-institute.org.il/upload/publications/Jerusalem%20Facts%20and%20Trends%20-%20Population.pdf> ('In 2015 a total of 320,300 Arabs resided in areas added to Jerusalem after 1967, constituting 60% of the overall population of these areas and 99% of the Arab population of the city'.)

<sup>24</sup> See Jack Khoury, 'Top Palestinian Negotiator: Kushner and Greenblatt Trying to Topple the Palestinian Authority', *Haaretz*, 23 June 2018, <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-saeb-erekat-kushner-and-greenblatt-are-trying-to-topple-the-pa-1.6199699>

<sup>25</sup> 'Trump cuts \$25 million in aid for Palestinians in East Jerusalem hospitals', *Reuters*, 9 September 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-palestinians-hospitals/trump-axes-25-million-in-aid-for-palestinians-in-east-jerusalem-hospitals-idUSKCN1LO000>

<sup>26</sup> See 'Prince Turki al Faisal: No, Mr. Trump, Jerusalem is not the capital of Israel', *The LA Times*, 15 December 2017, <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-turki-al-faisal-trump-jerusalem-not-capital-of-israel-20171215-story.html>

<sup>27</sup> Zvi Bar'el, 'Trump's Revived Jordan-Palestinian Confederation Plan May Be Dead on Arrival', *Haaretz*, 3 September 2018, <https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/.premium-trump-s-jordan-palestinian-confederation-plan-may-be-dead-1.6436489>

# The Succession of Saudi Arabia's Kingship: A Case Study of 2005

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## I . Introduction

On June 21, 2017, Saudi Arabia's King Salman appointed his son, Mohammed bin Salman, as his heir (*New York Times*, June 21, 2017; *Reuters*, July 19, 2017). This decision was endorsed by 31 out of 34 members of the Allegiance Council. It was an unconventional succession of kingship in modern Saudi Arabia since 1953, because the throne had been passed not linearly from father to son, but laterally from brother to brother until 2017.

In the 1950s, King Saud tried to change the succession formula which his father had designed, appointing his sons to the key state posts to control the state. King Saud's attempt caused an intensive power struggle between King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal over the next kingship succession. There were several cases of collision between the two camps during the period of the early 1960s. In 1964, Faisal won the power struggle and King Saud was dethroned after an armed confrontation in the Saud's palace.

The 1964-battle between the two camps opened Prince Abdullah's path to the throne. Prince Abdullah sided with Faisal, sending his National Guard troops to surround the Saud's palace and Royal Guard. This was a critical contribution to the Faisal's victory in the battle. The National Guard became a main power base for Abdullah.

This paper examines the power struggle between Abdullah and Sultan over the succession of the Saudi kingship, and analyzes the succession process in 2005.

## II . History of Succession in Saudi Arabia before 1964

Since the early years of his rule, Abdulaziz had the intention to pass the throne on to his immediate sons. He designed a succession plan in the order of the direct descendants, and put it into practice. As a ruler, he was able to strategically place his sons such as Saud, Faisal, and Khalid to key state posts. Abdulaziz appointed Saud, his eldest son, as Governor of Nezd (Riyadh, Al-Qassim,

Hail) and his second son Faisal as the Governor of Hijaz (Herb 1999, 89). And he appointed Saud as Crown Prince in 1933 right after his enthronement as the King of modern Saudi Arabia. His third son Khalid was appointed as Governor of Hijaz after Faisal terminated the Hijaz governorship in 1930 and became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. And in 1934 Khalid became Interior Minister, a key state power post (Herb 1999, 87-92; Kechichian 2001, 36-37).

King Abdulaziz decreed on his deathbed that the 'eldest' among the able sons of Abdulaziz should be king. When King Abdulaziz passed away, the then Crown Prince Saud was declared King and his brother Faisal became Crown Prince and Prime Minister (Henderson 1994, 8). Since the succession of Saud as King, and Faisal as Prime Minister, the two eldest sons of Abdulaziz shared power, but they began to compete for hegemony over state power. Having received traditional kingship training from Abdulaziz, Saud tried to focus his power on the royal court under the traditional and patrimonial paradigm. Faisal, on the other hand, took control of rapidly expanding bureaucratic governmental organizations. King Saud tried to strengthen the role of the royal court. As Prime Minister, Faisal exercised his powers in securing the control of the cabinet and the administrative institutions (Mann 2013, 27-28).

In contrast to the will of King Abdulaziz, however, Saud revealed his intention to succeed the throne to one of his sons, appointing them to the key state posts to control the state organizations. Since 1956, Saud had placed his sons to the key state posts (Herb 1999, 93-96), appointing them to Minister of Defense (Fahd), to Commander of the Royal Guard (Musaid), Commander of the National Guard (Khalid), and Commander of the Special Guard (Saad) (Al-Rasheed 2010). His sons, however, were too young and unsuited to carry out the key state posts. The powerful second generation princes such as Faisal, Khalid and Fahd, were furious about Saud's attempt to change Abdulaziz's succession formula (Kechichian 2001, 40-41).

Despite the rapid increase of government revenue from the crude oil exports, Saudi government's finances deteriorated through corruption and waste of the Saud's royal court, and by poor financial management. With the tide of Arab Nationalism, advocated by Egyptian President Nasser, the political and military influence of Nasser spread to the neighboring countries, including Yemen and Syria. In 1958, King Saud was accused of a conspiracy aimed at assassinating Nasser through the Syrian army. But his conspiracy was discovered and failed. King Saud's waste and dismal financial management combined with his impulsive foreign policy failures caused the country a serious setback. Even in these domestic and foreign crisis situations, Saud had shown little ability for coping with the crisis. The Saudi royal family and the Ulama perceived this situation as a threat to the Saudi monarchy (Vassiliev 1998, 354).

On March 24, 1958, two weeks after Saud's assassination attempt on Nasser discovered, Fahd, a powerful leader of the Sudayri Seven in the royal family, led a delegation of royal princes to Saud and delivered the following ultimatum: Firstly, to transfer all administrative powers to Faisal, secondly, to avoid waste of state finances and indiscriminate spending, thirdly, to remove the king's aides who participated in the assassination plot against Nasser, fourthly, the sons of Abdulaziz and Saud's sons should be treated equally (Kechichian 2001, 41; Herb 1999, 94).

Facing Faisal's challenge, Saud asked the U.S. to support him, but his request was ignored. The overwhelming majority of royal family members were hostile to him. Even within the military he was unpopular. As a result, he eventually proclaimed a royal decree on March 31, 1958, to transfer the executive power carrying out domestic and foreign policies to the Council of Ministers and the

Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Due to this, Faisal became Prime Minister, Supreme Commander of the Saudi Armed Forces as well as the country's security and defense forces (Vassiliev 1998, 355).

Despite officially transferring the executive power to Faisal, Saud attempted to restore his power through making alliance with Arab nationalists, progressive political groups and liberal princes who were popular among Saudi public at the time, pursuing constitutional monarchy (Mann 2013, 28-29). In May 1960, Faisal attempted to appoint Fahd as prime minister before leaving for Europe for medical treatment, but Saud refused to approve the appointment. Some princes supported Faisal, while others, including Talal and Nawaf, sided with Saud. In June 1960 Prince Talal, the leader of the liberal princes group, proposed the adoption of a constitutional monarchy, but Faisal rejected the proposal. Saud too did not accept the proposal because it was radical, although he kept up relations with these liberal groups.

As seen above, in 1960, Saud and Faisal collided each other due to budget issues and Faisal's attempt to appoint Fahd as acting prime minister. As a result, Faisal resigned. In this context, Saud reassumed the functions of Prime Minister and appointed new ministers. He appointed Talal as Finance Minister, his son Muhammad as Defense Minister, Talal's supporter Abdul Muhsin as Interior Minister, Badr as Minister of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, and the renowned nationalist Abdallah Tariqi as Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. However, this Saud-Talal alliance did not last long, because the two groups were temporarily united by their mutual understanding of sharing interests. Their alliance collapsed when Talal attempted to realize his political reform agenda. And Talal and the other 'Free Princes' exiled to Cairo, becoming Nasser's guests (Herb 1999, 96).

In November, 1961, Saud left the Kingdom for medical treatment, leaving the government to Faisal. After returning home in March 1962, Saud wanted to resume his authority. Faisal, however, not only refused it, but also demanded redistribution of offices between the Saud and Faisal camps. In a subsequent cabinet reorganization, Faisal was guaranteed permanent premiership and returned to the post of Prime Minister (Herb 1999, 96). In September 1962, when revolution befell the Yemeni monarchy, Faisal reshuffled his cabinet in October, and strengthened his position. Prince Sultan was appointed Defense Minister, replacing Saud's son, and Fahd was appointed Interior Minister. Faisal also appointed Khalid as Deputy Prime Minister, the next order of succession. In January 1963, Faisal appointed Abdullah to Commander of the National Guard, replacing Saud's son Sa'ad. By the mid-1963, Faisal's camp succeeded to remove all of Saud's sons from their state posts, with the exception of Mansur, the commander of the Royal Guard (Herb 1999, 96).

By the end of 1963, Saud once again tried to reclaim the hegemony by distributing money to the tribes, but it had no effect. In March 1964, Saud and Faisal collided again. Saud demanded that all executive power should be transferred to him. Faisal refused. On 25 March 1964, the Grand Mufti recommended that Saud accept Faisal's demands. Saud declined. Saud barricaded himself in his palace in Riyadh and deployed the Royal Guard around the walls to prepare for a battle. Faisal responded by sending the National Guard to surround the Royal Guard. Saud sent a message to Faisal exclaiming: "When my enemy has his hands around my neck, then I strike him with all my strength." Muhammad bin Abdulaziz went to Saud's palace, threw a letter at him, and told him never to threaten members of the family again. The forces of the two camps were too uneven and the Royal Guard capitulated (Herb 1999, 97-99; Vassiliev 1998, 367). 70 princes gathered and signed a petition to remove Saud from power. At the end of 1964, leading princes gathered to determine

Saud's deposition, and asked Ulamah and Majlis al-Wukala to transfer power to Faisal and dethrone Saud (Mann 2013, 27).

During this power struggle, Saudi Ulamah and religious sectors supported Faisal because of two factors: Firstly, Faisal's mother is a member of the Al-Shaikh family, which dominates the Saudi religious establishment. As a result, Faisal had a strong support from the Saudi religious establishment (Yamani 2009, 91; Mann 2013, 27). Secondly, the religious establishment, including Ulamah, judged that Saud was not qualified to manage state affairs, along with his luxury and indulgence. Eventually, on November 2, 1964, Saud was dethroned and exiled to Egypt with his sons (Herb 1999, 99; Vassiliev 1998, 354).

### **III. From National Guard to Throne**

#### **1. Prince Abdullah and National Guard under Faisal's Rule (1964-1975)**

Abdullah's control of the National Guard was a key factor in his success in becoming king. Because Faisal's appointment of Abdullah to Commander of the National Guard in 1963 and the National Guard's critical role in the armed confrontation between Saud and Faisal in March 1964 had helped Abdullah enter the path to the throne. On the one hand, the appointment of Abdullah to the National Guard strengthened Faisal's alliance and power base because Abdullah had been a supporter of the powerful ruling tribe of the Hail area in the past and he could mobilize the National Guard in his confrontation with Saud in 1964. The appointment, on the other hand, paved the way for Abdullah to the throne.

Sir Colin Crowe, a British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, wrote a letter to Frank Brenchley, Arabian Department, British Foreign Office on 18 March 1964 as follows:<sup>1)</sup>

"Notes recent tensions between Feisal and Saud, the National Guard is at full alert, and that Saud has demanded that Faisal dismiss two of his ministers and replace them with king's sons. "The only encouraging thing in this picture seems to be the high morale and efficiency of the National Guard and the degree to which Timbrell [British head of advisory team to the National Guard] is in Prince Abdullah's [head of National Guard] confidence".

Attaches a 'Report by Mr. Symons' of the embassy. Symons notes that two plans have been drawn up over the past few days, the first put into effect, the second explained to those who need to know. First is "protection of Faisal. All immediate guards of Faisal will henceforth be of the National Guard. A company will be permanently inside the grounds of his palace". Second is "defence of the regime... a plan has been drawn up for the occupation of certain points which would ensure the maintenance of vital public services, the continuation of the work of the cabinet and the denial of the use of the radio station to all but those supported by the National Guard."

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1) National Archives, Saudi Arabia, 1963-75, FO 371 / 174671, "Sir Colin Crowe's letter to Frank Brenchley, Arabian Department, Foreign Office, 18 March 1964," pro. Saudi Arabia 1963-75. For Declassified, January 16, 2018 (Mark Curtis files from the National Archives) [<http://markcurtis.info/pro-saudi-arabia-1963-75-for-declassified/> accessed on September 19, 2018]

Both these plans were drawn up by Brigadier Timbrell and Colonel Bromage, at the express wish of the Amir Abdullah and at very short notice. They have been communicated only to the top officers of the Guard. There has been no joint discussion with Sultan and the Brigadier has specifically asked that details of these plans should not be made known to the Americans as he feels that if made available to the MAAG group in Riyadh, they may be used in such a way as to destroy the confidence he has built up in his dealings with Abdullah. I support him in this.”

This letter shows the function of the National Guard in both the regime security and the potential of its role in the armed confrontation.

Faisal had concerned the potential threat from the military establishment and always suspected its loyalty. The Saudi government had taken elaborate precautions to separate various regular military components and to remove them from the cities and other strategic areas. Units of the Saudi army were widely scattered around the country, away from the main cities, for example, locating in the south facing the Jordan border, in the Yemeni border, and in the northwest. The great distances between principal cities and the military bases, and the difficulties of communication networks made a coordinated coup attempt almost impossible, unlike in most other Arab countries.<sup>2)</sup> No regular army stations were allowed near the capital. The members of the National Guard were recruited from tribes traditionally loyal to the Saudi monarchs and the Saudi regime relied heavily on the National Guard. Unlike the regular army, it was stationed near the principal cities so that could intercept any army moving against the government. Although the National Guard was roughly the same size as the regular army<sup>3)</sup>, it was not heavily armed. It lacked tanks and artillery, but it had been well trained for the mission of blocking an army movement. Prince Abdullah had strengthened the National Guard greatly during the period of his 50-year-commandership with the strong supports from Faisal and Khalid with the rapid expansion of budget, manpower and its function.

Faisal had a sense of debt to Abdullah, who helped him decisively in the confrontation with Saud in 1964.

## 2. Sultan's Attempt to Set the Succession

King Khalid appointed Abdullah as Second Deputy Prime Minister in March 1975 after Khalid succeeded to the throne. That means Abdullah became the second in line of succession to the throne. In other words, after this appointment, Prince Abdullah became the number three-man in the Saudi government and a Crown Prince in waiting. However, his appointment caused friction in the House of Saud. When King Khalid went to London for medical treatment in February 1977, Heir Apparent Fahd, and other senior officials, demanded that Prince Abdullah concede control of the National Guard. Fahd and several of his brothers tried to replace Abdallah as second deputy prime minister

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2) *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXIV, National Intelligence Estimate, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, Document 140, pp.447, 490-491.

3) in 1971, the size of the Saudi regular army were 37,000 men, while the National Guard's were 31,000. See, *National Archives*, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, POL 23-2, SAUD, A-152: "Annual Security Assessment for 1971," 27 October 1971, pp.11-13; *National Archives*, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964–66, POL 19, SAUD, Box 2642, A-273: "The Power Structure in Saudi Arabia," 23 March 1965, p.15; *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXIV, National Intelligence Estimate, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972, Document 140, p.447.

and second in line of succession with Fahd's brother Sultan, who had served as minister of defense and aviation since 1962. Fahd himself was believed to prefer Sultan as well and Sultan was backed by his other full brothers, known as 'Sudayri Seven' named after the tribe of their mother. Together they were the largest single group of full brothers among the many sons of King Abdulaziz and often appeared to act as a group. Whether Abdullah should be pressed to give up the commandership of the National Guard as the price for his appointment was the subject of family debate.

This issue was debated in Riyadh by 250 princes in August 1977. At the meeting, Fahd was said to have offered to appoint Abdullah as his crown prince, after Khalid's eventual death, but only if Abdullah agreed to give up the control of the National Guard. Under the proposal, the National Guard would either stay as a separate force, but under the command of Prince Salman, another of Fahd's full brothers and Governor of Riyadh, or be integrated into the regular armed forces under Sultan. Abdullah resisted this pressure, not having a full brother to whom he could have passed the role. Abdullah's primary power base resided in control over the National Guard. He feared that if he himself lacked command of the National Guard, Sultan, as minister of defense, would be physically able to stop him from succeeding to the throne.

Prince Muhammad and other senior leaders supported Abdullah. They perceived the move as a destabilizing step that did not serve the Kingdom's best interests. That option would have placed all of the country's mechanism of defense and security in the hands of 'Sudayri Seven.' Muhammad was also concerned about the pro-Western stance adopted by the government. He reiterated that consensus must be reached on vital matters, especially over the Kingdom's Arab identity and its vital foreign policy initiatives. Fahd's pro-American penchants caused discords among conservative Saudis.

In mid-1979, the Fahd's position was weakened in the context of Saudi Arabia's reaction to the Israeli-Egyptian Camp David agreement. Fahd favored a policy of minimum sanctions against President Sadat's Egypt. Prince Abdallah, however, advocated cooperation with key Arab countries, including Syria and Iraq, to punish Sadat. In this situation, Abdullah was supported by King Khalid, Muhammad bin Abdul Rahman, Saud bin Faisal, and even some of Fahd's full brothers. The Saudi government took a set of sanctions against Egypt after Sadat signed the Camp David Accords and accordingly, broke diplomatic relations. Abdullah, strengthened by the foreign policy initiative on the Camp David Accords, became more secured on his claim to become Heir Apparent once Fahd ascended to the throne. Abdullah reemerged as a key decision maker after the Khalid's health deteriorated. Prince Salman, the governor of Riyadh, mediated the dispute between Fahd and Abdullah, especially after the Mecca Mosque takeover, which had raised a common threat to the ruling family.

Abdullah had been the leading opponent of Sudayri Seven's dominance since 1960s. His faction included King Khalid and his elder brother Muhammad, Badr (Deputy Commander of the National Guard) and his full brothers Abdul Illah (governor of Qasim) and Abdul Majid (governor of Tabuk), as well as Majid bin Abdulaziz (governor of Makkah) and his full brother Sattam (deputy governor of Riyadh), Mit'ab (Minister of Public Works and Housing), Abdullah's sons, including Turki and Mit'ab (National Guard). He was also close to Talal, Badr, Nawwaf and the other 'liberal princes' of 1962. He was receptive to as much progressive force as Fahd and his brothers may care to unleash.



Under Khalid's reign (1975-1982), no single faction was able to dominate central issues related to succession and the distribution of power. In the absence of consensus, basic issues on succession remained unresolved.

### 3. Under Fahd's Reign (1982-2005)

On June 13, 1982, when King Khalid died, an official court statement declared Heir Apparent Fahd is the King of the state. The same statement also declared the King Fahd had nominated Prince Abdullah as Heir Apparent, a decision that was accepted by the majority of the ruling family. It was also announced that Defense Minister was appointed as second deputy prime minister. Both of Abdullah and Sultan could maintain their power bases controlling the National Guard and the regular armed forces. During his years as crown prince, Abdullah was described as a supporter of accommodation. He managed to group a large number of fringe and marginalized princes discontented with the prospect of the succession being passed among the Sudayri brothers one after another.

King Fahd and Heir Apparent Abdullah shared governing powers, the former concentrating on international concerns and the latter on regional, especially on Arab affairs.

In 1985, King Fahd appointed his son Muhammad bin Fahd<sup>4)</sup> as governor of the Eastern Province. This decision caused a competition among the senior princes to place their sons to government positions. Defense Minister Sultan demanded King Fahd to appoint his son Fahd bin Sultan as governor of Tabuk. Fahd complied with his demand but he extended the appointment of other young princes to the government positions, appointing Muhammad bin Saud (governor of Baha, 1986-2010)<sup>5)</sup>, Mish'al bin Saud (governor of Najran), Faysal bin Bandar (governor of Qasim), and Khalid bin Faysal (Asir) to the government posts. Sultan tried to check Muhammad bin Fahd's growing power. Sultan's own alliance was balanced by these appointments. This shows that the Sudayri faction was not a monolithic. Sometimes they competed each other for power because they had different ideological views and family interests. This fact provided a maneuverable space for Abdullah.

King Fahd tried to institutionalize the succession process issuing a decree (Basic Law) on March 1, 1992. The decree expanded the criteria for succession, which had been only seniority and family consensus. The new criteria of the law transcend hereditary rights and seniority by age for royal princes. It also expanded the pool of royal princes who took part in the choice of a new King or Heir Apparent, making the grandsons of Abdulaziz eligible for the throne. The most significant change by the edict was that the King has the right not only to appoint but also dismiss the Heir Apparent based on suitability rather than seniority.<sup>6)</sup> But Heir Apparent Abdullah was confirmed as

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4) He was appointed as Assistant Deputy Minister of Interior and remained in this position until he became Governor of the Eastern Province of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1985.

5) Prince Mohammed bin Saud served as defence minister in the early 1960s and as governor of Al Baha province from 1986 to 2010. *CTV News*, "Saudi Arabia's Prince Mohammed bin Saud dead at 78," The Associated Press, July 8, 2012. <https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/saudi-arabia-s-prince-mohammed-bin-saud-dead-at-78-1.870362> accessed on September 27, 2018; Sharaf Sabri, *The House of Saud in Commerce: A Study of Royal Entrepreneurship in Saudi Arabia*, I.S. New Delhi: Publications, 2001, p.39.

6) *New York Times*, "Saudi King Issues Decrees to Revise Governing System," By Youssef M. Ibrahim, March 2, 1992.

the heir to the throne by an order signed by King Fahd.

Following the list of Saudi Cabinet members shows that there is a balance between King Fahd's faction and Heir Apparent Abdullah's faction.

#### **The Cabinet (June 1999)<sup>7)</sup>**

- Head of State, Prime Minister, Fahd bin Abdula Aziz Al Saud
- First Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National Guard, Heir Apparent Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
- Second Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Aviation, and Inspector General, Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
- Governor of Riyadh, Prince Saman bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
- Minister of Public Works and Housing, Prince Mit'ab bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
- Minister of the Interior, Prince Nayif bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
- Minister of Foreign Affairs, Prince Saud bin Faysal bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud
- Minister of State (no portfolio), Prince Abdul Aziz bin Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud

Some Saudi dissidents had worried that King Fahd's death may spark an armed clash between Abdullah's National Guard and Sultan's armed forces. But it did not happen. Abdullah succeeded to the throne upon the death of his half-brother King Fahd. He was formally enthroned on August 2, 2005.

## **IV. Conclusion**

The Saudi National Guard was an important power base for Abdullah for this time and it also played a critical role for the Faisal's victory in the armed confrontation with Saud in 1964. During the period of his commandship of the National Guard, Abdullah strengthened and expanded National Guard. He succeeded to group a large number of alienated and marginalized princes discontented with the prospect of the succession being passed among the Sudayri brothers and broadened his power base considerably.

The power struggle over the succession between Saud and Faisal had led to a serious crisis of the disintegration of ruling royal family and an armed clash which could become a threat to the Saudi monarchical regime survival. The growing power of the 'Sudayri Seven' threatened the other members of the Royal Family and it helped Abdullah to group senior members of the royal family, including King Faisal, King Khalid and his elder brother Muhammad. Even though Abdullah could be classified as a 'traditionalist,' Talal, Badr, Nawwaf and the other 'liberal princes' of 1962 sided with him. The collective concern of the royal family members about the survival of the monarchical regime has also

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[<https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/02/world/saudi-king-issues-decrees-to-revise-governing-system.html> accessed on September 28, 2018]

7) Saudi Royal Decree, 16 June 1999.

contributed to prevent an extreme armed conflict.

Abdullah was viewed as more pious and less corrupt than his half brothers and he had a decisive character. Abdullah's mother, Fahda bint Asi Al Shuraim, was a member of the Al Rashid dynasty, a longtime rival of the Al Saud dynasty. She was descended from the powerful Shammar tribe and was the daughter of former Shammar tribe chief, Asi Shuraim. Abdullah married the daughters of the al Shalan of Anizah, al Fayz of Bani Sakhr, and al Jarbah of the Iraqi branch of the Shammar tribe. He had about 30 wives, and fathered about 35 children. He also married Jawahir bint Ali Hussein from Al Jiluwi clan, with whom he had a daughter, Princess Anoud and a son, Prince Saud. This family and tribal background was helpful for his success.

The most important factors for success in the power struggle over the succession were his ability to build a coalition, qualification as a ruler and chief executive, family and tribal background, public opinion within the royal family and support of military and security forces. In this regard, Abdullah's control of the National Guard was the most important factor for his success to the throne.


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# The Politics of Everyday Desires: Bananas, Dubai and the Revolution in Libya

**Matteo Capasso (European Univ. Institute, Italy)**

This paper focuses on how everyday aspirations and desires for better socio-economic conditions shaped and interacted with dominant formations of power during the regime of Qaddafi (al-Jamahiriyah) and unveil how global, regional and local forces interplayed in the 2011 ‘Libyan revolution.’ Drawing on Sara Ahmed and Laurent Berlant theoretical work on the cultural politics of emotions, the paper outlines how quotidian desires negotiated and shaped the dynamics of power and resistance. The paper is divided in four themes.

## **‘Bananas and Chewing Gum’**

From the late 1980s, the egalitarian and anti-imperialist premises of al-Jamāhīrīyah came under fire. While this period witnessed a heightened confrontation with the West and, in particular, the US, repeated collapses of the oil price and the subsequent decline of its revenues unveiled the shortcomings of the economy. The adventurist support for international revolutionary movements, together with the failure to diversify the economy’s reliance on oil, brought all these measures to a halt. The regime began struggling to provide the population with the goods it wanted on the everyday basis, and Libyans started experiencing a recurrent scarcity. In such a scenario, a popular desire for a consumerist and free-market economy insistently emerged because the regime-controlled economic programmes failed to deliver desired and wanted goods. These economic pitfalls forced the regime to embark into a process of economic liberalization (*infatih*) in 1987 - or what Qadhdhafi termed a ‘Revolution within the Revolution.’ Such a situation, nonetheless, only escalated with the imposition of the international sanctions in 1992 in the aftermath of Lockerbie, witnessing a steady rise of inflation and corruption. For example, the imposition of an air ban on Libya not only blocked the direct access to goods (prior to sanctions more than 30% of goods reached the country by air), but also forced the regime to rely more on the private sector. The purchase of previously accessible goods and equipment, therefore, took place through substantial payoffs to third parties and their prices inevitably raised above the level set up by the regime. Also, greater dependence on the private sector meant larger power for those, such as military and security officers, who had the necessary currency

and contacts to import foreign goods. The sale of those products to the public, consequently, took place at overcharged prices in black markets. In such a situation, the possession and access to tiny and seemingly unimportant commodities acquired a powerful symbolic meaning. Commodities became an expression of people's everyday desires to consume freely, overcoming the dire economic conditions.

Bananas, for instance, sparked a social craze in Libya, which challenged the regime-controlled policies of food demand and provision. Bananas not only conferred a social status to those who possessed them, but also questioned the regime-controlled definition of values, commitments and the good life. The culinary power of banana represented a transcendence of the strict socialist measures, enabling to imagine an alternative structure of life where abundance qua agency replaced shortages qua control. Chewing gum became another commodity whose inaccessibility turned it into a powerful tool for imagining a different futurity. The book of the Libyan writer, Mansour Bushnaf, titled 'Chewing Gum' (*al-'alkah*) whose distribution in Libya was initially banned, allows to grasp further the role 'chewing gum' played in the everyday popular imaginary. Chewing gums were not simply quotidian commodities, people attached to chewing gum promises of economic reforms, a desire for a more consumerist society, as well as a reformulation of the regime security apparatus. Those desires peaked in the recurring fantasy of turning Libya into Dubai, which appeared as a role model for (fast) modernization and development.

## **Dreaming Dubai**

Shaykh Zayed came to visit Libya from the UAE in the 1970s and he said that he wanted Dubai to be like Tripoli. Now, it's the other way around! Libya is stuck in the 1970s!

The story goes that, in the 1970s, Libya's level of infrastructural development had shocked and amazed the former leader of the UAE, Shaykh Zayed, who was visiting the country for a dental or eye surgery. In the 2000s, 'it's the other way around,' the Libyan wheel of modernisation and development spanned in the opposite direction for more than thirty years. The story stresses how the infrastructural development of Libya had failed to advance since the 1970s, while Dubai became a world trademark of progress in the region. To contemplate the fantasy of Dubai's success, which emerges from many Libyans, allows to comprehend what elements constitute its success. For instance, Dubai's success lies in its architectural landscape, comprising futuristic buildings and skyscrapers – i.e. the largest man-made island - or its enormous shopping-malls. All those megaprojects, together with a flourishing stock-market, presented Dubai as a corporate, consumerist-oriented city. What remains under the surface of these narratives, however, are the contradiction of Dubai. It is built on a highly exploitative system of migrant labours, which forbids them basic human rights, and political authority is concentrated in the hands of a small familial circle. Also, Dubai is no free-market paradise, rather the state intervenes pervasively into every aspect of society, and turned increasingly oppressive towards its dissidents in the recent years. Moreover, the dream of Dubai entailed 'global ambitions,' a desire to participate to a process of modernisation in collaboration



with the West, thus abandoning those anti-imperialist policies that relegated the country to a long period of international isolation.

In this regard, interviewees often accused him of being a ‘father’ who did not provide enough for his people. This aspect emerged when the interlocutors often questioned the Pan-African ambitions of the regime. Their main concern toward Qadhdhafi’s projects in Africa related to the use of the country’s wealth and resources. The terms used by the interviewees to describe their entitlement to the nation and its resources also reveal the gendered premises of dreaming Dubai. They all uphold to a patriarchal configuration of power. ‘Dreaming Dubai,’ in fact, comprised a desire for a father who meets his family expectations – like the monarchs in the Gulf –, opposed to a father – Qadhdhafi – who is accused to marrying the daughter (Libya) off to an African man, thus loss of national sovereignty and control of the country’s resources. This desire contextualizes the emergence of a new father, Saif al-Islam, who seemed to magnetize those clusters of desires and promises for upward social mobility, higher salaries, better infrastructures and global ambitions.

