불확실 시대, 중동의 화합과 번영의 길 모색

Seeking Harmony and Prosperity for the Middle East in the Era of Uncertainty

Date 2017. September 22nd (Fri.) - 24th (Sun.)

Venue Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (Minerva Complex B2F International Conference Room), President Hotel

Host KAMES (Korean Association of Middle East Studies)

How we can navigate this uncertain period and seek harmony and prosperity in the Middle East

Good morning to Your Excellency, Ambassador Adel Mohammad Adaileh of Jordan, Your Excellency, Ambassador Bader Mohammad al-Awadi of Kuwait, Your Excellency, Ambassador Mohamed Abdulla al-Dehaimi of Qatar, distinguished guests, honorable scholars, and ladies and gentlemen. It is a great pleasure for me to declare the opening of the 2017 KAMES International Conference and to welcome all of you attending this conference aimed at seeking harmony and prosperity for the Middle East in the era of uncertainty.

The Middle East is in the middle of tumultuous times because of the protracted Syrian and Yemeni civil wars, the appearance of the Islamic State and the conflict between Sunnis and Shias. To make matters worse, the Trump Administration in the U.S. has added to the uncertainty in the region. The primary purpose of our conference is to determine how we can navigate this uncertain period and seek harmony and prosperity in the region.

Many people have put a great deal of time and effort into funding and organizing this conference. I especially want to express my sincere appreciation to the members of the conference organizing committee.

I also want to extend my further thanks to the sponsors and co-hosts of this conference, including Dr. Moo-Je Cho, who is President of the National Research

Foundation of Korea, Ambassador Yong-min Park, who is Director-General of the African and Middle Eastern Bureau, Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Korea, and Ambassador Il-soo Kim, Executive Director of the Korea-Africa Center, who has kindly sponsored and co-hosted this conference. I am also indebted to the four research institutions which are co-hosting this conference. Last but not least, my thanks go to Professor Hyun-teak Kim, Vice President of HUFS who allowed us to hold this conference in the well-equipped Minerva Complex.

Once again, I truly thank all of you for participating in this conference. I truly wish you to have a delightful and productive day.

Thank you very much.

Young Chol Choe

President
Korean Association of Middle East Studies (KAMES)

Korean Government strive to understand the underlying reasons for the complexity and uncertainty of the Middle East

Professor Choi Young-chul, President of the Korean Association of Middle East Studies, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honor for me to be part of the 2017 International Conference hosted by the Korean Association of Middle East Studies. I am also pleased that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea is sponsoring this meaningful conference on the theme of "Seeking Harmony and Prosperity for the Middle East in the Era of Uncertainty." In the midst of uncertainty in the region, I find this theme to be both timely and pertinent.

The Korean Foreign Ministry is keenly aware of the entangled crises in the Middle East. As an outsider, a country not from the region, we strive to understand the underlying reasons for the complexity and uncertainty that prevail in the political scenes of the Middle East of late. Pundits used to talk about so-called 'Middle Eastern exceptionalism', as the region seemed to reject social and political evolution for many decades. Surprisingly, the death of a young fruit vendor on the streets of Tunis brought many changes. At that time, the watchers hailed it as the 'Arab Spring.' Today, nobody calls it a spring, since it resulted in various forms of turmoil in a number of Arab republics and, whether one likes to acknowledge it or not, eventually led to a surge of violent extremism throughout the region.

Why did it happen that way? What is the meaning of such a development? Could it have been different if we had acted any differently? What will transpire if we go on like this? How will all of these affect this part of the world? In short, what should we do over here about what's happening there? These are some of the questions that keep my bureau busy, and these are the questions about which I seek to draw inspiration from the discussions in this forum.

And of course there are more specific issues. The future of the two-state solution in Israel and

Palestine seems bleaker than at any time since the declaration of principles. The validity of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran is being challenged more often than when it had been signed. We are particularly interested in the future of Iran's nuclear deal, because it has some bearing on the future of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, which is the most pressing issue here on this peninsula because of the unsavory behavior of North Korea. On top of all these, the brotherly countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have entered into a serious feud, which seems to be lasting longer than anyone had too quickly presumed.

The Korean Government has an alarmingly high stake in the Middle East and North African region. It is the biggest source of our energy imports. The activities of Korean companies in the region have been mutually beneficial since the 1970s. The current endeavors of the oil-producing countries in the region to diversify their economies for the post-oil era promises yet another layer of enhanced cooperation between us. There are new opportunities ahead to break new ground and forge partnerships in such areas as health, medical, and information technology. And the safety and security of Korean nationals in the region is also a critical issue for the Korean government. Yes. We all know that. In fact, everyone knows it.

What less people know and what is less often the subject of discussion is that our region and the Middle East also face common sociopolitical concerns. For more than a generation, people in both regions lived in what is called the 'post-WWII era.' Even the period of the Cold War was fundamentally based on the international order created in the aftermath of the Second World War. This order now seems to be waning, calling for a remedy in both our regions and elsewhere. In such times as these what happens in one region has to be seriously studied by the other. We are more connected than we seem.

In this regard, I congratulate both the organizers and the participants of this conference on having a valuable opportunity that all of us from the two regions have a need for. I very much hope that from the discussions today we will gain a deeper understanding not only of the Middle East region but indeed of our common future.
Thank you.

Thank you.

Yong Min Park

Director-General for African and Middle Eastern Affairs,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea

2017 KAMES International Conference

Seeking Harmony and Prosperity
for the Middle East in the Era of Uncertainty

Date	September 22 (Fri) – September 24 (Sun), 2017
Venue	Minerva Complex International Conference Room (B2F) / HUFS Main Building, Room No. 328 & 329 (3F) / HUFS

Host:	Korean Association of Middle East Studies (KAMES)

Co-Host	Korea-Africa Center
	Institute of the Middle East Studies, HUFS
	Institute of Middle Eastern Affairs, Myongji University
	Institute of Eurasian Turkic Studies, Dongduk Women's University

Sponsor	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
	National Research Foundation
	Korea Institute for International Economy Policy (KIEF)

Program

❖ **The 1ˢᵗ Day - September 22, 2017**

Time	Events
	- Arrival of Foreign Participants - Hotel Check-in
19:00~ 21:00	**Welcoming Dinner** Venue: Brahms Hall (19F), President Hotel

❖ **The 2ⁿᵈ Day - September 23, 2017**

09:00 ~ 09:30　　Registration

Time & Session		Events & Paper Presentation	Chairman
09:30~ 10:00	**Opening Session**	**Opening Ceremony** (Venue: Minerva International Conference Room, HUFS) **- Opening Address** by Young-chol CHOE (President, KAMES) **- Welcoming Address** by Yong-min PARK (Director General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs) **- Congratulatory Speech (1)** by Sye Kyun CHUNG (Speaker of the National Assembly) **- Congratulatory Speech (2)** by H.E. Adel Mohammad ADAILEH (Ambassador of Jordan) **- Congratulatory Speech (3)** by Hyun-Taek KIM (Vice-President, HUFS) **Key-Note Speech** **Speech by** Soon-Nam HONG (Former President of KAMES, Korea) *"The Vital Interest Power of the Middle East for the Great Powers: Why Does the World Ignore the Core Area of World Politics and Civilization?"*	Su Wan Kim HUFS Korea

10:00 ~ 10:20　　Coffee & Tea Break

			Politics (1) (Venue: Minerva International Conference Room (B2F), HUFS)		Chairman Byung Ha HWANG Chosun Univ. Korea
10:20 ~ 12:00	1st Session	1	Iranian and US Elections, the JCPOA, and Shifting Alignments		
			Seyed Mohammad MARANDI (Univ. of Tehran, Iran)		
			Discussant : Ok Jeong NAM (Dankook Univ., Korea)		
		2	The Current Issue and Its Implication in the Middle East: The Implication of Syrian Crisis in Jordan		
			Abdullah al-NAGRASH (Univ. of Jordan, Jordan)		
			Discussant : Jung Kook AHN (Myongji Univ., Korea)		
		3	American Foreign Policy towards the Middle East under Donald Trump: Change and Continuity		
			Mohamed KHANI (Imam Sadiq Univ., Iran)		
			Discussant : Seung Hoon PAIK (HUFS, Korea)		
		4	Comparative Study on the Metaphysical Basis of the Political Approach of Ancient Iran and China		
			Dal Seung YU (HUFS, Korea)		
			Discussant : Kang Suk KIM (Dankook Univ., Korea)		

			Culture & Society (1) (Main Building Room No, 329 (3F) / HUFS)		Chairman Hidemitsu KUROKI JAMES Japan
10:20 ~ 12:00	2nd Session	1	Potentiality of Sufism in the Contemporary Period		
			Tonaga YASUSHI (Kyoto Univ., Japan)		
			Discussant : Jung Myung KIM (Myongji Univ., Korea)		
		2	A Muslim Perception of the Faith of Other Men in Seventeenth Century China: A Note on *Xizhenzhengda* (希眞正答 Correct Answers to Those Seeking for Truth)		
			Hyondo PARK (Myongji Univ., Korea)		
			Discussant : Siavashi SAFFARI (Seoul National Univ., Korea)		
		3	Changes in the Correlates of Dietary Behaviors among Second-Generation Muslim Youth in France: Re-Islamization or Demographic Changes?		
			Hiroshi KOJIMA (Waseda Univ., Japan)		
			Discussant : Noriko SATO (Pukyoung National Univ., Korea)		
		4	Turkish Interests in the New Conditions of the Middle East		
			Enkhbold GANPUREV (NIA, Mongolia)		
			Discussant : Chong Jin OH (HUFS, Korea)		

12:00 ~ 13:30　　Lunch　(Faculty Building Restaurant / HUFS)

13:30 ~ 15:30	3rd Session		**Economy** (Venue: Minerva International Conference Room (B2F) / HUFS)		**Chairman** Kwon Hyung LEE KIEP Korea
		1	Effect of Higher Education and R&D on Economic Growth of Resource Rich Countries		
			Sung Hyun SON (KIEP, Korea)		
			Discussant : Moamen GOUDA (HUFS, Korea)		
		2	Fund Capitalism in the Middle East since the Global Financial Crisis in 2008		
			Manabu SHIMIZU (Eurasian Consultant Ltd., Japan)		
			Discussant : Jae Wook JUNG (KIEP, Korea)		
		3	An Analysis of Construction of Economical Relationship between Asia and Middle East: As Case Study of Development from RCD to ECO		
			Soichiro TANAKA (Hitotsubashi University, Japan)		
			Discussant : Chanyong PARK (Andong National Univ., Korea)		
		4	Sectoral Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: Evidence from Egypt Governorates		
			Shimaa HANAFY (HUFS, Korea)		
			Discussant : Byeong Ho KIM (HUFS, Korea)		

13:30 ~ 15:30	4th Session		**Politics (2)** (Main Building, Room No. 329 (3F) / HUFS)		**Chairman** Chan Ki PARK Myongji Univ. Korea
		1	An Israeli-Palestanian Confederation as a New Framework to the Two States Solution		
			Joseph BEILIN (Beilink-Business Foreign Affairs, Israel)		
			Discussant : Sung Hun AHN (Gachon Univ., Korea)		
		2	The Long Fuse of the First Palestinian Intifada (1987-1993): How the Uprising Was Realized in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip		
			Hiroyuki SUZUKI (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science)		
			Discussant : Il Kwang SUNG (Konkuk Univ., Korea)		
		3	Analysis on the Trump Government's Policy on Iran		
			Joong Kwan KIM (Dongguk Univ., Korea)		
			Discussant : Engseng HO (MEI, Univ. of Singapore)		
		4	Zimbabwe, the Middle East and South Korea		
			Donald CHIMANIKIRE (Zimbabwe Univ., Zimbabwe)		
			Discussant : Sang Hwa LEE (HUFS, Korea)		

		Culture & Society (2) (Main Building, Room No. 328 (3F) / HUFS)		Chairman Hee Soo LEE Hanyang Univ. Korea
13:30 ~ 15:30	5th Session	1	Muslim Minorities' Problem in Mongolia: Kazakh and Khoton Communities	
			Sukhee BATTULGA (National University of Mongolia)	
			Discussant : Sang Cheol KIM (HUFS, Korea)	
		2	The Reason for ISIS's Enlarged Influence in 2015: The View of Sociology of Religion	
			Soo Jeong YI (Korea Army Academy at Yeong-Cheon, Korea)	
			Discussant : Sung Ok LEE (HUFS, Korea)	
		3	Rediscovering Gender as a Strong Analytical Tool for Resisting the Stereotypes of the Middle East	
			Hiroko MINESAKI (Aichi Univ. of Education, Japan) Junko TORIYAMA (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science)	
			Discussant : Eun Kyung OH (Dongduk Women's Univ., Korea)	
		4	Motahhari and Velayat-e Faqih: the Ideology that led to absolute centralization of Power	
			Qolamreza NASSR (Hiroshima Univ., Japan)	
			Discussant : Satoshi KATSUNUMA (Keio Univ., Japan)	

15:30 ~ 16:00   Coffee & Tea Break

		Language & Literature (Venue: Minerva International Conference Room (B2F) / HUFS)		Chairman Young Tae LEE HUFS Korea
16:00 ~ 17:20	6th Session	1	Study of Maqāmāt of al- Hamadhānī - Focused on Its Prosimetric Style and Literary Significance	
			Jeong A KIM (HUFS, Korea)	
			Discussant : Fumihiko KOBAYASHI (Independent Scholar, Japan)	
		2	Portrait of a Human Rights Champion and Writer: Revealing the Philosophy of Khaled Hosseini	
			Mohamed ELASKARY (HUFS, Korea)	
			Discussant : Salaheldin ELGEBILY (HUFS, Korea)	

16:00 ~ 17:20	7th Session	Industry-Academy Cluster (Main Building, Room No. 329 (3F) / HUFS)	Chairman Engseng HO Singapore Univ.
		1 Medical Korea Cooperation with The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Vision Jae Hyun SEOL (Digital Nomad Healthcare, Korea) Discussant : Soo Jin Lee (HUFS, Korea)	
		2 How to Make Better Tour Services for Muslim Tourist in Korea Sang Won PARK (Yalla Korea) Discussant : Sae Hee PARK (HUFS, Korea)	
		3 Discuss the Possibility of Cooperation between Academia and Business: The Case of an Arabic Education and Media Platform Sang Kyu KIM/ Ah Reum YU (Markaz Arabic, Korea) Discussant : Mi Soon JUNG (HUFS, Korea)	

17:20 ~ 18:00	Closing Session (Venue: Minerva International Conference Room (B2F) / HUFS)	
	- Closing Discussion - Session Reports - Closing Remarks by **Su Wan KIM** (Chairwoman, Organizing Committee)	

18:00~20:00	**Dinner** Venue: Sky Lounge (13F), Main Building / HUFS

❖ The 3rd Day - September 24, 2017

09:00-12:00   **Round Table & Lunch** - Ivy Hall (19F), President Hotel

* The program can be changed depending on situation.