## **Saif al-Islam: Rat or Hope**

The narratives shows how the everyday attachment of hope to Saif countered the feeling of unyielding predetermination of people’s lives under the rule of Qadhdhafi (‘we needed a miracle’). It is possible to say that Saif’s program of reforms embodied what Sara Ahmed calls the *futurity* of happiness. For Ahmed, emotions “do not reside in subjects or objects, but are produced as effects of circulation,” hope is attached to Saif because his figure made Libyans feel that the realization of the dream of Dubai was possible (‘infrastructure started, universities opened’). Many interviewees praised and believed Saif al-Islam programs (Libya alGhad) and its attempts to reform the country a la Dubai. At the same time, however, they also discuss the relationship between Saif and his father as a key factor that obstructed the realization of his successful program of reforms, pointing to the existence of an underlying conflict of power between them.

According to the interviewees, it appears that Saif’s difficulties to carry out a program of reforms did not coincide with the interests of Qadhdhafi and, more broadly, the regime. This culminated in December 2010, when Saif al-Islam released an official statement to announce that his foundation was going to abandon any human rights projects in Libya, and only focus on its ‘core charitable missions.’ The main problem faced by Saif’s reform programs was that Libya necessitated to undergo economic, institutional and political reforms at the same time. The emergence of a functioning and less regulated economy could only foster with the abandonment of that system of patronage and corruption that favoured a specific class of military-security officers. Such a process, consequently, could affect the power of specific elites, particularly the so-called ‘old guard,’ which seemed to be more attuned with another son of Qadhdhafi, Mutassim, who was leader of the armed forces. Therefore, when Qadhdhafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, seemed to magnetize those everyday hopes and aspirations, an internal struggle for power unfolded that ultimately led to the failure of reform in the country, creating further disillusionment

among the population. The willingness to dream Dubai, however, persisted and continued to exercise its influence throughout the course of the events that broke out in 2011.

## **A Cruel Revolution**

‘We want Libya to become like the UAE, like Dubai.’ This was one of the sayings that summarized the goals of the Revolution in 2011.

Since this fantasy contained the seeds of a promise that linked economic prosperity to better relations with Western countries, it laid the ground for the popular demand of a Western-led military intervention. Many interviewees aligned themselves optimistically toward the military intervention, believing that the ‘revolution via military intervention’ could materialize such a dream. They interpreted the NATO intervention as a means to attain their wishes and aspirations. The West was considered a strategic player that could allow ‘rebels’ to accomplish ‘what they wanted:’ the goals of the Revolution, thus turning Libya into Dubai. This fantasy contained a desire to re-approach Western countries in a less confrontational manner, to break away from a regime whose power remained in the hands of an enriched security apparatus. Those clusters of promises and desires attached to the fantasy oriented people toward a revolutionary event and the call for a military intervention, hoping to achieve – finally – their aspirations. While they acted as a foundation for optimism – reaching Dubai via the help of the West -, they also impeded its achievement.

This fantasy underestimated the neo-colonial elements behind the policies of Western countries, thus revealed itself as a form of ‘cruel optimism. The cruelty of this fantasy emerges in those governmental reports that describe the military intervention in Libya as not being informed by ‘accurate intelligence,’ ‘immediate threat to civilians was publicly overstated,’ and there was ‘exclusive focus on military intervention.’ (UK Gov’t Report) I argue that, by underestimating the neo-imperialist elements that guided the policies of many countries toward Libya in 2011, the optimistic revolutionary fervour unveiled its inherent cruelty. While the media discourse appeared to leave no other option for the NTC than mortgaging the Revolution to the West in order to prevent the massacre of Benghazi, the West gave precedence to its national interests over the faith of Libyans. For these reasons, Latif now believes that it is more likely to see Dubai turning into Libya, since Western powers ultimately decide the fate of Arab countries:

I understood what happened now. Rather than having Dubai in Libya, it is more possible that we will witness Dubai turning into Libya ... as long as the West is pleased.

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how everyday fantasies and desires interacted with dominant formations of power at the national and global level. In this regard, the fantasy of Dubai played a fundamental role in driving

people into the streets and guiding the NTC actions. It allowed to rationalize the needed means and alliances to realize certain goals. I argue, however, that this endured attachment to the fantasy of Dubai, functioned as a form of what Lauren Berlant calls ‘cruel optimism.’ Acting as a foundation for optimism, thus liberation and freedom, it was the same element that impeded the realization of such promises.



# 2nd Session. Culture & Society (1)

**Moderator: Hidemitsu Kuroki(JAMES, Japan)**

» **The Strategies for Survival: Syriac Orthodox Christians  
under the Syrian Civil War**

- Noriko Sato (Pukyong Univ., Korea)
- Discussant: Son, Young Kwang (Korea Army Academy, Korea)

» **How Qur' ān are Materialized in Muslims' space Under  
Mass Production and Consumer Society: From the case of  
South Tunisia**

- Tatsuro Futatsuyama (St. Agnes' Univ., Japan)
- Discussant: Alena Kulinich (Seoul National Univ., Korea)

» **Jerusalem in the three holy books of Judaism, Christianity  
and Islam**

- Shin, Seoung-Yun (HUFS, Korea)
- Discussant: Park, Hyon-do (Myongji Univ., Korea)

» **Iranian nationality and networking**

- Tomoko Yamagishi (Meiji Univ., Japan)
- Discussant: Siavash Saffari (Seoul National Univ., Korea)





# The Strategies for Survival: Syriac Orthodox Christians under the Syrian Civil War

Noriko Sato (Pukyong Univ., Korea)

This paper deals with Syriac Orthodox Christians in eastern Syria (the Jazira region), where Kurds and Arabs are the majority of the population. Syriac Orthodox Christians are members of one of the Miaphysite Churches and compose one of the small religious groups in the region. Since the invasion of the ISIS (*al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham*) into Iraq and Syria, a large number of Syriac Orthodox Christians in Iraq and Syria were besieged by the fear that they would be terminated. Although under the Syrian Civil War, they have been struggling for survival, some immigrated abroad, and others became either refugees or internally displaced people (Open Doors n.d.).

The primary causes of the threats are derived from the fact that foreign powers, such as the Gulf states, the U.S., and Turkey, Russian and Iran, had sponsored Islamist groups for geopolitical purposes. Such Islamist militants became the core of sectarian insurgency and allowed the advancement of ISIS, which attempted to establish an Islamic state in the land of Syria and to destroy its national community. Such regional and international situations favour non-state actors, such as Kurds, and enhance their role in negotiating with states and non-state entities. The Kurds attempt to hold together by the belief that northern and eastern Syria is to be Western Kurdistan (Rojava), which is their territory and is to be an autonomous region within a future Syrian federation. In 2013, the Kurdish YPG (the People's Protection Units), which is a military unit of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), proclaimed Afrin, Kobani (Ain al-Arab), and Jazira as Western Kurdistan [following the withdrawal of Syrian regime forces from Qamishly].

However, the Kurds seem to be unable to extend their influence over the regional and international realms of politics. Although the US government recognizes the SDF (Syrian Defence Forces), whose principal actors are the Kurds, as its ally in anti-ISIS operation (Tabler, Cagaptay, Pollock and Jeffrey 2016), the alliance with the SDF is no longer the primary issue for the US strategy for Syria, since the US allies have nearly cleared ISIS. The Russian and Iranian military presence and their support to the Assad regime have been more effective than the US operation in the eastern region, as the regime forces have been victorious for regaining the control of the Syrian land except for Idlib and Kurdish dominated eastern regions. Moreover, due to the Turkish military operations called Operation Olive Branch, in 2018, Kurdish controlled Afrin felled into Turkey's hand (Romano 2018). The negotiation between Turkey and the US barely prevented Turkish forces from remaining Manbij, which has been a strategic place for anti-ISIS operation and where the US-allied YPG (Kurdish-majority People's Protection Units) and the SDF (Syrian Defence Forces) committed to fighting against the ISIS (Stein 2018).

By looking at such a situation of the north and eastern Syria, one can understand that the power-game of foreign forces would control a future condition of Syria. In this course of actions, the Syriac Orthodox Christians need to find a way for their survival. These Christians use religious, linguistic, and political symbols for constructing their communal identities within Syria to integrate themselves into Syrian society, as well as to maintain their sectarian identity. This article attempts to examine how the Syriac Orthodox Christians in north-eastern Syria have transformed their identity and organised self-defence activities under the Syrian Civil War, and how they have been struggling for survival.

To pursue such a goal, Philpott's analyses (2007: 505-509) of the political pursuits of religious actors is useful for examining the case of the Syriac Orthodox Christians. Although Philpott examines the degree of autonomy between religious actors and states by using descriptive accounts, he refers to its quantitative assessments. He adapts the term of 'differentiation' for explaining the degree of autonomy between religious actors and states. It means an institutional relationship between the two and how much the two enjoy mutual independence. Religious actors who are involved in political movements are also influenced by a political theology which is a set of ideas that religious actors hold about legislative authority and justice. Differentiation and political theology are core concepts which lead religious actors to a particular sort of political involvement. When the relationship between religion and state maintains a higher degree of differentiation, they enjoy mutual autonomy. By contrast, with a lower degree of differentiation, the states exercise the prerogatives to control religious bodies through legislative and judicial powers. Philpott's methodological approach to the political pursuit of religious actors is useful for analysing contemporary political movements of Syriac Orthodox Christians in eastern Syria.

Before the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, the Syriac Orthodox Christians held a political theology which defined their identity as Christians as well as descendants of ancient Arameans, since the origin of their liturgical language, Syriac-Aramaic, was one of the ancient languages of Syria. The construction of such a political theology was due to the President Baschal al-'Assad's religious multicultural policy which acknowledged the existence of plural religious groups who had Syrian origin. It acknowledged the idea of a religious subculture, which explained the existence of distinct religious cultures in the same geographic space of Syria. Although the dominant Arab-Islamic culture has flourished in Syria, such Syrian-Arab nationalism incorporated the variety of the religious groups and acknowledged that Syrian culture was the amalgamation with different religious heritage (Hinnebusch 2001: 140). This religious multiculturalism tended to acknowledge the differences between the religious groups. Thus, the Syriac Orthodox Christians had developed the political theology in which they claimed their distinctiveness as one of the religious groups in Syria. However, they attempted to integrate them to Syrian society and stressed that their group shared their ethnic origin with other Syrian Arabs, as Genesis (26: 20) mentioned that ancient Arameans were descendants of Abraham. The Holy texts of both the Old Testament and al-Quran suggest that Abraham's descendants were descendants of Aram, son of Shem, who was also the ancestor of Arabs. (The Cow: 130; Genesis 11: 31; 12: 1; 15: 7; 26: 20).

The Syriac Orthodox Christians had developed such a set of ideas about their identity, which was their political theology. The construction of such religious and ethnic identity was their attempt to legitimise their position within the Syrian state. It means that they practised a consensual relationship with the authoritarian regime. The Syriac Orthodox Church also supported the political theology which justified their Syrian origin and maintained the integrationist position to preserve their influence in education and marriage law, which was a remnant of the Ottoman *millet* system for respecting the rights of religious minorities. The Syriac Orthodox Christians, as well



as their Church, had incentives to ally with the Syrian regime, which provided them with the favourable policies and ideological legitimization for the Christians as being Syrian citizens. Although Syria was a secular state and pursued independence of ecclesiastical authority, the regime utilised an idea of Arab and Syrian origin for integrating different religious and tribal groups into its territory and promoted religious multi-culturalism.

The military advancement of radical Islamists into eastern Syria, such as that of the ISIS, which attempted to establish an Islamic integrationist regime, threatened the Syriac Orthodox Christians. The ISIS, which aimed at building a territorial state, and in which the religious, political, and military bodies were integrated, called for an Islamic revolution throughout the *Umma*. As radical Islamists denied their religious bodies the distance to oppose the Syrian regime, Kurdish and Christian populations who embraced a secular view of the territorial state and started to claim the separation of religion and state.

The Kurds have developed a strong sense of what Anthony Smith (1987) calls *ethnie*, which indicates that they hold a sense of solidarity among their members who have common origins and cultural traits as well as the association of shared territory. The Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) *de fact* represents Syrian Kurds, is socio-political actors, which exert political influence over people in north and eastern Syria as well as over both the regional and international politics, as the US government recognises it as its ally in anti-ISIS operation (Tabler, Cagaptay, Pollock and Jeffrey 2016). The militarization of the Syrian conflicts provides the Kurds and PYD with an opportunity to introduce their ways of political management, which protects civilians from military threats and stands up for them. The PYD has been successful in their strategy which reflects calls from the street. The PYD suggests an idea for overcoming nation-state and achieving multi-cultural and consensus-oriented democratic autonomy (Charountaki 2015: 346-7). The Kurds attempt to establish a political system based on federalism, which acknowledges the rights of existing groups in eastern Syria.

In 2014, armed forces of the Syriac Orthodox Christians joined the military operation conducted by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, *Quwwāt Sūriyā al-Dīmuqrāṭīya* in Arabic), which is an alliance of Kurdish, Arab, Syriac, Assyrian, Armenian, Turkmen and Circassian militias. The Syriac Orthodox Christians' militia, *Sutoro*, cooperated to liberate the villages in eastern Syria, which had been under the control of ISIS (Hubo 2016a; Hubo 2016b; Kareem 2015). The military operating conducted by the SDF reflects the ideology of multi-cultural federalism.

In this course of action, the Syriac Orthodox Christians have started to stress a political theology in which they emphasise their ethnic identity to claim their rights equal to those of their Kurdish and Arab neighbours. The Islamists persecute Christians and present no interest in the existence of plural religious groups in Syria. The Syriac Orthodox Christians who work with the PYD stress that the Syriac Orthodox Christians should be identified as Assyrians, as they have maintained Syriac/Syriac-Aramaic language, i.e. the lingua-franca of the Neo-Assyrian Empire (934-609 BC). Thus, these Christians claim that they are the indigenous population of occupying the region. The Neo-Assyrian Empire was a multi-ethnic state, although its citizens had retained their ethnic and tribal identities (Parpora 2004: 5-13). The idea of Assyrianism, as a politico-geographical concept, is not new, as European colonial powers introduced it in the 19<sup>th</sup> century in order to instigate ethno-separatist Christians (Hourani 1970: 55-57). However, by referring to their origin, the contemporary Christians look at the ancient system of unifying the multitudes of people into a single administrative system. Syriac/Syriac-Aramaic is the liturgical language of the Syriac Christians, such as those belonging to Syriac Orthodox/Catholic/Protestant, Chaldean, Assyrian, and Maronite Churches. Their identity is channelled by the ancient Aramaic language, which

provides them with a means for confirming their direct connection to ancient Assyrians, as well as that for unifying these Christians living across the present state boundaries.

The Syriac Orthodox Christians believe that such a form of multi-culturalism enhances their hope for constructing an autonomous federal system, in which representatives of each group participate in the process of establishing a self-ruling political body. To some extent, they share the idea of a future state with the Kurds, in which non-state actors, including these Christians, can take a new initiative for pursuing *consensus-oriented autonomy*. Thus, many Syriac Orthodox Christians identify themselves as Assyrians and attempt to draw symbolic boundaries between Assyrian Christians and others in order for maintaining their distinctiveness. To create such boundaries is also an attempt to claim their rights as the indigenous population of the region and is also a means for merging them into the federal self-rule, which the Kurds take the initiative. They use identity politics in which they shift group boundaries as a strategy for establishing their position in the changing socio-political situation (e.g. Shoshana 2007: 355-365). In eastern Syria, radical Islamists movements attempted to create a regime in which Islamists exerted string influence over state politics. Assyrianism which is a political theology alleged by the Syriac Orthodox Christians sprung from such a regional political situation, in which the Islamists threatened them. The Christians seek an institutional separation between religious and political authorities. However, among these Christians, religion, as well as the Syriac Orthodox Church, lost its centripetal force for securing their rights as the indigenous population in the region.

When the al-‘Assad government forces, which are backed by Russia, Iran and Hezbollah forces, have been advancing, a rumour spreads among these Christians that *Sutoro* may switch the side to the government. The incidents that Kurdish PYD attacked the Syriac school in Qamishly and forced to close its schools in Qamisly, Darbashiya, and al-Malkiya indicate the discord between the Christians and Kurds (#sutoro Twitter 29 August 2018; AsiaNews. it 30 August 2018). To show their support to the regime, it is useful for the Syriac Orthodox Christians who insist on the Aramean origin and integrate Arameans into the pedigree of Arabs. Such an identity discourse of the Syriac Christians had been used before the break of the Syrian Civil War, as the al-‘Assad regime attempted to acknowledge the rights of all religious groups who have Syrian origins. The Syriac Orthodox Christians identify themselves as *Sūryāyē* (in Syriac) or *Sūryān* (in Arabic), who constitute a religious group and have a common origin and descent. However, their *Sūryāyē* or *Sūryān* identity include both religious and ethnic identities and therefore, is ambiguous and manipulative, when they try to handle their ethnic identity for pursuing secular identities and presenting themselves as being in a unified and distinctive indigenous group of the region. Currently, it is not sure whether or not the Syriac Orthodox Christians would continue to work with the Kurds. Or they would return to support the al-‘Assad regime. On-going war situation influences these Christians’ identity construction.

Although the Syriac Orthodox Christians fortify themselves by the political theology of identifying them either Assyrians or Arameans, they would not be able to establish a strong autonomy from the state. However, the ideology of how to define themselves influences their political action. The Syriac Orthodox Christians play within different frameworks for political settings and seek ways of working and cooperating with other groups in society by adopting different political theologies.


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# How Qur'ān are Materialized in Muslims' space Under Mass Production and Consumer Society: From the case of South Tunisia

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## 1. Aim of this presentation

The aim of this presentation is to demonstrate how *Qur'ān* are materialised in Tunisian Muslims' space under mass production and consumer society, focusing on interior ornaments and calendars.

Accelerated globalization, mass production, and consumer society allow various commodities, including religious commodities, to be transported across countries and regions. This phenomenon makes it increasingly important to consider how *Qur'ānic* commodities are produced, transported, and used across local cultures. Several studies were carried out focusing on religious commodities that are influenced by the permeating mass production/consumption in the MENA[cf. Starrett 1995; Zaidman 2003; Pinto 2007; Gökariksel & McLarney 2010; Armbrust 2012]. However, they overlook how Muslims handle these commodities; in other words, they overlook the details of how these items are manufactured and used in the local context.

Thus, this study presents the results of an anthropological field research that consisted in the observation of the *Qur'ān* ornaments in their spaces and interviews with producers and users of these items.

## 2. Method

The field research was conducted in three stages: first, from January to February 2013; second, from December 2014 to February 2015; and third, in August 2017. This study was conducted in a field in Douz, a small village in the southwest of Kebili prefecture. In fact, my research encompassed surveys in other cities, such as Tunis. However, in order to facilitate understanding here, this presentation focuses on the case of Douz.

Moreover, investigation in private dwellings was limited because of my gender. Thus, I investigated only the interior spaces of shops, offices, factories such as the 14 Kiosks, 12 tool shops, and 10 barber shops so on, totally 110 shops near the central market.

### 3. Definitions of interior ornaments and *Qur'ānic* commodities

This study defines the interior ornaments called *tazwīq* as items that are placed on the wall for decoration purposes, except for wall papers, mirrors, electric appliances, and items which are sold.

In addition, this study defined *Qur'ānic* commodities as items related to *Qur'ānic* verses and/or images from the Qur'ān, including several images such as Mecca and Medina and phrases such as *Duaa*. This study refers to other commodities as 'ordinary commodities' and also considerate *Qur'ānic* calendars and ordinary calendars.

However, it is difficult to strictly distinguish *Qur'ānic* items from non- *Qur'ānic*, since sometimes their relation with the Qur'ān is ambiguous. For example, the decorative motif of olive trees is sometimes considered *baraka* because it is mentioned several times in the Qur'ān. Thus, in this case, olive tree ornaments are considered *Qur'ānic* items. Similarly, the garden poster may remind one of the *Jenna*. Thus, this presentation points out that these items cannot be strictly divided, being arbitrarily divided to some extent.

### 4. *Qur'ānic* ornaments and *Qur'ānic* calendars

The field research revealed that there were 942 items in 110 shops in 2013 and 2015, which were divided into 348 *Qur'ānic* ornaments and 594 ordinary ornaments. This means that approximately 36.9% of all ornaments were *Qur'ānic*. These items are sold in interior commodity shops from weekly markets in Douz, However, many people buy them in the capital and in other cities since there are many types of shops in big cities.

The table shows the percentage of *Qur'ānic* calendars of all ornaments. In this case, calendars are the most popular ornaments and approximately 34% of *Qur'ānic* ornaments are on *Qur'ānic* calendars. In addition, 66.8% of calendars were *Qur'ānic*. This means that *Qur'ānic* calendars are one of the most common calendars and most common ornaments. Why are *Qur'ānic* calendars chosen? Some informants provided the reasons:

'Because our clients want to have an Islamic one. There are a lot of models, about 200 models, including non-religious ones. However, we choose an Islamic every year'. [2014.12.18, patisserie owner, in his thirties].

'There are designs of the sea and nature. However, old people do not like these models. Everyone, from children to old people, prefers the *Qur'ānic* ones. This is the reason'. [2014.12.19, book store owner, in his forties].

In addition to the reasons of choice, there is another reason why *Qur'ānic* calendars circulate widely in Tunisia: all *Qur'ānic* calendars are distributed free of charge by advertising sponsors. This is the typical system of producing free *Qur'ānic* calendars

- 1) The printing office promotes the idea of making and distributing a *Qur'ānic* calendar for companies
- 2) Some companies accept this promotion
- 3) The printing office designs several templates of it
- 4) The company chooses one to three types among some templates
- 5) The printing office prints them and delivers them to the company
- 6) The company distributes the calendars to its clients and customers after the New Year

119 *Qur'ānic* calendars I investigated are 82 types design which are produced by 47 advertising sponsors.

The interests of each position make the calendars widely circulated. Print offices want to print a many *Qur'ānic* calendars, so they promote them to companies. Companies want to advertise their name and *Qur'ānic* calendars are good materials, as they are not discarded along with their names. Clients can get New Year's calendars from shops and companies for free. The profits of each actor cause the calendars to be so widely circulated and thus are the most popular ornaments in their shops.

Almost all designs produced by print offices are from Internet websites. Print offices began to produce *Qur'ānic* calendars when their offices opened about 30 years ago. In the past, they assembled images of *Qur'ānic* verses from postcards or photographs. However, more recently, they have sourced almost all designs from Internet websites and use Photoshop to illustrate them.

It is not the companies but normally the print office that suggests the *Qur'ānic* verses and designs to the company. For example, a print office explained to me: 'This tree of Muḥammad (*shajarat al-nabī Muḥammad*) model is the most popular one, and this is why I recommend the most popular *Qur'ānic* calendars templates to the companies'. The companies choose from one to five designs of those recommended by the print offices. Thus, a large number of *Qur'ānic* calendars produced not by companies but by print offices using designs from Internet websites is delivered to customers in the New Year.

However, many clients who put *Qur'ānic* calendars in their spaces answered: 'We do not discard it; it is prohibited'. Thus, there is one more question: if print offices and companies continue to produce *Qur'ānic* calendars and if the user do not discard them, will the large number of *Qur'ānic* calendars continue to increase in their spaces?

## 5. Variables of calendars within two years

This table shows how the variables of *Qur'ānic* calendars and ordinary calendars remain in their position in shops within two years, comparing *Qur'ānic* and normal calendars. In 2013, there were 40 new year's *Qur'ānic* calendars compared to 25 new year's normal calendars, and there were 46 of the previous year's *Qur'ānic* calendars compared to 10 normal calendars.

In 2015, there were 28 new year's *Qur'ānic* calendars compared to 17 new year's normal calendars and 37 of

the previous year's *Qur'ānic* calendars compared to only 5 normal calendars. Thus, it is certain that *Qur'ānic* calendars are more frequently retained in their position after a few years. For example, as shown in the photo, the owner of a tool shop has been keeping *Qur'ānic* calendars on the wall in the same position since 2000. He explained: 'I keep them because they are *Qur'ānic* calendars'. In another case, the tailor keeps them in a storehouse and explains: 'I keep old *Qur'ānic* calendars there. We never discard *Qur'ānic* calendars'.

Nevertheless, we can understand from this table that many *Qur'ānic* calendars are still placed in their spaces, and some calendars have disappeared from their spaces in this period. At that case, where did they go? Nobody admits to discarding the calendars after New Year's Day. However, from the interview to some companies, they explained that

'There are some clients who discard them after New Year's Day, and there was even someone who threw it away. So, after that, my company ceased to order *Qur'ānic* calendars, but not ordinary calendars'[2014.12.15, tool shop owner].

In fact, 3 of the 22 companies I interviewed did not choose a *Qur'ānic* calendar in 2014.

Let me show some cases to understand disappeared *Qur'ānic* calendars. The *Qur'ānic* calendars in this photo are '*Sūra al-Ghāfir*', which are produced to advertise telephone and book shops and we can see that they were printed in 2010. However, in my investigation in 2013, I found the same calendar model, which was cut from under the advertisement and has remained in 2015. The next set of photos show us that in telephone shops, some Muslims also cut the day section of *Qur'ānic* calendars and retain them in August 2017. Two other *Qur'ānic* calendars were cut and have remained in the greengrocer's since 2015.

I will show you another example where studios place wooden frames around the cut calendar. In this village, there are several studios specialized on these works. This photo shows the technicians making a frame to cover a *Qur'ānic* poster – some of which are transformed from calendars. Just as in this case, it is possible that some framed *Qur'āns* have been originated from *Qur'ānic* calendars. This process shows us that, by not wanting to discard them but to retain them, people remake and reform them.

## 6. Discussion and conclusion

This case of *Qur'ānic* interior ornaments in Douz conveys several points.

In this case, *Qur'ānic* calendars are one of the most common calendars and most common ornaments in their spaces. This situation is caused by the interests of each position: the print offices who want to sell *Qur'ānic* calendars, the companies who want to advertise, and the clients who get calendars for free.

These free *Qur'ānic* calendars are commodities that are new items originated by the acceleration of consumer society and the ability to access Internet websites. However, at the same time, calendar users face the problem of not to discard calendars when the year has passed. We can understand the calendar users' idea of remaking the calendars so as not to discard *Qur'ānic* verses. In the situation of using these items, users transform these



materials into posters or frames, for example, to adapt them to their situation.

Globalization and capitalism make mass-produced religious commodities, and the ability to access Internet websites enable print offices to design easily. In this case, print offices promoted the distribution of a large amount of uniformed *Qur'ānic* calendars in this village. However, the user remakes these items in order not to discard them. This practice is called 'Modifying mass-produced and mass-consumed commodities to adapt them to the context of their local religious practices by Muslims'.



# Jerusalem in the three holy books of Judaism, Christianity and Islam

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A careful observation should be given regarding the nature of the Old Testament, the New Testament and the Qur'an, the three holy books of Judaism, Christianity and Islam prior to present discussion on Jerusalem. However, it seems hard to reach a scholarly consensus as to the question. In this presentation we want to examine how Jerusalem is depicted in these books as they are in our hands today. we want to see what Jerusalem is in these Scriptures. The scope of discussion will be limited to passages and verses in which the word Jerusalem appears explicitly in the three books.

## **I. Jerusalem(ירושלם) in the Old Testament**

The proper name Jerusalem appear 669 times in all in the Old Testament, which is said to have been recorded over a period of about one thousand years. It is important to observe the historical and literal context in which the term is used in order to properly identify what Jerusalem means in the Old Testament. This short presentation examines some main points of view of Jerusalem depicted 607 times in the historiography and prophecy written during the First and Second Temple periods of the ancient Israel.

### **1. Jerusalem in the Historiography of the Old Testament**

The first occurrence of Jerusalem in the Old Testament is found in the book of Joshua (10:1). Jerusalem is mentioned as a Canaanite city ruled by the king Ado'ni-ze'dek. However, Jerusalem appears on the historical stage of Israel since David began reigning in Jerusalem as the capital of all Israel.

#### **1) Jerusalem - the City of David (עיר דָּוִד)**

It is written that David conquered the Jebusites city and settled down there, naming it the City of David (עיר דָּוִד). The Biblical text states that David made Jerusalem the capital city, and the kingdom of Israel began to grow in strength (2 Sam 5:10; 1 Chr. 11: 9). Jerusalem is firstly described as a political center.

## **2) Jerusalem - the House of the Lord God (בֵּית יְהוָה הָאֱלֹהִים), the altar of burnt offering for Israel (מִזְבֵּחַ לְעֹלָה לְיִשְׂרָאֵל)**

The Old Testament records that Solomon, the third king of Israel, began building the temple for the Lord in the fourth year of his reign. The Biblical text explicitly declares that Jerusalem is the house of the Lord and that God dwells there forever (1 Chr. 23:25). At the same time Jerusalem is called the altar of burnt offering for Israel (1 Chr 22: 1). In the early history of the kingdom of Israel, Jerusalem became the religious center in the beginning years of the kingdom of Israel.

## **3) Jerusalem - Mount Mori'ah (הַר הַמֹּרִיָּה)**

The historiography of the Old Testament defines Jerusalem as Mori'ah in which Abraham was commanded to sacrifice his son as a burnt offering (Gen 22: 2; 2 Chr 3: 1). The Jews, who believe in these two texts as their scriptures, understand that Solomon built the Temple in the place where Abraham was trying to sacrifice Isaac. The unique expression "your son, your only son" in the story of binding Isaac is draws one's attention. Abraham's son's burnt offering. The New Testament borrows this expression and interprets it as a hint of the crucifixion event in Jerusalem: "his only Son" (τὸν υἱὸν τὸν μονογενῆ) (John 3:16). As reading the New Testament understanding of it as it is, we see that Jerusalem is portrayed as a place of Messianic future events.

## **4) Jerusalem - the Holy City (עִיר הַקֹּדֶשׁ)**

Jewish tradition says there are 72 names referring to Jerusalem. A significant expression of Jerusalem arises in the Old Testament historiography of the Second Temple period: "the city of Holiness" (עִיר הַקֹּדֶשׁ) (Neh 11:1). The city of Holiness is a new lexical expression not found in books of the First Temple period. And its usage began to spread in other sources in later periods. The Arabic name of Jerusalem "al-Quds" (الْقُدْسُ) seems to have been derived from this as well.

## **2. Jerusalem in the Prophecy of the Old Testament**

The most prominent message of the prophets of Israel is the futuristic picture that gentile nations and people will come to Jerusalem and worship the God of Israel. This prophetic message appears in the prophets of both First and Second temple periods. Representative cases are Isaiah and Zechariah (Isa 2:3; Zech 8:22). The Old Testament prophecy describes Jerusalem as the religious center of all nations of the world while the Old Testament historiography portrays Jerusalem primarily as a political and religious center for the nation of Israel. Jerusalem is presented as a place where gentile nations will worship the Lord God together with the Jewish people.