Map of HUFS

Sky Lounge
for Dinner (13F)

Main Building
for Conference (3F)

Minerva Complex
for Conference (B2F)

Faculty Building
for Lunch (2F)

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies (HUFS)

270 Imun-dong, Dongdaemun-gu, Seoul, Korea

Tel: +82-2-2173-3460 (Institute of Middle East Studies)

President Hotel

216 Eulgi-ro, Jung-gu, Seoul, Korea

Tel: +82-2-753-3131

| Opening Session | 09:30-10:00 |

Congratulatory Speech (1)

H.E. Sye Kyun CHUNG
Speaker, National Assembly of Korea

Congratulatory Speech (3)

Hyun-Taek KIM
Vice-President, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Key-note Speech

Soon-Nam HONG
Former President, Korean Association of Middle East Studies

> *"The Vital Interest Power of the Middle East for the Great Powers:*
> *Why Does the World Ignore the Core Area of World Politics and Civilization?"*

Congratulatory Speech (1)

H.E. Sye Kyun CHUNG
Speaker, National Assembly of Korea

Good morning, distinguished guests, honorable scholars and ladies and gentlemen,

I am CHUNG SYE KYUN, the chairman of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea.

I extend to you my heartiest congratulations of the opening of 2017 KAMES international conference.

Especially I would like to express my deep appreciation and welcome to all foreign participants from Japan, Jordan, Iran, Israel, Mongolia, singapore and Zimbabwe who have come long distance to be here with us today.

Korean Association of Middle Eastern Studies was established in 1979 and has grown as the leading and representative association in its field over Korea and Asia.

I thank all interested parties and people, who have worked so hard under such difficult conditions to foster KAMES today.

The title of this conference is "Seeking Harmony and Prosperity in the Era of Uncertainty".

If I choose one word which describes the world today, it would be "uncertainty."

Uncertainty is increasing in every field, including politics, economy, security and etc.

The launch of Donald Trump regime in America, the economic turmoil due to BREXIT in Europe, spread of terrorism and upsurge of conflict in the global sphere, these kinds of uncertainty in world order have been enlarged.

On this important situation, this conference will be a valuable opportunity to share ideas and to gather sagacity on ways to harmony and prosperity in the Middle East.

I sincerely congratulate on the 2017 KAMES International Conference once again. And I very much look forward to your meaningful discussions and exchange of views and this conference will be a way to find and suggest peace in the Middle East, and further in the world.

Thank you.

영상축사

존경하는 내외귀빈 여러분, 안녕하십니까.

대한민국 국회의장 정세균입니다.

<2017 한국중동학회 국제학술대회> 개최를 진심으로 축하드립니다.

특별히 멀리서 서울까지 귀한 걸음 해주신 해외 학자 여러분께도 환영과 감사의 인사를 드립니다.

1979 년 설립된 한국중동학회는 중동 지역학 연구 분야에 있어서 국내 최고를 넘어 아시아 최대의 학회로 성장해 왔습니다.

한국중동학회의 오늘이 있기까지 어려운 여건 속에서도 애써주신 관계자 여러분의 노고에 깊이 감사드립니다.

이번 포럼의 주제는 <불확실 시대, 중동의 화합과 번영의 길 모색>입니다.

지금 지구촌 전체를 관통하는 단 하나의 단어를 꼽으라면 '불확실성'이란 말일 겁니다.

정치, 경제, 안보 등 모든 영역에서 불확실성이 증대하고 있습니다.

미국의 트럼프 정부 출범, 유럽발 브렉시트에 따른 경제 혼란, 글로벌 차원의 테러 확산과 갈등 고조로 세계질서의 불확실성이 커져가고 있습니다.

이러한 시점에 열리는 이번 학술대회는 중동의 화합과 번영을 위해 어떤 접근이 필요한지 지혜를 모으는 귀한 시간이 될 것입니다.

한국중동학회 국제학술대회 개최를 다시 한 번 축하드리며, 오늘 이 자리가 중동을 넘어 세계 평화의 길을 모색하는 뜻 깊은 시간이 되길 바랍니다.

감사합니다.

Congratulatory Speech (3)

Hyun-Taek KIM
Vice-President, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Honorable professors and scholars of leading education institutes from eight countries, distinguished researchers and guests, Young-chol Choe, president of KAMES, Your Excellency, Ambassador Adel Mohammad Adaileh of Jordan, Your Excellency, Ambassador Bader Mohammad AL-AWADI of Kuwait, Your Excellency, Ambassador Mohamed Abdulla AL-DEHAIMI of Qatar, Yong-min Park, director general of ministry of foreign affairs and ladies and gentlemen, good morning.

I am Hyun-Teak Kim, the vice president of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. It is a great pleasure for me to be invited to this meaningful event, 2017 KAMES International Conference, to promote knowledge and to share ideas over the Middle East.

Especially I would like to express my deep appreciation and welcome to all foreign participants from Japan, Jordan, Iran, Israel, Mongolia, Singapore and Zimbabwe who have come long distance to be here with us today.

Korean Association of Middle Eastern Studies has lead the field of Middle Eastern studies in this country and played as a principal axis of nurturing the pool of researchers. This association is now on its way to cooperate with CHAMES, JAMES and MAMES, researching on Middle Eastern Studies over Asia.

I also recognize that this conference will play a key role in promoting future international, intercultural, and inter-organizational cooperation and thus contribute to academic excellence in this era of knowledge-intensive collaborating society.

With this in mind, I very much look forward to your discussions and exchange of views at today's conference. Once again, I heartily welcome you all to KAMES International Conference. I strongly hope and know that you will find the conference extremely stimulating and enjoyable.

Thank you.

The Vital Interest Power of the Middle East for the Great Powers:

Why Does the World Ignore The Core Area of World Politics and Civilization?

✍ *Soon-Nam Hong*

Former President of KAMES, Korea

The international community is losing its identity and changing from the past to the G-Zero era because of UK Brexit in Europe and America Exit by President Donald J. Trump in the world. As the Soviet Union retired from the international political arena due to the collapse of the Cold War system, the United States was the only powerful country in charge of the international order, taking on the role of a police state.

But the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the global economic downturn made the United States an environment in which the entire global problem could not be accounted for in an asymmetric political environment. The national cost of Afghanistan and Iraq war intervention was too great. China grew into a great economic power in the Pax Americas era. In the G2 era, America's policy of inducing China to assume the role of a responsible superpower failed. China is the second largest economy after the United States. And the United States is trying to get away from the environment that is responsible for the world order alone.

International politics can not maintain a framework of order in the past bipolar regime environment. Europe does not want the US to intervene in Europe. The role of NATO, the NATO treaty, is only to serve the United States in the Middle East and Central Asia, not in Europe.

The international community is the G-Zero era. As President Trump has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement on climate change, the United States has taken no responsibility for international order. It is not the United States-led international society.

The international community is in an age of uncertainty in the order of chaos.

① Europe is becoming a small political stage in the international society because of Britain 's brexit problem. It is a dangerous area of low-intensity terrorism and has become a refugee-hating environment.

② Asia is a conflict zone between the United States and China due to territorial disputes and the North Korean nuclear issue caused by the rise of China.

③ The Middle East is an area where political significance is neglected due to the political disorder of the Middle East that Israel wanted because of Arab Spring failure, Syrian civil war, ISIL problem.

④ Africa and Central and South America are regions that have lost interest in international politics.

In the international community where there is no leadership now, the Middle East has become a powerless region that has lost the centripetal force of Lebanese politics and society that Israel desires with chaos and disorder. However, the Middle East is an important area where order must be rearranged with historical culture and geopolitical importance. In international politics, nothing can be discussed except in the Middle East. This is because the Middle East is a center for Europe and Asia geopolitically, rather than as a source of energy resources. China is the end of the Silk Road and the beginning of the world. As long as the earth exists, the Middle East is always an important area. In the G-Zero era, it is the Middle East and the region of interest of the great powers that can build the leadership of the great powers.

Serious competition between the United States and China and North Korea's nuclear and missile tests have put Asia and the Pacific in danger, and Britain's Brecksite has made European society difficult.

Therefore, this KAMES international academic conference will Presents significant discourse of the Middle East toward international community large meaning have. It is very meaningful to suggest to the international community the implications of the Middle East problem that we can not ignore through academic discourse in politics, economy, culture and history.

Ⅰ. History and culture

The beginning of human civilization and religious history is the Middle East. The first human civilization, the Sumerian civilization, departed from present-day Iraq's Mesopotamia region. The Middle East civilization, the Babylonian civilization of Mesopotamia, and the Persian civilization in Iran are the Middle East. Jews learned the basis of Jewish civilization through long exile in Babylonian. For example, in the 7th century B.C., the Jews were introduced to the laws of the Jewish god, BC Hammurabi Code. The knowledge of Babylonian astronomy, geometry, chemistry, medicine, and physics has been passed on to the Jews.

The Middle East is a region where the world's three largest religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam have emerged. This is also the reason for the Middle East to become a disputed region. The Holy Land of the Christian Church and the Holy Land of Islam, which overlaps with the holy shrine of Islam, explain this well.

BC Rome made Egypt as a storehouse of food of wheat grain. The Roman Empire used Egypt as a sea of resistance for Jewish protests, and used Egypt as a military food supply window for the conquest of the Parthia Empire and the Persian Empire.

Alexandria is the center of the academic community as a center of academic contention against Greece. The key to the ancient civilization of ancient civilizations is the reason why the Egyptian language and the Greek language are carved with hieroglyphics (religious language). At that time, the Arabic language was Greek and Coptic, followed by Hebrew, Greek and Arabic (Aram).

Napoleon and Hitler also took the Middle East seriously. Today, many ancient civilizations in the Middle

East have been found in the Louvre and the London Museum, and there is evidence that European conquerors considered the Middle East an important conquest. Napoleon's Egyptian invasion and General Tommy Rommel's tanks made the Middle East a surrogate battlefield in Europe. In the British and French colonies and the bipolar system of the Cold War system of the US and the Soviet Union, the Middle East was an area of understanding of the great powers due to the identity of the energy supply, Christianity and Islamic civilization.

India is isolated from the rest of the world by the Persian barriers and the Chinese barriers, but is known to Europe and the world as a result by conquest of Alexander the Great. Until the British rule, India was a thoroughly isolated area. Britain was not that hard to rule India, but eventually lost India by Gandhi's nationalism in teaching democracy. The conflict between the UK's 3C policy and Germany's 3B policy in the Middle East can be read in the political logic of British power to protect India.

England and Francel competed for control of the Middle East with the initiative of the Suez Canal, and the winner was England. Israel has served as a buffer for Jerusalem, a symbol of Christian values in the Middle East, and a powerful country that blocks the Soviet south. The interests of the great powers had a real interest in the security of the oil producing countries in the petroleum energy sources.

The war in the Middle East made a symmetrical structure between the US and the Soviet Union. The United States has played a role as a police state in keeping the order of the international community as a cause of oil security. As a result, the conflict in the Middle East was a conflict between the Jews and the Arabs, but it was developed as a proxy of the great powers and created a war environment that could not be solved.

China has already been linked to the Middle East through Silk Road since BC. Napoleon warned China not to wake up as a sleeping lion. When China wakes up, the world becomes loud. Japan was also trying to exploit Arab traders on the Korean Peninsula to open up world trade. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, China has begun to be interested in the Middle East and is restoring silk waking up.

The world is changing more and more in a flat state. In the network world connected by the speed of light, the meaning of the border has lost its significance due to the change of the global economic era, but once again the barriers of religious conflict have begun to appear in the Middle East. With the advent of IS, the conflict between Shia Muslims and Sunni Muslims is deepening. In the identity of the Caliph, the Arab cause has changed due to the identity of Islam. It is the center of the history of Israel and oil in the Middle East.

Ⅱ. International political environment change and the Middle East

After the collapse of the Cold War era in the late 1980s, the international political environment became the US-led asymmetric era. In order to maintain the existing world order, the Obama administration has tried to maintain the responsibility of the great powers by rebalancing policy and the pivot to Asia policy.

Trump's election to the United States surprised the world with the beginning of the G-Zero era. The world is perplexed by the emergence of leaders without political and diplomatic experience in international politics. The United States was the leader of the international democratic market economy. However, American citizens have chosen a leader who takes US the first policy by the global economic recession and the US industrial panic.

President Trump's announcement to withdraw the US from the Paris Climate Agreement give up its Big

Brother Role for world politics, that is the rules based international order. Europe without the United States has no dependable foundation. Britain's withdrawal from the European Union is a European-based change in Europe. Competition and conflict between the euro and the euro are intensifying. The dollar is the only currency in the world, but China is attacking it by the Chinese yuan. This is the economic crisis in which economic order has collapsed along with the global economic recession.

The US leadership and global confidence will be inevitably weakened in world politics. The Trump administration, using chronic trade deficits and enormous military expenditures, ignored the existing frameworks and declared US priority policy, thinking that other countries would benefit relatively.

While China is proposing a new theory of great power relations, it tries not to take responsibility in the international community, and the United States tries to reduce the responsibility of the international community for selective intervention policies and protectionism.

China is building an artificial island and military base in the South China Sea and the East China Sea, creating a territorial conflict environment with the United States and its neighbors. North Korea's nuclear and missile tests in East Asia require US cooperation with China. But the United States is also wary of the chinese - Russia alliance.

The United States is increasingly tense with Russia in Europe, and competing with China in the Middle East. Russia merges the Crimean Peninsula and is in dispute with Ukraine. There is no power to check Russia in Europe where it is a problem in Europe but Britain is absent. The Ukraine problem is linked to the Middle East problem. This means Russia's South Korean policy toward the Middle East.

Indeed, Russia intervened in Syria's civil war in the name of raiding IS rebels. The United States is hostile to both the Assad regime and the IS rebels, but acknowledges the Assad regime implicitly as a crisis throughout the Middle East. Asia is a dangerous situation where President Trump and Kim Jung Eun's chicken game is just around the corner.

Now we can not see the power to take responsibility for the order of the international community. Only the great powers have selective intervention and control in disputed areas for national interests. The world is politically panic, and the Middle East is an area conducive to terrorism. Europe is suffering from suicide bombings of Islamic extremists who desert their lives in despair. Trump's policy has been challenging by the recovery of the US economy and the rise of the value of the dollar, when the protection trade policy represents political interest. Therefore, the world is upset by an uncertain political environment and the Middle East is becoming a darker political chaos environment. We came to think again about the challenge and response of Professor Arnold J. Toinby.

Ⅲ. ISIL and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

In the Middle East, Egypt and Saudi Arabia lose political influence, and the Middle East's power center and identity are unclear. The identity of the Middle East has joined forces with the identity of the Arabs, who politically fight Israel. Israeli political strategy has reduced the Arab cause to Lebanon as a testing ground.

The Arab Spring, which started in 2010, was a European hope and failed. In Islamic values, European clothes have proven to be strange clothes for Arabs. As the regimes of Muslim countries change, they all fall

into a swamp of self-survival. With the confusion of Iraq and the Syrian civil war, Europe has been in a position to avoid refugee problems as security threats in Europe. Britain and Europe see African and Middle Eastern refugees as objects of hatred. The problem of refugees in Europe is a product of Middle Eastern politics and Europe sees Islam as a wary and anxious eye.

9/11 Terror was an inflection point that darkened the future of the Middle East. In 2001, the US needed an Afghanistan test war for the Iraq war. The United States sought military and strategic influence over Central Asia rather than threats of terrorism. As a result, the United States had to re-experience the experience of the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan for 10 years after Vietnam war in the wars of Afghanistan and Iraq.

Since Iraqi war influential countries in the Middle East, including Syria, Egypt, Libya, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, are facing social turmoil that is hard to maintain. Saudi Arabia, which is responsible for Gulf and oil security, has made a dangerous choice to replace the Prince with the failure of the Yemen war and is deepening its conflict with Iran. It is the crisis period of the Gulf monarchic regimes.

In 2014, Islamic extremists declared ISIL(the Islamic state of Iraq and the Levant) as the Caliph state. After that, it changed its name to Islam State (IS: Islam State) to have an identity of Caliph rule. Although it is the national name of a declarative Islamic extremist group that has not been recognized in the international community, the meaning of the Caliph state is significant both politically and religiously.

In order to defeat the IS rebels and defend Syria's Assad regime, Russia intervened in Syria's civil war by attacking Syria's Aleppo. As the issue of the Palestinian cause of Arabs shrinked to regional problems, the Syrian civil war became an international issue as the epicenter of the European refugee problem. The US - led European Union forces had to remove the IS rebels. The Russian air raids to Aleppo provided the Assad regime an opportunity to survive in the Arab world.

The Trump administration is leading the Middle East policy of abandoning Iran 's nuclear negotiations. This is the reason that Iran is a rouge country to earn time and not keep its nuclear negotiations, just as North Korea has spent time experimenting with nuclear weapons. Trump's Middle East policy, which ignores multilateral negotiations involving the United States, France, Germany, Russia, and China, is the US's hegemonic policy in the Middle East.

Oil prices have fallen due to the mass production of shale oil and gas, meaning that the Middle East is getting smaller in the world and oil-producing countries are suffering economically. But as a result of the delay in development of alternative energy, oil prices are expected to rise again in the past.

The Middle East is still a global energy source. As long as the Russian and Chinese influence exist in the Middle East, the United States and Europe have no choice and to take on Big Brother's Role for oil security in the Middle East. Only Israel has the greatest benefit of guaranteeing national security during the chaos of the world. The Kurds are important in the Middle Eastern politics. The Kurdish ethnic minority has a small autonomy in which the great powers do not intervene in the indifference of the political environment. Ironically, the United States and Israel have the characteristics of a nation that shares national interests in the crisis and threats of the world, characterized by immigration.

IV. The Need for Middle Eastern Studies:
the Middle East is the core of Earth.

The year 2016 can be said to be the G-Zero era, which is the absence of world leadership, with Britain's Brexit withdrawing from the European Union and American Amexit withdrawing from the Paris Agreement. This is a time when no superpowers are responsible for international order.

The world is chaotic and disordered. The two financial crises and the global economic recession have led all nations to think of national interests first. The Middle East and Asia, the disputed areas at the center of the world order, are a chaotic environment. Threats of North Korea 's nuclear and missile tests make the world angered, but international consensus of isolation and sanctions on the North Korea are difficult to realize due to the interests of the great powers.

Political scientists can think of various hypotheses;

Is the time when the tension and balance between the great powers contributed to world peace really gone?

Can North Korea continue to threaten the United States through nuclear and missile tests?
Can Russia live in isolation in Europe?
Will President Trump need to heighten tensions with China, through Taiwan and Japan ahead?
Can the world turn away from the Middle East in international politics?

The Middle East is the power vacuum area without Egypt and Saudi Arabia led-the force and the whole region is chaotic and disorderly. The unrest in Iraq, the Syrian civil war, Egyptian political unrest, the crisis of the Gulfist regimes, oil price decline and international indifference to oil resources, Palestinian despair, Kurdish minority issue and so on, are making the Middle East uneasy.

Israel did not feel threatened by the Arab forces that threatened security - Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The United States took a strategic advantage in the Central Asian region during the Afghan War and won oil security and sovereignty in the Iraq war.

However, Europe and the US are groaning in the threat of terrorism. Europe is threatened by national security because of the problem of Middle East refugees and the threat of IS terrorism. Europeans now dislike Islam refugees. There is no peace in the Middle East. Terror is an unstable daily life due to the invisible enemy threat. The world must find a peaceful and sustainable environment in a time of uncertainty that can not be foreseen by the chaos of disorder.

In order to eliminate the threat of terrorism, it is necessary to understand the Islamic culture and understand the peaceful coexistence of Jews and Arabs in the Middle East. Next, Kurdish minority issues will emerge. Conflicts such as ethnic groups, sects, and tribalism may indicate that the Middle East is in need of authoritarianism.

It is an area where the problem can not be solved by the Arab spring of 2010. Currently, IS is spreading terrorism not only in the Middle East, but also throughout the world as a terrorist cause called jihad. The spread of IS to terrorist underground organizations is even more dangerous. We must remember the lessons that Islamic warriors who have returned to the Arab countries after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan have expanded the terrorist environment in the Middle East.

In such a disorderly political environment of the Middle East, it is academicly important for the Korean Association of Middle East Studies(KAMES) to hold international conferences on the theme of "**Seeking Harmony and Prosperity for the Middle East in the Era of uncertainty**" The Middle East is always a study area that is academically important as the central area of yesterday and today.

Through this international academic conference, it is deserving to be highly appreciated that the Middle East experts from Korea and overseas gather in difficult period of the international society to reevaluate and reexamine the Middle East for world peace. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all the scholars and experts from Korea, the Middle East, and other countries who participated in this academic conference of the Korean Association of the Middle East Studies(KAMES). Thank you. ❀

강대국의 이해사할지역 중동 :
"왜 세계는 정치와 문명의 중심지역인 중동을 외면하는가?"

영국의 브렉시트(Brexit)와 미국의 아멕시트(America Exit)로 국제사회는 G-Zero 시대로 과거의 틀에서 벗어나 정체성을 잃고 변화하고 있다. 냉전체제의 붕괴로 인하여 소련이 국제정치무대에서 은퇴하면서 미국은 국제질서에 책임지는 유일한 강대국으로 경찰국가의 역할을 맡았다. 그러나 2001 년 9.11 테러와 세계경제불황은 비대칭정치 환경에서 미국이 지구문제 전체를 책임질 수 없는 환경으로 만들었다. 아프가니스탄 전쟁과 이라크 전쟁 개입에 대한 국가비용이 너무 컸다. 중국은 팍스 아메리카 시대에 경제대국으로 성장했다. G2 시대로 중국이 책임 있는 강대국의 역할을 하도록 유도하는 미국의 정책은 실패했다. 중국은 미국 다음으로 경제대국이다. 그리고 미국은 혼자서 세계질서를 책임질 수 있는 환경에서 벗어나려고 하고 있다.

국제정치는 과거의 양극체제환경의 질서의 틀을 유지할 수 없다. 유럽은 유럽문제에 미국이 개입하는 것을 원하지 않는다. 북대서양 조약기구인 NATO 의 역할은 미국이 유럽이 아닌 중동이나 중앙아시아 문제에서 미국의 명분을 맞추는 역할을 할 뿐이다.

국제사회는 G-Zero 시대이다. 트럼프 미국대통령이 파리세계기후협약에서 탈퇴하면서 미국은 국제질서에 대한 책임을 벗었다. 이제 미국이 주도하는 국제사회가 아니다.

국제사회는 혼돈의 질서에서 불확실한 시대에 있다.

①유럽은 영국의 브렉시트(brexit) 문제로 국제사회에서 작은 정치무대가 되고 있다.

저강도 성격의 테러의 위험지역이며 난민혐오주의환경이 되었다.

②아시아는 중국의 부상으로 인한 영토분쟁과 북핵문제로 인한 미국과 중국의 갈등 지역이다.

③중동은 아랍의 봄의 실패, 시리아 내전, ISIL 문제 등으로 이스라엘이 원했던 중동 의 정치적 무질서로 인하여 정치적 중요성이 무시된 지역이다.

④아프리카와 중남미는 국제정치에서 관심을 잃은 지역이다.

이제 리더십이 부재하는 국제사회에서 중동은 혼란과 무질서로 이스라엘이 원하는 레바논식의 정치와 사회의 구심력을 잃은 힘없는 지역이 되었다. 그러나 중동은 역사문화와 지정학적 중요성으로 다시 질서를 정리하여야 하는 중요한 지역이다. 국제정치에서 중동을 제외하고는 아무것도 논할 수가 없다. 중동이 에너지 자원공급원이라는 중요성보다는 지정학적으로 유럽과 아시아를 이어가는 중심지이기 때문이다. 중국이 세계로 뻗어가는 실크로드의 종착이자 시작인 길목이다. 지구가 존재하는 한 중동은 항상 중요한 지역이다. G-Zero 시대에 강대국의 리더십을 구축할 수 있는 지역이 중동지역이며 강대국의 이해관심 지역이기 때문이다.

이번 국제학술대회는 미중의 경쟁과 북핵문제로 아시아가 위험하며 영국이 브렉시트로 유럽이 힘들 때 우리가 외면할 수 없는 중동문제를 정치, 경제, 문화, 역사적으로 학문적 담론을 통한 함의를 국제사회에 제시한다는 데 큰 의미를 가진다.

Ⅰ. 역사와 문화

인류문명과 종교역사의 시작은 중동이다. 최초의 인류문명인 수메르 문명은 지금의 이라크인 메소포타미아 지역에서 출발했다. 세계 3 대 문명인 이집트 화라오 문명, 메소포타미아의 바빌로니아 문명, 이란의 페르시아 문명이 발흥한 지역이 중동이다. 유대인들은 바빌로니아에서 오랜 유배생활을 통해 유대문명의 기초를 배웠다. 기원전 7 세기 바빌로니아 유수 때 예를 들면 유대인은 등벌법인 함무라비법전을 그대로 모세의 율법으로 전수됐다. 바빌로니아의 천문학, 기하학, 화학, 의학, 물리학 등의 지식이 유대인들에게 전해졌다.

중동은 세계 3 대 종교인 유대교, 기독교, 이슬람이 발흥한 지역이다. 이는 오늘날까지 중동을 분쟁지역으로 만드는 요인이기도 하다. 기독교정신의 성지와 이슬람의 성지가 겹치는 예루살렘 성역이 이를 잘 설명하고 있다.

기원전 로마의 시저는 이집트를 밀 곡창지대의 보고로 식량창고역할의 속주로 삼았다. 로마 제국은 유대인 저항운동의 방파제로 이집트를 이용했으며 유프라테스 강 넘어기원전 탈레스, 피타고라스, 아르키메데스 등 그리스 철학자, 수학자들은 이집트 화라오 문명에서 큰 학문적 영향을 받았다. 파르티아 제국과 페르시아를 정복하는 식량보급창고로도 이집트를 이용했다.

알렉산드리아는 그리스와 경합하는 학문의 중심지로 스토어 학파의 무대이다. 고대 문명의 열쇠인 로젯타 스톤에 이집트 민중어(콥틱어)와 그리스어(상류층언어)가 상형문자(종교언어)와 같이 새겨진 이유이다. 당시의 학문어로는 그리스어와 콥틱어이며 후에 종교언어로 히브리어, 희랍어, 아랍어(아람어)가 등장했다.

나폴레옹과 히틀러도 중동을 중요하게 생각했다. 오늘날 중동의 많은 고대문명유물들이 루브르 박물관과 런던박물관에 소장되게 된 이유에서 유럽의 정복자들이 중동을 중요한 정복지로 생각하였다는 증거를 찾을 수 있다. 나폴레옹의 이집트 침략과 롬멜 장군의 탱크부대는 중동을 유럽의 대리전쟁터로 만들었다. 영불의 식민지 시대와 냉전체제의 미소의 양극체제에서도 중동은 에너지 공급원과 기독교와 이슬람 문명의 정체성으로 강대국의 이해사할지역이었다.

인도는 페르시아의 장벽과 중국의 장벽으로 세계와 고립되었지만 알렉산더 대황의 정복사업으로 유럽과 세계에 알려진 지역이다. 영국이 지배할 때까지 인도는 철저히 고립된 지역이었다. 영국은 인도를 지배하는데 힘들지 않았지만 민주주의를 가르치는데 간디 옹의 민족주의로 결국은 인도를 잃었다. 중동에서 영국의 3C 정책과 독일의 3B 정책의 충돌은 인도를 지키는 영국의 힘의 정치논리에서 읽을 수 있다.