A short summary of Jerusalem in the Old Testament is that Jerusalem is described as the city of David. Jerusalem is the House of the Lord, the altar of burnt offering for Israel. Jerusalem is a place where the sacrifice of the beloved Only Begotten is implied. Jerusalem is called holy city, where Jews and foreign nations

will come together to worship the God of Israel.

## **II. Jerusalem(Ιερουσαλήμ) in the New Testament**

In the New Testament, one finds 139 occurrences of Jerusalem. it is necessary to survey Jerusalem according to the general division of the New Testament books in order to examine what Jerusalem means in different contexts.

### **1. Jerusalem in the books of Gospel and Acts**

An intensive use of a proper noun may demonstrate its special meaning in a simple way. Jerusalem appears 89 times while other names such as Nazareth and Capernaum are mentioned only 12 and 16 times respectively. The frequency of use itself reveals that Jerusalem is the geographic center of the Gospels and Acts. Actually Jerusalem is described as a center of special events there:

- 1) The final destination of the Christ's journey: Mark 10:32, 10:33; Luke 9:31, 9:51, 9:53, 13:33, 19:11, 19:28.
- 2) The center of eschatological events: Luke 21:10, 21:24.
- 3) The starting place of redemption and salvation: Luke 24:47; Acts 1: 4, 1: 8.
- 4) The center of the church: Acts 8: 1, 11:22.

It is Acts 8 where the word church(ἐκκλησία) as a term that we commonly understand first appears in its arrangement of the New Testament. And the church is described as the church in Jerusalem (Acts 8:1; 11:22), i.e., the Jerusalem Church. It is undeniable fact that the church in Jerusalem was the first beginning of the Church of God. This seems to be an important meaning of Jerusalem in the New Testament.

### **2. Jerusalem in the Pauline Epistles**

In Pauline epistles, Jerusalem appears 10 times. Among these, a case seems to be used in the context of citations from the Old Testament. It is Galatians 4:26-28. The other nine times Jerusalem is used as a city name in the Pauline epistles (Romans 15:19, 15:25, 15:26, 15:31; 1 Corinthians 16:3; Galatians 1:17, 1:18, 2:1, 4:25). One of these verses seems to reflect Paul's understanding of Jerusalem as the beginning and center of the Gospel (Romans 15:19).

### 3. Jerusalem in the General Epistles

Jerusalem appears only once in the General Epistles. In this section of the New Testament, however, Jerusalem is modified with new and special expressions. Jerusalem is called the city of the living God, Jerusalem in heaven (πόλει θεοῦ ζῶντος, Ἱερουσαλὴμ ἐπουρανίῳ) (Hebrews 12:22). In this biblical text we first encounter the motif of two Jerusalem. Jerusalem on earth and Jerusalem in heaven. What is interesting is the way Jerusalem is pronounced in Hebrew: *Yerushalaim* (ירושלים). The morphological form of *Yerushalaim* in Hebrew is dual in number. It means two Jerusalem.

### 4. Jerusalem in the book of Revelation

Jerusalem in the last book of the New Testament is illuminated on a series of new images that begin from the General Epistles. An additional description is added: the new Jerusalem which comes down from my God out of heaven and holy city (τῆς καινῆς Ἱερουσαλὴμ ἡ καταβαίνουσα ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ μου), new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God (Rev. 3:12; 21:2). The last occurrence of Jerusalem in the New Testament describes the holy city of Jerusalem coming down from heaven from God (Rev. 21:10). The common element in expressions of the holy and new Jerusalem in the book of Revelation is that Jerusalem comes down from heaven. This is not to coexist with Jerusalem on earth, but to replace earthly Jerusalem. The context of Revelation 21 and 22, depicting the new and holy city of Jerusalem from heaven, shows that this Jerusalem will be eternal. Jerusalem is the place where the saved will reign forever (Revelation 22: 5).

Jerusalem in the New Testament no longer has a political image. Jerusalem is described as a center of religious achievement (esp. fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy) and of a new beginning. At the end of the New Testament, Jerusalem appears in an apocalyptic and eschatological picture.

## III. Jerusalem(الْقُدْس) in the Qur'an

A widely known recent book about Jerusalem in the Islamic Scripture is *Jerusalem in the Qur'an* (Imran N. Hosein, *Jerusalem in The Qur'an*, Masjid Dar al-Qur'an: New York. 2002). The key idea the writer is trying to convey is that the name Jerusalem is hidden in the Qur'an because of the eschatological importance of Jerusalem. There is a full agreement in one point: the name of Jerusalem does not appear in the Qur'an. A verse is found to be relating to Jerusalem in the Qur'an (Surah 17:1):

"Glory to (God) who did take His Servant for a journey by night from the Sacred Mosque to the Farthest Mosque (المَسْجِدِ الْأَقْصَى) whose precincts We did Bless - in order that We might show some of Our Signs: for He is the one Who hearth (السَّمِيعُ) and seeth (all things) (الْبَصِيرُ)"

The background to this text is the Night Journey of Mohammad known to have occurred around 621. Muhammad, who prayed at the Sacred Mosque (المَسْجِدُ الْحَرَامُ) in Mecca, followed the guidance of the angel to the farthest mosque and prayed / worshiped there, then ascended to heaven and then returned to Mecca. The 'farthest mosque' is the place which is found in this verse: المسجد الأقصى. The present al-Aqsa Mosque is located in the southern part of the temple site of Jerusalem. Expressions in this verse "السميع" the one who listens to" and "البصير" the one who sees" seem to have some connection with the expression that appears in the words of Solomon, who built the first temple here and prayed for heaven (1Kings 8:29):

"that thy eyes may be open night and day toward this house  
(לְהִיּוֹת עֵינֶיךָ פְּתוּחוֹת אֶל-הַבַּיִת הַזֶּה לַיְלָה וַיּוֹם), the place of which thou hast said, 'My name shall be  
there,' that thou mayest hearken to the prayer (לְשַׁמֵּעַ אֶל-הַתְּפִלָּה) which thy servant offers  
toward this place"

It is generally understood that المسجد الأقصى in Surah 17:1 means al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem even though its construction was completed around 70 years later after the death of Mohammad. Yusuf Ali assumes that المسجد الأقصى where Mohammad prayed is the former site of Solomon's Temple (cf. Yusuf Ali, A., *The Holy Qura'n*, State of Qatar, 1946, p. 693). Al-masjid al-aqsa in this verse seems to deliver religious importance of the place. However, one may not estimate the meaning of Jerusalem in the Qur'an as long as one does not find explicit occurrence of Jerusalem in it.

In summary, Jerusalem is portrayed as a political and religious capital of Jewish nation in the Old Testament. However, their prophetic literature tends to broaden borders of Jerusalem and turns Jerusalem as the worship center for all nations including Jewish people. The New Testament describes that the prophetic vision of the Old Testament on Jerusalem is accomplished there. Jerusalem becomes now the center of new phenomena: birthplace of the Church and the eschatological destination - the heavenly Jerusalem. The total absence of Jerusalem in the Qur'an looks quite strange in light of intensive occurrence of Jerusalem in the Old and New Testaments.







# Iranian nationality and networking

**Tomoko Yamagishi (Meiji Univ., Japan)**

This paper tries to highlight on a hypothesis of Iranian nationality which is dependent upon activity of networking, more than by birth or by legal registration. It indicates that while the basic prerequisites for nation-state system are challenged in globalizing world, we find some networking phenomena strongly upheld Iranian/Persian cause. The legacy of networking society is briefly referred, to argue that the legacy of networking activities encourages Iranians to adapt to the age of mass migration and the advanced information and communication technologies.

## **1. Crucial elements of modern nation-states: Media, Place, and Time**

As Benedict Anderson analysed and described in his book “Imagined Community”, “nationalism” is a modern politico-cultural device for which mass media is indispensable. “Nationals” can’t maintain their identity without mass-media. Anderson also elaborately depicts how arbitrary segment of land became “state” cut out by “national border” lines, and how language and history became peculiar “national heritage.” In other words, he clarified that place and time are the main axis of imagining a nation.

Iran, among other Middle Eastern nation-states, can be categorized as a newly independent country, whose boundary lines were mainly drawn by Great Powers. Iranian nation consists of various ethnic groups, so that since the 20<sup>th</sup> century the central power has ardently implemented “Iranian Nationalism,” in which they insist on the heritage of the Persian Empires and the legitimacy of kingship.

## **2. Conditions of modern nation-states being undermined**

The so-called “globalization,” for some extent, challenges the very existential conditions of modern nation states including Iran. First, massive scale of migration flowing out of Iran should be considered seriously. Estimated number of “Iranians living abroad” is about 5 million, and many of them seem to hold plural passports and construct compound or hyphenated identity, such as Iranian-American. Iran is not a sole “mother-land” for those migrants.

Second, the rapidly developing information and communication technology changes the very basic sense of “sympathy” and “place.” When one accepts that face-to-face relationship is the very base of fostering sympathy, proximity and sympathy are thought to be in direct proportion: two persons sympathize more intensely when they stay nearer and meet more frequently, and farther the distance, meeting becomes less frequent, and so fades away sympathy. However, thanks to the highly developed ICT, physical distance came to matter less, and one might feel more familiar with someone living at a long distance, rather than the “neighbours.”

Edward Relph, a celebrated geographer, argues that phenomenologically “place” is not only horizontal, but also vertical. A certain “place” is more significant, so to make that “place” higher than other places. And the territory of a nation-state is thought to be a special place, often referred to with family code, such as “home”, “motherland”.

As the relationship of distance and sympathy becomes less proportionate, connectivity becomes more important for fostering sympathy. One may feel more sympathetic to some space where one can connect there more easily or more often. ICT enhances the selected connectivity, so that one can even feel “at home” in some cyberspace. In a globalized world, peoples are restrained less territorially, and their imagination can easily go beyond the established topos of a nation.

## **3. “Persian” consciousness in internet**

While pundits argue the crisis of nation-states due to the globalization and the development of ICT, we recognize some instance of “nationalistic” enthusiasm enhanced in internet. According to Niki Akhavan’s study, a claim for “Persian Gulf,” refusing the designation of “Arabian Gulf” on maps, became heated projects in internet. It started from a complaint to KLM by those well-informed of “foreign” views and tech-savvy. After the introduction of Web 2.0, it became easy to upload or post comments in Farsi, so that various groups mushroomed to claim “Persian Gulf” in various weblogs, specialized websites, text messages with hash-tags, etc. It is noteworthy that the enthusiasm crossed over the politically opposing groups. One could find the same claim among those who harshly accuse Iranian government, while Iranian government herself sent the same claim

to the famous magazine of “National Geographic.”

One may also recall that during the Green Movement 2009, the planning of protests was carried out and diffused in internet, and Iranians in both Iran and abroad tried to make simultaneous rallies.

Considering the above-mentioned examples, one may maintain that Iranian migrants all over the world and Iranians in Iran are connected considerably, and in their selected connectivity “Iranian/Persian cause” is still relevant.

## 4. Historical orientation

Janet Abu-Lughod’s “Before European Hegemony” eloquently maintains that the “World System” in the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> century consisted in networks of cities, which were like islands on lands took the role of nodes of nets. Their networks extended over African and Eurasian continents and very well flourished. And today’s Iran was a part of that “World System.” At that time different civilizations were kept in touch, and diversity in life styles, such as languages and religiosities, were tolerated in cities, to promote far distance trades, monetary economy, scholarly works, and to develop production systems.

One can also date back to the Persian Empires to find that networking activities were significant for political bodies. Kingship was to construct and keep roads (*Shah-rah*) in good condition, so to connect city-states. While each city-state with its king and his people with distinctive culture was preserved, Persian kings enjoyed the title of “King of kings / *Shahan-Shah*.”

More importantly, since Farsi writing were regular among bureaucrats and intellectuals in various Khanates and dynasties which located in today’s Iran and Central Asia, in addition to Mughal Empire and some part of Qing dynasty, networks of Farsi literate intellectuals existed in the wake of the age of modern mass-media. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century Farsi newspapers which took initiatives in modernization discourse were printed in Istanbul, Calcutta (Kolkata), London and Cairo, and we notice that the readers scattered all over the African and Eurasian continents. Those modernization discourse included the aspiration of modern “nation” of Iran. That is to say, Farsi literates in the 19<sup>th</sup> century discussed about modernizing “Iran” while living in distance from Qajar Iran.

## 5. Concluding remarks

One might point out that living on open network has been a persistent mode of life in the Middle East and

Central Asia and living closed in a fragmented land by the name of nation-state, though considered modern and common today, is a system ill-suited to the legacy of the region including Iran.

From that viewpoint, it is not surprising that Iranians today easily enjoy connectivity through ICT to keep in touch with their family and “fellows” at far distance, notwithstanding her/his residential registration. And that may well provide them with a way to share common image of community or circle, and a sense of Iranian nationality to survive.

# 3rd Session. Economy

**Moderator: Lee, Kwon Hyung(KIEP, Korea)**

» **On the political economy of non-military sanctions in the contemporary world economy**

- Manabu Shimizu (Emeritus Researcher, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan)
- Discussant: Moamen Gouda (HUFS, Korea)

» **The Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and the Effect on the Local Society: Economy, Politics, and Policy**

- Kim, Jung-Kwan (Dongguk Univ., Korea)
- Discussant: Ahn, Sung Hun (Gachon Univ., Korea)


» **Determinants of FDI Location in Egypt—Empirical Analysis Using Governorate Panel Data**

- Shima Hanafy (HUFS, Korea)
- Discussant: Kim, Byeong Ho (HUFS, Korea)

» **An emerging frontier in Wealth Creation from Islamic Knowledge and Understanding through Halal Economy and K-Pop Culture**

- Adlin Dato' Masood(USIM, Malaysia) & Alina Abdul Rahim (USIM, Malaysia)
- Discussant: Lee, Hee-Yul (Sejong Cyber Univ., Korea)





# On the political economy of non-military sanctions in the contemporary world economy

**Manabu Shimizu (Institute of Developing Economies, Japan)**

This paper is an attempt to sort out new features and implications of sanctions by focusing mainly on the countries in the Middle East such as Iran taking into account the environmental changes in the international politics as well as structural transformation in the world economic system. My paper tries to refer to the Middle East. However, I have to refer to the general trend also in order to have a more comprehensive picture.

## **(1) Economic sanctions and their varieties**

Economic sanctions against the targeted country are major tools in the non-military measures imposed by international organizations such as the UN and /or by a state or a group of states in order to enforce the country to remedy the policies which are supposed to cause threat to the economic system, peace or human rights. Very often embargo of strategic commodities such as oil was effective in sanctions. Historically, the oil embargo by the US against Japan in 1941 in order to put pressure on Japan to prevent Japan's military aggression against China and Indo-China was one of the most important cases to assess the implications of sanctions. Another case was an embargo of oil against the countries which were supportive or friendly to Israel in the Arab Israel War in 1973.

Cases of economic sanctions increased in number drastically since the beginning of 1990s with the end of cold war responding to the transformation of the world order including the collapse of Yugoslavia, the increase and expansion of regional conflicts, and in the expansion of militarization created another real threat because of attempt by plural countries to attain or explore the nuclear devices against the NPT regulations. The economic sanctions to contain these attempts have been inevitably combined with complicated international politics.

On the other hand, the new features in the world economy since the 1980s are termed as globalization in trade and investment accompanied by the new stage of finance capitalism increasing the mutual financial and trade

interdependency among nations which resulted in vulnerability vis-à-vis restrictions on capital flow and trade settlement. The globalization in trade at the same time increased conflicts among the states concerning various regulations whose supposed violations incurred litigations which sometimes demanded huge compensations for the victims by the companies related. This is not sanctions so to speak. However, any huge penalty sometimes threatens the existence of the corporations themselves.

Let me point out various cases which incurred economic sanctions particularly since the collapse of USSR and the end of cold war.

- 1 . Against the intention of development of nuclear bombs and related devices. Iran and North Korea are most contemporary cases. As for India and Pakistan, both of them exploded nuclear bombs in 1998. However, India and Pakistan have not signed the NPT and objected from the beginning the logics behind the NPT. Strangely Israel is outside of the sanction of target in spite of high possibility of her nuclear development.
2. Against the alleged annexation of the “foreign territories”.  
Economic sanctions against Russia which “annexed” the Crimea in 2014...  
Violation of international laws concerning the sovereignty of territories is of course deserves the sanctions in principle. How about the carving Kosovo out of Serbia ?
3. Economic sanction against Turkey in 2018 caused by the US in order to free the US pastor under detention in Turkey
4. Economic sanction against Venezuela in 2018

## **(2) Case study: US sanction against Iran in 2018**

One of the most controversial and imminent issues is the new sanctions against Iran by the US in in the middle of 2018 with its severity and confrontational character.

The Trump administration of the US withdrew in 2018 from the 2015 Iren nuclear deal JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) by signing an executive order of the President. As a matter of course Iran protested and strongly criticized the unilateral withdrawal from the deal in which the US took part in the formation. Iran insisted that it obeyed every details of the deal. Disappointment was expressed by other parties to the JCPOA namely Britain, France, Germany Russia and China. However, President Trump takes a very strong position against Iran and he boasts of the “most biting sanctions ever imposed.” which might bring a big change in the behavior of foreign policy of Iran.

The US goal of the sanctions is to reduce Iran’s oil export “down to zero.” At present November 4 is declared as the day when the sanction on oil export will go into effect. The side effects of the US sanctions is not limited



to the US. The European countries, particularly corporations engaged in Iran related business began to refrain from the contracts including the French TOTAL being afraid of the “secondary sanctions” by the US if the corporation doesn’t obey the US sanctions.. The major reason why any secondary sanction is sometimes very much effective is the result of globalization of world economy in which many corporations invest in multiple countries and engage in “in-company international trade” which make them vulnerable to the secondary sanctions. The secondary sanctions are liable to expand and deepen the effect of economic sanctions.

Another important point to be noted is the intended purpose of the US concerning those sanctions. From the viewpoint of the US, there are two alternative options. One option is any regime change namely the fundamental change in the present Islamic Republic. Another option is Iran’s acceptance of the strict demands of the US in its foreign policies. Either option is not acceptable to the present regime of Iran. Therefore development in the future is difficult to predict. However, the Trump options against Iran clearly show any economic sanction is not peaceful means and sometimes very severe only second to direct military engagement. In case of regime change, aggravation of macro-economy which incites any complaints of the people against the government and another political forces in waiting might be included in any hidden scenario. An indirect intervention in the exchange rate of the targeted country accelerating inflationary trend which could be a damaging blow to the political system itself.

### **(3) Trade wars and sanctions**

Trade wars are not themselves economic sanctions. On July 7, 2018, the US announced additional 25 percent of tariff on the imported items from China equivalent to around 34 billion dollars. China responded by similar tariff on the same value of import from the US. July 10 President Trump announced a list of items including 6000 for the additional 10 percent tariff. Total amount will be 200 billion dollars. If executed in sum they constitute around 40 % of total export of China to the US.

It is to be noted the US has begun to employ the logic of national security in order to rationalize trade restrictions. The ambiguity of “national security” could include without limit a wider range of commodities under the logic of security.

Another anxiety of trade wars is a secondary negative impact beyond the direct impact of additional tariff. They have significant impact beyond the two countries engaged in the trade wars and extend to the third countries. The impact expands through the supply chains or value chains to other wider areas.

## **(4) Trump Phenomena**

In principle, economic sanctions are policies which should be analyzed seriously in detail including their economic and political implications and influences. However, President Trump of the US took recourse to economic sanctions so often and so prevalently in its foreign policies with apparently different objectives that it is more difficult to classify and categorize the implications of function of sanctions. Decrease of foreign aid, economic or military, is employed sometimes as a tool of “deal” to change the recipient’s political, military and economic behaviors. Decrease of its contribution to the UNRWA is used to enforce US’s Palestine policies while the same logic is employed to enforce Pakistan to change its relations with the Afghan Taliban.

## **(5) Illogical logic or logic with some objective facts ?**

When I proposed my subject of presentation for the KAMES conference I intended to refer to Iran mainly as one of the hot issues related to the political economy of non-military sanctions. However, the global picture concerning non –military sanctions widened drastically by the US. Trump administration’s new rush of economic sanctions not only against the political adversaries but also against its strategic allies in order to realize the so-called “America First” economic strategy in order to satisfy President’s own political domestic constituency. The so-called US –China trade war erupted suddenly in a big scale as a precursor to the following stage. This challenge should be analyzed in the historical perspective taking into account the characteristics of the contemporary world economy.

The first point to be raised is that these sanctions were not enforced after the due factual and logical considerations concerning their impact on the world economy as a whole as well as on the US economy itself. The direct purpose was to reduce trade deficit of the US by reducing or discouraging the export of the counterpart to the US by taking recourse to an abrupt and rude trade tariff measures. This is nothing but one of the apparently ad-hoc major mercantile policies. The policy is based upon a short-sighted populism targeting the electoral constituencies in the US to win over their voting. In other words, the policy is a political decision separated from purely economic considerations.

Therefore we have to analyze the negative side effects as well as positive side effects of the policy. The consumers have to bear the price rise caused by higher income tariff and producers have to put up with the high cost of imported materials and components. The most important factors to be taken into account are related to the contemporary world economy. The extent of globalization have created and creating a more intensive network of supply and value chains in the production process. The production process of final product is divided into multiple locations, often dispersed in different countries. Smartphones are some of the representative cases.

Under the condition any change in the custom tariff of the importing country does affect not only the exporting countries of the final products but also other countries involved in stages of production including the importing country, which results in an incurred economic damage for the country which imposed punitive higher custom tariff in order to improve the balance of payment.

The last point to be discussed is Trump's effort to return of manufacturing industries to the US. Some people might say his policies are against the major tide of the world economy. There is much truth in the logic. At the same time, Trump's logic might have to some extent some not illogical elements in it. This is a decreasing gap of wages between the developed economies and developing economies, which might create space for a return back to the developed economies a certain kind of manufacturing industries from the developing economies on a more equal and competitive basis.



# The Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and the Effect of the Local Society: Economy, Politics, and Policy

Kim, Joong-Kwan (Dongguk Univ., Korea)

## 1. Refugee Migration process and Current status in Lebanon

The world has faced one of the largest exoduses in recent history in the Syrian conflict that began in March 2011. One direct implication of this conflict is large-scale population migration. Indeed, approximately four million Syrians have fled their country in search of a safe haven along the borders with the neighbor country that eroded the capacity of the Lebanese government. It is the result of the strategic depopulation of Syria (الجمهورية العربية السورية, al-Jumhūrīyah al-‘Arabīyah as-Sūrīyah) by hegemonic powers (Agier, 2011.11.). The function of control of refugees whether in the application of asylum policies or in the management of camps, came to accompany that of protection, and very often to dominate it.

Lebanon (الجمهورية اللبنانية, al-Jumhūrīyah al-Lubnānīyah) is currently experiencing considerable difficulties in connection with the influx of refugees from Syria. During the conflict, the number of refugees who moved to Lebanon exceeded 1.5 million people. Here we should note that Lebanon ranks first in the number of refugees who moved during the conflict in Syria.<sup>1)</sup> The mass influx had already put an enormous strain on Lebanon’s economic infrastructure. Because Lebanese government has chosen to accommodate the Syrian refugees mostly with the national government’s expense. Lebanese government response to the Syrian refugee crisis exemplify, issues concerning migration stand as a dynamic and complex set of political, economic and social matters, affecting the process of both horizontal and vertical policy making. Distinguishing feature of Lebanon’s mass migration management is the prevalence of the security and control dimension of the policy, indicating the state actors’ dominant role in times of mass influxes of refugees. Accordingly, the initial policy response is to keep as many displaced persons as they can under state control, and possibly accommodate them in the state-controlled camps. And finally, a significant feature of mass migration management concerns the legal status and the use of terminology, such as referring to the displaced people as guests instead of refugees, which emphasizes the temporary aspect.

This paper aims to estimate the effect of the steep influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon since the onset of the conflict in Syria. Given the disruptive nature of population displacements, assessing the impact of the influx of refugees into the Lebanon is imperative to understanding the changes, whether negative or positive, that the country on the receiving end can face, be they social, economic, demographic, or political (Frontex, 2016).

1) According to United Nations Office’s High Commissioner for Refugees, by October 2017 in Lebanese refugee there were about 1.5 million internally displaced people from Syria (Al-Quds al-Arabi website reports with reference to the Lebanese Foreign Minister Mansour Adnan, РОССИЯ СЕГОДНЯ 2017.10.16.).

## **2. Early Stage of the Process of the Syrian Conflict**

During the early period of conflict in Syria, which began in March 2011, over 100,000 people died in the country, and more than 4 million became refugees on Syrian territory; more than two million fled to neighboring countries(RIA News, 2016).

To be more exact, before the conflict started the total population of Syria had been approximately 20 million people. During the conflict in Syria, which began in March 2011, till 2014 more than 150,000 people killed(BAKU/Trend, 2014.10.14.), more than 4.5million people have become refugees in Syrian territory, 2.5 million people have fled to neighboring countries. By the year of 2016 the number of Syrians, killed in the conflict was accounted as around 600,000 peoples(WORLD, 2016.07.03.).

The unrest in Syria began in mid-March in the southern city of Deraa, and then spread to a number of other regions(the newspaper "Radikal"(ria.ru/arab\_news, 2011. 06.11.). Syrian human rights activists report that in clashes with the security forces more than 1.3 thousand people were killed. In its turn, according to official data, since the beginning of the events, more than 250 servicemen and representatives of the security forces have been killed as a result of the actions of "armed terrorist elements", which the Syrian authorities consider responsible for the violence in the country.

## **3. Economic, Social and political Effects of Refugees**

After two years of the war, more than half a million of Syrian residents have fled to neighboring Lebanon, whose population are only 4 million people. Infrastructure of Lebanon does not cope with the issue - for example, for one and a half year the load on the electric grid has increased by 27%, and disconnections have begun. So the new refugees have turned into an economic problem.<sup>2)</sup> People from comparatively wealthy Homs and Damascus often move to Lebanese territory(Euronews, 2013.05.18.). The Lebanese government has maintained an open door policy towards Syrian refugees, Therefore, there exists no international laws which Lebanon must follow in dealing with the refugees this has included the government of Lebanon not building any refugee camps.<sup>3)</sup>

For the most part, the burden of maintaining Syrian refugees falls on the shoulders of the Lebanese authorities and humanitarian organizations. Unemployment is rising and inflation in the past year increased by 10%. Partially because of Syrian refugees issue Lebanon's expenditure on debt servicing have increased by 67%, so creditors fear that the Lebanese economy simply unable to digest, such a radical increase in the population(Patricia Ward, 2014). But

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2) According to the World Bank, in Lebanon, the GDP per capita, is \$15,900 versus \$5,000 in Syria. and living standard of in Lebanon is much higher than in Syria.

3) The UNHCR worried that the Lebanese government has not signed the '1951 Refugee Convention' which secures a refugee who belongs to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion(wikipedia, 2018.02.28. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrians\\_in\\_Lebanon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syrians_in_Lebanon)).

whether Syrian refugees are a new burden or engine of the economy or Lebanon is still to be seen. Georges Cormu, the former Minister of Finance of Lebanon, economist, while commenting on the situation on Syrian refugees for Euronews, pointed out, that as for the consequences of Syrian refugees influx for the Lebanese economy.

There are two points of view in problems of Lebanon. The first is economic view. According to it, the influx of refugees stimulates economic markets and, in particular, the real estate market, thanks to some wealthy Syrians. But there is another point of view. There are a lot of questions about the load that Lebanon can endure. The problem is its side effect to reproduce the problems on political and social perspective on this migrant's influx to Lebanon. And one of the reasons for the fears is a decrease in the proportion of Lebanese population.

Another issue is consequences of increasing investment and the number of workers in the Lebanon's economy. Syrian workers, in particular in the construction sector, have brought their families to Lebanon, who also got registered as refugees. For this reason, there is an increase in the number of refugees. But Syrian labor is a key element in the economic system of Lebanon. The refugees who are capable of working must compete with the Lebanon for the country's lowest paying jobs to get work, which has resulted in damage to Lebanon's local economic infrastructure.

As for the question of negative impact from the influx of refugees on the tourism sector. Actually, in Beirut, or other tourist areas where furnished apartments are given for rent, wealthy Syrian refugees have replaced tourists, who usually came from the Persian Gulf countries. Actually the Lebanese government is not in a position to control the Lebanese economy, prices and production. We should regard this lack of control as chronic and long-standing problem. The government has appealed to various international and Arab organizations to take care of Syrian refugees. But the Lebanese government did not receive proper support. The solution will come when the situation in Syria calms down, and the Syrian refugees are able to return home (Kim 2017).

## 4. Conclusion

The findings of this paper are articulated on the existing policies to minimize the side effect on the country and also refugee peoples from the Syria and the proper way to stabilize the condition. On the territory of Lebanon, whose population is four million people; there are about one million and half Syrian citizens, as well as half a million refugees from Palestine. The Lebanese authorities regularly addressed the international community, including the UN, asking for help, to prevent catastrophe which refugees' stay in Lebanon. Among alternative explanations to solve these problems, one could include the possibility that Lebanon can be taking additional measures to production sector for hiring these refugees. Most of all, Lebanese government find an opportunity to incentive the refugees to return to home land, and make a system to forced refugees to be located in border regions and camps with tight movement restrictions.

The policy questions should guide next steps on the Syrian refugee issue of Lebanon: ① How to maximize the social and economic benefits of the refugee presence for host communities and the local economy as a whole? ② How to mitigate the potential negative geopolitical challenges of the refugee presence on host communities? ③ How to support refugees to be self-reliant until they are able to return? ④ How to develop the productive negotiations with

the Syrian government and the opposition? To find proper ways for all possible formulas to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people and reduce tensions in the region, the Special Representative of hegemonic countries should visit Beirut or near capital of Syria to discuss the possibility of resuming negotiations between the Syrian government and the coalition of opposition and revolutionary forces as well as refugee issue.

This study concludes that immigrants exert a modest impact on general sectors of Lebanon. Under Lebanese law, Syrian refugees cannot apply for resettlement but only for temporary protection status.