영불은 수에즈 운하의 주도권싸움으로 중동의 지배권을 놓고 경쟁했으며 승자는 영국이었다. 이스라엘은 중동에서 기독교가치관의 상징인 예루살렘과 소련의 남하를 막는 강대국이 완충국가 역할을 했다. 강대국의 이해관계는 석유 에너지원을 산유국의 안보에 실질적인 관심이 있었다. 중동전쟁은 미국과 소련의 대칭구조로 만들었다. 미국은 석유안보라는 명분으로 국제사회의

질서를 지키는 경찰국가역할을 해왔다. 결과적으로 중동의 분쟁은 유대인과 아랍의 갈등이지만 강대국의 대리전 양상으로 발전하여 풀 수 없는 전쟁환경을 만들었다.

중국은 이미 기원전부터 실크로드를 통해 중동과 연결되어 왔다. 나폴레옹은 중국을 잠자는 사자로 깨우지 말라고 경고하였다. 중국이 잠을 깨면 세계가 소란스러워진다고 했다. 일본도 한반도를 발판으로 아랍상인을 이용하여 세계무역을 개척하려 했었다. 9.11 테러이후 중국은 중동에 관심을 가지기 시작했으며 잠을 깨어 비단길을 재정비하고 있다.

세계는 편편한 상태에서 더욱 가깝게 변하고 있다. 세계는 광속으로 연결된 네트워크 시대에 국경의 의미는 글로벌 경제시대의 변화로 의미를 잃었지만 중동은 다시 한 번 종교분쟁의 장벽들이 나타나기 시작했다. IS 의 출현으로 시아 무슬림과 수니 무슬림의 갈등이 더욱 깊어지고 있다. 칼리프의 정체성에서 이슬람의 정체성문제로 아랍의 대의가 변했다. 중동에서 이스라엘과 석유가 존재하는 역사의 중심지역이다.

Ⅱ. 국제정치환경 변화와 중동

1980 년대 말 냉전체제 붕괴 후 국제정치환경은 미국이 주도하는 비대칭시대가 됐다. 미국은 기존의 세계질서를 유지하기 위해 오바마 정권은 재균형정책과 아시아회귀정책으로 강대국의 책임을 지키려 노력했다.

트럼프의 미국대통령 당선은 G-Zero 시대의 시작으로 세계를 놀라게 했다. 국제정치에서 정치와 외교적 경험 없는 지도자의 출현으로 세계는 당황하고 있다. 미국은 국제사회에서 자유민주의 시장경제를 지키는 수문장이었다. 그러나 미국 시민은 세계경제불황과 미국의 산업공황화로 미국우선주의를 택하는 지도자를 택했다. 트럼프의 파리기후협약 탈퇴선언은 국제사회의 지각운동이었다. 미국이 없는 유럽은 신뢰할 수 있는 기반이 없다. 영국이 유럽연합에서 탈퇴하는 브렉시트는 유럽의 지각변동이다. 유로화와 파운드의 기축통화에 대한 경쟁과 갈등이 심화되고 있다. 달러화는 세계의 유일한 기축통화국이지만 중국이 위안화로 물량공격을 하고 있다. 지금은 세계경제 불황과 더불어 경제 질서가 붕괴된 경제위기시대다.

트럼프 행정부는 만성무역적자와 막대한 군비를 사용으로 다른 국가들이 상대적으로 이익을 본다고 생각하면서 기존의 틀들을 무시하고 미국우선주의 정책을 선언했다.

중국은 강대국의 신형대국 관계론을 제안하면서도 국제사회에서 책임을 지려하지 않으려 하고 미국은 선별적 개입정책과 보호무역주의로 국제사회의 책임을 축소하려고 한다.

중국은 남중국해와 동중국해에서 인공 섬과 군사기지를 건설하면서 미국과 주변국들과 영토갈등환경을 만들고 있다. 동아시아에서 북한의 핵과 미사일 실험으로 미국은 중국의 협력이 필요하다. 또한 미국은 중-러 동맹관계를 경계하고 있다. 미국은 유럽에서는 러시아와 중동과 아시아에서는 중국과의 경쟁으로 긴장이 고조되고 있다.

러시아는 크림반도를 병합하고 우크라이나와 분쟁 중이다. 유럽의 문제이지만 영국이 부재한 유럽에서 러시아를 견제할 세력은 없다. 우크라이나 문제는 뒤에 중동문제가 연계되어 있다. 러시아의 남진을 의미한다. 실제로 러시아는 IS 반군을 공습한다는 명분으로 시리아의 내전에 개입했다. 미국은 아사드 정권과 IS 반군 모두를 적대시하고 있지만 중동전체의 위기를 아사드

정권을 묵시적으로 인정하고 있다. 아시아는 트럼프 대통령과 김정은의 치킨게임이 막다른 곳까지 오는 위험한 상황이다.

지금은 국제사회의 질서를 책임질 강대국은 보이지 않는다. 강대국들은 오직 국가이익을 위해 분쟁지역에서 선별적 개입과 통제를 하고 있다. 세계는 정치적으로 공황상태이며 중동은 테러화약고 이다. 유럽은 절망으로 자기목숨을 버리는 이슬람 극단주의자들의 자살폭탄테러로 몸살을 앓고 있다. 미국의 경기회복과 달러가치 상승으로 보호무역정책이 정치이익으로 대변하는 시대로 트럼프의 정책은 변했다. 결과적으로 세계는 불확실한 정치 환경시대에 당황하고 있으며 중동은 더욱 어두운 정치적 혼돈환경이 되고 있다.

Ⅲ. ISIL 과 이스라엘-팔레스타인 분쟁

중동지역도 이집트와 사우디아라비아가 정치영향력을 잃으면서 중동의 힘의 중심과 정체성이 불투명한 혼돈의 시대에 있다. 중동의 정체성은 정치적으로 이스라엘과 전쟁하는 아랍의 대의라는 정체성으로 힘을 합쳤다. 이스라엘의 정치 전략으로 레바논을 실험장으로 아랍의 대의를 축소시켰다.

2010 년 시작된 아랍의 봄은 유럽인들의 소망이었을 뿐 실패했다. 이슬람 가치관에서 유럽의 옷은 낯선 옷이라는 것이 증명됐다. 이슬람 국가들의 정권이 바뀌면서 자기 생존이라는 늪에 모두 허우적거리고 있다. 이라크 혼란과 시리아 내전으로 유럽은 난민문제를 안보위협으로 기피하는 입장이 됐다. 영국과 유럽은 아프리카와 중동 난민들을 혐오의 대상으로 보고 있다. 유럽의 난민문제는 중동정치의 산물이며 유럽은 이슬람을 경계와 불안한 시선으로 보고 있다.

9.11 테러는 중동의 앞날을 어둡게 하는 변곡점이었다. 2001 년 미국은 이라크 전쟁을 위한 아프가니스탄 실험전쟁이 필요했다. 미국은 테러위협보다는 중앙아시아에 대한 군사적, 전략적 영향력을 확보하고자 했다. 결과적으로 미국은 아프가니스탄 전쟁과 이라크 전쟁으로 과거 소련이 아프가니스탄에서 10 년간 수렁에 빠진 경험을 베트남에 이어 다시 경험해야 했다. 이라크 전쟁 후 시리아, 이집트, 리비아, 이라크, 사우디아라비아 등 중동의 영향력이 있는 국가들은 정권을 유지하기도 힘드는 사회적 혼란을 겪고 있다. 걸프와 석유안보를 책임지는 사우디아라비아는 예멘 전쟁의 실패로 황세자를 교체하는 위험한 선택을 했으며 이란과 갈등관계가 깊어지고 있다. 걸프 왕정체제 국가들의 위기시대이다.

2014 년 모슬을 점령한 알까에다 세력이 이라크-레반트이슬람국가(ISIL : Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)라는 칼리프 국가를 선언했다. 그 후 칼리프 통치의 정체성을 가지기 위해 이슬람 국가(IS : Islam State)로 명칭을 바꿨다. 국제사회에서 인정하지 않은 선언적 이슬람극단주의 단체의 국가명칭이지만 칼리프 국가라는 의미는 정치와 종교적으로 그 의미가 크다. IS 반군을 격퇴하고 시리아의 아사드 정권을 지키기 위해 러시아는 시리아의 알레포 공습으로 시리아 내전에 개입했다. 아랍의 대의인 팔레스타인 문제가 지역문제로 축소되면서 시리아 내전은 유럽난민문제 진원지로 국제문제가 됐다. 미국이 주도하는 유럽연합군은 IS 반군을 제거해야 했다. 이는 러시아의 알레포 공습으로 아사드 정권이 생존하는 기회를 제공했다.

트럼프 행정부는 이란의 핵협상을 포기하는 중동정책으로 앞서가고 있다. 이는 북한이 핵실험 시간을 벌 듯 이란도 시간을 벌고 핵협상을 지키지 않을 불량국가라는 이유이다. 미국, 프랑스, 독일, 러시아, 중국이 참여한 다자협상을 무시하려는 트럼프의 중동정책은 중동에서 미국의 패권정책을 의미한다.

현재는 셰일석유와 가스의 대량생산으로 석유가격이 하락하여 중동의 의미가 세계에서 작아지고 있으며 산유국들이 경제적으로 고통을 받고 있다. 그러나 대체에너지 개발이 늦어지는 결과로 과거처럼 다시 석유가격이 오를 전망이다.

중동은 아직도 세계 에너지공급원이다. 중동에서 러시아와 중국의 영향력이 존재하는 한 미국과 유럽은 중동에서 석유안보를 위해 다시 대형의 역할을 (Big Brother's Role) 맡을 수밖에 없다. 오직 이스라엘은 세계혼란기에 국가안보 보장이라는 가장 큰 혜택을 받고 있다. 팔레스타인 다음으로 중동정치에서 중요한 변수인 쿠르드 족은 강대국이 개입하지 않는 작은 자치권을 얻었다. 미국과 이스라엘은 이민국가라는 특성으로 세계의 위기와 위협에서 국가이익을 같이 하는 국가의 특성을 가지고 있다.

IV. 중동학 연구의 필요성 : 중동은 지구의 배꼽이다.

2016 년은 영국의 브렉시트(Brexit : 유럽연합탈퇴)와 미국의 아멕시트(Amexit : 파리협정탈퇴)로 세계의 리더십 부재인 G-Zero 시대라 할 수 있다. 이는 국제질서를 책임질 강대국은 존재하지 않는 시대이다.

세계는 혼돈과 무질서 상태다. 두 차례의 금융위기와 세계경제불황은 모든 국가들이 국가이익을 먼저 생각하게 만들었다. 세계질서의 중심에 있는 분쟁지역인 중동과 아시아는 혼돈환경이다. 북한의 핵과 미사일 실험의 위협은 전 세계를 분노하게 하지만 고립과 제재라는 국제합의는 강대국 간의 이해관계로 실현하기가 어렵다.

강대국 간의 긴장과 균형이 세계평화에 기여한 시대는 정말 사라진 것인가?

북한은 계속 핵과 미사일 실험으로 미국을 위협할 수 있는가?

러시아는 유럽에서 고립되어 살 수 있는가?

트럼프 대통령은 대만과 일본을 앞세워 중국과 긴장국면을 고조하여야만 할 것인가? 세계가 국제정치에서 중동을 외면할 수 있는가?

중동은 이집트와 사우디아라비아가 가졌던 힘의 공백으로 전 지역이 혼돈과 무질서로 일관하고 있다. 이라크 불안, 시리아내전, 이집트의 정치 불안, 걸프 왕정체제의 위기, 석유가격하락과 석유자원에 대한 국제사회의 무관심, 팔레스타인의 절망, 쿠르드 소수민족 문제 등이 중동을 불안하게 만들고 있다.

이스라엘은 안보를 위협했던 아랍의 힘인 이집트와 사우디아라비아에 위협을 느끼지 않게 되었다. 미국은 아프간 전쟁으로 중앙아시아지역에서 전략적 우위를 차지하였으며 이라크 전쟁으로 석유 안보와 주권을 차지했다.

그러나 유럽과 미국은 저강도 전쟁인 테러의 위협에서 신음하고 있다. 유럽은 이슬람을 혐오하는 중동난민문제와 IS 테러위협으로 국가안보가 위협을 받고 있다. 중동에서 평화는 보이지 않는다. 테러라는 보이지 않는 적의 위협으로 일상생활이 불안하다. 이에 세계는 무질서의 혼돈으로 앞을 볼 수 없는 불확실한 시대에서 평화적이며 지속가능한 환경을 찾아야 한다.

테러의 위협을 제거하기 위해서는 이슬람 문화를 이해하여야 하며, 중동에서 유대인과 아랍인의 평화공존을 이해하여야 중동 분쟁문제는 풀 수 없다. 그 다음은 쿠르드 소수민족 문제가 등장할 것이다. 중동은 부족주의, 종족주의, 종파주의의 갈등환경으로 권위적인 정권이 필요한 지역이다. 아랍의 봄으로는 문제를 해결할 수 없는 지역이다. 현재 IS 는 지하드라는 테러명분으로 테러리즘을 중동뿐만 아니라 전 세계에 확산시키고 있다. IS 가 테러지하조직으로 확산되는 현상은 더 위험한 상황이다. 과거 아프가니스탄에서 소련이 철수한 후 아랍 국가들에 귀국한 이슬람 전사들이 중동지역에 테러환경을 확대시킨 경험적 교훈을 기억해야 한다.

이와 같은 중동의 무질서한 정치 환경에서 한국 중동학회가 **"불확실 시대 중동이 화합과 번영의 길 모색"이라는 주제로** 국제학술대회를 개최하는 것은 학문적으로 중요한 의미를 가진다. 중동은 언제나 어제와 오늘의 중심지역으로 학문적으로 중요한 연구지역이다. 이번 국제학술대회를 통하여 국제사회의 어렵고 힘든 시기에 한국과 해외 각국의 중동 전문가들이 한자리에 모여 세계평화를 위한 중동의 재평가와 재조명하려는 학문적 연구노력은 높이 평가 받을 가치가 있다. 다시 한 번 한국중동학회의 국제학술대회에 참가하신 국, 내외 모든 학자 분들과 전문가들에게 감사드리며 기조연설을 마칩니다.