# Determinants of FDI Location in Egypt—Empirical Analysis Using Governorate Panel Data

Shimaa Hanafy (HUFS, Korea)

**JEL Codes:** F21, E22, R12, O53, Z10

**Keywords:** Foreign direct investment; FDI location; agglomeration; cultural similarity; regional FDI; Arab countries.

Egypt attracted the largest amount of FDI inflows in North Africa and has been among the top four recipients of FDI in Africa on an annual basis since 2004 (excluding the year 2011, where the January Uprising deterred FDI in Egypt). In 2015 and 2016, the country received the second largest amount of FDI inflows to Africa. FDI is a major contributor to capital accumulation in the Egyptian economy. During the period 2004–2010, FDI inflows constituted an average of 30% of Egyptian gross fixed capital formation. This is much higher than the average in North Africa (15%), Arab countries (19%), Africa (16%), developing countries (12%), and worldwide (11%).<sup>1)</sup> In spite of its importance, empirical research on FDI in Egypt is still limited.<sup>2)</sup>

FDI is very unevenly distributed across regions in Egypt (Hanafy, 2015). For example, Egypt consists of 27 governorates, but roughly 90% of greenfield FDI has been directed to 10 governorates only, with the governorates Cairo and Giza together attracting about two-thirds of it. The current concentration of FDI in only a few regions might prevent the dissemination of possible positive FDI effects throughout the whole economy and thus increase regional divergence (Mumkin and Nunnenkamp, 2012). Recent political events in Egypt show that inequality can be a major source of political unrest in the country. In this paper, we ask two questions. First, what factors are statistically significant and economically relevant determinants of the location of FDI inflows in Egypt? And second, do these factors also explain the spatial distribution of FDI from other Arab countries, that is, FDI when cultural and language are similar between the FDI source and the recipient country?

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1) This is the annual average before the Egyptian Uprising, in line with the time focus of our analysis. When including recent years, the average contribution of FDI inflows to gross fixed capital formation in Egypt was 18% in 2004–2016, again higher than North Africa (11%), Africa (15%), developing countries (9%), and worldwide (9%) (UNCTAD, 2017).

2) See Hanafy and Marktanner (forthcoming) for an analysis of the effect of aggregate and sectoral FDI on economic growth in Egyptian governorates.

To answer these questions, we use a novel panel dataset of 26 governorates in Egypt for the period 1992–2008, exploring the role played by different potential determinants of FDI spatial distribution across Egypt. Specifically, and based on findings of previous literature, we investigate the impact of agglomeration and market variables, labour market variables as well as regional investment policy variables. We begin our estimations with a panel of aggregate FDI inflows, that is, FDI from all regions of the world. We then split our sample into two subsamples: FDI inflows from Arab countries (Arab FDI) and FDI inflows from the rest of the world (non-Arab FDI). Our model timeframe is mainly restricted by available data on regional GDP.

The paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, to date no empirical study identifies the location determinants of FDI in Egypt. A considerable body of literature explores the location of foreign investors within various developed and developing countries, for example, the United States (e.g. Bobonis and Shatz, 2007; Halvorsen, 2012); China (e.g. Cheng and Kwan, 2000; Coughlin and Segev, 2000; He, 2002; Sun et al., 2002), and India (Nunnenkamp and Stracke, 2008; Mukim and Nunnenkamp, 2012). The results of these studies show how FDI location determinants can differ across countries and samples. Accordingly, our analysis allows us to assess whether FDI location determinants in Egypt are different from those found in the literature for other countries. Our results are of direct relevance for policymakers.

The paper's second contribution is the use of a novel panel dataset on Egyptian governorates that the author collected and consolidated from various data sources and one that, as far as we know, has not previously been used for econometric research. In fact, we are not aware of any econometric study that uses a panel dataset at the Egyptian governorate level. Presumably, this is due to the difficulties of collecting economic data in Egypt.

Third, the paper contributes to the strand of literature on the role of culture and language as potential FDI determinants. In a recent paper, Méon and Sekkat (2015) demonstrate how formal and informal institutions interact in determining FDI. The authors highlight the particular importance of this interaction for MENA countries. The relevance of cultural similarity for FDI in the case of Arab countries has been tackled by two studies. First, Roberts and Almahmood (2009) find a significant effect of cultural similarity when investigating FDI to Saudi Arabia. Second, Sekkat (2014) uses a panel of FDI in 13 Arab countries for the period 1995–2009 to compare determinants of intra-Arab FDI with FDI from non-Arab countries. Sekkat (2014) shows that determinants of FDI inflows to Arab countries vary depending on whether their source is Arab or non-Arab countries and that intra-Arab FDI is higher than can be deduced from empirical models, suggesting cultural similarity as well as regional strategic considerations as explanations for this phenomenon.

Our contribution to this strand of literature is our focus on FDI location determinants *within* the same host country. Using the case of Arab FDI to Egypt, our data allow us to investigate whether these determinants are different depending on the similarity of culture and language between the FDI source and recipient country. Specifically, we distinguish between location determinants of Arab versus non-Arab FDI to Egypt, which is the largest recipient of intra-Arab FDI (Bolbol and Fatheldin, 2006). Arab investors share the Arabic language and are relatively close, culture-wise, to the host Egypt, which facilitates communication, access to information, and networking. In contrast, non-Arab investors in Egypt are exposed to higher information asymmetries and

information costs. Therefore, we expect non-Arab investors to follow more the location choices by previous investors compared to Arab investors.

The results of this paper provide first insight into the location choice behaviour of foreign investors in Egypt. Despite the strong concentration of FDI in Egypt and in contrast to results from other countries, we find no significant effect of previous FDI concentration on new FDI inflows, which suggests no self-reinforcing effect of FDI. We argue that the lack of foreign-specific agglomeration of FDI in Egypt is good news for the remote governorates. This lack of path-dependency indicates that it is not too late for governorates that to date have been less attractive for foreign investors to attract new or more FDI in the future.

Our results further reveal that domestic private investment are important determinants of FDI, which can be explained by agglomeration and signalling effects. This result offers an important message for policymakers: Facilitating domestic private investment in investment-scarce regions in Egypt could increase both domestic private and foreign investments in these regions. This could be done, for example, through financial reforms and better access to credit. Our further findings show that well-functioning Free Zones and labour abundance positively determine the distribution of FDI inflows in Egypt on the governorate level. While we do find a positive effect of labour quantity, we do not find any significant effect of labour education on FDI location. Furthermore, our results show that a number of regional policies in Egypt—with the exception of Free Zones—did not affect the FDI distribution in the country.

Finally, our analysis reveals substantial differences between the location determinants of Arab versus non-Arab FDI in Egypt. Our results suggest that regional investors from other Arab countries—who share the Arabic language and are culturally quite similar to Egypt—are more willing to invest in less investment-agglomerated areas compared to non-Arab investors, which is in line with our hypothesis. The good news is that Arab FDI could help smooth the high inequality of investment distribution in Egypt.

Moreover, and somewhat surprisingly, our findings also reveal that there appears to be no significant effect of agglomeration economies or incentive reactions by Arab FDI. In fact, Arab FDI location does not seem to be affected by any of the usual determinants. As similarly argued by Bolbol and Fatheldin (2006) and Sekkat (2014) for intra-Arab FDI, our finding seems to suggest that regional strategic and political considerations are of more relevance than economic considerations for the location of Arab FDI. This makes Arab FDI less vulnerable to economic downturns and instability, both of which characterise the post-uprising era in Egypt.

As a robustness check, we re-run our regression models while restricting the FDI inflows to those in the manufacturing sector in order to rule out that our different results for Arab and non-Arab FDI are driven by differences in their sectoral composition. We conduct the analysis for manufacturing FDI for various reasons. First, the manufacturing sector hosts the largest share of FDI in Egypt. Second, FDI flows into this sector show the highest geographic dispersion in Egypt. For more details on sectoral FDI in Egypt, see Hanafy (2015) and Hanafy and Marktanner (forthcoming). Third, agglomeration externalities in terms of economies of scale and forward and backward linkages are expected to be most pronounced in this sector. Fourth, many agricultural

activities as well as some services, such as tourism, are partly location bound, which limits investor location choice. The results are in line with our findings above, suggesting that the differences in location determinants between Arab and non-Arab FDI are not driven by their sectoral composition.

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Accessed 25 May 2018.



# An emerging frontier in Wealth Creation from Islamic Knowledge and Understanding through Halal Economy and K-Pop Culture

**Adlin Dato' Masood (USIM, Malaysia)& Alina Abdul Rahim (USIM, Malaysia)**

## **ABSTRACT**

*K-Pop culture and Halal Economy, has grown at an unparalleled rate leading to increases in wealth creation for both the entertainment and food industry players respectively. The K-Pop culture introduced by South Korea has captured the world by storm especially in the Asian and South East Asian nations. K-pop culture, fortifies and consolidates the cultural identity of Asians by highlighting oriental norms with value propositions that have acceptable universal global appeal. Balancing development between Asian traditional values and modernity: it is unsurprising that Korean TV dramas, K-pop, Korean cuisine and fashion are well received. Concurrently, the Korean government has seen this as an opportunity to expand their businesses beyond their shores and now sees the Halal economy as a business sector that is both lucrative and sustainable. To do so, they have also earmarked the cosmetics and food industries to penetrate the Asian and Middle East markets. However, the industry players who aim to obtain Halal certificates, face considerable difficulties as this Muslim minority country only has one Halal certification body that is recognised world wide. An added disadvantage is that many industry players are not well versed in Islam. This paper thus seeks to examine the possibility that Islamic knowledge and values can be obtained by non-Muslims who want to reap what Halal economy can offer, which will lead to greater tolerance and understanding about Islam, at the same time avoiding blunders of misrepresentation of Halal definitions, and practice. This is to steer away from offending the world Muslims consumers and affecting South Korean reputation in the Halal global markets. By emulating the Malaysian experience of a multi-racial country with non Muslims presence actively building the Halal industry, Halal products of reputable branding and acceptance may be possible, to be produced and offered by the South Koreans, through correct Islamic knowledge gained, accurate understanding, and product development, in order to produce globally acceptable Halal made-in-Korean products.*

**Keywords:** K-Pop; Halal Economy; Wealth Creation; Islamic knowledge and Life style, Religion





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# The Civil War in Syria: An Israeli Perspective

**Niv Farago (Sogang Univ., Korea)**

Following the eruption of the civil war in Syria in 2011, Benjamin Netanyahu's government considered the option of assisting the rebel forces in toppling Bashar al-Assad's regime, but eventually decided not to intervene in the war.<sup>1)</sup> Thus, Israel's involvement in the war in Syria has been confined to activities against Iran's military buildup in the country and Islamic State affiliated forces. Up to the summer of 2018, these activities included providing guns and ammunition to rebel groups in the vicinity of the Israel-Syria border in order to prevent Islamic State affiliated groups and Iran-backed Shiite militias from gaining control of that area.<sup>2)</sup>

The rationale behind Israel's relative neutrality in the civil war was explained by Avigdor Lieberman, Israel's defense minister, in an interview he gave to the Saudi online daily newspaper *Elaph* in April 2018. According to Lieberman, the various forces that fight each other in Syria are mostly unfriendly towards Israel and the Israeli government wishes all of them success.<sup>3)</sup>

However, after more than seven years of civil war in Syria during which Assad's Alawite minority-led regime was almost ousted from power, Russian and Iranian military intervention succeeded in crushing most of the Sunni rebel forces. As the civil war approaches its end with forces loyal to Assad regaining control over most of Syria's territory, Israel watches with much anxiety Iran's continued military buildup in the country. For policymakers in Jerusalem, the threat of an Iranian-led Shiite-controlled military axis consisting of the Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria – a threat that seemed remote only a few years ago – is rapidly taking shape.

The purpose of this study is to analyze from an Israeli point of view the developing situation in Syria as well as Iran's and Russia's interests and activities in this country. It does so by examining the perspectives of Israeli politicians, military officers and leading security experts on the Syrian conundrum. The study suggests that the

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1) Ben Caspit and Aryeh Eldad, An interview with Yuval Steinitz, Israel's minister of energy and member of the security cabinet, [in Hebrew], *Radio 103fm*, July 1, 2018, <https://103fm.maariv.co.il/programs/media.aspx?ZrqvnVq=HGGEFD&c41t4nzVQ=EF>.

2) Elizabeth Tsurkov, "Inside Israel's Secret Program to Back Syrian Rebels," *Foreign Policy*, September 6, 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/09/06/in-secret-program-israel-armed-and-funded-rebel-groups-in-southern-syria/#>.

3) Liad Osmo, "Lieberman in an interview to a Saudi website: 'If Iran attacks Tel Aviv, we will attack Tehran,'" [in Hebrew], *Ynetnews*, April 26, 2018, <https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5241832,00.html>.

threats and challenges presented to Israel's national security by Assad's impending victory and the continued presence of Iranian forces on Syrian soil increase the risk of tensions spiraling out of control and resulting in a regional war.

In this regard, senior IDF officers as well as Israeli security experts warn that Iran is in pursuit of capability to operate militarily against Israel from Syrian territory. Thus, Iran is constantly attempting to transfer to Syria military forces and advanced weapons systems to include rockets. Significantly, sensitive Iranian projects in Syria, such as surface-to-surface missile facilities are set in close to Russian bases and anti-aircraft systems in an effort to deter Israel from striking.<sup>4)</sup>

Israel's determination to prevent Iran's military entrenchment in Syria "at any cost" is reflected not only in the utterances of its senior politicians,<sup>5)</sup> but also by augmented IDF activity against Iranian targets in Syria over the past year. In response, in the summer of 2018, Iran reportedly transferred to its Shiite proxies in Iraq 24 missiles that can reach Tel Aviv and Riyadh and threatened to increase their number if necessary.<sup>6)</sup> It seems, however, that the transfer of Iranian missiles to Iraq has failed to deter Israel from striking even harder at Iranian targets in Syria. Moreover, although thus far the IDF has refrained from operating against Iranian targets in Iraq, Defense Minister Lieberman clarified that Israel reserves the right to contend with any Iranian threat regardless of its location.<sup>7)</sup>

In addition to the use of force, Israel is leading a diplomatic campaign aimed at persuading France, Germany and Britain that sanctions relief following the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran has facilitated Iranian aggression in the Middle East.<sup>8)</sup> The Netanyahu government hopes that Europe will follow the Trump administration by withdrawing from the nuclear deal and re-imposing biting sanctions on the ayatollahs' regime.

A possible collapse of the nuclear deal, however, would remove the limitations imposed on Iran's nuclear program and enable the ayatollahs regime to minimize the time required for breaking out towards nuclear weapons. Such a contingency could prompt the Israeli government to sanction military action against Iran's nuclear program. Between 2010 and 2012, Prime Minister Netanyahu instructed twice Israel's security chiefs to ready the IDF to strike Iran's nuclear installations at a short notice. Netanyahu eventually withdrew his instructions because the security chiefs insisted on getting a green light from the Obama administration that was staunchly opposed to an Israeli strike on Iran.<sup>9)</sup> With Donald Trump in the Oval Office and John Bolton as national

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4) Seth J. Frantzman, "Iran Increases Missile Threat to Israel, Linking Syria and Iraq," *The Jerusalem Post*, August 31, 2018, <https://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Iran-increases-missile-threat-to-Israel-linking-Syria-and-Iraq-566232>.

5) Liad Osimo, "Lieberman in an interview to a Saudi website: 'If Iran attacks Tel Aviv, we will attack Tehran,'" [in Hebrew], *Ynetnews*, April 26, 2018, <https://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5241832,00.html>.

6) John Irish and Ahmed Rasheed, "Exclusive: Iran moves missiles to Iraq in warning to enemies," *Reuters*, August 31, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-iraq-missiles-exclusive/exclusive-iran-moves-missiles-to-iraq-in-warning-to-enemies-idUSKCN1LG0WB>.

7) Jonathan Lis, "Israel Signals It Could Hit Iranian Targets in Iraq," *Haaretz*, September 3, 2018, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/defense-chief-signals-israel-could-hit-iranian-targets-in-iraq-1.6437525>.

8) Noa Landau, "Macron to Netanyahu: Jerusalem Embassy Move Led to People Dying, Didn't Promote Peace," *Haaretz*, June 5, 2018, <https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/watch-netanyahu-and-macron-give-statements-after-meeting-in-paris-1.6153497>.

9) Ben Caspit, *The Netanyahu Years* [in Hebrew] (Rishon LeZion: Miskal, 2017), 256, 272-281, 316-328; Stuart Winer, "Ex-Mossad chief: In 2011 Netanyahu ordered military to ready Iran strike," *The Times of Israel*, May 31, 2018, <https://www.timesofisrael.com/ex-mossad-chief-in-2011-netanyahu-ordered-military-to-ready-iran-strike/>.

security advisor, Netanyahu would probably encounter fewer difficulties in promoting the execution of an Israeli military option for dealing with Iran's nuclear program.

If Israel, the United States, or both, strike Iran's nuclear installations, the ayatollahs might react by instructing the Assad regime, the Hezbollah and other Shiite forces loyal to Iran to retaliate by launching rockets and missiles at sensitive Israeli infrastructure, to include power plants, chemical industries and the nuclear research center at Dimona. Such a contingency could easily escalate to an all-out war in the region.

Another issue that is likely to increase tensions along the Israel-Syria border in the wake of the Syrian civil war is Israel's control of the Golan Heights. After Assad consolidates his rule over Syria, he may opt to resort to ultra-nationalist foreign policy statements in an attempt to vent out pent-up public anger against his regime towards Israel. In an interview Assad gave to the Qatari newspaper *Al-Sharq* two years before the civil war erupted, he emphasized that the Syrian economy and army are dedicated to the purpose of liberating the Golan.<sup>10)</sup> With a rehabilitated Syrian military, advanced Russian weapons systems and the support and guidance of Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps, Assad's threats should not be taken lightly.

Despite the challenges presented to Israel by the approaching end of the Syrian civil war, a victorious Assad regime in Damascus, as well as continued Iranian military presence in Syria, is a circumstance that can also serve a few of the Netanyahu government's strategic objectives in the region. For example, it can assist Israel in nurturing its fledgling cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf States that share Israel's apprehension of Iran's regional ambitions. Growing Arab-Israeli rapprochement may consequently mitigate Arab support of the Palestinians, as demonstrated by the reluctance of Arab leaders to take punitive action against the Trump administration and Israel after the United States moved its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May 2018.<sup>11)</sup> Furthermore, in view of the Iran-Syria defense pact of August 2018 and the atrocities committed by Assad forces and supporters against Sunnis throughout the war, the Syrian president may find it virtually impossible to win Arab sympathy and support for his demand that Israel withdraws from the Golan Heights.

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10) Jāber al-Harami, 'nawwaha bi-al-qarārāt alatti šadarat 'an qimmat al-dūḥah wa-akkada an al-muṣālahāt al-'arabīyah šādiqah ... al-Asad li-al-sharq: "must'idūn li-musā'adat amrikā li-l'insihāb min al-'irāq'" ('[president Asad] referred to the decisions of Doha summit and confirmed that the Arab conciliation is sincere ... Asad to 'al-sharq': "[we are] ready to help the United States to withdraw from Iraq"), *Al-Sharq* (in Arabic), April 2, 2009.

11) Elisabeth Marteu, "Saudi Arabia and the Israel-Palestine conflict: between a rock and a hard place," *The Conversation*, June 24, 2018, <https://theconversation.com/saudi-arabia-and-the-israel-palestine-conflict-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place-98129>.





# Survival of the El-Sisi Regime

**Kim, Eunbee (Korea National Defence Univ., Korea)**

The second term of the el-Sisi government began as of March 2018. Although Egyptians, who had desired democracy, ousted their dictator (Mubarak) through civil resistance in 2011, they decided to go back to a military regime by selecting el-Sisi again. According to the civil-military relationship theory, a military rule goes against democracy; thus, re-election of el-Sisi was not consistent with the Egyptians' desires for democracy that the world witnessed in the 2011 Arab Revolution. Nevertheless, el-Sisi was re-elected with 97% of the vote, and a survey indicates that 85% of Egyptians support and trust their military (Arab Barometer IV).

The support for the el-Sisi military regime reflects the public disappointment with the Muslim Brotherhood (based on the maladministration of Morsi) and a betterment of economic indicators such as GDP and unemployment rate over that of the Mubarak and Morsi regimes. Above all, Egyptians support their military regime because there is no alternative political party/group nor a leader. However, it is questionable whether the el-Sisi regime will last long. Egyptians' grievances against the government are accumulating: El-Sisi has been a known abuser of human rights, particularly in regards to regime opposition, and apart from the macro economic indicators (e.g., GDP), the Egyptian economy remains in a vulnerable situation, reminiscent of pre-Revolution 2011.

## Survival of a Regime

Scholars say that leaders want to survive in their office, and that this aim is the essence of politics. The desire for surviving in office motivates everything from policy choice to institution goals and foreign policy.<sup>1)</sup> However, it is always challenged by factors such as internal contradictions (based on the failure of performance, negative coalition, or lack of legitimacy), shifts in underlying power structures (such as defection of military/elite), or exogenous forces.<sup>2)</sup> Therefore, leaders make efforts to

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1) De Mesquita, B. B., Smith, A., Morrow, J. D., & Siverson, R. M. (2003). *The logic of political survival*. MIT press.

2) Young, O. R. (1982). Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of international regimes. *International organization*, 36(2), 277-297.

satisfy their people in order to prevent the influence of power groups such as military and elites, and obtain legitimacy in order to survive in their office.

However, for a military regime, it is difficult to obtain legitimacy because a military is not an institution for politics but rather a defense under civilian control. A military structure is not skillful at politics, which leads the government to be ineffective. Nevertheless, in history, there have been many countries (including Egypt) where the military rules the government. The military has engaged in politics as a savior when its country is in an economic/political emergency situation because a military has been perceived as a group who can serve its country for public interests.

As in other types of regime, the leader from the military is eager to survive in his office. Therefore, a military regime puts efforts in 1) centralizing its authority, 2) preventing another coup by comforting its military, and 3) obtaining legitimacy. In order to centralize the authority, a military regime represses dissenters and restricts individual freedom, which weakens democratic norms and promotes abuse of human rights. In addition, in comforting its military, the military regime allows the military to intervene in politics and/or have economic privileges, which can weaken their combat strength. Lastly, in order to obtain legitimacy, a military regime believes that it can have legitimacy with better political/economic performance by differentiating itself from the former regime.<sup>3)</sup>

In this line, several case studies have found that military regimes failed when they had an economic crisis, splits in the military, and/or deepened political challenges. In addition, a few quantitative studies revealed that a military regime is not more effective in economic development or political stability; rather, bad economic performance is significantly related to the regime failure.<sup>4)</sup> Then, how can one predict the destiny of el-Sisi regime? Is it on the road of survival and prosperity or failure?

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3) Danopoulos, C. P. (1983). Military professionalism and regime legitimacy in Greece, 1967-1974. *Political Science Quarterly*, 98(3), 485-506.

4) McKinlay, R. D., & Cohan, A. S. (1976a). The economic performance of military regimes: a cross-national aggregate study. *British Journal of Political Science*, 6(3), 291-310.; McKinlay, R. D., & Cohan, A. S. (1976b). Performance and instability in military and nonmilitary regime systems. *American Political Science Review*, 70(3), 850-864.



# Survival of el-Sisi Regime

## 1. Centralizing authority

Since el-Sisi obtained power over Egypt, el-Sisi has repressed any potential dissenters, controlled the activities of NGOs, corrupted judicial system, and strengthened press control.<sup>5)</sup> Moreover, illegal arrest, imprisonment, torture, and disappearance of individuals have been reported in Western media.<sup>6)</sup> Since el-Sisi came to power, thousands of people have been imprisoned without any trial, and the UN human rights office have become involved with the government to prevent further of these human rights abuses.<sup>7)</sup>

Nevertheless, in March 2018, el-Sisi extended emergency law for the 5<sup>th</sup> time since 2017. Under this law, the government can censor private email, phone calls, and newspapers; restrict personal freedom; and isolate some areas and control individuals' business as well. In fact, those oppressive policies have been legitimized under the name of 'war on terror' (named Sinai 2018), even though the operation itself is not that effective. Residents of the operation are suffering and the number of terrorist attacks have not decreased. The Sinai 2018 operation is instead suspected to a cover for threatening potential dissenters.

Egyptians' grievances against the government based on these oppressions and human rights abuse are accumulating. Oppressive policies can prevent a disturbance in the short term. However, as one (including Egypt) witnessed in 2011, once grievances grow and hit the boiling point, it can develop into another civil resistance.

## 2. Comforting Military

The military is one of the greatest supporters of a military regime. However, on the other hand, once the military defects the regime, the regime is unlikely to survive. The defection of the military in an authoritarian regime has been counted as one of the critical factors for regime failure,<sup>8)</sup> which was witnessed in 2011 Egypt. El-Sisi recognizes that factor and has implemented coup-proofing policies, particularly in providing economic privileges.

Policies for comforting the military have been adopted since Nasser, and the Sadat regime began providing economic benefits. Since then, the economic intervention of the Egyptian military has expanded from baby formula to defense industrial products. However, when Gamal Mubarak (son of Mubarak) actively implemented neoliberal economic policies that included excluding the military in

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5) Marshall, S. (2015). *The Egyptian armed forces and the remaking of an economic empire* (Vol. 15). Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

6) BBC News(2018. 2. 23) [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/ibt-sh/shadow\\_over\\_egypt](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/ibt-sh/shadow_over_egypt)

7) During the presidential election campaign, el-Sisi arrested Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a potential presidential candidate and the leader of the Strong Egypt Party (an Islamic party from Muslim Brotherhood), in order to prevent his bid for the presidency, and accused 28 members of 'Egyptian Council for Change' of potential state overthrow.

8) Binnendijk, A. L., & Marovic, I. (2006). Power and persuasion: Nonviolent strategies to influence state security forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004). *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39(3), 411-429.

national economic projects such as the Suez canal expanding construction, the military grew fearful of losing their privileges. It capitalized on the 2011 Arab uprising as a chance for retaining privilege and obtaining people's support by drawing a line between the former 'corrupted' regime and the military. By standing with protesters, the military was perceived as a savior of chaotic Egypt after Mubarak. The military intervened in politics and maintained its economic benefits. Although elected president Morsi tried to exclude the military from politics and economy, it was once again installed to economic favor due to el-Sisi's supported coup.

Since el-Sisi came to power, the economic influence of the military in the private sector has expanded. The middle class and business owners are dissatisfied with the encroachment of the military in the private sector. In addition, military is receiving tax privileges where it has always been exempted from income tax, import tariff, and real estate tax, el-Sisi has recently expanded it to give military corporations tax privileges.

The Egyptian military has been criticized from outside of the country. Last March, 'Transparency International Defence & Security' said that as the third weapon importer in the world, Egypt needs to be transparent about its imports and the usage of military aids. It further criticized the military for putting efforts into developing political and economic influence, rather than defending Egyptian territory or people.<sup>9)</sup> Despite the international and local criticism, for el-Sisi, favoring the military is an easy, inexpensive, and a necessity to sustain its regime.

### 3. Obtaining legitimacy through economic performance

Scholars say that a regime can obtain its legitimacy by showing political/economic performance that is improved over the former regime. In fact, in terms of macro economic indicators such as GDP, the Egyptian economy has recovered from the depression after el-Sisi came to power. This improved performance helped drive the reelection of el-Sisi. However, at the micro level, the Egyptian economy is in a vulnerable condition.

First of all, Egypt has a high amount of foreign and public debts. By 2017, Egypt had 82 billion dollars in foreign debts, and its public debts were 102% of its GDP. As a result, Egypt is spending 38% of its revenue on repayment.<sup>10)</sup>

Second, foreign aid has decreased. Egypt had received economic aid from the US since 1947, with an amount over 800 million dollars in the 1980s. In addition, the US has provided 1.3 billion dollars of military aid (which funds one-third of Egyptian defense revenue) since Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1979. However, the economic aid has decreased to 140 million dollars, and the military aid is not secure. The US is questioning the legitimacy of military aid due to the human rights abuses in Egypt. The US already cut off 95 million dollars of military aid and just released 195 million dollars that had been held back earlier this year.

Third, the income from the Suez Canal is not increasing as expected. Reopening the 'new Suez Canal' in 2015, Egypt expected doubled income as it shortened the time of passage. However, as oil

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9) Transparency International Defence & Security(2018. 3) [http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/The\\_OfficersRepublic\\_TIDS\\_WEB2.pdf](http://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/The_OfficersRepublic_TIDS_WEB2.pdf)

10) Trading Economics, <https://tradingeconomics.com/egypt/government-debt-to-gdp>

prices decrease, ship owners prefer to take the detour route to save the canal passage fee; and, as the performance of the Panama Canal increased, the number of ships passing through Panama Canal increased.

Fourth, following the IMF guidelines, Egypt increased public utility charges and decreased subsidies. These actions make the middle/lower class suffer because the inflation rate is already too high.<sup>11)</sup>

Above all, the high population growth rate of Egypt is the problem. The population in 2017 was 97.5 million, and it is expected to expand to 128 million in 2030. Egypt's economic growth is not catching up to population growth and considering the expected shortages of houses, schools, and jobs, economic conditions in the near future could worsen.

## Conclusion

In history, many military regimes have failed through bottom-up revolution, military coup, or external invasion; and scholars have found that the reasons are related to internal discord, power groups' influence or split, or failure in obtaining legitimacy. In order to survive, leaders (including military junta) put their efforts into centralizing authority, comforting power groups (especially the military), and obtaining legitimacy through better economic performance.

Since el-Sisi came to power through a military coup, he has implemented such policies to survive in his office as well. He oppresses dissenters, controls individuals' freedom, censors press, and eliminates potential competitors in order to centralize this authority and prevent an internal split. As the military is the strongest regime supporting group, he is giving military economic privileges including business licenses and tax exemptions. He believes that if the military does not have grievances against the regime, then the military will not defect him as it did during the 2011 Arab uprisings. Lastly, he tries to obtain legitimacy by showing better economic performance differentiating his regime from the former one. However, his new economic policies for overcoming economic hardships are causing suffering.

As there is no alternative political group or leader, Egypt looks likely to remain in a military regime. However, it is hard to say the el-Sisi regime would survive long. El-Sisi's oppressive policies make the world suspicious of providing necessary foreign aid; and, with worsening economic conditions, could lead to an accumulation of public grievances. In this situation, comforting the military and keeping it as a royal supporter looks to be the only option for el-Sisi to survive in his office. Egypt is no longer considered an influential country anymore in the region, even though it has been a primary actor in the region and possesses the 12<sup>th</sup> largest military power in the world. In order for el-Sisi to not only survive but thrive in his office, achieve the 'Egypt vision 2030' that advocates being the 30<sup>th</sup> rich country in the world by 2030, and restore its past glory, he needs to be mindful of the factors for regime survival and failure.

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11) Inflation rate in 2018 June was 14%. Comparing to 30% in 2017, it was improved, but accumulated cost of living is high.



# Regional Intervention to Post-conflict Libya and its Consequences: Who are Supporting Whom for What?

**Amane Kobayashi (The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan)**

## Introduction

This research examines how the Middle Eastern and North African countries have intervened and been involved in the post-conflict politics of Libya, and how the intervention affected the political and security development in the country.