감사합니다.

1st Session	Politics (1)

10:20 - 12:00

Minerva Complex, International Conference Room (B2 F)

Chairman :   Byung Ha HWANG

(Chosun University, Korea)

1

Iranian and US Elections, the JCPOA, and Shifting Alignments

Seyed Mohammad MARANDI (University of Tehran, Iran)

Discussant : Ok Jeong NAM (Dankook University, Korea)

2

The Current Issue and Its Implication in the Middle East: The Implication of Syrian Crisis in Jordan

Abdullah al-NAGRASH (University of Jordan, Jordan)

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Iranian and US Elections, the JCPOA, and Shifting Alignments

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Unlike the largely surprising results in the United States presidential election, the Iranian presidential election result was as expected and in accordance with polling data gathered in the months leading up to the event. Hence, while all the candidates in the Iranian presidential election pledged support for the implementation of the nuclear agreement, President Rouhani's reelection was seen by many international observers as well as those involved with the JCPOA as a sign of continuity in Iranian foreign policy and continued implementation of the nuclear accord. On the other hand, despite repeated and significant violations under Obama, the election of Donald Trump as well as his rhetoric has raised many questions about US intentions and the future of the agreement between Iran and the P5+1. This potential escalation comes at a time when the US is increasingly at odds with allies such as the EU and Australia, neighbors such as Mexico and Canada, major powers such as China and Russia, and is constantly threatening North Korea with extinction and annihilation. In addition, Wahhabi extremists funded and supported by the US and client regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Israeli, have failed to overthrow the Syrian government. Just as the American and western backed Saudi armed forces have failed to occupy the Yemeni capital Sanaa after two and a half years of imposing mass starvation and widespread destruction. The declining fortunes of Iran's regional antagonists along with the increasing isolation of the Trump regime, will make any attempt to further weaken the JCPOA increasingly costly for the United States. Whereas, Iran's deepening alliances in the region and its deepening ties with a sanctioned Russia, an antagonized China, and an unhappy EU significantly lessens the impact of any new US escalation. ❋

The Current Issue and Its Implication in the Middle East:

The Implication of Syrian Crisis in Jordan

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Implications of the Syrian Crisis on Jordan:

Noticeably, in the last six years, Syria has been suffering from brutal acts of violence between the regime forces and the Syrian free army, let alone the other militant groups. This accompanied by Kofi Anan, who was the international mediator on Syria, resignation in 2012 resulted in limited chances to resolve the crisis, politically and diplomatically. Annan himself described the situation as "mission impossible".

It can be argued that despite widespread public discontent with climbing prices, unemployment, and government corruption, the protests failed to mobilize massive numbers of Jordanians to the streets. Jordan, however, did not escape the consequences of regional instability as chaos in Syria triggered a flood of refugees across Jordan's northern border. Till now, and because of continuing warfare, hundreds of thousands of Syrian civilians lost their lives, and many millions fled to neighboring states of Jordan; Iraq; Turkey; and Lebanon, besides seeking humanitarian asylum in Western countries in Europe; Australia; Canada; and the United States. As a result to the turmoil, Syria is plagued by violence; mass-killing; torture; displacement; and territorial fragmentation. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International reports indicated that since the uprising 4.8 million Syrians fled externally, and more than 6.3 million Syrians displaced internally, meanwhile almost 13.5 million civilians are crucially in need of humanitarian aid.

Refugees Issues: the Political, economic, social and security implications

The Jordanian public consistently overstates the negative impacts of the Syrian refugee influx, while the positive impacts receive far less attention, highlighting the politicized nature of the refugee crisis in Jordan.

Public sentiment toward Syrian refugees has a deleterious effect on the government's ability to respond productively to the refugee influx. Confronted with persistently underfunded humanitarian appeals, Jordan has lost confidence in international donor support. Without additional aid and a sustainable response to the refugee crisis, Jordan will continue to restrict the protection space for Syrians. Doing so will increase the long-term risks of instability in Jordan and the region.

Obviously, the Syrian refugee crisis has exacerbated political, economic, and resource challenges in Jordan. Yet, the roots of the kingdom's challenges run deeper than the refugee crisis and if left unaddressed it probably affect the country's stability. If Jordan is to confront its national challenges and continue to provide a safe haven for Syrian refugees, then the country will depend on increased international support. The Syrian refugee influx into Jordan has been massive. Since the outbreak of political violence in Syria in 2011, more than 620,000 Syrians were registered with the United Nations Refugee Agency in Jordan. Eighty-four percent of these Syrians live in host communities as opposed to refugee camps. The majority of Syrian refugees have settled into some of Jordan's poorest northern areas, with the governorates of Amman, Irbid, and Mafraq hosting more than 76 percent of all Syrian refugees in Jordan.

Syrian refugees have stressed economic and resource infrastructure in Jordan, which was already suffering from structural issues prior the refugee crisis. Refugees compete with Jordan's vulnerable populations for scarce resources, employment opportunities, healthcare, shelter, and education. Jordan was already facing substantial challenges to its resource, economic, and social sectors before the influx. Jordan struggled with massive water scarcity, climbing youth unemployment, and development deficits in sectors like healthcare and education. Generally speaking, Syrians triggered a rapid increase in public frustration about these issues. Syrian refugees have impacted Jordan both in positive and negative ways, but the public narrative is overwhelmingly critical of the Syrian presence. According to a report by the International Labor Organization, 85 percent of Jordanian workers believe that Syrians should not be allowed to enter Jordan freely, and 65 percent believe that all Syrians should live within refugee camps. Public sentiment has significantly undermined the government's willingness to host additional refugees. Decreasing confidence in international support, a destabilizing security context, and pressure on resources have only served to enhance this attitude. The negative public perceptions highlight a primary challenge facing Jordan: politically, how does the country negotiate the demands of its citizens, while simultaneously accruing the benefits of hosting the Syrian refugee population?

The Syrian refugee influx has illuminated a crisis of governance in Jordan. In particular, the government is stretched beyond its capacity to deliver essential services like healthcare, education, and waste management in the municipalities most affected by the Syrian refugee crisis. As the quality of services deteriorates, Jordanian citizens place increasing blame not just on Syrian refugees but also on the government for service delivery failures. This dynamic presents the government with a significant political challenge and constrains its range of options in responding to the Syrian refugee crisis.

As public schools became saturated with Syrian refugees, host communities expressed concern about overcrowded classrooms, and double-shifting. Over half of the Syrian refugee population in Jordan is under the age of eighteen; hence placing large demands on educational capacity. Jordan has opened 98 additional double-shifted schools to alleviate pressures on classroom size. The stress on educational capacity has increased host-community tensions. The Jordanian healthcare system has come under pressure in terms of both finances and service capacity. For some citizens, the influx of Syrian refugees has rendered healthcare less accessible and more expensive. With over 80 percent of Syrians living outside of camps, refugees have had a major impact on the Jordanian housing market. The increased demand for housing stimulated by Syrians drove up rental prices and further stressed availability of affordable housing. Jordanians indicate competition over access to shelter is a major driver of tension.

The Jordanian economy was already struggling with destabilizing elements before the Syrian crisis; however, the Syrian refugee crisis exacerbates Jordan's negative economic trends. For instance, housing; and competition over jobs in the informal sector leads to the depression of wages and worsened economic situations for the poorest Jordanians. Many Jordanians blame the influx of Syrian refugees for increased levels of unemployment. The International Labor Organization reported unemployment among Jordanians grew from 14.5 percent in March 2011 to 22 percent in 2014. Though Syrians cannot legally work in Jordan, the organization estimated 160,000 Syrians were employed in the informal job sector, particularly in agricultural, construction, and service jobs. According to the survey published by the International Labor Organization, 96 percent of Jordanians believed Syrians were taking their jobs.

In addition to education, healthcare, and waste management, Syrian refugees also benefit from untargeted government subsidies for water, bread, and gas. Jordan is broadly constrained in its ability to respond to the Syrian refugee crisis because of dominant perceptions among Jordanians that Syrians are having an extreme negative impact on the economy

The influx of Syrian refugees to Jordan has brought renewed international attention to the country's water crisis. The drastic population increase in Jordan attributed to the Syrian refugee influx has brought the horizon of water exhaustion much closer. The Jordanian Ministry of Water and Irrigation projected that the demand for water in the kingdom would rise by 16 percent and that the water deficit would increase by almost 50 percent in part due to the influx of Syrian refugees. In some areas of Jordan, Syrian refugees have doubled the demand for water. The water shortage in Jordan is rapidly becoming a threatening political problem. Jordan's water crisis is a complex problem, worsened by the influx of Syrian refugees.

Historically, the Hashemite's have sought a balance among the East Bank Jordanian tribes, West Bank Palestinians, Islamists, and nationalists. Every population influx into Jordan has impacted this delicate balance, and the Syrian refugee influx is no exception. Tribal support of the Hashemite monarchy is a critical feature of the state's political legitimacy. As a consequence, Jordanian identity stems in part from attempts by East Bank Jordanians to preserve their political status within the kingdom. In this context, the Syrian conflict is seen as posing serious threats to the stability of the Jordanian government and the region. It is important to recognize that distances between Syria and Jordan are very short. Damascus is less than 200 kilometers from Amman and the fighting in Dara'a is just across the Jordanian border. The sounds of the shelling in Syria can be heard from Jordanian border towns. The conflict in Syria is affecting Jordan's stability and security in a number of ways, most immediately in the dramatic and massive influx of refugees and the growing importance of the Jordanian-Syrian border in terms of the movement of weapons and fighters, including jihadists, into Syria. The Jordanian security forces have been working overtime to ensure that Syrian Islamists, including the terrorist-designated *Jabhat al-Nusra*, are no longer using Jordan as a rear guard for staging support for the rebellion in the south. In particular, they have sought to halt foreign fighters, including jihadists, from crossing the Jordan-Syria border to support the rebels. There are concerns about the impact of the return of these battle-hardened Islamists to Jordan and the threat they may pose to the regime. Jordan has also stepped up its diplomatic efforts, with bilateral talks with Iran, Russia, Turkey, the United States and the European Union and has been particularly active with the UN and other multilateral organizations. It has brought the issue of Syrian refugees and their impact on Jordan to the UN Security Council in an attempt to raise awareness of the significant costs the refugees pose and to enhance burden-sharing.

Jordan's policy toward the Syrian refugees has been shaped by its long tradition of welcoming Palestinian refugees. Indeed this tradition of hospitality has led the Jordanian government to accept numbers of refugees far

beyond what any western government would contemplate. In parts of northern Jordan, Syrian refugees make up more than half of the local population. Popular resentment against the Syrian refugees is growing as Jordanians blame the Syrians for shortages of goods, rising prices, increasing rental costs, and increasing unemployment. There are particular concerns about shortages of water which has long been an issue in the country. While it is important to note that some Jordanians have profited from the presence of the refugees, many working-class Jordanians feel threatened by the presence of the refugees – which has political consequences as well. In terms of the impact of the refugees on domestic political life in Jordan, the tribal Bedouin support base for the Hashemite kingdom has already long been threatened by the Palestinian refugee population that now constitutes a majority of Jordan's citizens. The arrival of large numbers of Syrian refugees raises concerns that Bedouin interests will become an even smaller minority in the future

As prospects for a resolution to the Syrian conflict become increasingly elusive and the number of Syrian refugees in Jordan increases constantly, public disenchantment has turned back toward the Jordanian government. The sharp population increase from the refugees' arrival revealed long-present and deepening fissures in Jordan's political, economic, and social infrastructure. The Syrian influx presents Jordan with a political problem. Syrians are highly concentrated in Jordan's most vulnerable communities, and grievances brought to the fore by Syrian refugees have begun to mobilize marginalized Jordanians. As public frustration grows, political conflict is increasingly framed as a struggle against disenfranchisement. As massive population growth stresses host-community capacities, Syrian refugees have cast a light on some of Jordan's greatest contemporary challenges. A plethora of reports point to the Syrian refugee impact on Jordan's depleted resources, increased job competition, overburdened infrastructure, and strained social services, like healthcare and education. Notably, the challenges highlighted by the refugees all have deep roots in Jordan's social, economic, and political fabrics.

Indeed, the Syrian refugee population has merely exacerbated preexisting endemic challenges that could affect future instability. Jordanian citizens have called upon the government to limit competition from Syrian refugees. it seems Jordanian officials have concluded that the initial political benefits of hosting Syrian refugees have diminished and that an increasing Syrian presence in the kingdom may threaten national stability, as Jordanian unrest centers on the pressures Syrian refugees place on host communities. Jordan has a long record of providing asylum to persecuted peoples. Indeed, while the scale of the Syrian refugee crisis presents a difficult challenge, the Jordanian government's response to the arrival of Syrian refugees must be understood as a continuation of its historical response to refugee inflows into the country, most notably those of Palestinian and Iraqi refugee populations.

Extremism concerns:

As extremists continue to move into southern Syria, growing security and humanitarian problems may soon outstrip Jordan's ability to handle spillover from the war. Jordan exerted efforts in southern Syria to control its border and restrain financing to extremists inside Syria. Even before the war next door worsened, Jordan faced domestic unrest and economic difficulties. To this has been added a series of problems stemming from the situation in southern Syria. The "unknowns" of Syrians in Jordan is a problem. Currently, up to 1.5 million Syrian refugees are believed to be in Jordan, but only 600,000 have registered with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and only 125,000 are living in the kingdom's two main refugee camps

(Zaatari and Azraq desert camp). While estimates vary, the status of over 750,000 Syrian remains largely unknown; most are believed to be staying with extended family or friends in Jordan. This population represents Jordan's soft underbelly, from which Bashar al-Assad or ISIS could launch terrorist attacks against the kingdom. Even more worrisome is the fact that Jordan received refugees from beyond the Deraa region, including eastern Syria, where Jabhat Alnusra and ISIS have a stronger grip.

Tensions with domestic Salafists are another challenge. A number of Jordanian Salafists have made their way into southern Syria to fight, raising fears that they could eventually return home to stir trouble in the kingdom. Jordanian authorities have been able to contain the tension so far. If the kingdom allows Assad to continue his barrel bombing of the opposition and retake Syrian territory down to the border, the refugee influx will exacerbate an already tense situation in Jordan. Moreover, the Assad regime does not have enough troops to truly hold all of the territory it retakes, meaning Syria will remain unstable for years to come. If Jordan does nothing, extremists in southern Syria will expand their numbers and influence, and the government will suffer criticism at home for doing nothing to help the Syrian opposition. Such sentiment could in turn inflame tribal and Salafist factions in Jordan and invite attacks from domestic extremists.

Alternatively, if Amman actively works against Assad, Damascus would likely use the "unknown" Syrians in Jordan to carry out terrorist attacks, making the plots look as if they were carried out by Jordanian Salafists, ISIS, or both. More broadly, absent a major shift in U.S. policy regarding direct intervention in Syria, the opposition is unlikely to defeat the regime anytime soon, perpetuating a state of war that will only generate more extremism.

Whatever the case, security in Jordan will remain precarious so long as the Assad regime continues its vicious attacks on Syrian civilians, which in turn create refugee flows, attract foreign jihadists, and justify extremism as a tit-for-tat response. Finally, Washington should expand its coordination with Jordan to rooting out extremism and pushing the Assad regime back to negotiating a real transition that will end the war, not simply local ceasefires that perpetuate the "dynamic stalemate" and risk generating extremism for years to come. ❈

American Foreign Policy towards the Middle East under Donald Trump:

"Change and Continuity"

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Abstract:

Donald Trump's election victory and his arrival at the White House was a surprise not only for many Americans but also for observers and politicians in different parts of the world including the Middle East. The main question for governments and nations in the Middle East was and still is that how he would conduct US foreign policy towards this region. Although the main characteristic of Trump's behaviour remains to be his unpredictability, yet this paper argues that when it comes to American foreign policy his room for manoeuvrability seems to be limited. The main argument of this paper is that US Foreign policy towards the Middle East under trump can be understood in two trends of change and continuity. The change will occur wherever and whenever his own personality & mentality together with that of his close advisors can outweigh the institutional and structural factors and players in the process of decision-making in US political system. Therefore while his stance on Palestinian-Israeli conflict remains almost the same, his policy towards Syrian crisis and Iran are subject to change according to the developments on the ground and regional and international conditions. However even in these issues & areas "change" doesn't necessarily mean a more radical course of actions, and it is likely to witness a combination of softening and hardening previous policies. ❀

Keywords: United States, Donald Trump, Foreign Policy, Middle East, Iran,

Comparative Study of the Metaphysical Basis of the Political Approach of Ancient Iran and China

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Ⅰ. Introduction

Persia and China are two ancient civilizations, each of which formed a vas and stable culture. In addition, each culture had a different kind of cosmology during the formation of its civilization. Chinese cosmology was based on ethics, whereas Persian cosmology was based on religion. In this regard, both civilizations underwent specific processes in developing their cosmology and metaphysics. Since ancient political thought was centered around the political ruler and since that ruler was thought to be part the cosmological system, a comparison of rulership theory in Persian and Chinese cosmologies is an interesting topic in the study of ancient political thought in general and of these two civilizations' political ideas in particular.

This paper attempts to determine the relationship between the political ideas of the two civilizations and their cosmological bases, how this relationship can be comparatively conceptualized, and how their similarities and differences can be identified. This study enables us to understand the nature of the political approach to these two civilizations during the emergence and evolution of the foundations of their thinking. At the beginning of human civilization, metaphysics appeared and evolved in its primitive form into cosmology. In this paper, we examine the cosmology of these two civilizations and the relationship between political ideas and their cosmologies. Cosmologies are thinking systems that connect ideas related to the beginning and end of the world and social, political and ethical ideas that are related to each other. Cosmologies have theorized the practical systems of socio-political life in their own ways. They are among the signs of humanity's self-alienation in this phase of mental evolution; that is, they have projected actual life systems into a cosmic system. Since cosmologies as mental creations are constantly evolving, their specific time and closed identity framework cannot be determined. Their conceptual boundaries can, however, be identified and defined. In this paper, although we are speaking of the Chinese cosmology and the Persian cosmology in singular form, we will discuss their evolutionary aspects and the roles various ideas and scholars have played in developing them.

We assume that in addition to the changes in the descriptive and conceptual elements of each cosmology, a specific identity can be observed in each system. Here, we focus on those general aspects of the cosmologies that, taken together, show a single identity that differs in its details. When we say Chinese and Persian cosmology, we mean those mental systems that grew through myths, epics, and rites and that eventually evolved into philosophical and theological forms during the ancient times of both civilizations. A major source of texts in these fields was provided during the 6th-9th centuries BCE in China, although such a source was not available in Iran except for myths belonging to later times. Therefore, in this paper,we focus on myths, rites, religious texts (e.g., the Avesta), and their interpretations when studying Persian cosmology, whereas in China, there are many texts from well-developed schools of thought. This paper does not discuss Chinese philosophical schools; instead, it examines cosmological traditions and texts focusing on cosmology in famous philosophical schools, including Confucianism. A discussion of the philosophical roots of Chinese cosmology, itself a broad and important topic, is beyond the scope of this paper.

Ⅱ. Cosmology and political ideas

Although no important texts exist (or have not been found) from the history of the early days of human civilization, including the Chinese and Persian civilizations, it can be said that political ideas have been the main component of all cosmologies, even in the era when mythical cosmology dominated. Nations that took the first steps toward civilization, a degree of social differentiation, and the first forms of government attempted to answer questions about the nature of political authority, the source of political legitimacy, the nature of political responsibility, the source of social institutions, and the status of laws and, most importantly, attempted to understand and justify political inequalities. During the first phases of the evolution of human consciousness, myths helped people to understand and find answers to these questions in the form of narrations, allusions, metaphors, and symbolism.

Ancient cosmologies are the core of a theoretical system reflecting issues faced by ancient civilizations. Cosmologies express in ideas what we express today in terms of concepts, ideas such as sources of political legitimation, social norms, forms of political governance, and the relation between a worldly leader and a heavenly sovereign. Because of the confusion between political matters and social matters that occurred during the mythical period of consciousness in Persian civilization, the way socio-political organizations work must be studied through myths, epics, rites, and religious teachings. These cultural sources, which have passed through devastating historical events, can be used to produce a kind of theoretical system in the form of cosmological categorization.

Man has always reflected the order of his life by means of a symbolic culture in an order of ideal form. Although the ratio of the practical order of life has a dialectic and a bilateral relationship with its theoretical order, in this dialectic, the actual order must be considered the reference point and the theoretical order its reflection. Man has reflected the practical order of his life in a cosmic theoretical order to give it a divine and eternal character. Cosmology has presented an order of life in an ideal form and from a divine source, where earthly and heavenly existence obey a unified order based upon justice and temperance. This ideal justice has, in fact, been the unconscious justification for the appearance of difference and discrimination and of class differentiation in actual life systems.

Ⅲ. The foundation of cosmological systems in China and Iran

Before discussing cosmological systems and political thought in China and Iran, one should first note that cosmology evolved from different bases in these two countries. Although cosmology and metaphysics emerged from a mythological system in both China and Iran, their development had different sources. In China, cosmology and political thought were bred in the so-called sage tradition, whereas in Iran, religion and religious cosmology were the foundation for developing wisdom and thought. The sage tradition in China developed a type of cosmology known as "ethical cosmology". By comparison, in the West (i.e., Greece, Rome, and Europe), another type of cosmology was developed, called "philosophical cosmology" or "specialized metaphysical cosmology". Thus, it can be said that in the three civilizations – Chinese, Persian-Islamic, and Western – there developed three types of cosmology, ethical, religious, and philosophical, each with its own particular characteristics.

In China, political thought was mostly based on practical aspects, with no special attention to theoretical aspects. Practical ethics held the same position in developing theories as philosophy did in the West and theology and mysticism did in Iran.

Chinese cosmology

Two different ideological traditions developed in ancient China: one in the written series known as "Yang-Yin" and the other in the written series known as the "Appendixes". The Appendixes were writings and interpretations that Confucius' anonymous followers added to a book known as "Changes", itself is an important work in Chinese cosmology. Later, in the Sunnatan era, the two traditions were mixed so that in the book "Historical Backgrounds", an important reference for Chinese cosmology, was called the Yang-Yin religion (Fung, 1983: 174).

What we call Chinese cosmology is not only a school of thought consisting of theories and beliefs developed and dispersed among a group of Chinese scholars. In addition to its development in the works of Chinese scholars, including Confucian ones, Chinese cosmology has become part of peoples' beliefs. In China, religion and ethics have evolved separately, so people follow the Taoist religion and Confucian ethics. Taoism is, however, different from the general principles of religion.

In Chinese cosmology, beings are seen as a unified system consisting of all mental and dynamic elements. The value of the world tends toward goodness, life moves toward one supernatural destination, and evil forces cannot keep it from dynamics and development (Fung, 1983: 95).

Hsin-Wu

One of the first ideas in Chinese cosmology is found in a text called "Hsin-Wu", dated to the 4th or 3rd century BCE. According to this text, the world is made of nine elements, five of which are water, earth, fire, wood, and metal. Various powers are made by mixing these elements. The eighth element includes signs tha tdetermine ther uler's function and guide him in performing his duties. Sunlight, heat, cold, rain, wind, and equinox are the elements that, if they occur in time, will nurture life. Each of these elements corresponds to one of the ruler's features: timely rain corresponds to the ruler's dignity, timely heat to his wisdom, sunlight to his discipline, and timely cold to his thoughtfulness. The ruler's right actions correspond to the timely appearance of the above elements, and his wrong actions correspond to their untimely appearance. Their timely appearance will make nature flourish and increase its bounty, and their untimely appearance will create an imbalance in

nature and cause destruction. Their untimely appearance also warns the ruler to reform his behavior and prevent future untimely appearances(Fung, 1983: 177).

As we have seen, in Chinese cosmology, beings and political society are connected to one other like parts of a body, in equilibrium and temperance. As we will see, in Persian cosmology, the same organism is present, and there is an organic relationship between natural, social, and political forces.

Monthly rules

"Monthly rules" is a document dating to the late 3rd century BCE related to the Yang-Yin religion. It is a guide to the duties the ruler and people must perform every month. Its logic accords socio-political power to natural forces and cosmic structure. The timely performance of these duties is related to the nature of beings and preserves discipline and prevents anarchy. For instance, during the first month of the year, the ruler should ban cutting down trees and destroying birds' nests, prevent war operations, and propagate examples of faith among citizens. According to the document, an imbalance between the ruler's actions and the cosmic rules will lead to an imbalance between society and nature and cause anarchy.

Harmony and balance

Harmony, balance and equilibrium are the most important aspects of Chinese cosmology. The world is the permanent source of energy and life. Movement in life is the source of eternal creation and variety. Life's spirit is reflected in love's spirit (Thome, 1980: 46). Life is an active being that shows improvement in a creative manner. The primary essence is unique in one sense and multi-faceted in another sense. Life is the essential chain from heaven and earth linking people to each other. Creative energy exists in the infinite variety of life's manifestation and leads all of it to the eternity.

Lao-tzu suggests that life's essence is, in fact, about one becoming numerous uncountable forms in uncountable beings: "Tao created one, one created two, two created three, and three created everything" (Thome, 1980; 48). The earth is a field of countless activities that are influenced by a single being. He says the Tao includes everything. The principle of harmony and balance is the main principle that embodies the Chinese spirit.

This viewpoint can be seen in Chinese music and poetry as well. The principle of harmony and balance informs China's history and social rules. Moreover, it guarantees that all aspects of one's personal life are worth appreciating. We must address kindness and love in all these forms because all sources of life deserve appreciation. The Tao, which is the main source of life and spreads through all beings without limitation, links a chain of interdependence of all life forms, and all these forms are meaningful and valuable.

Therefore, it is clear that the basis of Chinese cosmology is founded on unification and harmony. Life's stimulus is its natural creativity. What the ruler must do is directed toward dynamics and eternity. The ruler's actions must follow a harmony and an equilibrium that are the essence of life. Chinese writers have discussed in detail how to go through life this way. As the sage's son of heaven, the ruler recognizes the way and leads society.

Persian cosmology

Persian cosmology has considerable similarities with Chinese cosmology as well as essential differences. The similarities are related to elements shared by many ancient cosmologies. For example, the cosmologies of

ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt, Persia, and China include the following aspects:

1- the relationship of life to a generality, such as a cosmic system;
2- the dominance of an eternal law over all existence, including political and ethical life;
3- the inherent link between the divine and earthly kingdoms
4- the priority of the sage and virtuous king.

The aspect of animism, which is among the inherent elements of cosmology in the era of mythical consciousness, is found in all of the cosmologies mentioned above.

Man's basic questions about the origin of life and his position in the order of the universe are answered in the form of mythical orders (Frankdort, 1960: 85). It is assumed that all living things are linked to one other within an organic form. The three domains of being (nature, society, and human beings) are not seen as separate from each other. In every cosmological system, a unique eternal law is assumed for discipline and related to a cosmic system. This eternal law is given various names in the different cosmological systems of ancient civilizations, such as "rta" (India), "Asa" (Persia), "Tao" (China), and "Ma, at" (Egypt). This concept is the idealized form of the need for law and order in life (Frankfort, 1969: 45).

The Persian cosmology is different than the Chinese one in the following aspects:
1- the idea of ultimate salvation;
2- the belief in resurrection;
3- the cosmic source of position and function;
4- the duality of substance;
5- the resurrection and redeemer (eschatological ends).

The belief in duality is an important aspect of every cosmological system; however, there was a trend toward a substantial belief in duality in the latter period in ancient Persia, which was not the case in Chinese and Indian cosmologies. Although Zoroaster's teachings were a monotheistic reaction against ancient beliefs in polytheism, there was a trend in Mazdaic religion (which flourished thanks to Zoroastrian teachings) toward a belief in essential duality. This belief in duality in Mazdaic religion during the Sasanian era (in Persia) is known as a critical duality because it is a belief in two separate essences (i.e., the good and the evil), each of which have a creator: Ahura Mazda and Ahriman. These two essences are involved in an never-ending quarrel with each other, which will finally lead to the inevitable victory of Ahura Mazda over Ahriman. Evil will be uprooted in this victory, and the world will end in unification and integrity. This battle is the only way to eradicate evil in the world (Douechesh Guillemin, 1982: 105).