Regional countries intervened to Libya's 2011 civil war and post-conflict reconstruction according to their own agenda and regional strategy, and it is sometimes criticized as "proxy war"<sup>1</sup>. While Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia supported House of Representatives (HoR) and the Libyan National Army (LNA), an armed force based in the East, Turkey and Qatar supported General National Congress (GNC) and Islamist groups in the West<sup>2</sup>. Political disputes and armed conflicts were accelerated as a consequence of the foreign intervention.


## Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia

Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia have been supporting General Khalifa Haftar, the military leader of the LNA to seize eastern Libya to contain terrorist organizations and armed groups in the region. Also, Egyptian air forces have been frequently bombing the bases of "terrorist groups" in the east. Those three countries deepened the involvement in Libya's political disputes since 2014, countering to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). They looked Qatar as a big sponsor of the MB and decided to support the Haftar and HoR for containing both Qatar and MB in Libya and the North Africa. This led the eastern-based government to have cut "diplomatic ties" with Qatar in 2017 following Egypt, UAE and Saudi Arabia, while the Government of National Accord (GNA), internationally recognized government in Tripoli have not taken any actions.

Egypt considers that Libya is the direct threat for its national security, as it has been facing the influx of armed groups, weapons or drugs from the neighbor<sup>3</sup>. Egyptian terrorist organizations have benefited from Libya as the safe haven, enabling them to hide from the security forces, establish training camps or logistic hubs. Egypt's biggest concern is, to prevent the inflow of threats from Libya and to cut the network of MB, which Cairo accuses of being a terrorist organization, and other Jihadist groups between the two countries. Egypt understands that Libyan transitional governments do not have capability and even intention to work with Egypt for counter-terrorism or border security. Therefore, working with Haftar seems the most feasible option for Cairo.

UAE's Military support to Haftar has been remarkable. Prince Muhammad bin Zaid of Abu Dhabi has been strengthening the support for Haftar. UAE considers that only Haftar has the capability to contain MB and Islamist militias in Libya. UAE has built an air base for the LNA and provided military assets including aircraft and helicopter<sup>4</sup>. Haftar has been frequently invited to Abu Dhabi and met Prince Muhammad.

Regional Intervention to Libya



Created by the author with *Mapchat.net*<sup>5</sup>

### Qatar, Turkey and Sudan

Qatar and Turkey have supported the MB and Islamist factions in Libya politically, financially, and sometimes militarily since the beginning of the 2011 civil war. Both countries were involved deeply in the civil war supporting rebels to overthrow the Gaddafi regime. During the first post-conflict period, Qatar supported the General National Congress (GNC), a transitional government that had deep ties with the MB, even after the GNC lost domestic and international legitimacy.

Turkey's intention was more economically-motivated. It tried regaining its economic interests in Libya, as Turkish companies have participated in various projects during the Gaddafi regime.<sup>6</sup> However, the intervention of Qatar and Turkey have been less noticeable since 2016, as the Islamist factions are weakened in Libya and UAE and Egyptian intervention became more obvious. Although Turkey is still working in Libya, its activity is more economic-driven, rather than political interference.

Sudan's stance is more indecisive. Sudan has been widely regarded as a collaborator of Qatar and Turkey "fueling conflicts and terrorism in Libya<sup>7</sup>." Indeed, Sudan has worked with Qatar providing assistance including arms to the rebels during the 2011 civil war. This was partially because Qatar is one of the biggest investor and financial supporter of Sudan<sup>8</sup>. However, Sudan also relies heavily on economic support from Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain particularly after South Sudan's independence in 2011 (which reduced Sudan's ownership of oil reserves by 75%)<sup>9</sup>. Moreover, the Qatar diplomatic crisis since 2017 has forced Khartoum to balance its ties both with Qatar and confronting GCC countries. Sudan's Libya policies therefore became toned down accordingly. Same as Egypt, Sudan's national security has been challenged by the influx of armed groups, weapons or drugs from Libya. Sudanese rebels are participating in Libyan conflict as mercenaries, gaining arms and money, and preparing for military operation inside Sudan<sup>10</sup>.

## Conclusion

Russia and some European countries have been intervening actively in Libya. Russia's has provided military assistance to Haftar since 2016<sup>11</sup>. Senior officials of European countries have repeatedly visited Libya and met with not only GNA but also Haftar. While recognizing GNA as the legitimate government, EU considers Haftar as a crucial player for Libyan future. Haftar-led LNA is considered as the only force capable for counter-terrorism in Libya. However, while this approach favoring Haftar could prevent threats from Libya approaching Russia and EU in short term, it would prevent Libya's state-building and trigger more political fragmentation and armed conflicts.

Algeria, another regional power has long been reluctant in direct intervention or exclusive approach, while concerning the insecurity of long and porous desert border with Libya<sup>12</sup>. However, if the foreign intervention supporting Haftar results to threaten Algeria's national security, it's approach would be changed.

Regional countries have been intervening in Libya according to their own agenda and strategy. However, Libya's fragile post-conflict politics and security were fragmented and destabilized as a consequence. The presidential and parliamentary election has been planned within 2018 by the Western initiative, but the new election(s) under the current volatile environment in Libya would trigger more violent conflict and foreign intervention<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, "Exiting Chaos: Ghassan Salamé Reflects on Peacemaking," *Oslo Forum Interview*, June 20, 2018, [https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/HDC-OF18-Interview-REV2-WEB.pdf];


Frederic Wehrey and Wolfram Lacher, "The Wrong Way to Fix Libya," *Foreign Affairs*, June 19, 2018, [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/libya/2018-06-19/wrong-way-fix-libya].

<sup>2</sup> GNC and HoR have confronted politically and militarily since 2014. GNC has two-years tenure as a transitional government and HoR was established after the 2014 national election. However, GNC rejected to recognize HoR as its successor and refused dismissal, despite the international community recognized HoR as the only legitimate government in Libya. Militias supporting GNC forced HoR out from the capital city Tripoli. HoR was therefore established in Tobruq, an Eastern city, and never be able to enter Tripoli during its two-years term.



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- <sup>3</sup> Aboulenein, Ahmed, "Egypt foreign minister calls Libyan militant camps a direct threat", *Reuters*, May 30, 2017, [<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-egypt-security-libya/egypt-foreign-minister-calls-libyan-militant-camps-a-direct-threat-idUSKBN18P1TC>].
- <sup>4</sup> Reports of the UN Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya.
- <sup>5</sup> *Mapchat.net*, created in August 20, 2018, [<https://mapchart.net/world.html>].
- <sup>6</sup> Barkey, Henri J., "Turkish Foreign Policy and the Middle East", *CERI Strategy Papers*, No.10, CERI, June 6, 2011; Kayaoglu, Barin, "Why Turkey is making a return to Libya", *Al Monitor*, June 14, 2016, [<http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/06/turkey-libya-economic-interests-ankara-tripoli-embassy.html#ixzz5RzNpf2v2>].
- <sup>7</sup> Awny, Malek "Libyan leader: Qatar, Turkey and Sudan stoking conflict" *Arab News*, December 16, 2017, [<http://www.arabnews.com/node/1209761/middle-east>].
- <sup>8</sup> Al-Jaali, Abd Al-Wahhab. A.M., *Economic Cooperation Between Sudan and Qatar*, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, January 4, 2012, [[https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Economic\\_cooperation\\_between\\_Sudan\\_and\\_Qatar.pdf](https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/lists/ACRPS-PDFDocumentLibrary/Economic_cooperation_between_Sudan_and_Qatar.pdf)].
- <sup>9</sup> Cafiero, Giorgio, "Qatar-GCC crisis unsettles Sudan". *Al Monitor*, June 20, 2017, [<https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2017/06/qatar-gcc-crisis-sudan-saudi-arabia-economic-support.html>].
- <sup>10</sup> ElHag, Asim, "The Sudanese Role in Libya 2011", *Reinventing Peace*, World Peace Foundation, December 17, 2012, [<https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2012/12/17/the-sudanese-role-in-libya-2011/>].
- <sup>11</sup> Roland Oliphant, "Russian links with Libya general 'undeniable', US general claims", *The Telegraph*, March 24, 2017, [<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/24/russian-troops-ground-libya-us-general-claims/>].
- <sup>12</sup> Harchaoui, Jalel, "Too Close for Comfort: How Algeria Faces the Libyan Conflict", *SANA Briefing Paper*, Small Arms Survey, July, 2018.
- <sup>13</sup> Megerisi, Tarek, *Libya Elections 2018: The Missing Ingredient*, European Council on Foreign Relations, June 1, 2018, [[https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\\_libya\\_elections\\_2018\\_the\\_missing\\_ingredient](https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_libya_elections_2018_the_missing_ingredient)]; International Crisis Group, "Making the Best of France's Libya Summit", *Middle East and North Africa Briefing*, No.58, May 28, 2018, [<https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/b058-making-the-best-of-frances-libya-summit.pdf>].





# Turkey's 2014 Presidential Elections and Kurdish Nationalist Movements in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq

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In November of 2013, then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kurdish Regional Government (hereafter referred to as the KRG) President Masoud Barzani met in a rally in Diyarbakir and declared a timeless brotherhood between Turks and Kurds while hinting at achieving long lasting peace. Devlet Bahceli, the chairman of the National Action Party (hereafter referred to as the MHP), lambasted the actions as treacherous and treasonous<sup>1</sup>. Fast forward to the present and Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (hereafter referred to as the AKP) is in a formal coalition with the MHP and has been seen on stage at rallies giving symbolic hand gesture of the Grey wolves, a radical ultra-nationalist organization and paramilitary arm of the MHP<sup>2</sup>. Meanwhile, the Turkish-PKK peace process has ended, Turkish troops and planes are regularly operating in Kurdish regions of Syria and Iraq, and Turkey has thwarted any attempts to entertain Kurdish nationalist movements. This seemingly multifaceted reversal in AKP policy is best understood as a domestic electoral vote-seeking strategy and their effects on the inherent transnational nature of Kurdish nationalism. This paper argues that the results of the 2014 presidential election necessitated a rational choice to realign domestically in order to maintain regime security and that this realignment had a negative impact on Kurdish nationalistic aspirations.

## **2014 Presidential Elections- Background & Context and Results & Implications**

Having been in power since 2002, the AKP steadily increased their vote share and consolidated their hold on legislative, executive, and judicial powers while decreasing the deep state threat through the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials with the help of the Fethullah Gulen Movement<sup>3</sup>. The AKP upheld a ceasefire with the PKK, Erdogan maintained amicable political relationships with Kurdish leaders, and signed substantial energy projects deals with the KRG. Concurrently, Ankara hosted talks with Salih Muslim, the chairman of the Democratic Union Party (hereafter referred to as the PYD) representing Syrian Kurds, and Turkish intelligence officers were in talks with imprisoned Abdullah Ocalan, the founder of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (hereafter

referred to as the PKK). However, in June of 2013, protests erupted in Gezi Park over the tearing down of trees which transformed into a month long anti-government protest and resulted in a brutal governmental suppression and multiple deaths, hundreds of injuries, and thousands of arrests<sup>4</sup>. As an indication of a larger of a power struggle, Gulen publicly criticized Erdogan's heavy handed response to the Gezi protests leading to the once long time allies parting ways and eventually a graft scandal in December of 2013 for which Gulen's movement was blamed by the AKP. These allegations of corruption and a slide towards authoritarianism were felt at the polls a couple of months prior to the presidential elections in the local elections when the AKP saw their vote share decrease 7 percentage points amid further complaints of voting irregularities<sup>5</sup>. In short, the AKP was under tremendous scrutiny and managing increasing disapproval leading up to the presidential elections.

## **Results and implications of the presidential election**

Erdogan claimed victory by earning 52% of the vote. The Republican People's Party (hereafter referred to as the CHP) and the MHP ran Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu as a joint candidate and received 38%, but the biggest surprise was the People's Democratic Party's (hereafter referred to as the HDP) nominee Selahattin Demirtas, acquiring 9.8% of the vote<sup>6</sup>. The HDP is the successor of a banned pro-Kurdish party, and it ran on a liberal platform aiming to extend its reach to non-Kurdish marginalized voters. Turkish electoral laws dictate that in general elections, a party must reach a 10% threshold to enter parliament. If a party does not attain the necessary 10%, then its seats go to the second place party and in the southeast, these votes typically go to the AKP as the southeast is a two-party competition. In prior elections Kurdish candidates ran as independents to circumvent this dilemma, but this strategy also creates doubt and confusion in the electorate and puts candidates at a disadvantage. Subsequently, the next general elections were ten months away and despite years of attempts to court and appeal to Kurdish voters, for the first time a pro-Kurdish party was teetering on the brink of entering parliament. Given that the AKP barely pulled off a simple majority (52%), this possibility was problematic for Erdogan and the AKP for three reasons: it would deprive the AKP of the seats it was expecting to get from the HDP's sub-10% showing; without these votes the AKP was in real danger of not reaching the 60% (330 seat) necessary to push constitutional reforms that would greatly strengthen the authority of the president, which was Erdogan's fundamental objective; and every step closer to losing the simple majority is a step closer to Erdogan having to answer the aforementioned allegations in a court of law. It is logical to assume that if he were to lose power, he would face charges relating to abusing the power of his office. Thus, there was need to change strategies.

## Kurdish Nationalist Movements

This paper maintains that Kurdish nationalism is a byproduct of Turkish and Arab nationalism. Primordialist arguments rely heavily on distinction made by traveler historians ranging from Xenophon to Ibn Battuta, shared creation myths, ancient lineages, and cultural heritage. While this paper does not deny any of these commonalities, it maintains the constructionist argument that Kurdish national identity evolved in response to imposed national identities formed when heterogeneous empires became nation states with imposed homogeneous identities. Thus, Kurdishness was a result of Turkishness and Arabness<sup>7</sup>.

When the Ottoman Empire was dismantled after World War One, the borders imposed constituted neither natural nor culturally significant borders leaving approximately 30 million Kurds divided among Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The 1920 Treaty of Sevres paid lip service to Kurdish nationalism, but it was replaced with the more Turk-friendly Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 after the Turkish War of Independence<sup>8</sup>, severely diminishing Kurdish hopes for a nation-state. It was this milieu in which modern Kurdish nationalism began to organize itself in earnest. Turkey began to impose a national identity, and Kurdish groups reacted to state assimilation policies resulting in a transnational rally around the flag effect for an ironically stateless nation. For example, the 1925 Sheik Said rebellion was a religio-nationalist response to the state centralization and secularization policies that tore down traditional tribal socio-political power structures in the Kurdish region of Turkey<sup>91011</sup>. However, Turkey's statist policies were instrumental catalysts for the foundational writings of modern Kurdish nationalism<sup>12</sup>. Accordingly, after the Sheik Said rebellion was brutally suppressed, many of the participants and those fearful of collective retaliation left for Syria where they printed journals, newspapers, and supported the Mount Ararat rebellion in Turkey in 1930. This pattern continued through the 20<sup>th</sup> century as groups would rebel in one country and seek refuge in another<sup>13</sup>. Kurdish nationalist movements were inherently transnational because they were developed in the 1920's by a generation to whom the externally imposed borders were irrelevant, as they neither represented their Ottoman past nor imagined Kurdish future. Nevertheless, as Syria and Iraq became independent of France and the U.K., the newly independent states, like Turkey before them, perceived Kurdish national identity as a threat to the state's territorial integrity. Both states set out to Arabize Kurdish territory and Kurds living within their borders creating distinct sets of obstacles for Kurds in each state. Consequently, Kurdish movements have evolved independent of one another as they have to negotiate their cause with separate political entities.

In Turkey, the state imposed harsh assimilation campaigns that included forced migrations, martial law, making it illegal to print, broadcast, or speak Kurdish while refusing recognize the Kurds as a distinct group, instead referring to them as "mountain Turks" until the 1990's<sup>1415</sup>. In 1978, the Kurdistan Workers' Party or PKK was founded by Abdullah Ocalan. Since the early 80's, the conflict between the state and the PKK has claimed more than 40,000 lives<sup>16</sup>, however as mentioned above, there was a ceasefire in place leading up to the 2014 elections.

Beginning in the early 60's in Syria, Kurds were also subjected to expulsions, forced migrations, and institutionalized denial of their existence. Additionally, some were considered to be *ajanib* meaning that they

were not citizens, could not own property, work in government jobs, have bank accounts, or obtain commercial driver's licenses. Others were known as *maktoumeen* who had few civil rights, could not obtain diplomas (and thus couldn't enter university), and could not register their marriages<sup>17</sup>. These groups are essentially stateless. However, Syrian Kurds did not organize military until comparatively late because until 1998 Syria was a base for PKK operations and the PKK was able to calm the masses in return for safe haven. Shortly after Ocalan's capture, the leftover remnants of the PKK formed the PYD in Syria, and their armed wing, the People's Protection Units (hereafter referred to as the YPG) are the forces fighting for the nationalist cause in the Syrian Civil War. Whilst Turkey armed and supported groups fighting against the YPG forces in prior to the 2014 elections, there was still open dialogue, negotiations, and even consensus between PYD leadership and Ankara concerning the extent of the PYD's ambitions, and there was no direct conflict between the two sides.

Iraqi Kurds were significantly more politically and militarily organized dating back to the short-lived Republic of Mahabad in Iran, in the mid-40's. The prime minister of the republic was Mustafa Barzani who eventually sought refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan and played an important role until the time of his death. Like their counterparts, Iraqi Kurds suffered through Arabization, assimilation, and forced migration, but they also endured multiple chemical weapons attacks under Saddam Hussein that left hundreds of thousands dead. After the Gulf War in 91', a no fly zone was implemented, the KRG was formed in 92', and it was officially recognized by the Iraqi state as a federal entity in 2005. The KRG and the AKP developed an energy-based relationship that remains to this day. Leading up to the 2014 election, the KRG had signed long-term energy deals, Turkey was the biggest investor in the region, there was an increase in flights and trade, and diplomatic exchanges were regular.

It is imperative to understand that there are antagonistic Kurdish rivalries that have resulted in armed conflict in all three states. There is no unified Kurdish consensus regarding how to accomplish Kurdish nationalist ambitions, or even what those ambitions are.

## **A Rational Choice and Spatial Analysis**

Rational Choice literature tells us that parties make rational calculations in forming policy platforms to attract potential swing voters. Based on spatial modeling, Akdag argues that the AKP made rational calculations in attempting to solve the Kurdish problem in order to attract the Kurdish vote. This paper concurs, but as shown above, these steps failed to accomplish their desired task. Therefore, it is an equally rational choice to abandon that course. The AKP is a grass roots, neoliberal, Islamist, nationalistic party. The political space the AKP occupies is diametrically opposed to the HDP as it is a liberal socialist party. Likewise, the secular Kemalist space occupied by the CHP represented the power structure that the AKP brought down during its first 10 years in office. However, the nationalist MHP and AKP occupy a similar political space as they both cater to religious, nationalistic, conservative voters<sup>18</sup>. The major issue the two sides disagree on is the AKP's approach to the Kurdish question. Therefore, it was a rational calculation to abandon the AKP's

attempt at attracting HDP swing voters and taking a more aggressive stance towards the HDP and on the Kurdish issue for four reasons: it was a deflection from the Gezi Park protests, the graft scandal, and poor economic performances; attacking a socialist entity will help with economic voters; attacking a leftist entity appeals to conservative voters; and armed conflict will cause a rally around the flag effect which will appeal to nationalistic voters.

## **The Effect of the Election on Kurdish National Movements in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq**

After the success in the 2014 presidential election, the HDP proclaimed that it would run as a party instead of independent candidates, threatening the AKP's ability to reach 330 seats as mentioned above. The peace process that began in early 2013 was still intact going into the elections, but shortly after the elections, the Islamic State laid siege to the small Kurdish town of Kobani in northern Syria on the Turkish border. Turkish tanks stood idly by and watched the onslaught. Additionally, Turkey would not allow Turkish Kurds to cross the border to help the people of Kobani. Turkey's reluctance to help or allow others to help the outnumbered and outgunned town of 40,000 against IS was regarded as complicity at best and assistance at worst. Ocalan warned that if Kobani fell, the talks would end, and his fellow PKK members lamented that they had not invited a ceasefire only to shift the fight to the PYD in Syria<sup>19</sup>. During the siege, Dermitas proclaimed that Kurds should stand up in defense of Kobani. The ensuing violence over the next two days left 63 dead marking the bloodiest day of the conflict in Turkey in two years<sup>20</sup>. There was one final attempt to reconcile the peace process, but it unraveled over the course of a month. Reports later claimed that Erdogan only saw electoral improvements for the HDP in the polls, so he decided it was not beneficial to go through with the process<sup>21</sup> demonstrating Erdogan's calculated pragmatism and transactional approach to politics. Violence worsened in the lead up to the general elections in June<sup>22</sup>. Finally, following the election in which the HDP received 13% of the vote, and the AKP lost its majority for the first time in 12 years, polls indicated that 22% of MHP and 4% of CHP and HDP voters would have voted for the AKP if they had known the outcome prior to voting<sup>23</sup>. Additionally, another poll indicated that 60% of MHP voters preferred an AKP-MHP coalition<sup>24</sup>. These numbers indicate that voters did not desire the instability implicit in the status quo. Erdogan and the AKP came to power as highly capable technocrats with an acute awareness of what voters require and the necessary pragmatism to deliver, so there were no serious attempts at forging a coalition and snap elections were called for November. Meanwhile, the ceasefire ended when two police officers were killed, the government bombed PKK positions in northern Iraq, and violence spiraled out of control. The escalation of violence in the southeast, the HDP's inability to properly distance itself from the PKK, the PKK's decision to take the fight to urban centers in the southeast, and the MHP's reluctance to enter into any coalition proved to be the deterministic factors for voters in the snap elections. There was a high level of desertion, and the HDP suffered from a lower voter turnout. In times of external threat and armed conflict, voters often look for strong stable leadership, and that's what the AKP campaigned on and provided. They won back their majority in parliament.

The summer of the 2016 witnessed a coup attempt largely blamed on external forces. Strong nationalistic rhetoric is a practical response to external threats and those believed to be a threat to regime security were swiftly detained. Erdogan himself stated that the coup attempt “was a gift from God” encouraging some to believe that when the charismatic HDP leader Selahattin Demirtas was arrested along with 12 HDP MPs on charges ranging from terrorism (because of presumed links to the PKK ) to insulting the president, the charges were fictitious. It is safe to assume that some people were detained for criticizing the policies concerning the southeast rather than involvement in the coup. After the coup, 15 Kurdish media outlets were also shut down, the crackdown on dissent, and open war with the PKK continued. According to the Crisis Group, in the year prior to the 2014 presidential election, there was 1 PKK (8 overall) death in the Turkish-PKK conflict compared to 24 (92 overall) the year after the election, and 908 (1,993 overall) the following year<sup>25</sup>. The nationalistic vote-seeking strategy worked. By February of 2017, the AKP and MHP announced a joint campaign for the constitutional reforms that successfully massively expanded presidential authority which led to a successful formal coalition with the MHP in the recent 2018 general elections. Therefore, the domestic pressure to take a tougher stance on the Kurdish issue in Turkey resulted in incarcerating the Kurdish political leadership and activists, silencing dissenting voices, and an increase of casualties in the ranks of the PKK diminishing its ability as a fighting force.

The AKP’s need to maintain strong nationalistic credentials deeply affected foreign policy. The transnational nature of the Kurdish movement meant that the Turkish leadership saw Kurdish nationalist movements in neighboring countries to be a potential threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity, as any improvement in the status of Kurdish entities could cause a domino effect. Prior to the election, the PYD leadership was met multiple times with AKP leadership in Ankara. However, in response to Turkey’s complacency in Kobani mentioned above, Syrian Kurds announced a declaration of autonomy in January of 2015. This was met with continued support for groups fighting against the YPG, especially the Free Syrian Army. In August of 2016, Turkish troops entered Syria to fight IS and to stop Syrian Kurds from creating a contiguous territory in Operation Euphrates Shield. In January of 2018, Turkish forces were again involved in major operations to regain strategic territory from the YPG. This time they retook and help the city of Afrin in hopes of being able to return Syrian refugees there at the end of the conflict. Syrian Turkmen, including units from the ultra-nationalist Grey Wolves mentioned above have been active in Syria for years, so the decision to send Turkish troops yielded high approval from MHP supporters. These highly popular operations in Syria have continued and Turkish troops or their affiliates occupy strategic locations across Syria preventing the creation of another autonomous Kurdish region as was their stated objectives. According to one poll put out by A&G Polling in Turkey, 90% of respondents approved of military campaigns in Syria, so it is logical to assume that there was electorally beneficial to take the fight to the Syrian Kurds. Thus, strategic calculations to sure up the nationalist vote have had negative effects on Syrian Kurdish nationalist movements.

On a different note, as mentioned above, the AKP and KRG have maintained a cordial productive relationship over the last decade. There were several spats in the press concerning Turkish claims on Mosul and Kirkuk, and even expanding Syrian operations into Iraq, but these were largely ignored or compartmentalized and did not affect bi-lateral relations. However, the independence referendum held by the KRG in September of 2017 was a severe miscalculation on President Barzani’s part. Leading up to the referendum, the KRG was



exporting 560,000 bbl/d through Turkey for which Turkey received transport fees, but the cost of losing MHP support going into the 2018 elections was not worth the benefit of transport fees<sup>26</sup>. Before the AKP's alignment with the nationalist MHP, the AKP had more room to bargain for a massive concession, but given the domestic axis shift that occurred after the 2014 elections, the AKP could not entertain the idea. Barzani mistook an asymmetric transactional relationship for a mutually beneficial partnership. Accordingly, Erdogan stopped all flights going into Erbil and Sulimaniyeh from Turkey, held joint operations with the Iraqi and Iranian militaries, cut the flow of oil going through Turkey by half, turned the border crossing over to Baghdad, proclaimed that military options were on the table, and threatened to turn off the valve and let them starve<sup>27</sup>. This echoed MHP chairman Bahceli's warning that the referendum is a cause of war and that the Turkish state must do whatever is necessary to disallow it to stand. Again, the domestic coalition had a negative impact on a Kurdish nationalist movement.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, the AKP's pivot away from unsuccessful appeasement policies towards a more aggressive nationalistic platform was a rational vote-seeking modification. In doing so, he accomplished his stated ambitions of transforming the Turkish system into a presidential one with expansive powers and himself in the office, and suppressed Kurdish nationalist movements in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. However, currently, the AKP is not the political power house it once was. In the last elections, the AKP received 42% of the vote signifying its vulnerability to shifting alliances. Additionally, the MHP received 11% and its off-shoot, the Good Party received almost 10% meaning that approximately 21% of the MP's are coming from a staunchly nationalistic stock. Therefore, it stands to logic that he continue with this successful calculation for the time being. Erdogan still has mega-construction projects and social transformation that he wants to accomplish. Furthermore, external threats allow him to deflect or occasionally absolve himself of the responsibility for problematic domestic realities. Additionally, it is logical for Erdogan to assume that if he loses power, he will likely have to answer for the many accusations concerning his time in office. This suggests that the AKP will stay the nationalistic course until dynamics dictate otherwise.

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<sup>1)</sup> Mehmet Umit Necef, "Barzani and Erdogan Meet in Diyarbakir: A Historical Day," *Videncenter Om Det Moderne Mellemsten*, December 17, 2014, 1-3.

<sup>2)</sup> Nergis Canefe & Tanil Bora (2003) The Intellectual Roots of Anti-European Sentiments in Turkish Politics: The Case of Radical Turkish Nationalism, *Turkish Studies*, 4:1, 127-148, DOI: [10.1080/714005725](https://doi.org/10.1080/714005725). Crying "Wolf": Why Turkish Fears Need Not Block Kurdish Reform Crisis Group Europe Report N°227, 7 October 2013, 8-10.

<sup>3)</sup> Indrani Talukdar, Turkey: The Presidential Elections, 2014, *Contemporary Review of the Middle East* 2(4):341

<sup>4)</sup> Sermin Tekinalp, "Value Priority and Humor as a Defense to Cultural Schism: Analysis of the Istanbul Gezi Park Protest," *International Journal of Communication*, 10(2016):2347

<sup>5)</sup> "2014 Yerel Secim Sonuclari." Secim.haberler.com. <https://secim.haberler.com/2014/> (accessed 08/02/2018).

<sup>6)</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>7)</sup> Denis Natali, *The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, (2005): xvii-xxi.

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- <sup>8)</sup> Gunter, Michael M. *The Kurds: a modern history*. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, (2017): 27
- <sup>9)</sup> Michael M. Gunter, *Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War* (London: Hurst & Company, 2014), 14-15.
- <sup>10)</sup> Gokhan, Ak and Kaynar, Mete. "Turkey's Security Dilemma in the Foundation of the Early Republic: the Independence Tribunals." *The International Journal of Social Sciences* 55 (2017): 359
- <sup>11)</sup> Maarten Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State: *On the Social and Political Organization of Kurdistan* (London: Zed Books, 1978), 288-289.
- <sup>12)</sup> After the rebellion, the Bedir Khan brothers moved to Syria and wrote their proto-nationalist *The Case of Kurdistan Against Turkey* which served as a rallying cry for all Kurds and a notice of grievances for the international community.
- <sup>13)</sup> *Ibid* 30-45\*
- <sup>14)</sup> Henri Barkey, "Turkey and Iraq: The Making of a Partnership," *Turkish Studies*. Vol. 12, No 4 (2011): 665.
- <sup>15)</sup> Fotios Moustakis and Rudra Chaudhuri, "Turkish-Kurdish Relations and the European Union: An Unprecedented Shift in the Kemalist Paradigm," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 4, (2005): 77-89, 78-80
- <sup>16)</sup> Omer Taspinar and Gonul Tol, "Turkey and the Kurds: From Predicament to Opportunity," *US Europe Analysis Series*, 54 (2014): 1.
- <sup>17)</sup> Gunter, *Out of Nowhere* 19-22
- <sup>18)</sup> Abramowitz, Morton: *New Turkey or New Government? The June 2015 Parliamentary Election*. Washington D.C.: Bi-Partisan Policy Center, 2015, 14
- <sup>19)</sup> Ezgi Basaran, *Frontline Turkey: The Conflict at the Heart of the Middle East* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2017), 112.
- <sup>20)</sup> "Turkey's PKK Conflict." Crisisgroup.com. <http://www.crisisgroup.be/interactives/turkey/> (accessed 08/01/2018)
- <sup>21)</sup> "HDP Co chair Dermitas Reveals Details of Peace Process." *Hurriyetdailynews.com*. <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hdp-co-chair-demirtas-reveals-details-of-peace-process--86041> (accessed 08/01/2018)
- <sup>22)</sup> Twin bombing hit HDP headquarters narrowly missing Dermitas, and campaign rallies were bombed leaving scores dead. Mutual distrust led both sides to blame each other directly or for being a part of a more sinister conspiracy
- <sup>23)</sup> Sabri Sayari, "Back to a Predominant Party System: The November 2015 Snap Election in Turkey," *South European Society and Politics* Vol. 21, No. 2, (2016):268
- <sup>24)</sup> Ali Akarca, "Putting Turkey's June and November 2015 Election Outcomes in Perspective," *Insight Turkey*. Vol, 17, No. 4 (2015): 93.
- <sup>25)</sup> <http://www.crisisgroup.be/interactives/turkey/>
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- <sup>27)</sup> *Ibid*, 140

# 5th Session.

## Education, Language and Society

**Moderator: Jung, Kyu Young(Chosun Univ., Korea)**

» **Arabic Language Education and Curriculum Policy**

- Ahlam Al Zehhawi (Zayed Univ. UAE)
- Discussant: Lee, Kye Youn (Myongji Univ., Korea)

» **MA EFL Iranian students' Bilinguality and their Multicultural Personality Traits manifestation in Persian and English milieus**

- Hossein Samadi Bahrami (School of International Relations, Iran)
- Discussant: Fahime G. Bidgoli (HUFS, Korea)

» **Learning effects of Arabic short-term immersion camp: an examination of the satisfaction of three basic psychological needs based on the self-determination theory**

- Akiko Sumi (Kyoto Notre Dame Univ., Japan) & Katsunori Sumi (Nagoya Institute of Technology, Japan)
- Discussant: Seo, Jung Min (HUFS, Korea)

» **Presentation of the Middle East in Educational Comics for Elementary Students**

- Lee, Sung Ok (HUFS, Korea)
- Discussant: Kim, Eun-ji (HUFS, Korea)





# Arabic Language Education and Curriculum Policy

**Ahlam Al Zehhawi (Zayed Univ., UAE)**

The initiative aims also to transform the lesson of Arabic into a world of self-learning by activating the role of the student and not marginalizing it. It would be through the development of the knowledge acquired into a world of creativity and teamwork taking it away from being just a lesson limited to the professor and his role and supervision.