As mentioned earlier, the most influential Chinese cosmology, the Yang-Yin religion, comprises two opposite elements, Yang and Yin, which create the universe. However, Yan and Yin, contrary to what is believed about light and darkness and about Ahura Mazda and Ahriman in Mazdaic theology, are complementary rather than adversarial; there are no controversies in Yang and Yin. Yang forms the spiritual heaven, and Yin forms the spiritual earth, and one cannot survive without the other. In contrast, Ahriman creates confusion and disorder, whereas Ahura Mazda is successful in defeating Ahriman.

Salvation and resurrection

Iran was the first nation in history to have a theological viewpoint. This viewpoint influenced Judaism and Christianity, both of which also have a divine viewpoint. Such a viewpoint is based on a philosophy of history that conceptualizes history as having a beginning, a specified direction and a destination.

Persian cosmology posits a kind of cosmic circle in which good and evil, light and darkness, Sepanta mainu and Angara mainu, Urmazd and Ahriman are fighting each other. Mankind's destiny is influenced by this battle. Man has an important role in helping the powers of good triumph over evil and light triumph over darkness.

The noted scholar Widengren suggests that resurrection-based viewpoints in religions and Western beliefs are based on the Persian viewpoint and that teachings about the historical cycle and the ultimate resurrection are certainly Persian in origin (Widengren, 1965: 482).

He says, "Persian religions are salvation-based in their entire aspects and forms, and everything is directed to a personal and collective salvation. The final step to man's ultimate level of perfection is, in fact, taken in the ultimate resurrection and the final home".

As stated earlier, Chinese cosmology lacks a resurrection-based viewpoint similar to that of Persian cosmology. In Chinese cosmology, man's perfection is attained in this world, where creative powers enable man to move toward perfection.

In Chinese cosmology, the world is full of infinite creative energy, change, and new discoveries (Fang, 1957: 51). The constant process of change that forms the Tao's creative movement as the rule for all creatures shows a trend toward constant perfection and the development in all beings as a way to perfection.

The Tao's constant changes throughout time and the unity of all beings are the source of creation and eternal creativity. Perfection means being in perfect harmony with the Tao.

Belief in a savior (eschatological bias)

The belief in a savior in Persian cosmology is related to the resurrection-based viewpoint. In this cosmology, there are teachings about cosmic circulation, according to which the formation of evil in an essentially good world disturbed the cosmic balance and brought confusion into the world. To solve this problem and rebalance the world, evil must be eradicated. The duality in Mazdaian cosmology is also related to this viewpoint. According to Mazdaian cosmology, Urmazd and Ahriman each created followers to fight the battle of good against evil. Ultimate victory is achieved with the appearance of a savior and his help to humans.

The division of the world into two distinct categories (Ahuraian and Ahrimanian) and the conflict between them are prominent aspects of Persian cosmology. In Chinese cosmology (as well as Indian cosmology), the conflict between divine and evil forces also exists. When evil entered the world, it disturbed everything, and the unification of the world will be possible only with ultimate resurrection. In Persian cosmology, however, contrary to the Greek viewpoint, cosmic circulation does not lead to eternal circulation; contrary to the Indian Calpas, it is not based on eternal retrospection (Zaehner, 1956: 181). Cosmic circulation in Persian cosmology ends in resurrection and in the ultimate salvation of benevolents, the eternal destruction of malevolents, ultimate domination for Asa and the ultimate kingdom of Ahura Mazda.

Belief in a savior has ancient roots in Iranian religions and is not limited to Zoroastrianism. In the Mehr religion, one of the most ancient religions in Iran, the savior has a high position (Boil, 1385: 90). There are two interpretations of the savior in the Avesta. The Gathas, the oldest part of the Avesta, mention Saoshyant, who is known as a savior by many interpreters. In later eras, Zoroastrians also had the same inference about the world, but Zaehner, the famous Iranologist, does not agree with that inference and considers Susiant equal to Zoroaster. He believes that Zoroaster hoped to perform his teaching in this world, and there is nothing about resurrection in

what is called the "Gathas" in the Avesta's old songs (Zaehner, 1956: 76).

The earthly ruler and the divine ruler

In Persian cosmology, the ruler is also considered part of an integrated cosmic system. In Iran, the earthly system was seen in relation to the divine system and depended on the general rule governing the entire world. The ruling system in the earthly system was also found among cosmic systems; the earthly kingdom was an instance of the divine kingdom (Frye, 1962: 24). In Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and Indian cosmologies, the ruler was closely related to the divine kings and had a specified function assigned by them. In Egyptian cosmology, the ruler (Pharaoh) was himself among the gods and their descendants, and his commands were seen as divine. In Mesopotamia, the ruler was a representative of the divine gods and enforced their rules on earth (Zaehner, 1956: 150).

In Persian cosmology, the ruler was seen as an agent of the divine gods and considered himself the accomplisher of the gods' commands. How he proved his relation to those gods is itself a broad topic for discussion.

In Chinese cosmology, as mentioned above, the ruler had a special position among beings. He was a sage ruler, and this wisdom connected him to the cosmic system in a special way. The difference between the Persian and Chinese rulers, apart from unity of thought, is related to the ruler's special position in the order of wisdom, which is highly organized in Chinese tradition. In China, there are numerous complete documents from major writers and philosophers in which that wisdom has been fully defined.

Moreover, in China, these writings include complete details about the ruler's practical responsibilities for two reasons: first, because the general trend in Chinese thought is toward practical ethics and aspects; second, because the survival of a vast quantity of writings by scholars gives us access to many details concerning political issues.

The divine source of socio-political class

The description of the ruler's legitimacy and personal and social function is part of every cosmology. In this regard, Persian cosmology has similarities to and differences from Chinese cosmology. Human communities in primitive cultures believed in supreme aspects of their rulers and believed that they had special abilities. These graces and abilities were sometimes compared with supernatural capacities. Emile Durkheim, the famous French sociologist, analyzed the nature and features of these thoughts in detail and presented them in sociological terms. He suggests that primitive tribes believed in the supremacy of their rulers based in a special force called "Mana".

In ancient Persian belief, there had long been concepts such as Farrah abundance, which became an important element in Persian cosmology. These concepts took their place in philosophical, religious, and even Gnostic schools and appeared in new manifestations. Although initially connected with the ruler's grace, Farrah was not only for rulers. What particularly belongs to rulers is the kingly Farrah, which people are deprived of. That is, everyone has Farrah according to their own social class and are responsible for performing their specified function because of it. Rulers, heroes, leaders, and social classes all have their own abundance. Rulers have a special Farrah, referred to as kingship Farrah. Possessing the kingly abundance is related to following justice.

Farrah received new representations in the form of symbols, figures and objects. These symbols were reformed versions of those invented by the Egyptians, who had likely used Farrah as the symbol of procreation to show the achievement of supernatural graces. Achamenians received the symbol from Mesopotamian kings and reformed it as their symbol of abundance (Mojtabaii, 1975: 124). Later, other such symbols (e.g., crown, rampart, and head band) appeared as symbols of Farrah, and in addition to rulers, other social classes used them to show their splendor.

The concept of abundance is more clearly reflected in Persian cosmology than in Chinese and other cosmologies. In ancient times, there were also religions that worshiped symbols of abundance (Korerjie Kobajie, 1992: 351). Iranians also believed in a special abundance for their race, called the Arian Farrah.

Ⅳ. Conclusion

In ancient cosmologies, class categorization was an essential element of cosmology. In both Iranian and Chinese cosmologies, there were explanations about how to categorize a class. Categorization had a supernatural aspect, and its source was related to supernatural forces. In Iranian thought, there were special categorizations and work divisions between classes and a cosmic hierarchy and work division between gods; this was an interesting ideology. Dumézil, the well-known French Iranologist who studied Arian myths and religions, identified three categories of gods in Indian and Persian cosmologies, each with a symbol of a special function and class. He suggested that Mitra and Varona were the symbols of clerics (Moubads, the clergy), Indra was the symbol of warriors, and Nastia was the symbol of the producing class (farmers and cultivators) (Widengren, 1965: 142). Zaehner, the Iranologist mentioned previously, suggested that because it was a relative society, Iranian society was clearly divided into three classes, clerics, warriors and farmers, each of which had its own god in the divine system.

In ancient Chinese mythology, social categorization also had a kind of divine aspect. One ancient Chinese myth suggests that humans were made by a goddess named Gera from processed pottery clay. In this myth, people made of yellow clay became the ruling class or nobles, and those made from dark clay became ordinary people. People made from yellow clay who were the ruling class or nobles had their own god, Huangvi, who later became an arch-god. ✽

Key Words: Iran, China, Cosmology, Metaphysics, Political thought

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2nd Session   Culture & Society (1)

10:20 - 12:00
 Room No. 329, Main Building (3 F)

Chairman :   Hidemitsu KUROKI

(Japanese Association of Middle East Studies)

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Potentiality of Sufism in the Contemporary Period

Tonaga YASUSHI (Kyoto University, Japan)

Discussant : Jung Myung KIM (Myongji University, Korea)

2

A Muslim Perception of the Faith of Other Men in Seventeenth Century China: A Note to *Xizhenzhengda* (希眞正答 Correct Answers to Those Seeking for Truth)

Hyondo PARK (Myongji University, Korea)

Discussant : Siavashi SAFFARI (Seoul National University, Korea)

3

**Changes in the Correlates of Dietary Behaviors among Second-Generation Muslim Youth in France :
Re-Islamization or Demographic changes?**

Hiroshi KOJIMA (Waseda University, Japan)

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4

Turkish Interests in the New Conditions of the Middle East

Enkhbold GANPUREV (National Intelligence Academy, Turkey)

Discussant : Chong Jin OH (HUFS, Korea)

Potentiality of Sufism in the Contemporary Period[1]

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I. Three-axis Framework of Sufis

The problem of defining Sufism is more difficult than it appears.   While it is usually defined as "Islamic Mysticism" in introductory books on Islam, very few of the recent academic works on Sufism adopt such a definition, or rather most of them draw attention to the fact that this "definition" is misleading (Ernst 1997, xvii; Chittick 2000a, 1-2).

I would like to address the meaning of *tasawwuf* in another form, namely the "three-axis framework of Sufism."   I also use the word "Sufism," but I do not use this notion as a substantial notion that has one-to-one equivalents in the Islamic world.   Instead I would like to propose that we should use this word as a working concept subject to analysis.   I think that as long as we dwell on the definition we can reach no solution.   I therefore avoid giving any definition and present a framework which can show the various meanings of *tasawwuf*.

My analytical framework consists of three axes (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1 Three-axis Framework of Sufism

The axis X is the ethical axis.   Clearly, the primary sources of Sufism often treat morals and ethics in daily life.   These books insist less that common Muslims have mystical experiences than that they have an ethical way of life.   In other words, to be a good Sufi is to be a good Muslim, and there is no difference between the ideal of Sufism and that of Islam in this axis.

The axis Y is the mystical axis, and we must admit that Sufism does possess a mystical aspect.

The axis Z is that of the popular cult.   This includes the religious practices as they are practiced among people, and which are either truly related with Sufism or only exploit the name in order to legitimize themselves. This axis sometimes includes popular practices that are criticized as non-Islamic or anti-Islamic.

The reality determined by these three axes vary according to when and where the phenomena of *tasawwuf* are observed.

Islamic studies (especially the philological studies of Islamic mysticism) have targeted the axis Y, while the axis Z has been the main target of anthropology (and that of historical studies, especially in the premodern era). The axis X has not yet been investigated fully, partly because it is the farthest from the normal translation of "Islamic mysticism."

The advantage of this framework is that it can show various realities by taking the respective degrees of the three axes as variables in a single framework.   Frequent reference to this framework during discussion will make us conscious of the subtle differences in the understanding of Sufism.

II. Modern and Contemporary Sufism

Up to the middle of the 20th century the students of Sufism had not paid enough attention to the age after the 13th century, which was considered the period of decadence[2].

The efforts of scholars such as H. Corbin enabled us to trace the development of Sufism in the 'middle period' mainly in the Iranian-Shiite world.   The studies of the modern period are presently under development, and it is almost impossible to draw a big picture on this topic.[3]   For that reason, I concentrate here on drawing a

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[2] The best example of this 'obsolete' view can be seen in (Arberry 1950[1979]).   He considered Ibn al-Fārid (d. 1235), Ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240) and Jalāl al-Din Rumi (d. 1273) to be apexes of Sufism and characterized the period afterwards with the term "the decay of Sufism."

[3] The remarkable studies on Sufism, *tariqa* and the saint cult in the modern and contemporary period include (Baldick 1989).   This study extends its target chronologically to the 20th century as well as extending its analysis geographically. (Rahman 1979) is famous for its invention of the term 'neo-Sufism' to refer to the "Sufism reformed on orthodox lines and interpreted in an activist sense" (p. 206.)   According to Rahman, Ahmad Ibn Idris (d. 1837) was one of the representatives of this tendency.   This notion of 'neo-Sufism' later became the subject of debate.   (Martin 1976) depicts the *tariqa* movements on the African continent in the 19th century.   (Voll 1994) mentioned Sufism in his description of the modern Islamic world after the 18th century.   He expanded the notion of 'neo-Sufism' and applied it to such orders as Naqshbandiya.   (Levtzion and Voll 1987) made a positive evaluation of the 18th century as the era of renewal and reform. (O'Fahey and Radtke 1993) presented a counterargument to the usage of the notion of 'neo-Sufism.'   Through the investigation of the works of A□mad Ibn Idris, the authors claimed that the continuity between the premodern and modern

rough sketch of modern and contemporary Sufism using the three-axes framework.

We would like to preface the discussion by noting that common people came to be able to attain knowledge directly from printed materials and were able to become a new type of elites as a result of print capitalism and public education, while in the premodern period Islamic elites *('ulama')* monopolized knowledge through their control of Islamic manuscripts.

The following groups of people all play a part in this discussion: Muslim groups including modernists, Islamists (including Wahhabis and salafis), government officials after the independent (most of them were secular nationalists), Sufis, 'ulama', and common people; and representatives of the European world including colonialists, orientalists (who were sometimes combined with colonialists), and European Sufis.