It is an initiative similar to the concept of integral education that is applied in scientific fields in many European and Asian countries. It emphasizes its applicability to the Arabic language, but it is vital because of the nature of the Arabic language makes it possible to apply it in the form of various activities inside and outside the classroom.

It's a circle of knowledges which improves the awareness of learners with implementation and Amusement. This circle may expand to more than four different connected subjects according to the student specialty, his education tendencies, and technical information included. It is a group of methods gathers different strategies such self-learning. That's is what makes this style distinguished.

I have been implementing this approach since 2005 until now. This lead to making lots of workshops, exhibitions and conferences. My participation was accompanied by a mini-exhibition of the groups of the students work from various departments and specialties (Art, Psychological, Health, Business and Political Science). It included many technical wooden artistic portraits, cutters, documents and picture reflects for the first time the qualitative development of the Arabic language in the United Arab Emirates.

This approach has been implemented since 2005 till now. Which resulted in many workshops and exhibitions of beautiful models for students from different departments and disciplines (arts, mental health, health, business science and political science). And included many art paintings of wood and pieces of machinery and documents and images that reflect for the first time the qualitative development of the Arabic language in the United Arab Emirates. This makes it different from the principle of Steam.

At Zayed University, specifically in the Department of Arabic Language, we have applied this curriculum for more than 14 semesters with successful . As we study Arabic language skills for all the university disciplines, this application took the special character of each scientific and non-scientific specialization. As well as the level and nature of students towards excellence and creativity on one hand and the desire to get out of the world of traditional learning change and innovation.

The method used to implement the curriculum was an effective tool for attracting students and an easier way to absorb more information. It achieved high performance results, reflected the talents and abilities of Zayed students and proved highly capability in implementing STEM program and high achievement in its specialties.

As the STEM is specialized in the integration of scientific disciplines, which is prevalent in the institutions that apply them, the principle applied at Zayed University is specialized in integrating some scientific and also human disciplines, and thus can be considered complementary to it.

The approach of Zayed University is different in two ways. The first is its interest in heritage and the second is the link between its application and the successful practical models. Exhibitions were a great success in the conferences that were held.

The initiative was also accepted to participate in the Fourth Gulf Conference by an invitation of the Ministry of Education where it was presented to hundreds of teachers. All the observations were excellent and positive, according to reports of consultants presented from the Ministry of Education was the only national participation of the UAE between the participation of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt and the United States, who expressed great admiration for the growth of the work of the students who made it so distinguished.

Arabic is not just rules that require knowledge and memorization so that we can improve it and improve its pronunciation.

It is a matter of senses and love we exchange with a language that honors those who do not have.

Teacher of Arabic must be aware of it deeply, aware that he must know its secrets and characteristics so that he knows how to presented to his students in a way that brings them closer to each other

Dr. Ahmed Abdo Awad, define the language as a connection achieved by the self-awareness of public expertise, and the availability of communication and social cohesion and unity. but he believes that these definitions do not embody the implicit concept of language and does not go beyond the apparent use of it.

The method used to implement the curriculum was an effective tool for attracting students and an easier way to absorb more information. It achieved results of high education performance, outputs and reflected the talents and abilities of Zayed students and proved highly capability in implementing the STEM program and high achievement in its specialties.

Examples of this are the color psychology project, which was held in the Arabic language curriculum for the psychology department, which began by asking if you know anything about the color effects on selves. Then we agreed to establish it after the students were convinced of the importance of this subject for their specialties. The class has been divided into four groups. The group presented the effect of colors on food, drink, rose and precious stone. It resulted the following outcomes:

- Enhance reading and writing skills
- Enhancing the skill of self-research and self-reliance
- Teamwork training
- Training in technical workshops
- Acquisition of knowledge and scientific information
- Combine different materials
- Training in the skill of social communication
- Show talent in presentation
- Reach new research and scientific conclusions.

These educational outcomes would have not been achieved if we had followed the traditional method of writing the correct academic research. These are the benefits of self-learning of the Arabic language that can be applied in a scientific ways.

Difficulties in applying this approach:

Most teachers who have learned traditional methods find it difficult or unwilling to have modern teaching skills

Although the modern age needs multiple high skills, the formation of this generation of teachers takes time and for those who believe in his mission as a teacher who must strive to develop his students

The distance from the implicit concept of language has led to a decline in the levels of Arabic language education in the Arab world in these methods. Because Arabic teacher is still not culturally and intellectually

ready to understand it's mechanisms. This creative language learning technique is considered to be templates to be taught and memorized to be applied in an exam. A teacher must understand and appreciate the extent of this language in order to be able to present it as it should be, and therefore it must follow special methods in education.

The unwillingness of academic departments to support such projects, which Ken described as killing creativity and innovation of skills.





# MA EFL Iranian students' Bilinguality and their Multicultural Personality Traits manifestation in Persian and English milieus

**Hossein Samadi Bahrami (School of International Relations, Iran)**

## **Abstract**

Based on the deterministic nature of language in defining culture, the possibility of bilinguals living and acting in two linguistic worlds was investigated in this study. Multicultural Personality Traits [Cultural Empathy (CE), Open-mindedness (OM), Social Initiative (SI), Emotional Stability (ES) and Flexibility (FL)] of 65 EFL MA Iranian students were measured in English and Persian language contexts. The main question raised was whether bilingual EFL MA Iranian students' manifestation of their Multicultural Personality Traits (MPTs) in Persian and English contexts is of different intensity and rate. The data collected and analyzed revealed that EFL MA Iranian students' MPTs intensity in English language context was higher than their MPTs intensity in Persian language context. Specifically, the highest difference was found to be in their **Cultural Empathy**. Although the total MPTs of participants was not significantly different in English and Persian language contexts, their Cultural Empathy, Open-mindedness, and Emotional Stability were found to be significantly stronger in English language context. Finally, the investigation on the impact of gender on MPTs' manifestation also revealed significant higher differences in both groups' Cultural Empathy, but female students' Open-mindedness was also found to be significantly higher in English language contexts than Persian language context compared.

## **1. Introduction**

The idea of how language might influence one's perception and system of thinking has always been intriguing to scholars in philosophy, sociology, linguistics, and language learning. Language is not only the means to be used to communicate and to represent the intentions and understandings of the world around, but also to mold and shape the value-attributing system of its speakers in a way to coincide with their speech community's norms, conventions, and values. Language defines culture that is rooted in and derived from the

common social and historical background, and consequentially culture constructs the valorizing system that sets force every aspect of individual's social life (Kim, 2003). Linguistic context in which one is born and raised gradually solidifies his understanding and concept formation of the external world. Therefore, people who are raised as bilinguals, and language students who are trained and educated to be bilinguals, acquire the ability to experience two linguistic worlds and might manifest two distinct personality features in every one of their two speech communities.

As stated in Sapir-and-Whorf hypothesis, the role of one's first language on constructing his philosophical and cultural knowledge, i.e. his ontology of life and existence is quite vigorous and lays the cornerstone foundation of every one's identity. This cultural knowledge that is in compliance with one's 1<sup>st</sup> language speech community knowledge is called by Riley (2008) "commonsense knowledge" which is the base for identity at the communal and collective levels.

In the theory of linguistic relativity, it is believed that the reality of the world around is perceived relatively (Lund, 2003) and there is not a single absolute reality in the mankind's world; all perceived entities are just the images of realities based on the perception and channels of perception available. Every individual, based on his linguistic channel of communication and perception has an agentive role in constructing his understanding of the world. Landar (1966), quoting Sapir, states that "no two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached" (p.224). Application of this understanding to various speech communities can partially explain the existing diversities in life among human speech communities. Every speech community, in terms of its own language, molds its own version of the reality. Perceptions and conceptualization of the worldly phenomena experienced in the social life are constructed in distinct ways and forms in every specific language. This is known as "Mental Event Representation (MER)" (Watson-Gegeo and Nielsen, 2005, p. 159).

In the theory of linguistic determinism, it is believed not only our perception of the world is under the influence of our language and the specific possibilities available in that language, but also our way of thinking is also profoundly affected by our language. Every established language in every speech community sets a pattern and a frame for its members to think accordingly and within. Speakers of every language are at the "mercy" of their language, i.e. linguistic determinism (Barker & Galasinski, 2001; Ishtla, 1999). "Language can be used to manufacture an ideology which would steer the way people think" (Jones & Wareing, 1999) and accordingly behave. Landar (1966) reiterates Boas's idea about language and culture in these terms that "the history of language reflects the history of culture" and culture is the accumulated common knowledge of every speech community (P.135). Lander (1966) believes that "Language is a subset of those habits" which are defined in its totality to form culture (p.130). In their relativity hypothesis, Sapir and Whorf opine that societies based on their cultures which are influenced by and reflected in their language have different world perceptions and values. Landar (1966) argues that "truth ...comes from collective experience [that is] crystallized in language" (p.150). On the other hand, long-used and firmly establish languages in every speech community which are entrenched deep in their cultural principles both facilitate the formation and expression of considered-acceptable meanings and ideas and hamper the generation of some other considered-unacceptable ones. This aspect of language is known as linguistic determinism. Therefore, bilinguals may find certain

possibilities of personality and mentality manifestations more available at one of their two language domains than the other one.

## 2. This Study

The relativity and deterministic understandings of language have formed the theoretical base of this study in which the possibility that bilinguals might live and act in two worlds as they speak two languages was investigated. This study measured and analyzed Multicultural Personality Traits [Cultural Empathy (CE), Open-mindedness (OM), Social Initiative (SI), Emotional Stability (ES) and Flexibility (FL)] of 65 EFL MA Iranian students, as they acted in their native Persian language community context and in their academic English speaking community context by means of using Multicultural Personality Questionnaire.

the following three research questions were formulated to be investigated:

- 1- Do MA EFL Iranian students manifest significantly different and distinct Multicultural Personality Traits in L1/Persian and L2/English contexts?
- 2- In which one of the five subcategories of MPTs (CE, OM, SI, ES, FL) do MA EFL Iranian students manifest significantly different rate of personality traits while they act in Persian and English language contexts?
- 3- Does Iranian EFL students' gender play a significant role in the rate of their biculturality manifested in Persian and English milieus?

## 3. Findings

Although this study revealed that the total MPTs of MA EFL Iranian students in English language and Persian language contexts were not significantly different, but it was found that they manifested different rates of **Cultural Empathy**, **Open-mindedness** and **Emotional Stability** in Persian and English language contexts.

Participants' MPTs analyzed in English and Persian language contexts in accordance with their gender indicated that MPTs of male students was 2.83 points higher in English context than Persian context ( $274.23 - 271.40 = 2.83$ ). This much difference of MPTs in English and Persian contexts did not prove to be statistically significant. But their CE within the two linguistic contexts proved to be significantly different.

A paired-samples *t*-test of male students' performance indicated a statistically significant difference in the male EFL students' CE presented in English language contexts ( $M = 60.57$ ) and Persian language context [ $M = 58.10$ ,  $SD = 6.216$ ,  $t(29) = 2.84$ ,  $p \leq .005$ ]. Therefore, it was concluded that male students manifest their CE differently in English or Persian language contexts. It was also found that female students, like their male counterparts, manifest their CE differently in the English and Persian language contexts. But female students

were also found to be manifesting different ES in English and Persian language context; whereas, boys did not present such a difference.

A paired-samples *t*-test of female students' performance revealed that there was a statistically significant difference in their CE presented in English language contexts ( $M= 61.97$ ,  $SD= 6.776$ ) and Persian language context [ $M=57.91$ ,  $SD= 6.93$ ,  $t(34) = 4.10$ ,  $p \leq .01$ ], as well as their OM and ES.

## 4. Discussions

The significant differences recognized in Cultural Empathy, Open-mindedness, and Emotional Stability are suggestive of biculturality of EFL Iranian students in English and Persian contexts. The significant different CE in English and Persian contexts can be attributed to the fact that these students' long time association with English language had developed in them an affinity towards their L2 speakers and communities. Their being in an English context switches their mood of thought and feelings towards an intercultural domain within which they would assume an identity of higher empathetic quality. And their greater OM in English language context can be related to the idea that English-dominated context is less restrictive and more facilitative in demonstrating varieties of opinions. In a sense, English language context provides greater potentiality for the versatility of its speakers. Therefore, such a context would provide participants with greater opportunities for being more tolerant of varieties. English language, taken to be symbolically representative of the western world which is founded on the individualistic principles that provides excessive individual rights to indulge in, provides its non-native speakers this sense of individualistic leverage as well. On the other hand, Persian language, representing and safeguarding collective communal values at the cost of confining individuals' freedom calls on the individuals to be more observant of social conventions and persuades its speakers to tread within the collectively ratified area and not trespass the socially set limitations. The third reason for the higher OM in English context is that EFL students in English language context have always interacted with English speaking interlocutors whom they have gradually learned to recognize as open and not critical to new idea; therefore, it has become an automatic mechanism in their personality to feel free under such conditions and give free rein to their thoughts and feelings.

## 5. Conclusion

Every aspect of human existence on the Earth is always contextualized and context-bound; therefore, to exist means to be contextualized. The very first context in which individuals have unconsciously shrink-wrapped themselves is the first language itself. Bilinguality provides an opportunity to tear open the monolingually-closed pages of the mind and provide it the possibility of being in a partially new context.

In order to create something in this world, there is only one way: create its proper context and within that context it will come into existence. Personality and identity constructions are carried out in a similar manner. Firstly all the required contextual elements are constructed and consequentially within these contextual elements the desired identity comes into existence. And among the means to construct a context, language is the most effective one in portraying a contextual foreground to construct a specific personality. This type of language functioning is constructive because it opens the eyes to see some things in some especial forms from one specific angle in a monocolour and shape but it blocks the eyes of mind to conceptualize and comprehend the phenomena from a different point of view and in a different shape. So, L1 is both constructive and deconstructive and L2 provides a new opportunity to experience the world and the existence anew.

The world of monolinguals is all spent inside the Platonic Cave; whereas, bilinguals have had the possibility to experience the world out of *The Cave*, and probably more realistically speaking, the world inside another a little bit different cave. Bilingual are more engaged with mental challenges to fully understand both their L1-bound and L2-bound culturally-valued systems and contexts. In fact, they straddle not only two languages but also two cultural worlds, L1 culture and L2 culture, and have developed an ability to have one eye on their L1C and the other on their L2C.

It sounds logical to argue that the participants' higher rate of OM is due to their deeper understanding of their L1C and L2C. This bifocal capability has helped them to develop a broader inclusive perspective which has resulted in their greater OM. Therefore, L2 studies can expand the scope of the view of its practitioners to be more inclusive and tolerant of differences and varieties.


## 6. Suggestions for Further Studies

- The new world – the global village – has ushered in a new chapter in human beings' existence.

This global village is heading towards a unified entity and with this new world people have to either strike a chord with the other dominants in melting, molting and merging or try to sustain the variety and enjoying the native identity that has given every speech community a unique essence of identity. This challenging task of constructing a multicultural community will be experienced by bilinguals sooner than the monolinguals; therefore, investigations in this area can shed light to up-coming future of human community in a multilingual and multicultural world and might have the resolution to conflicts

that are rooted in lack of mutual understanding rising from lack of possibility of communications among them.

- Bilinguality and multiculturalism can truly be named as the dire need of the modern world of the global village; therefore, it should be integrated with national education. How can bilinguality and biculturalism be practiced in a manner to enrich students' understanding of their own national language and culture and resolve the concerns that states might have towards L2 learning?
- L2 learning brings about a new language socialization process in a new social context and has the potentiality of constructing a new social interaction that can consequentially result in a new self or identity of mutual understanding between nations; therefore, possibility of closer ties between nations can be studied and nurtured through joint bilingual programs.



# Learning effects of Arabic short-term immersion camp: an examination of the satisfaction of three basic psychological needs based on the self-determination theory

**Akiko Sumi (Kyoto Notre Dame Univ., Japan)**  
**& Katsunori Sumi (Nagoya Institute of Technology, Japan)**

## 1. Introduction

The purpose of this study is to examine how much an Arabic intensive program, titled "the Arabic Intensive Camp in Rurikei," satisfied the participants' *basic psychological needs* which can be applied for successful learning as defined within the Self-determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2008; Ryan & Deci, 2000a). In the first section of this introduction, the Arabic intensive short camps are described. These were held for one week in 2015 and 2016, in Rurikei, which is in the suburbs of Kyoto, Japan. Second, three basic psychological needs are defined according to Self-determination Theory. Third, we explain how the Camp was used to satisfy these basic psychological needs. Finally, the purpose of this study is explained in detail.

### 1.1 The Arabic Intensive Camp in Rurikei

The Arabic Intensive Camp in Rurikei (referred to as the Camp below) ran for one week in an accommodation in Rurikei, Kyoto, in both 2015 and 2016, and was designed for university students. All of the participants voluntarily decided to take part in the Camp, and they made a pledge to solely use only the Arabic language throughout the duration of the Camp. Participation was not intended to generate credit hours. The Camp did not belong to any single university.

Each year, approximately 50 participants, chosen from over 80 applicants and from diverse regions of Japan, participated and were divided into three levels of Arabic language competency. There were three 90 minute classes and one 90 minute cultural activity per day, except during the arrival and departure days. Each class or level was assigned homework, which did not take much time for most of the participants. Outside of the classes, they freely studied either in their rooms or a common study room. The instructors were three or four Japanese and four or five Arabic native speakers, including university teachers. Apart from Arabic language classes, the participants attended various cultural activities, such as Arab dance, Arabic calligraphy, and Arabic cooking, singing, and plays. The Camp adopted methods for enhancing students' autonomous motivation to learn Arabic, based on the Self-determination Theory.

## 1.2 Three basic psychological needs as defined within the Self-determination Theory

The Self-determination Theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000) is a macro-theory of human motivation, personality development, and well-being in social contexts. It has received considerable attention in recent years. According to this theory, the satisfaction of basic psychological needs is innate and essential for the internalization of motivation, as well as for psychological growth, integrity, and well-being. In contrast, the degree to which any of these three psychological needs is unsupported or thwarted will lead to diminished motivation and well-being. For learners, the frustration of the basic psychological needs is associated with academic disengagement and poorer learning outcomes. The assumptions of the Self-determination Theory are supported by the results of numerous studies (Niemic & Ryan, 2009).

Within the Self-determination Theory, the basic psychological needs are defined as the need for competence, autonomy, and relatedness (Deci & Ryan, 2000). The need for competence refers to the experience of behavior as effectively enacted. This need encourages individuals to seek challenges, and to maintain and enhance their acquired skills and capacities through activities. For example, learners may satisfy the need for competence when they feel that they can meet the challenges of their schoolwork (i.e., show successful performance). The need for autonomy involves the experience of behavior as volitional and reflectively self-endorsed. When individuals act autonomously, they act according to their own interests and integrated values, or self-expressively. If learners can freely choose to spend time and energy on their study, they can fulfill their need for autonomy. The need for relatedness refers to the desire to feel meaningfully connected to others. To satisfy this need, individuals attempt to connect with, and be important to and accepted by others. When learners fulfill the need for relatedness in a class, they tend to maintain good relationships with classmates and teachers, and they more effectively teach and learn from each other.

## 1.3 The Satisfaction of these basic psychological needs in the Camp

The Camp was designed to offer the participants an appropriate environment to support these three basic psychological needs, as much as possible. To facilitate competency satisfaction, a list of Arabic words and sample sentences were sent to the participants a few weeks prior to the Camp, in order to alleviate their possible performance anxiety while in the Camp. In support of competency, during the Camp the instructors always tried to orally provide positive evaluations and encouragements to the participants. The instructors were ready to answer questions and to help the participant in the study room at night, so that the participants could attend classes and activities with confidence.

To facilitate autonomy satisfaction, numerous situations to encourage active learning were created for the participants. For example, they chose their own themes, structures, and wording for presentations in class, and they practiced skits of their own design; they chose topics and their own structure while writing compositions in Arabic (within the given broad subject of the class); and they chose what to do in the talent show which was performed by the class members at the end of the Camp. Thus, they assigned the roles and actors for a play, or performed a song or a dance of their choice. In other words, they were actively engaged in these works.

To facilitate relatedness satisfaction, the Camp was designed to gather university students whose goal was to improve their Arabic language skill as part of a group while living together with Japanese instructors and native



speakers of Arabic in one house for 24 hours. As a result, personal relations among the participants and the instructors were nurtured. The relationships among the participants and the instructors were also promoted via abundant opportunities to display cooperation, empathy, and solidarity, and by the use of learning activities such as the practice of skits, dialogues, and group presentations. Cultural activities, such as dancing, singing, and acting, were also socially binding activities.

#### 1.4 The Purpose of this study

As mentioned above, the Camp offered favorable conditions to satisfy the participants' basic psychological needs. However, whether the Camp actually fulfilled their basic psychological needs had to be examined. In addition, because all of the participants already had learned Arabic before the Camp, the degree of needs satisfaction that they attained while learning Arabic in the Camp had to be specifically considered. Therefore, this study examined their needs satisfaction during the Camp, and compared that data to student data obtained before the Camp began.

## 2. Methods

The respondents to the study data-collection questionnaires were 45 participants who attended the Camp in 2015 and 50 participants who attended in 2016. They consisted of 59 women and 36 men, with a mean age of 21.95 (SD = 8.17, range 18 to 68 years). Most of them were students in universities in Japan. Ethical clearance for the study was obtained from the ethical committee at the first author's teaching institution.

After informed consent was obtained from all of the respondents, they answered questionnaires twice, once before and once after the Camp. The questionnaire before the Camp contained three open questions about the satisfaction of basic psychological needs during their own Arabic learning experiences up to that time. The questionnaire after the Camp contained three open questions asking about the satisfaction of basic psychological needs during the Camp. Table 1 presents these open questions.

**Table 1 Open questions**

Basic needs	Before the Camp	After the Camp
Competence	How satisfied were you with exercising and expressing your capacities in Arabic learning until now?	During this Camp, how satisfied were you with exercising and expressing your capacities?
Autonomy	How satisfied were you with autonomously choosing and practicing during your Arabic learning until now?	During this Camp, how satisfied were you with autonomously choosing and practicing?
Relatedness	How satisfied were you regarding connecting and interacting with others	During this Camp, how satisfied were you regarding connecting and

The answers of the participants were rated using a scale of 1 to 10: 1 represents no satisfaction of the need, and 10 represents considerable satisfaction. This rating process was conducted by two professors who fully understand the theory of basic psychological needs satisfaction. The averages of the two raters' scores were used as the data for the analyses.

### 3. Results

Examples of responses concerning the satisfactions of basic needs before and during the Camp are presented in Table 2. Some notable responses from before the Camp were insufficient opportunities to practice communication or conversation (25%, 24 out of 95 participants) and shortage of learning companions (22%, 21 out of 95 participants).

**Table 2 Examples of responses concerning the satisfaction of needs**

Basic needs	Need satisfaction before the Camp	Need satisfaction during the Camp
Competence	Because I learn what I like, I carried out the given tasks. I found confidence in my understanding.	Under the strict rule of "Arabic only," the opportunities to display my ability to use Arabic increased.
Autonomy	I chose to learn Arabic by my own will. I have willingly learned Arabic, asking my teachers for instruction.	I moved my learning forward myself and decided everything except the content of the classes.
Relatedness	People who study Arabic generally possess a sense of purpose and an eagerness to study; therefore, they had a good influence on me.	I was very stimulated by people who are superior to me [in skill]. It was a good camp because I had friends who tried to use Arabic at all times.

There were differences not exceeding 3 between the two raters' ratings for each of the categories of responses. Table 3 shows means and standard deviations of the average scores for competence, autonomy, and relatedness satisfaction before and during the Camp. All the means of the needs satisfaction scores were above the midpoint of the rating scale (5.5). There were significant differences between before and during the Camp in all of the needs satisfactions ( $ps < 0.01$ ). The needs satisfaction ratings during the Camp were higher than those before the Camp.

**Table 3 Means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlations**

Satisfaction of basic needs	Means	SD	Correlations				
			1.	2.	3.	4.	5.
Before the	7.16	2.17					

Camp											
1.											
Competence											
2.	5.56	1.60	**								
Autonomy	0.48										
3.	6.35	2.34	-0.02	0.17							
Relatedness											
During											
the Camp											
4.											
Competence	8.56	1.33	0.33	**	0.25	*	0.11				
5.	7.34	1.69				0.29	**	0.01	0.41	**	
Autonomy	0.08										
6.	8.51	1.64	0.19				0.10	-0.02	0.31	**	0.53 **
Relatedness											

SD =standard deviations. \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01.

Table 3 contains Pearson correlations between the rating scores. Before the Camp, there was only significant and moderate correlation between the autonomy and relatedness satisfactions. In contrast, during the Camp, there were moderate to high correlations between the satisfactions of all the needs. Competence satisfaction before the Camp was correlated with competence satisfaction during the Camp. Autonomy satisfaction before the Camp was correlated with competence and autonomy satisfactions during the Camp.

## 4. Discussion

This study aimed to examine the participants' satisfaction of three basic psychological needs – competence, autonomy, and relatedness – during the Camp. The participants' responses to the open questions about their satisfaction before and during the Camp were quantified based on the definition of satisfaction proposed by the Self-determination Theory. The results indicated markedly higher satisfaction for the three basic psychological needs during the Camp.


Their satisfaction of basic needs before the Camp seems to be comparatively high. This result is a matter of course, because the participants attending the Camp would have been strongly motivated to learn Arabic. Over and above this, their satisfaction during the Camp exceeded the ratings from before the Camp. The higher basic needs satisfaction ratings during the Camp in comparison to those before the Camp suggest that the Camp facilitated greater satisfaction of the participants' basic needs.

The basic needs satisfaction ratings during the Camp were not completely independent of the ratings from before the Camp. There were low to moderate and significant correlations between a part of these basic needs satisfactions ( $r_s = 0.25$  to  $0.33$ ). These results suggest that individuals who were more highly satisfied in regard

to their competence before the Camp had higher competence satisfaction during the Camp. Moreover, individuals with higher autonomy satisfaction before the Camp also were rated higher in competence and autonomy satisfaction during the Camp. Therefore, the ratings for competence and autonomy satisfaction while learning Arabic before the Camp might have weakly influenced those during the Camp. In contrast, relatedness satisfaction during the Camp was not related to basic needs satisfaction before the Camp. The results indicate independence between them. The reason for these results may be a certain similarity in environment for their competence and autonomy before and during the Camp, and in contrast, for relatedness, a substantial different conditions before and during the Camp.

Examples of notable responses before the Camp include that more than 20% of the participants expressed complaints about insufficient opportunities to practice communication or conversation, and also about a shortage of learning companions. These responses suggest a problem associated with Arabic learning conditions in Japan. The Camp was intentionally designed to offer the participants an environment that encourages communication among the learners, who were all autonomously motivated. Specifically, this interaction condition (i.e., offering and encouraging communication opportunities), differs somewhat from the typical scenario of learning for these participants. Consequently, this environment facilitated higher needs satisfaction for the participants during the Camp.

The high satisfaction of the participants' three basic needs during the Camp suggests the efficacy of the methods used within the Camp. These were incorporated to satisfy the basic psychological needs, and the methods mostly achieved positive results. According to the Self-determination Theory, a learning opportunity such as the Camp can enhance the participants' autonomous motivation to learn Arabic. Further study is needed to clarify which modifications in the Camp conditions would be required to improve learning motivation even more after the Camp. Differences between Arabic and non-Arabic majors and in the gender of the participants also will require more examination in future studies.



# Presentation of the Middle East in Educational Comics for Elementary Students

Lee, Sung Ok (HUFS, Korea)

## I. Introduction

Contraction of space due to globalization and development of technology and ever-increasing exposure to other cultures increases the needs for understanding of the other cultures and the others not only to adults but also to children. In school curriculum - G4 Civics: “cultural diversity” is introduced at G4 (Civics), and “world geography” at G6 (Society). However, children are exposed to other cultures through maps, books, soccer games, TV, etc. prior to school curriculum.<sup>1)</sup> One of such media influencing children’s understanding of the world is Educational Comics.<sup>2)</sup> While educational comics are the important source of information, in case of incorrect information, not only those wrong information or confusion, but also low possibility of correction through teachers or parents are problematic. Hence, a need of research and analysis. This research examines how popular educational comics for elementary students present the Middle East (its society and culture) and the types of incorrect information on the Middle East. It concludes with some suggestions for improvement.

The study analyzes 19 books in two formats from two different publishers as its case study. They are 13 books dealing with 5 countries from MiraeN: Treasure Hunting in Iraq, TH in Egypt, TH in Turkey, TH in Israel, TH in Mesopotamian Civilization, TH in Egyptian Civilization(2vol.), TH in Persian Civilization, Survival in Pyramids(4vol.), Survival in Desert, and 6 books dealing with 17 countries from Hermanhesse-book: *How so? New exploration of world societies and cultures in textbooks* 12(Turkey), 13(Iran, Iraq, Kuwait), 14(Saudi Arabia and 5 other countries, 15(Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon), 46(Egypt), 47(Morocco, Tunisia, Kenya, Ethiopia)

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1) Lee Kyung Han(2016), *Children’s Geography*, pp.45-57.

2) According to the Korea Creative Content Agency, educational comic books make over 1 trillion won market in 2017, comprising 67% of the total comics market.

## **II. Presentation of the Middle East (and Middle Eastern countries) and its image in educational comic books for elementary students**

### **1. Problems with the terms, people, representativeness**

Survival series and Treasure Hunting series focus on ancient civilization, and selected countries are limited (13 books, 5 countries, Egypt 3 items 7 books). How so? series deals with countries(state) as a unit. Its number of volume represents the “importance” of the given country. E.g.) US (3 volumes), France(2), Germany(2), etc. Contemporary ME is dealt with in geographic terms of Asia and Africa in textbooks. On the other hand, in educational comics, the terms Middle East, West Asia(Southwest Asia), Arab, Muslim are used with confusion or as if they are interchangeable. Even when brief explanation on different terms are given, after the explanation comes interchanging usage (How so? Saudi Arabia, p.9) The term “Arab” is used as a name of the region, not as adjective (How so? 15. Syria, Israel., p.10 etc.). The term “Islamic state” and “Arab state” are used interchangeably (How so? Saudi, p.43, 46 etc.). New terms like “Middle East Islamic realm”, “Middle East Asia” with unclear explanation lead to further confusion (How so? Iran, p.36, 37). Sometimes, the modern term “Middle East” is used for ancient society (How so? 13 Iran, p.76).

Confusion of terms is found not only about the region but also about the people in it. Confusion between Bedouin Arab, Muslim, Palestinians are frequent, not to mention explanation on race or ethnicity.

### **2. The Middle East as too conservative and solely religious**

Visual presentation of people in the region is generally too conservative in clothing. Countries are introduced as an “Islamic state.” For example, “Egypt, as a member of Islamic Alliance[sic], ...follows Islamic principles in everything. ...Politics and religion are united(unity in church and state)...” (How so? 46 Egypt, p.19) “We live [exactly] as the Quran, the sacred book of Islam, teaches. It is not the big population of [Muslims] that makes an Islamic state. But we call an Islamic state when it follows the teaching of Islam thoroughly. ...Needless to say life, laws, culture, but even all the policies of the state and life of the citizens!” (How so? Egypt, 103) “The [Saudi] king rules the country according to Sharia, the Islamic law.” (How so? Saudi, p.15) “[Jews] do not use the phone or TV [on Shabbat strictly].” (Treasure hunting in Israel, p.154)

### **3. Incorrect information as well as lack of cultural sensitivity**

Muhammad, the prophet of Islam, is presented in drawings (How so? Egypt, p.107, Survival in Pyramid 1,

p.33 etc.). Sometimes, they distort the religious belief of the contemporary Middle Eastern people for the sake of the plot (Treasure hunting in Iraq, p.33, How so? Saudi Arabia and other countries, p.29). The Gulf is always presented as the “Persian Gulf”. (How so? Saudi Arabia, p.9 etc.). Palestine-Israeli relations are described from the viewpoint of Israel.

On the other hand, sometimes political correctness or cultural relativism is used with exaggeration. For example, “That’s why [since Egypt is an Islamic state]... people look happy[literally ‘bright face’], have no discontentment...rare incidents or crimes of violence...” (How so?46 Egypt, p.111) “Iraqi people are said to be impetuous and hot-tempered. However, since they take religious doctrines as their convictions in life, they are all good in their deep hearts and have no malice.” (Treasure hunting in Iraq, p.80)

### **III. Analysis of information on the Middle East in educational comic books for elementary students**

#### **1. Incorrect information on religions**

Most of the explanations on Islam are incorrect. Considering the purpose of educational comics *is* to get knowledge, seriousness of the problem should be voiced. Some examples are like,

“The poor or the rich use about 25% of their income as zakat.” (How so? Saudi Arabia, p.39) “Ramadan is the ninth month of Islamic calendar. It falls usually in November.” (How so? Saudi Arabia, p.41) “The twelfth month of Islamic calendar (usually in March) is for the pilgrimage.” (How so? Saudi Arabia, p.51) “The first month of Jewish calendar falls on March-April in solar calendar.” (Treasure hunting in Israel, p.154) [July to October] “Ramadan is a holiday commemorating a month Mahomet, who established Islam, learned Koran from the angel Gabriel.” (Treasure hunting in Turkey p.30) “Islamic state is male-dominating patriarchal society. ...Rich people [sometimes] have many wives.” (How so? Saudi, p.43) “A sit for muezzin who leads the prayer in Islamic worship.” (Treasure hunting in Turkey, p.154) “As for the marriage, it is possible up to 4 times in accordance with Islamic creed...” (How so? 13, p.124)

#### **2. Incorrect information on history and country profile**

“The first Middle East War in 1967” (How so? 15, Syria, Israel, p.16) “The third Middle East War in 1963” (How so? 15, p.69) “PLO was founded in 1969” (How so? 15, p.93) “98% of the population of Egypt is Hamitic [ethnic groups, or race] composed of Egyptians, Bedouins, and Berbers as well as minority [ethnic] groups such

as Greeks, Nubia, Armenians.” (Treasure hunting in Egypt, p.26) “[Iran] hardly works in agriculture.” (How so? Iran, p.9) “The name Israel means ‘God rules(dominates)’ in Hebrew.” “Israel is a democratic state which has a parliament called Knesset, unique in the Middle East.” (Treasure hunting in Israel, p.24, How so? 15, p.46) “Originally Christianity regards Sundays as the day of rest, most of the churches in Israel have worship services on Saturdays, that is the day of rest[shabbat] of Judaism.” (Treasure hunting in Israel, p.115) “[I] broke the *tugra* into pieces and put them onto four corners [of the letter]...” (Treasure hunting in Turkey, p.137) [Tugra is written like a signature.]

### 3. Incorrect information on society and culture

“All the Turks like kebab, but it is not easy to eat kebab often in Turkey where price of meat is expensive. So, most of people eat baked beans and rice with cucumber pickle.” (How so? Turkey, p.118)

“Dolma is made by wrapping various seasons and pasta with vegetable leaves. Eggplant leaves, pumpkin leaves, hot pepper leaves, tomato leaves, vine leaves, cabbage, etc.” (How so? Turkey, p.119)

“There is not much meat dishes... No more than kebab made of lamb meat.”... “Meat is expensive and extravagant food!” “Hookah pipe [Nargila] has no nicotine and not harmful for health...” (How so? Egypt, p.113) [meat is common and ordinary diet except for the poor. And nargila has nicotine and similar risk for health.]

### 4. Incorrect visual presentation

Depiction of clothing is generally problematic. Some examples are,

Depiction of Wadi (TH in Iraq, p.30, Survival in Desert, 92)

Depiction of a camel (Survival in Pyramid 3., p. 75) [A camel’s leg has two knees, in drawing one.]

Depiction of Muslim turban (How so? 46, p.106) [It is about Mecca...Muslim turban looks like Sikh turban.]

Depiction of Muslim women (How so? 14, p.35) [To explain women hiding their hands...looks like ones in Joseon dynasty palace]

Depiction of ghusl and ‘udu (How so? 14, p. 38) [As like bathing]

Depiction of Arabic letters for “Sula Trading co.” (TH in Egypt Civilization, p.75)

Depict of Omani and Yemeni men with daggers (How so? 14, p.59) [depicting sword instead of daggers. In Korean, two are same.]

Depiction of skating Iranians in a park. (How so? 13, p.42) [Men and women mixed]



## 5. Problem of terms and transliteration

Same term with different transliterations are found very often. For example, Allah is 알라, 알라신, 하느님, 유일신 알라, 신; Muslim is 이슬람 신도, 이슬람교도, 무슬림, 모슬렘, 이슬람 인, 이슬람 여자, 이슬람 여성, 모슬렘 여성, Christianity is 그리스도교, 크리스트교, 기독교; Shahadat is 샤하다, 샤하다트, 샤하다드; Sawm is 사움, 사븀, 샤움; Hajj is 핫즈, 하주, 하즈, 하드쉬, Muezzin is 무아진, 무엣진, 무에진; Alexander is 알렉산더, or 알렉산드로스. The Arabic article Al as 알 or 엘, with no space or with space.

There are wrong readings such as “알 주물리야 미스르 알 아라비야” -> 알 줌후리야 (How So? 46 Egypt, p.19) “라 일라하 이라-이-라 모하메아둔라술룰-일라” (How so? 14, p.36) 이맘 알 아드함 모스크 -> 이맘 알 아으담 모스크 (How so? 13, p.83) 옴미야드 왕조 -> 우마위야 왕조 (How so? 13, p.86) Mihrab: 미라브 (How so? 14, p.37) 야울 귀레쉬 -> 야울르 귀레쉬 (TH in Turkey, p.102) 오토갈 -> 오토가르 (TH in Turkey, p.103) 투그라 -> 투으라 (TH in Turkey, p.57, 137) 미크바 -> 미크베 (TH in Israel, throughout the book) 케투빔 -> 크투빔 (TH in Israel, p.55) 마차 -> 마짜 (TH in Israel, p.162)

Sometimes, too many terms in Arabic or English are given, while omitting important terms like Shabbat[Israel], Qanat or Falaj [Oman].

There are type errors or incorrect readings of English, also inconsistency within a book. For example, Najd is presented as 네지드, then 비즈드 (How so? Saudi, p.18); Sawm as 사븀, then 라븀 (How so? Saudi, p.43); the ruling family of Kuwait as 사바, then 사라 (How so? 13, p.114, 120); Shabti (for ancient Egyptians) as 샤브티, then 우샤브티(Survival in Pyramid 3, p92, p.110) [Shabti has various spellings including these two.]. 하니파 학파 -> 하나피 학파 (how so? 13, p.83) 하드리마우트 -> 하드라마우트 (How so? Saudi, p.26) 절벽을 깎아 -> 절벽을 깎아 (Treasure hunting in Persian civilization, p.51)

## **IV. Conclusion and Suggestions**

### **Summary of findings**

Survival series and Treasure Hunting series focus on ancient civilization, presents limited number of countries (5) while repeating explanation on ancient civilization. How so? series presents more countries (17) with modern history, however, explanation on Islam for each country makes repetition, more seriously, incorrect information.

Generally, largely incorrect explanation especially on Islam, seriousness of transliteration, inconsistency and unclear explanation make us rethink the purpose of educational comics.

### **Suggestions**

Need of supervision of specialists, not nominal but actual regional specialists.

Need of establishing rules on transliteration and terms (ME studies, Islamic studies, archeology, world history)

Need of academic exchange among different field for children's education

2018 KAMES International Conference

The Middle East in an Era of Transition,  
Reorganization of the Regional Order and the Search for Partnership

# 6th Session. History and Society

**Moderator: Sami Abdul-Wahab**  
**(Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission in Korea)**

» **Oman's Relations with Iran 1972~2018**

- Mohammed Saad Al-Muqadam (Sultan Qaboos Univ., Oman)
- Discussant: Mohamed El-Askary (HUFS, Korea)


» **Relations Between Mongolia and Middle Eastern Countries**

- Oyunsuren. S(National Univ. of Mongolia, Mongolia)
- Discussant: Kim, Kangsuk (Dankook Univ., Korea)

» **The Korean Wave "Hallyu": A Form of the Korean Soft  
Power, Diplomacy Towards the Arab World**

- Mohamed El Bouchikhi (Sun Moon Univ., Korea)
- Discussant: Yi, Soo Jeong (Korea Army Academy, Korea)





# Oman's Relations with Iran 1972~2018

**Mohammed Saad Al-Muqadam (Sultan Qaboos Univ., Oman)**

The geographical and historical ties that have linked Oman and Iran from ancient to contemporary times have shaped their political processes and have enabled the conditions for Oman's relations with Iran to develop throughout the centuries. This paper focuses on the major elements that have shaped the relations between Oman and Iran from 1971 to 2018. First, the relations with Iran following the accession of HM Sultan Qaboos in 1970 and Iran's role in Dhofar war 1973-1975. Second, how these relations developed after the Iranian **Revomtim** 1979. Third, Oman's position in Iran-Iraq war of 1980. Third, how Omani diplomacy has sought to balance its relationship with Iran alongside its relations with the GCC States and the United States.

Fourth, Oman position on Iran nuclear programme. Oman shows solidarity with Iran in nuclear issue. Oman desire to avoid further regional conflict in the regain.

Fifth, Oman position in regional security in the Gulf. Oman opposed excluding Iran and supporting to including Iran in the region security. Oman sign security pact with Iran Omanis unlikely to participate in schemes that seek to build regional security by excluding Iran. In 2009 Oman signed security pact with Iran.

Sixth, Oman's role as a mediator between the other GCC states and the united states and Iran. Oman's relationship with Iran offers the GCC states and the USA a channel for communication. The Omani role in securing the release of American prisoners in Iran. Oman's position in maintaining good relations with both countries. Oman's relationship with Iran does not undermine the Oman relations with the GCC and the USA. Oman shows solidarity with Iran in nuclear issue.

Seventh, Oman – Iran economic, In addition to strong diplomatic and political ties, Iran and Oman cooperate economically on several fronts. In addition to these they signed major economic projects, including energy. Most recently, the they signed an initial agreement to begin supplying large quantities of natural gas from Iran to Oman.

Finally, perhaps the influence of geography on Oman's relations with Iran that can be regarded as the most important element in Oman's-Iran relations.



# RELATIONS BETWEEN MONGOLIA AND MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES

**Oyunsuren. S (National Univ. of Mongolia, Mongolia)**

In this paper I have tried to analyze the events of historic and current relations, and determine opportunities of future relations between Mongolia and Middle Eastern Countries.

Ancient Mongolians (Hunnus) established the first contact and developed relations with nations of Middle Eastern region through “Silk Road”. Countries that crossed “Silk Road”, the first transport route connecting Europe and Asia, greatly benefitted from trade, economic and cultural exchanges.

The Mongol Empire’s foreign and diplomatic policy had been guided by the principles of maintaining peace and solidarity as well as conquering nations through armed forces. In this manner most of the vast territory of Eurasia and the peoples of occupied nations had been taken under its control. However, Mongols were not driven by its desire to conquer or occupy and rule the nations under its dictatorship. On the contrary, they strived to unite all mankind under one rule to live in peace and harmony with one another. Some scholars called the social situation of this Great State established by Chinggis Khan, as “*Pax Mongolica*” or “*Mongolic(sh) peace*”. It can be characterized as follows.

“Ikh Zasag” (Great Yasa) Law Code rigorously observed by Chinghis Khan and his successors, says that Mongols should respect the culture, livelihood, life style, tradition and customs of conquered nations, and at the same time the law emphasizes rights of one’s belief and worship noting that “one should revere all religions without prejudice to any one religion.” Such provisions conditioned for the religions such as Islam to start spreading throughout Mongolia from 13<sup>th</sup> century. “Ikh Zasag” Law Code provided a legal environment for Islam to influence the society, economy and political as well as the intellectual life of Mongols. Great Khans and aristocrats of Mongol Empire, which conquered half of the world, provided protectorship to the Muslims, who had abundant experience in trade and commerce, and widely used them for deals in finance and politics.

In addition, William de Rubruck in his book “Visit to the Mongol Empire”, which covered the history of Mongolia during Munkh Khan’s reign (1251-1259), states that the merchants’ district of the capital of Kharkhorum, which was populated by many nationalities and religions, was constituted by Muslims. He also mentions that among the diplomatic messengers, who came to Kharkhorum for a mission, he had met with

delegates from Bagdad's Khalif and Sultan of Rum (Turkey). Moreover, Rubruk states that Buddhist, Islamic and Christian churches and temples were freely running their activities in the capital.

In 1261 the establishment of Mongolian -Ilkhanid state in modern Iran favorably influenced the expansion of Mongol Empire's foreign relations in the Central East, Western Asia, Middle East and Western Europe. This way Asia Minor and Middle Eastern states were overtaken by the powerful influence of Mongolian foreign policy and traditions of diplomatic relations.

During 13<sup>th</sup> – 14<sup>th</sup> centuries an express post that has long history of development expanded and grew into a strictly organized, multifunctional government service, which allowed the Yuan Dynasty to deliver its state and trade policies to the Far East and West, Europe, Small Asia, and Arab countries by land or by waterway.

Consequently, the Mongolian Empire had significantly contributed to the mankind by ensuring the diplomatic immunity of envoys at the world level, introducing prompt communication system, creating an easy and understandable system of taxation, providing for the peaceful coexistence of religions and free practice of religion, and had pioneered the globalization processes.

However, starting from 14<sup>th</sup> century Ilkhanid and Golden Horde Mongols had become virtually indistinguishable from mere Iranian and Turkish locals.

Consequently, due to the external factors including war waged with foreign countries and internal factors such as inappropriate actions from high ranking nobility, wrong system of levy, peasant uprisings of conquered nations Ilkhanid, Tsagaadai, Golden Horde States and Yuan Dynasty have perished one after another ending Mongolian domination in Asia and Europe.

Mongolians were able to grow into empires when they united and sought for their national interests. However, in times when they neglected their national interests, and fought with each other, empire disintegrated and Mongolians had come under the domination of others (Manchurians), and came close to vanishing.

However, with the arrival of 20<sup>th</sup> century Mongolians embraced national freedom in 1911, people's national revolution was victorious in 1921, and further maintained national patriotism through the tough times of the battle of Khalkh river and Second World War.

After the Second World War the Government of Mongolian People's Republic initiated actions to intensify development, expand foreign relations, and strengthen its position in the international arena. During this period at times when there emerged signs of new conflict in the Middle East Mongolian People's Republic started to articulate its own political standing in relation to the region. Its political standing, however, was one-sided and stated that "Mongolia will support people's freedom movement in Arab countries, develop a top priority to conduct relations with socialist oriented countries (Egypt, Algeria, Democratic Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Lybia), and support Palestinian and Arab people's just resistance against Israel".

With the accession of Mongolia into the UN membership on 27 October 1961 its foreign political relations have entered into a new threshold. For the years of 1960-1980s with the expansion of the content and goals of Mongolian foreign policy its diplomatic service has intensified, its structure and organization has improved, and



its personnel has strengthened. During this period Mongolia opened its Embassy in Algeria in 1964 and in Egypt in 1967, and has developed its foreign relations through the exchange of representatives via parliament, party and public organizational contacts, condemning of Israel via UN and international organizational platform, and by lending support to the political standing of Arabic countries.

Consequently, with the intensification of foreign relations of Mongolian People's Republic it established diplomatic relations with the Middle Eastern countries such as Democratic People's Republic of Algeria (25 June 1961), Republic of Iraq (5 February 1962), Arab Republic of Egypt (2 April 1963), Syrian Arab Republic (31 July 1967), Republic of Turkey (24 June 1969), Kingdom of Morocco (14 July 1970), Republic of Yemen (28 August 1970), Islamic Republic of Iran (20 May 1971), State of Kuwait (17 June 1975), Great People's Socialist Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (16 June 1976), Republic of Tunisia (15 February 1977), Palestine (25 April 1979), and Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (21 May 1981).

During 1990's internal and external environment of Mongolia enormously changed. Since this time Mongolia changed to democratic political system and market economy.

Therefore, Mongolia declared in its 1992 Constitution that it "adheres to the universally recognized norms and principles of international law and pursues a peaceful foreign policy", which became the legal grounds for its current foreign policy.

In addition, it determined the main guiding principle of foreign policy as "multi-based" and outlined in its 1994 "Concept of Mongolia's Foreign Policy" to pursue: a. open and non-aligned policy, b. safeguard its vital national interests, ensure its independence, c. develop equal relations with foreign countries and seek to avoid becoming overly reliant or dependent on any particular country, d. pursue a policy of refraining from joining any military alliance or grouping, and defend its national security interests via economic means.

Consequently, due to Middle Eastern region's geographical position in the intersection of three continents, and in view of factors such as vast resource of oil and natural gas, financial capacity, and active non-aligned policy Mongolia has increased interest in the development of trade, economic and cultural relations with the countries of Middle Eastern region and in attracting loans and foreign investment.

Also in this region Mongolia started to maintain a policy of not lending one-sided support to either Arab countries or Israel but rather support a peaceful resolution that provides for the interests of both parties in the Israel, Palestine conflict.

In considering the fact that the countries of Middle Eastern region belong to developing country category Mongolia has developed its relations with these countries on the basis of its foreign policy direction on maintaining "friendly relations with developing countries and cooperating with them, as much as possible, in the solution of common objectives. Beyond the framework of bilateral relations with these countries, this task will be realized mainly through cooperation within the framework of international organizations and movements, such as the United Nations, the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement."

During this time Mongolia has established diplomatic relations with the State of Israel (2 October 1991), Sultanate of Oman (27 April 1992), United Arab Emirates (1 April 1996), State of Qatar (21 January 1998), Lebanese Republic (5 February 1998), State of Bahrain (16 May 1998).

In the statement issued by the Foreign Ministry of Mongolia on 4 October 2001 on the issue of international terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, which came at the center of world attention, it states that the Government

of Mongolia firmly stands against international terrorism and condemns September 11 terrorist attack to the USA as a crime against democracy and freedom. Mongolia supports the world alliance against international terrorism.

Mongolia has also clearly declared that such condemnation of international terrorism will not affect its relations with countries of Islamic religion as such a fight is not directed against Islamic religion but against terrorists and fundamentalists that conduct their activities in the name of Islamic religion.

Government of Mongolia maintains Islamic religion in the framework of political policy and it has reflected in its Law of Mongolia on the Relations of the State and Monastery. Therefore, Arabic countries could have an interest to support its Islamic minority, and Mongolia could develop its mutual relations with these countries in ways that do not affect its national security interests in the areas of humanitarian and social cooperation and utilize development funds and charity organizations to implement different economic projects.

One of the most important achievements was the establishment of diplomatic relations of Mongolia with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 12 February 2007.

Mongolia is successfully developing friendly relations and cooperation with our two neighbors, many other countries. Relations with UN organizations and other international and regional organizations deepened and Mongolia's participation increased in multilateral regional activities, which led to strengthened reputation of our country in international arena.

Taking into account the ever changing external and internal environment as well as objectives and challenges ahead of us, Mongolia passed renewed concept of foreign policy of Mongolia in February 2011.

Positive things of the new concept of foreign policy of Mongolia are that it welcomed the changes in world-wide politics: regional new definition, balance of powers in international system, new trends in CBM, current situation in international crime, economic interdependence, role of the non state actors, relationship of military and civilians, new trends on international institutions, role environmental security, green diplomacy, importance of public and economic diplomacy, new development I information technology.

As a part of foreign policy priorities of Mongolia, bilateral relationships with Russian Federation and People's Republic of China has elevated to a new strategic partnership level while expanding close cooperation.

At the same time, relations and cooperation with "third neighbors" has advanced. While Mongolia is located in the northeast region of East Asia, its "third neighbor" foreign policy is poised to allow Ulaanbaatar to boost bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relations with countries around the world. Land-locked between two politically, economically, and militarily powerful nations — Russia and China — Mongolia's third neighbor policy by no means will exclude these neighbors. Instead, the strategic policy framework intends to use a soft-power approach to international relations as a modus operandi to tackle developing vital sectors such as education, science and technology, mining, and energy infrastructure. For example, landlocked Mongolia's foreign policy now stretches out to many sectors, including oil and energy in the Persian Gulf.

Furthermore, historical new page was opened in Mongolia and Kuwait relations as Kuwait opened the Embassy to Mongolia in Ulaanbaatar in 2010 and Mongolia opened the Embassy to Kuwait in Ali Kuwait in 2011. After that the United Arab Emirates opened the Embassy to Mongolia in Ulaanbaatar. Thanks to these events Mongolia has taken specific steps to further continue cooperation with the Kuwait Fund and Abu Dabi Fund that are implementing several large projects in Mongolia, as well as to obtain aid and low interest loans.

Also one of the opportunities for landlocked Mongolia to expand economic cooperation with the countries such as Egypt, Turkey and Iran with which Mongolia has traditional diplomatic ties, is to join the common network of “Silk Road”, which constitutes the main economic development route connecting Asia and Europe via railroad, highway, pipe line and oil.

In addition, it is important to intensify relations with these countries through non-governmental organizations and develop public diplomacy. Mongolian Association of Middle Eastern Studies was established in 2002, and this association became a member of the Asian Federation of Middle Eastern Studies’ Associations in 2004. It conducts intensive activities on the Middle Eastern studies.

Since the academic year of 2004 the Department of Asian studies of the Mongolian National University has been teaching its students Arabic language. Also School of International Relations and Public Administration of National University of Mongolia plays important role to prepare young researchers of Middle East studies through master and doctor student programs and has been developing academic relations between Universities such as Cairo, Hebrew, etc. at the same time. This has emerged from a necessity to prepare experts to cooperate with these countries.

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# The Korean Wave "Hallyu": A Form of the Korean Soft Power, Diplomacy Towards the Arab World

**Mohamed El Bouchikhi (Sun Moon Univ., Korea)**

By early 1990s, South Korea emerged as one of the Asian Tigers that rose from the edge of poverty in the aftermath of the Korean War (1950-53) as a poor and wane nation to one of the largest economies in the world. It was inaugurated by its membership among the club of rich nations in OECD in 1996. Therefore, Korea presented one of the fastest and most successful economic development in our contemporary world, astonishing the world with its economic compressed development model. The world that witnessed the dramatic event of the Korea War in the 1950s also witnessed the influx of the Korean electronic products as well as the TV drama and popular. The latter is the cultural products such as TV dramas, popular culture, dance, video games as well as to a lesser extent toward Korean fashion, food, language, tourism that spread across different periods of time and through different tools.

The first wave of the Korean Wave is the Korean TV dramas and popular music, which were successful in reaching Asian viewers in mass. This unprecedented presence alarmed the Chinese media that coined the term "*Hallyu*" that was developed as a pun and double entendre of the term "*han-liu*", or literally "cold wave" by Chinese to symbolize the sudden and forceful onslaught of the wave of the Korean media into the Chinese market. Therefore, *Hallyu* to a surge in the international visibility of Korean culture, beginning in East Asia in the 1990s and continuing more recently in the United States, Latin America, the Middle East, and parts of Europe. The wave consists principally of two forms of media, television serials and pop music (K-pop), although Korean feature films and other musical forms are also part of the phenomenon.

In the age of globalization, media has been an important mechanism through which provided continuous vehicle for the Korean Wave. Late 1990s, globalization become a buzzword which involved extensive networks that opened the way to the flows and influences of capitals and goods, information, ideas, and people. The Internet and its advanced technologies make the speed of cultural diffusion faster. The role of video-sharing sites such as YouTube and mobile social media supports a decentralized file sharing system for culture to spread through interpersonal contacts.

Some might argue that the Hallyu originates from the Korean's cultural characteristics that have a strong affinity for music and dance. However, I think, it is only a new phase of the successful Korean industrialization model, where Koreans successfully reproduced Western cultural products in their own style leading the globalization of the Korean style, language, food, popular culture. Hallyu is another manifestation of the Korean

cultural industry that successfully played the role that Japanese had played once. It is reflecting the rise of the cultural industry that was making successful progress domestically.

As the time went by, the Korean Wave was not limited to TV dramas, the new Korean Wave is spear-headed by the spread of the K-pop. Therefore, the rapid growth of the social media services such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, and the instant messaging apps such as WhatsApp, Line, and KakaoTalk have made it possible to expand the Korean Wave beyond its traditional sphere of Asia to Europe, Latin America, and as far as the Arab World. When the famous song of Psy, Gangnam Style, reached every corner of the world, was chanted and imitated by millions across the globe, was mainly due to YouTube and Facebook.

One might argue the reasons behind the rapid spread of the Korean Wave and the warm welcome it has been receiving in the various regions of the world. It is argued that Americans found it more relaxing and cheerful, while it is simplicity and romance attracted Europeans. For Asians, through Hallyu, they discover that kind of lifestyle and trends they wish to emulate. Meanwhile, Arabs subtle repression of emotions and intense romantic passion without overt sexuality, which makes safe to be watched with the family members. It is also argued that the success of the Korean Wave lies on the quality of its contents, combination of modernity and tradition, as well as the Asian beauty, skillful storytelling and the modern image of male and female. The Korean wave, therefore, has become a cultural phenomenon in which people in the world become interested in adopting and buying Korean products, learning the language and visiting the nation. The wave of sympathy that swept the social media in the aftermath of Sewol tragedy that left hundreds of sunken kids in 2015. This sentiment of sympathy was the result of the Korean Wave in the Arab eyes and the world eyes as well.

The history of the Arabo-Korean relationships goes back deep into history to the time of the ancient dynasties. However, since the 1970s, both Korea and Arabs have embarked on a new era of exchanged mutual interests, where Korea provided Arabs with technical and human resources for the construction boom, while Arabs provided natural resources and political support in the UN. Despite the friendly beneficial relationship, the Korean hostage crisis in Afghanistan in 2007 that spread an anti-Korean sentiment across the region, seeing the Korean missionaries as agents of American zealots seeking to Christianize the Muslims.

In order to overcome the misunderstanding of that turbulent phase and restore their friendship, Korea inaugurated the Korea Arab Society in 2007. The pragmatic Korean foreign policy towards the Arab region based on its non-interfering policy as well as not openly cheering its relations with Israel helped Korea to develop the image of a non-imperialist nation. The global reach of the Hallyu encouraged the Korean government to ride the wave to further develop its national brand and present its culture on the global stage. As it was also used to promote its products overseas, and to attract foreign students and tourists. The Arab region is seen as of great potentials in regard to the Korean Wave.

Borrowing the G. Nye's concept of soft power, as the ability to get what you want through the attraction rather than coercion or payment, arising from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideas, and policies. Based on this, Korean Wave represents a form of the Korean soft power diplomacy, aiming to win the hearts and minds of other country's population. Therefore, the Arab is among the Korean Wave's targets, where Korea seeks

to overcome the unfriendly sentiment that was resulted from sending its troops to Iraq in 2004 and the 2007 hostage crisis in Afghanistan.

The first wave of Hallyu reached the Arab region with the *Autumn in My Heart* drama that was premiered on Egyptian state television on August 2004. The first wave was very successful as the drama gained popularity among Arabs, and as a response, Korea launched its first Korean satellite station, Korea TV. The channel translated Korean cultural content into many local languages in the Middle East. The warm welcome of the Korean drama and culture has led to spiking number of Korean dramas consumed by Arab viewers. By scanning the Internet, I found that about 300 Korean dramas were translated into Arabic. This number reveals how much Arab viewers were involved in watching Korean drama. In a study conducted by Suen Noh in 2011 based on Korean culture fan club at an American social networking website for 3 months starting in December 2009. He found out that Arab fandoms developed a personal engagement with Korea through the K-dramas. They overtly expressed their love of Korea, Korean culture, language, and their willingness to visit the country, learn the language, or study there. In fact, many students applied for studying the language, either as a major, Korean Studies in both Egypt and Jordan or courses offered by the embassy in Morocco.

Early 2005, when I applied for the Korean Language courses at Mohammed V University, which were supported by the Korean Embassy, only a few students joined the classes with finished the year with only 4 students. However, only a few years later, as Moroccans started watching the K-drama, the number of students applying to learn the language grew increasingly. Korean drama served as a gateway to a broader interest in the Korean culture, it provided an understanding framework for the Middle East to know Korean lifestyle, customs, values, and history. It also works as a cultural bridge between two regions are geographically far from each other. The second Korean Wave echoed in the Arab region as well, where Arab youth welcomed K-pop music and K-pop idols. It helped in to enhance Middle Easterners' familiarity with Korea and its public image, leading to increasing interest in visiting South Korea.

In 2009, Korea launched its cable channel to the Arab region called "Korea TV" which was an Arabic channel, showing most popular Korean dramas, music videos, reality and variety shows, and even some Korean learning shows. Despite being shut down later, the Korean fanbase grew bigger in all Arab countries. The spread of the Hallyu among Arab youth paved the road for more to learn the Korean language, not just those who chose to study it at college. Many now are taking lessons, learning online or having a tutor, or even watching Korean dramas to learn and speak the language. Besides the short-lived Korea TV, Korea inaugurated the first cultural center in the Middle East for promoting Korean culture in Abu Dhabi in 2016. It has sections providing a first-hand experience of traditional Korean culture and showcasing the Korean cultural industry. Korea also launched the Korean cultural center in Egypt in 2013, in order to improve the image of Korea in the eyes of the Egyptian people.

Moreover, Hallyu concerts took place in the Arab region such as KCON, which an annual Korean culture convention organized in different places in the World. In 2016, it took place in Abu Dhabi, as the first KCON event in the Middle East. It incorporated a K-pop concert with other cultural elements of K-beauty and K-food. The event attracted more than 8,000 people from the UAE, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other neighboring Middle Eastern countries.

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# 7th Session. Culture & Society (2)

Moderator: Choi, Young-chol  
(Seoul Jangsin Univ., Seoul)

» **Reflection on Arab Media in the Post-Uprising Phase: The Whereabouts of Media Freedom**

- Yushi Chiba (Komatsu Univ., Japan)
- Discussant: Eum, Ik Ran (Dankook Univ., Korea)


» **Media and Political engagement in Middle East – Case of Tunisia and Turkey**

- Kim Suwan (HUFS, Korea)
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- Suzuki Takahiro (Doshisha Univ., Japan)
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# Reflection on Arab Media in the Post-Uprising Phase: The Whereabouts of Media Freedom

Yushi Chiba (Komatsu Univ., Japan)

## Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview regarding media freedom in the Arab world since the Arab uprisings began. The uprisings, igniting in a rural city in Tunisia and then spreading to other Arab countries, resulted in overthrowing long-standing authoritarian governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, and they have impacted most Arab countries. Although a series of protests started as requirements for better governance, political freedom, and qualified life, its outcomes seem to be far from successful; some countries such as Libya, Yemen, and Syria plunged into civil wars with no end in sight. Furthermore, Egypt, even if it experienced an ephemeral democratic period for a few years after Mubarak stepped down, soon went back to authoritarianism. Until now—except for Tunisia—, there have been no Arab countries experiencing substantial democratic progress. Therefore, contrary to initial optimistic views on uprisings that emphasized people's power and the effectiveness of social movements toward authoritarian governments, recent studies tend to take more severe perspectives on the incidents and shed light on aspects such as the robustness of authoritarianism, its potentially long-term and destructive impact on democratization regionally, and its influence on interstate relationships.

Soon after the citizens' protests began, many observers paid attention to media because they believed in their important roles in disseminating information among citizens, mobilizing them, and ousting dictators. Particularly, those who emphasized the role of social networking services (SNSs), such as Twitter and Facebook, referred to demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt, the "Facebook Revolution," or the "Web 2.0 Revolution" even before dictators were ousted. Although there is much room for debate regarding the media's actual role in each country's demonstrations, nobody clearly denies the role of media in the uprisings. Many researchers have tried to reveal political roles of media throughout the uprisings. However, contrary to studies that focus on the role of media, the number of studies that focus on the upheavals' impact on media is quite limited.<sup>i</sup> Although many observers regard the Arab uprisings as momentous historically for showing the power of media freedom enabled by the development of media technologies, most studies have never focused on the whereabouts of media freedom in the Arab world after the uprisings. For a better understanding of the relationship between media and the uprisings,

this study considers the uprisings' impact on media situations, as well as the whereabouts of media freedom in the Arab world since the beginning of the uprisings.


## **Trajectory of Media Freedom: Before and After the Arab Uprisings**

In providing an overview of media freedom in the Arab world since the uprisings began, this paper began with a reference to the Press Freedom Index (PFI) published since 2002 by Freedom House, the U.S.-based NGO, to assess each country's degree of political freedom and civil rights. Taking the fact that the number of similar indices is quite limited, Freedom House's PFI is worth referring to when comparing the degree of media freedom among different countries.<sup>ii</sup> The PFI varies from 0 to 100: countries that enjoy a greater degree of media freedom have indices closer to 0, whereas countries with the least media freedom have indices closer to 100. Countries are categorized into three types according to the degree of media freedom: *Free (F)*, with a score between 0 and 30, where media freedom is regarded as guaranteed; *Partly Free (PF)*, with a score between 31 and 60, where media freedom is not always free or only partly allowed; and *Not Free (NF)*, with a score between 61 and 100, where media freedom is very limited and in crisis. As noted below, the situations of media freedom in most Arab countries are categorized as either *Not Free* or *Partly Free*.

### **(1) PFI transition in countries that experienced regime changes and/or civil wars**

First, PFIs in countries that experienced regime changes and/or civil wars are examined. These countries include Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. As Figure 1 shows, although some countries such as Tunisia and Libya experienced dramatic improvements in PFIs between 2011 and 2012, the mid-to-long term trend shows that—except for Tunisia—the status of every country is still *NF*, and the situation is getting worse. The deterioration in PFIs seems to reflect political and security problems these countries suffer. Mid-to-long term, it is evident that the recent scores in Egypt, Yemen, and Syria became worse than those derived before the uprisings; the most remarkable case is Egypt, where the PFI was highest just before the revolution. In Libya, the index is deteriorating rapidly; even if it seems better than that during Qaddafi's period, the recent situation is far from ideal. These facts show that—except for Tunisia—the uprisings did not improve media freedom in the countries cited. Rather, their mid-to-long term effects may be devastating.

**Figure 1. Transition in Press Freedom Indices (PFIs) in countries that experienced regime changes and/ or civil wars**




(Source) Data from Freedom House website (<https://freedomhouse.org/>)

## (2) PFI Transition in the Arabian Gulf countries

Second, PFI in countries located in the Arabian Gulf are examined. As is well-known, except for Yemen, countries located in the Arabian Gulf are monarchies that are richer than other Arab countries because of revenue from petroleum resources. Soon after the Tunisian government was toppled, these countries attempted to conciliate citizens with several measures. On one hand, they spent a lot of money distracting citizens from their discontent with the governments. On the other hand, they took harsh measures toward those who rebelled against government. While countries such as the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar did not feel any threat within their borders, Bahrain experienced a series of demonstrations that led to a serious clash between citizens and the army supported by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Considering the transition in PFIs of those countries in the mid-to-long term, it is noteworthy that the index in every country is worsening in the same manner, as Figure 2 shows. Not only Bahrain, but also countries such as the UAE and Qatar—regardless of the lack of any internal threat throughout the Arab uprisings—show declining scores. This fact shows that the uprisings were not the impetus for improving the degree of media freedom in Arabian Gulf countries, though they could promote deterioration of media freedom in the area in the long run.

**Figure 2. Transition in PFI scores in countries located in the Arabian Gulf**




(Source) Data from Freedom House website (<https://freedomhouse.org/>)

### (3) PFIs in other countries

Third, PFIs in the rest of the countries—Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Jordan, Sudan, and Algeria—are examined. Jordan and Morocco experienced governmental change, though the monarchies and power of kings were preserved. In both countries, the governments tried to appease citizens and promised political reform. However, when we think about the transition in PFIs, their scores did not improve; rather, they were worse than before. Likewise, no country had a dramatic improvement in its PFI.

**Figure 3. PFI transition in other countries**



(Source) Data from Freedom House website (<https://freedomhouse.org/>)

## What is Behind the Deterioration of Media Freedom? Considering Some Possibilities

Judging from Freedom House's PFI, except for Tunisia, no Arab countries have experienced substantial improvements in media freedom. Rather, in the mid-to-long term, the uprisings have probably had a deteriorating impact on the media situation in most Arab countries. At least, the situation of media freedom in the Arab world since the uprisings has never changed positively. What is the reason for this situation? Why has it not changed or even deteriorated? In other words, before and after the uprisings, how have Arab authoritarian governments retained control of the media? Here, four reasons should be mentioned: adaptability to new media environments, restructuring of media-state relationships, strengthening of pressures on media throughout political turmoil, and the upgrading of media policies.

### (1) Adaptability to new media environments

First, contrary to the belief that authoritarian governments are not familiar with new technologies, most Arab governments have been becoming more adaptive to new media environments. Since the early 1990s, most Arab

governments have attempted to adopt state-of-the-art media technologies rather than ignore them. Although the Arab uprisings highlighted the difficulty of controlling media in the age of the free flow of information, the incidents also became an opportunity for most governments to learn the necessity of being much more cunning in terms of media control.

## (2) Restructuring of media-state relationships

Second, some countries—particularly those that experienced governmental changes—experienced media restructuring after the uprisings. Therefore, just after the revolutions, there was hope for realizing better media-state relationships. However, what most countries experienced was just the restructuring of such relationships. Most media entrepreneurs who had good relationships with governments kept their businesses throughout the uprisings. Therefore, the fundamental structure between the media and the state did not change dramatically.

## (3) Strengthening of pressures on media throughout political turmoil

Third, because the uprisings resulted in a strong political blow to both governments and regional orders, many governments tightened the social and political orders. Although countries such as the UAE and Qatar did not experience domestic threats throughout the uprisings, they are not irrelevant to the incidents. To tighten social control, governments interfered with domestic media, leading to the deterioration of media freedom.

## (4) Upgrading of media policies

Fourth, since the Arab uprisings, many observers have noted technology upgrades for Internet censorship in most countries mentioned herein. As Evgeny Morozov mentioned, technology can strengthen authoritarian governments rather than benefit citizens.<sup>iii</sup>

# Conclusion

As this paper shows, except for Tunisia, media freedom in Arab countries has not improved; rather, deterioration can be observed. Though the Arab uprisings remain in people's minds as showing the power of media, the mid-to-long term trend may show that the incident was just an opportunity for Arab authoritarian governments to upgrade their adaptability to new media environments.

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<sup>i</sup> A few studies are relevant: E. Webb (2014) *Media in Egypt and Tunisia: From Control to Transition?* Palgrave Macmillan; N. Sakr (2013) *Transformation in Egyptian Journalism*. I.B. Tauris.

<sup>ii</sup> Other NGOs such as Reporters without Borders and the Committee to Protect Journalists use similar indices.




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However, because the Freedom House's index is considered to be consistent in its assessments, this paper refers to it throughout.

<sup>iii</sup> E. Morozov (2011) *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*. PublicAffairs.





# Media and Political engagement in Middle East - Case of Tunisia and Turkey

**Kim Suwan (HUFS, Korea)**

The Media's power to engage society is increasingly transforming society itself. Media is now both messenger and message-powering big-data levels of audience response with rapid-fire rounds of news and it exerts a strong influence on society such as leader image, cultural values, even diplomatic relations. Media is powerful because it gives society knowledge and perspective to make sense of the environment.

It is often assumed that media should function as a fourth estate independent of government, and hence should act as society's conscience. In the Middle East, despite its importance to the 2011 Arab Spring, and even with the advent of social media, the media's relationship with government remains in flux, sometimes acting as the people's conscience, sometimes acting as the government's instrument. Tunisia's Independent High Authority of Audiovisual Communication and Turkey's Radio and Television Supreme Council consist of members chosen and confirmed by their respective parliaments. Morocco's High Authority for Audiovisual Communication has members appointed by the king, the prime minister and president of the parliament. These differences create distinct modes of legitimacy and, depending on the historical and political climate, they can reduce or increase government restrictions on free media access. Another indicator of the intertwined nature of the media and politics is the surge in surveillance programs.

In Tunisia, successive government leaders in post-Ben Ali Tunisia have realized the utility of a media subservient to the state and have been reluctant to support proper freedom of information and communication. They have repeated the practices of previous leaderships, justifying authoritarian action as an entitlement of government. The arbitrary practices of authoritarian rule have not been eradicated and the media are still seen as a weapon in a political struggle, rather than as a fully independent structure and essential vehicle of public participation in the construction of a new political order.

In Turkey, the broad structural features of media markets have exhibited remarkable continuities over the past

25 years. At the same time, they have interacted in historically contingent ways, to become a key ingredient in the ongoing drama of political events. At a more specific level, the tools used by the present AKP government to control and pressure media outlets and individual journalists have been used before. The media serves as an accurate mirror of the government's stance at any time between democracy and authoritarianism. The media's functionality is trapped at the intersection of complexities, such as partisan politics, authoritarian tendencies, and capitalist market rules.



# From Exploitation to Separation, the Two Phases of Institutional Segregation: the Case of South Africa and Israel

**Suzuki Takahiro (Doshisha Univ., Japan)**

## **1. Introduction**

There are many arguments over similarity between Bantustans of Apartheid South Africa, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip(WBGS) of Historical Palestine after the Oslo accord. Apartheid is the system of institutional segregation. Bantustans are "autonomous/independent" African "Homelands". Palestine Authority, which controls cities and towns of WBGS, had been established as an embryo of future nation-state.

All "homelands" here has been established as "nation-state". In other words, the biggest common feature is "Define and Rule" (Mahmood Mamdani). Then how and why did it emerge? And if it is an institutional segregation, is that static system? If it has changed, what is the reasons behind that?

If one looks at the chronology of South Africa and Israel, one would notice that there are events that occurred in almost the same timing and sequence from the late 1970s to the first half of 1990s. However, it seems that the actual results have starkly differed. In post-apartheid South Africa, all South Africans are at least equal before the law. But in Israel, the two-states-solution was adopted and never been implemented. Israel has been accused as an Apartheid state (Yiftachel, 2005; 2016)<sup>1</sup>. Even then U.S. ambassador to Israel criticised legal double standard in the West Bank in 2016 (Barak 2016)<sup>2</sup>. Then, what alteration of the states was the driving force that leads to this bifurcation?

To answer this, the author tries to analyse institutional segregation and its historical change in role and aim, which can be observed in the history of the two states.

## 2. On comparing the Two States

Marc Bloch wrote that "[T]hus two conditions are necessary to make a comparison, historically speaking, possible: there must be a certain similarity between the facts observed - an obvious point - and a certain dissimilarity between the situations in which they have arisen"<sup>3</sup> (Bloch, 1967, 45).

Lijphart wrote in his article "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method" that there are 4 cases that comparison works. The third case is that large number of important characteristics is similar and the one which one wants to compare and relate to others is dissimilar <sup>4</sup>(Lijphart, 1971, 687)

From these perspectives, South Africa and the State of Israel have much in common. Both South Africa and the State of Israel are the states which European settlers conquered the indigenous populations and their land by their armed force. Both states did massive scale intrusions against neighbouring majority-ruling-states at the beginning of the 1980s, and experienced serious economic and financial crises due to the war expenditures to some degree, and started neoliberal economic reforms, faced huge resistance inside and outside their borders in the middle of 80s, and sought to start peace negotiations with major liberation forces in the late 80s. Both states, in parallel with the end of the cold war, declared mutual agreements in 1993, made transitions to the new regimes (multi-racial-democracy and the start of interim self-government in WBGS) (See Appendix 1 for the timeline). And moreover, in 1978 in both states then ruling circles did present the plans, which can be seen as the blueprints after 1994, namely Camp David accords and then Prime Minister Botha's remark that he would implement liberalisation policy and aim the society based on class, not race and Rieckert Commission report was presented to the cabinet next year. As Paul Pierson put it, timing and sequence, and conjunctures matter. For example, in this article, the interactions with economic reforms after the end of Bretton Woods system and first oil shock and the lines and activities of major liberation forces of the two states is the major subject of the analysis of the bifurcation of the racial policies of the two states. And it is also a matter of positive feedback, and thus path dependence<sup>5</sup>.

### 2-1. On Previous Studies

There are several attempts recently that try to go beyond a simile. Ilan Pappé edited a collection of treaties for comparison, however, it does contain only two articles trying to analyse whole racial regime, others just pick up some topics that show some analogy. The one is Farsakh and the other is Jonathan Cook (Farsakh, 2015; Cook, 2015)<sup>6</sup>. Leila Farsakh's works refer to some important studies of SA, however her works have one big fault, that is defining Apartheid only from economic aspect, in sum, exploitation. As Anthony pointed out, the feature of

South African discrimination is centralised *de jure* discrimination (Marx, 2007). He compared three states (South Africa, the American South, and Brazil) where strong discrimination against Black Population exists. The fault of Cook is he only analyse the things inside official Israeli territory. He ignores the composition of then member states of United Nations, and the process of making United Nations, the actual operation in the postwar years until mass independence of former colonies and their joining, and UN's relationship to Colonialism and West-centrism, which Mazower pointed out (Mazower, 2009)<sup>7</sup>.

Clarno compares two states after 1994 as neoliberal governance, but his main aim is to compare the mode of rule in the two states after 1994, not before 1994 and how it had been created. Badran compares white protest groups, though it is not unimportant, but problem of the scope of the analysis remains. Ran Greenstein's "Genealogies of conflict" just describe and put side by side the histories of two until 1940s (Badran, 2010; Clarno, 2017; Greenstein, 1995)<sup>8</sup>.

### **3. Institutional Segregation, and its Two Courses and Phases**

What is institutional segregation? It is not just a racial discrimination, nor just a geographical separation. It is the system that tries to keep indigenous peoples and other "non-citizens" or second-class citizens subjugated permanently. It is *de jure*, not *de facto* discrimination against indigenous peoples and other second-classes. It is not static, but dynamic system.

There are some crucial and consistent features that don't change. The political aim of institutional segregation is to control, and the unchanging point of the control is maintaining majority status of settlers. Economically, the unchanging point is banning and preventing independent commodity production by indigenous peoples.

There are two types of institutional segregation. They are lax segregation with partial integration of indigenous peoples as second-class citizens, and total segregation. The character of the shift from the former to the latter can be defined as below. Economically, it is the shift from exploitation to desertion. Politically, it is the shift from keeping indigenous people in their reserves to confinement, and enlarged and strengthened collaborating indigenous bureaucracy for that.

The reasons behind these shifts are as follows. During the period that reserves can provide auxiliary means of labour reproduction such as self-sufficient agriculture and unpaid family labour for child-rearing, economy of settler colonial state can exploit circular migrants because part of labour reproduction cost is bore by non-capitalistic economy of reserve. Thus, the role of politics is to ensure that those migrants go back their reserve and to prevent them becoming permanent urban dweller. However, when it become impossible for non-

capitalistic economy of reserve to bear the cost of labour reproduction due to population explosion or deterioration of land or the economy does not need more indigenous labour except certain part of them, the main function of a reserve come to be confining indigenous population, which the economy doesn't need any more, and thus are not even industrial reserve army any more. Then, the role of the politics become ensure confinement and prevent disturbance happening inside settlers' area and affecting the smooth functioning of the economy. This shift had happened in South Africa and Israel after the first major disturbances by indigenous peoples respectively. It is a very active response by a settler colonial state to the change in the economy to shift the aim of segregation on indigenous population from exploitation to desertion.

### 3-1. Historical Development of Institutional Segregation

Indirect rule, mandatory/trustee, and "separate development", what is common between these three modes of rule is "us and them". "Us", the enlightened, progressive Westerners have the right for self-determination, and is able to run modern state, on the other hand, "them", the benighted, stationary natives, cannot run modern state nor survive facing the West, and have to be protected and supervised, or at least until the day they become modern and independent "nation" that can form their own state. They define and divide population, and rule.

Anyway, All the colonial state had to face was "the native question" (Mamdani 1996: 3), or "the native administration". Mahmood Mamdani studied the history of indirect rule in British and French colonies. he pointed out that there was a huge change in modes of rule in British India after Sepoy Mutiny. He pointed out that political crisis in the colony is also "a crisis of justification" (2012: 8).

Sir Henry Maine, a legal member of the viceroy's cabinet in postmutiny India, claimed former mode was no more pragmatic. From civilisation to conservation and from progress to order, mission should be changed. As a result, "noninterference" and "protection" was the new Language of Rule. Under this Mode of Rule, native population was classified into many "natural" ethnic groups, and reclassified when politically necessary, "always in the language of cultural difference and cosmopolitan tolerance" (Mamdani 2012: 30).

### 3-2. Consistent nature of Institutional Segregation

There has been always two camps, namely, total segregationist camp and regulated partial inclusionist camp. For example, in 1920s' South Africa, there were Stallard Commission and Godley Commission (Mine, 1996a)<sup>9</sup>.

However, what has never changed in institutional segregation of a settler colonial state is maintaining its control over native populations and settler supremacy. For that purpose, institutional segregation developed its



method. This method contains not granting political rights as its citizen, furthering economic dependence, and surveillance. Thus, settler colonial states have established "Homelands" and made indigenous populations its "nationals", prevented them create an independent economy, and regulated the flow of human, commodity, and capital as shall be seen later.

In South Africa, from mid-19th century, colonial power began to use the chiefs as agents administering customary law in Natal. 1913 Land Act was the first Act that divided ownership and possession of rural land by race. Only 8% (13% later) of the land was allocated to African occupation. The Act worked as the legal basis for forced removal of African farmers. A series of Acts was passed soon after the 1948 general elections. The 1950 Population Registration Act required all South Africans to carry ID, which was 1951 national census classified all the population into 4 races. This ID was the first centralised ID and fingerprints were corrected at the same time.

In 1951, The Bantu Authorities Act was also passed. In 1952, Native Affairs Department established national labour bureau system in respect of African workers, usurping it from the Department of Labour. And next year, NAD set up its own Housing sub-department for Africans to curtail the size of influx. The government divided African population into first 8, and then 10 groups while the English and Afrikaner were treated as one. It was supposed that those homelands would become "fully independent nation" eventually. Almost all reserves consisted of fragments of the lands. This fragmentation thought to be useful to prevent potential threat to emerge. Usually, lands of the Homelands were poor and rainfall was unreliable. Even in Zululand, the best land was owned by the settler. The government sent Africans to Homelands (Butler et al., 1977: 13; Lipton, 1986: 23; Southall, 1982: 34-36; Thompson, 2001: 164, 191-195)<sup>10</sup>.

In Palestinian case, before the erupt of the first Arab-Israeli war, most of Palestinian villagers' agriculture was on subsistence basis and they sought employment outside their village. After the war, because urban Palestinian population ran away, Palestinian industrial base had been destroyed. Furthermore, confiscation of land intensified surplus labour among Palestinian villagers inside now-Israel. Most of villagers who can work commute to Jewish metropolitan areas as unskilled or semiskilled workers. Who remains in agriculture has to cultivate labour intensive crops and non-profitable livestock for Jews such as sheep and goats. Due to the restriction and discrimination in credit and subsidies, it was also difficult to invest in industries.

The Israeli authority utilised traditional leaderships such as patriarchs and religious notables. Because of their vulnerable situation, Israeli Palestinian tended to rely on their extended families and so forth. And the authority maintained good relationship with those leaders (Cohen, H., 2011; Lustick, 1980, 150-151, 155-156, 159-160,

164)<sup>11</sup>.

The Israeli authority did not want WB agriculture to compete with theirs and prevented its development. Hence, for example, the distribution of water was unequal. And patterns of work changed markedly and much of the working force of WBGS became unskilled and low-paid workers in Israel (Graham-Brown, 1983, 177, 205)<sup>12</sup>.

Leibler (2011) points out, "the 1967 census was surprisingly similar to the 1948 census and population registration: both were taken under curfew and determined which resident would be allocated citizenship or residency rights" (2011: 242)<sup>13</sup>. It means, in another word, legal dualism have started in Historical Palestine since 1948. Even today, WBGS Palestinians have to hold ID issued by Israel interior ministry (Tawil-Souri, 2011)<sup>14</sup>.

The Israeli authority also had used local elites such as village heads, clan elders, and labour contractors in WBGS like it did inside the 1949 armistice line. And even today, Hillel Cohen pointed out that "the security cooperation [with PLO-leading-PA] can be analyzed as an Israeli success to recruit elements within the occupied territories to protect Israeli interests; ...a typical action by colonial rulers" (Cohen 2011: 110).

### 3-3. Exploitation-phase of Institutional Segregation

As Harold Wolpe, and later Claude Meillassoux put it, the key of the understanding Apartheid is articulation, especially its early period. If it is a racist ideology that is to blame, it can be actualised in various other ways such as various forms of *de facto* discrimination in the Northern States and Brazil (Marx, 2007; Meillassoux, 1977; Wolpe, 1972, 426)<sup>15</sup>.

The function of articulation in capitalist economy is that it can capitalise on pre-capitalist economy and mode of reproduction of indigenous community not to pay living wage because the indigenous community provides auxiliary means of reproducing labour power (Wolpe, 1972, 431-435).

For this purpose, the settler colonial authority tries to preserve the community of indigenous population and its traditional law and customs. The latter helps the authority to lessen the cost of enhancing bureaucracy and control the indigenous population (Wolpe, 1972, 435-438).

In South African case, Wolpe argued that the 1913 Native Land Act, which confined African peasants in reserves, banned Whites from buying reserve land at the same time and one-man-one-plot became rule inside, and its production was not high enough to stop reserve Africans from migration (Wolpe, 1972, 436-437). Beinart and Delius also argue that the Act did not rob Africans of their land. It was already took away by military conquest and the short-term-goal of the Act was to keep the land left in their hand. And the reserves also gave long-term basis for traditional leadership and customary law (Beinart and Delius, 2014, 668, 688)<sup>16</sup>. As Simkins argued,

this articulation was effective until 1955 (Simkins, 1981)<sup>17</sup>.

In Palestinian case, even before the 1948 war, there was "Farming on small family plots, usually undertake by women and old men, served to supplement their wages" (Lustick, 1980, 50). After the war, they had to completely rely on agriculture though new state of Israel expropriated much of their land (Lustick, 1980, 51). For the case of WBGS Palestinian, in 1967, the West Bank was still agricultural society. At least when Graham-Brown wrote her article, majority of commuters from WB was still rural dwellers. And as they became commuting workers to Israel, elderly and women came to cultivate their family land too (Farsakh, 2005, 106-107; Graham-Brown, 1983, 171, 182).

### 3-4. Desertion-phase of Institutional Segregation

As indigenous population increases and land deteriorates, it become hard to supplement the income of migrant family with the harvest from their plot. More indigenous people become permanently urbanised workers. (Wolpe, 1972, 439-444). Hence, institutional segregation moves to the next phase, namely, desertion and absolute enhancement of segregation. However, as Posel argued, the change of economy does not necessarily lead to total segregation. It is rather reaction to mass disturbance that happens under the conjuncture of various factors such as mass impoverishment, political events, strict policing and so on (Mine, 1991; Posel, 1991)<sup>18</sup>.

In South African case, according to the study of Simkins, the proportion of reserve agriculture could provide was substantially constant between 1918 and 1955. However, because of rapid expansion of the population, it came to decline rapidly (Simkins, 1981, 264). Thus, in the early phase of Apartheid, urbanisation of African population did not stop (Posel, 1991, 140-148). It was Sharpeville massacre that lead to total enhancement of Apartheid (Posel, 1991, 227-255). Some became commuter working in border industry area in homeland, but in total, homeland was rural slum where abandoned labour power was confined (Butler et al, 1977; Hindson, 1987; Southall, 1982).

[Tables shall be added]

In Palestinian case, though more and more people worked inside Israel, the land confiscation in the early 1980s and the recession at the same time and mass return of Palestinian workers from the Gulf states because of low oil price created mass unemployment in WBGS. In this context, the first Intifada happened and it lead to the Oslo accords and interim self-government (Naramoto, 2005, 253-257, 289-290).

However, in sharp contrast to post-1967 period, there emerged strict influx control against WBGS Palestinians after 1993 (Kelly, 2006). And "agricultural employment doubled between 1995 and 2011, increasing from 53,000 to 99,000 workers" (World Bank 2013: 13)<sup>19</sup>, it "merely may reflect the absence of better jobs elsewhere and the spread of subsistence agriculture, as a means of economic survival" (2013: 14) while PA, especially its security forces absorbed much labour power (Kelly, 2006). And though the Israel authority increased the issue of work permit, unemployment is still high and it just prevent imminent explosion (Al-Amoudi, 2016). Hence, while there is still some room for subsistence agriculture, WBGS Palestinian after the Oslo accord is exposed to desertion generally.

[Tables shall be added]

### 3-5. Supplement: Commanding Heights of the Two Homeland-Systems

[Shall be described and analysed in coming presentation]

### 3-6. Concluding Remarks: The Qualitative and Developmental Similarities of the Two Homeland-Systems

Both South Africa and Israel have implemented spatial segregation between settlers and indigenous people through ID system. All people has been classified into different status groups.

De-development (Roy, 2001) has been omnipresent in the indigenous populated areas of the two states<sup>20</sup>. And the natives were/are sorely dependent on metropolitan part of the whole territories and vulnerable to exploitation because of Pass/Permit System. However, though Israel has exploited Palestinian Labour and profited from international aid, economically, institutional segregation itself does not necessarily pay (Hever 2010)<sup>21</sup>. As is the case with Apartheid South Africa, political side of institutional segregation must be considered (Marx 1998).

There has been the shift from exploitation to desertion in the two states' system of institutional segregation. Furthermore, the difference in the economic structures between the two states and their relationship with the two institutional segregation systems' shift has to be analysed to what caused the difference in the status of indigenous populations in the two states after the end of the Cold War.

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