In the following sections I would like to depict the Sufism in the modern and contemporary period from the three angles.   First I discuss the criticism of Sufism by the modernists, Islamists and nationalists.   Second I consider the relationship between each of these three groups and Sufism, especially focusing on Sufis' opinions. Third, I treat the relationship between the universal mysticism and Sufism in terms of its expansion beyond the borders of Islam.

1. Criticism of Sufism

Modernists were said to criticize Sufism as a set of obsolete superstitions that retarded modernization, while Islamists were said to criticize it as *bid␣a* (a deviation from the authentic tradition of Islam).   We, however, must not forget that both modernists and Islamists basically admired the classical Sufis while being critical of contemporary Sufism (Ernst 1997, 200, 203).   They distinguished the right Sufis from the lapsed ones and praised the former and criticized the latter.   Even if all of the Sufis that they encountered were lapsed, they did not conclude that Sufism as such was evil and wrong.   In effect, they were criticizing Sufism's axis Z (sometimes also the axis Y), which deviated from the authentic tradition of Islam, i.e. the axis X of Sufism.   It was extremely rare for them to criticize all of the aspects of Sufism including its axis X.

Although we have not yet determined who first denied Sufism as such, the official Islam of contemporary Saudi Arabia has the following position.   Al-Junayd, who is generally venerated as a representative of classical Sufism by most Muslims, is not considered a Sufi but rather a right saint (*wali salih*).   Thus, Sufism itself is denied.[4]   Therefore we can conclude that from the viewpoint of the official Islam of Saudi Arabia, Sufism is composed of only the axes Y and Z, and that Sufism does not truly encompass the axis X.

Not only such a theoretical criticism but also the suppression of Sufism by states caused its decline. Colonialist bureaucrats and after independence government officials labeled Sufism as obsolete superstition and suppressed it because Sufism's power to organize people was a threat to them.[5]   They especially feared the axis Z of Sufism.   The state suppression of Sufism by nationalist or socialist governments was seen in Turkey, the

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eras should be emphasized more than the discontinuity, and therefore warned others to be careful when using this notion. At the same time, however, they admitted the transformation of the organization of *tariqa*s toward centralization.   The most comprehensive work on the arguments in modern and contemporary Sufism is (Sirriyeh 1999).   This is very handy and informative, but not entirely original, partly because it mainly depends on secondary sources.

[4] The notion of 'wali has its basis in the Qur'an (e.g. 10: 62-63), and belief in its existence is stated in the Islamic creed. Therefore 'wali as such does not necessarily have a connection with Sufism.

[5] More strictly speaking, the power of *tariqa* rather than Sufism was felt to be a threat.   This is because 'fundamentalistic' leaders of *tariqa* s were contrasted with *marabouts* who were considered to be ignorant and easy to control in Maghrib states. See (O'Fahey and Radtke 1993, 61-62)

former Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China.

One scholar termed this phenomenon 'state anti-Sufism' (Sirriyeh 1999, 153-160). This notion underlines the fact that the decline of Sufism in some regions of the Islamic world derived from state suppression rather than theoretical criticism. The suppression was practiced through the banning of political involvement of the *tariqa* members and of the forfeiture of *waqf* (immovables of endowment) from *tariqa*s.

Generally speaking, the modern age is considered to be a period of decline for Sufism. I, however, would like to point out that this opinion was mainly based on the cases in Mashriq and Turkey. This idea of decline should be reconsidered through a comparison of these regions with other areas such as sub-Saharan Africa and of that period with the contemporary period.

2. Sufism and other trends

Sufism has tried to rebut the criticism leveled by the proponents of modernism, Islamism and nationalism. Sufism has also at times had affinities with these trends.

Idries Shah, a contemporary Sufi, "presents Sufism not as mystical Islam but as a psychological method for apprehending reality"(Ernst 1997, 225) against the modernist criticism that Sufism is irrational superstition. Sufis claim that their belief is in complete accordance with the Qur'an and prophetic sunna in response to the criticism from Islamism that Sufism is *bid'a*. This claim of Sufis can be seen in the expression '*al-tasawwuf al-sunni*' (Sunni Sufism), which is often used in the Arab world.[6] This '*al-tasawwuf al-sunni* claims that Sufism is based on its axis X and is similar to the intention of the compilers of the classical manuals of Sufism in the third phase of the classical period (roughly between 950 and 1150). The emphasis on the axis X suggests that Sufism has the same basis as Islamism.

Although Sufism was often suppressed by the secular nationalists who took control of government after independence from the colonial suzerain, Sufis themselves were the representatives of religious nationalism. Shaykh Muhammad 'Abd Allāh Hasan, who was called 'mad mulla' by the colonialists, is considered the father of the Somali nation even today, and the Sanusiya order played a major role in the formation of the national identity of Libya. Therefore, we can conclude that the government suppressed Sufism because it was a potential rival to the secular nationalists. At the same time, if a government was able to exploit Sufism, it could become a powerful supporter. An example can be seen in the attitude of the political leaders of Pakistan when they "attempted to redefine Sufi shrines in terms of a national ideology (Ernst 1997, 209)."

3. Universal Mysticism and Sufism

In the late 18th century some orientalists began to depict Sufis as free thinkers who did not dwell on the legality of Islam. The same opinion can be observed even in the contemporary period.

Professor Carl Ernst reported his experience when he gave a public lecture in Washington, D.C. According to his account, after the speech Iranians and Afghans exiled from their homelands claimed that Sufism had nothing to do with Islam. According to Ernst, "for those who had become alienated by

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[6] For example, al-Taftāzānī who was the head of Superior Council of Sufi *tariqa*s (*al-Majlis al-a'la lil-turuq al-sufiya*) in Egypt and vice-president of Cairo University, implied that their own Sufism is in the tradition of Sunni Sufism, which was originally formed by such authentic scholars as al-Ghazali. See (al-Taftāzānī 1983.)

fundamentalism, Islam had become the symbol of authoritarian oppression, while Sufism was the way to freedom and universality" (Ernst 1997, xvi).   Here one can observe an image of Sufism based solely on the axis Y, with the axes X and Z totally neglected, but also a universal mysticism that expands beyond the borders of Islam.   This phenomenon represents the expansion of the axis Y outside of Islam, and encompasses such Sufis as Javad Nurbakhsh, the present leader of the Ni'matullahiya order in Iran, who pays little attention to the *shari'a,* and Guru Bawa Muhaiyaddeen, who pretends a synthesis of Sufism and various Hindu teachings (Chittick 2000a, 31).[7]

III. Present and Future of Sufism

We have no doubt that understanding Islam is indispensable to understanding human history and the contemporary world.   Unfortunately, general image of Islam is distorted by the emphasis on Islamism (in the name of 'Islamic fundamentalism' or rather 'Islamic terrorism').   This emphasis has grown since the events of September 11, 2001.   I believe that most intellectuals already knew that it was inaccurate to represent Islam by fundamentalism.   The question then arises of what should be observed in order to understand Islam.

I do not propose that Sufism alone needs to be better understood, but I would like to underline that disregarding the power of Sufism is a mistake.   Partly because it is translated as 'Islamic mysticism,' Sufism can be considered to rely on scholars' sophistic arguments or to be a kind of superstitious cult, and it is often seen as having no influence on the contemporary world.   In contradiction to such beliefs, some observers hold that "[t]here is no stronger rival claim [to fundamentalist spokesmen] on these sources [of authority in the Islamic tradition] than in Sufism" (Ernst 1997, 213), and "[t]oday grass-roots Islam is far more likely to be inspired by Sufi teachers than by modernist intellectuals, who are cut off from the masses" (Chittick 2000a, 30).

Sufism is not only active and prevailing in the contemporary Islamic world but also has the potential to offer a vision of Islam in the future.

The axis X, which is the core of Sufism and also embodies the values of Islam, has played a role in the revival of Islam.   We can observe the activities of Sufism in the Islamic resurgence in Central Asia, Turkey and Sudan.   As I pointed out above, the revival of morals and commandments is the focus of the axis X, and there is no substantial difference between being a good Muslim and being a good Sufi.

There is a classic contrast between '*zahir*' (exterior) and '*batin*' (interior) in Islam, with the former being represented now by Islamists who want to bring *shari'a* into operation rather than by '*ulama*' who were its representatives in the premodern age.   On the other hand, it is still Sufis who represent the side of *batin*. We should consider that there are many common elements between Islamists and Sufis, although the former criticized the latter (or at least a part of the latter) in the modern era.[8]

The axis Z of Sufism can be understood as the crystallization of the wishes of the common people.   In the contemporary Islamic world, where there is a lack of hope for the future, the people's desire for the axis Z of Sufism remains alive.

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[7] The understanding of Sufism by modern westerners devoted to Sufism has the same tendency.

[8] Even if sometimes *'ulama'* and Sufis were in conflict with each other, collaboration between them was more common after Sufism attained authenticity at the end of the classical period.   It was also a common phenomenon that a single person could be both one of the *'ulama'* and a Sufi.

The opinion mentioned above that Sufism is a way to freedom and universalism is based on the axis Z as well as the axis Y.   When nationalism lost its general appeal, Islamism became an alternative.   When Islamism someday loses its appeal, a new alternative may be Sufism.   At the same time, as I already pointed out, the expansion of the axis Y may lead to the attainment of a universal level for Sufism beyond the borders of Islam.

Thus, Sufism vacillates between its similarity to Islamism and its expansion beyond the borders of Islam. When it emphasizes the axis X, Sufism asserts that it is Islam itself.   When it emphasizes the axis Y, which is deepened by the axis X, Sufism insists on being a spirituality which gives life to *fiqh* and Islamism.   On the other hand, when it emphasizes the axis Z, Sufism becomes critical of the exclusive attitudes of *fiqh* and Islamism and presents an alternative.   And when it tries to expand the axis Y, Sufism asserts that it does not belong to Islam alone but to human beings in general.

The varied potential of Sufism derives from its structure having plural axes.   It is the question of which axis is emphasized that has formed and still forms the history of Islam as well as the history of Sufism.❁

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A Muslim Perception of the Faith of Other Men in Seventeenth Century China

A Note on *Xizhen zhengda* (希眞正答 Correct Answers to Those Seeking for Truth)

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Ever since Wang Daiyu (王岱興 ca. 1592-ca. 1658), an ʿ*alīm* in Nanjing, wrote in 1642 the first serious Islamic text *Zhengjiao zhenquan* (正教眞詮 *The Real Commentary on the True Teaching*),[1] Chinese Muslim intellectuals composed books on various Islamic topics, like theology, philosophy and rites, and translated Arabic and Persian books into Chinese, many of which were related to Sufism, for about two centuries, from the middle of the seventeenth to the end of the nineteenth century.[2] As Murata thoughtfully observes, the rise of

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[1] It would seem difficult to regard as a mere coincidence that the *Han Kitāb* literary activity started in Nanjing, where the Jesuits sojourned and actively worked for spreading Catholicism. Sachiko Murata translated *Zhengjiao zhenquan* in English under the title *The First Islamic Classic in Chinese: Wang Daiyu's Real Commentary on the True Teaching*, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2017.

[2] Rokuro termed this period to be "the Renaissance in the history of Chinese Islam." It would not, however, be adequate to call it so, for the term "Renaissance" signifies the revival of a tradition once-existed but died out or was neglected, and in the history of Islam in China, there had been, so far as is known, no such preceding tradition at all before the seventeenth century. See Kuwata Rokuro 桑田六郎, "Minmatsu Shinsho no Kaiju 明末淸初の回儒," in *Shiratori Hakushi Kanrei Kinen Tōyōshi Ronso* 白鳥博士還曆記念東洋史論叢 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1925), pp. 377-378. Sino-Muslim scholarship can be divided into three periods: inception, flowering and Yunnan tradition. The period of inception is from 1642 to 1676 and represented by Wang Daiyu, Wu Sunqie (c. 1598-1698) and Zhang Zhong (1584-1670). The main centers of these Muslims' scholarly activities were Nanjing and Suzhou. The Muslim writers produced Islamic works for both their fellow Muslims at Jingtangs and non-Muslim Chinese intellectuals. In using Neo-Confucian philosophical terminology and concepts in explication of Islamic creed, they laid firm foundations of Sino-Muslim scholarly tradition for later Chinese 'ulamā' to follow. Ma Zhu, Liu Zhi and Jin Tianzhu (1736-1795), the three prominent figures in the period of flowering from 1673 to 1738. Ma Dexin (1794-1874) and his disciple Ma Lianyuan (1841-1903) who represents the third period of Sino-Muslim scholarship from the late eighteenth to the end of nineteenth century, called the period of Yunnan

Muslim literature in Chinese, often dubbed as *Han Kitāb* literature, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries represents "the first instance in which Muslims wrote major treatises in the language of one of the great, pre-existing intellectual traditions."[3]

Entirely surrounded by non-Muslims, Wang must have felt the urgent need to defend his religion and formulate his own understanding of other religions. In the preface of the first Chinese Muslim work, *Zhengjiao zhenquan*, he describes the general situation Muslims in China faced, the need for writing books in Chinese, and lauded his Islamic religion as superior to Chinese religions.[4] The whole work is dedicated to praising Islam by utilizing Neo-Confucian terms and concepts. But his clear understanding of his own religion in Chinese milieu is more vividly expressed in his short treatise *Xizhen zhengda* (希眞正答 *Correct Answers to Those Seeking for Truth*), compiled by his students, where he answers to all the questions on his religion by non-Muslim Chinese, proving eventually the superiority of Islam.

This paper attempts to analyze Wang's views on other religions in China. By carefully sifting through the expressions, terms and concepts used in the religious and philosophical dialogues Wang engaged in with non-Muslim Chinese, this paper highlights the challenges Muslim intellectuals had to face in seventeenth century China, and reveals how meticulously a Muslim ʿalīm countered the Three Teachings of China, namely, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism. ❀

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tradition, for the center of the Han Kitāb tradition moved from the east to the south-western province of Yunnan. While Muslim works in the first and second periods mainly dealt with such topics of Islamic religion as theology, philosophy and rites, those in the third period further included geography, astronomy, and literature and translation of the Qurʾān.

[3] Sachiko Murata, *Chinese Gleams of Sufi Light* (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2000), pp. 5-6: "… the first instance in which Muslims wrote major treatises in the language of one of the great, pre-existing intellectual traditions. Only the Indian, Buddhist, Greek, and Judeo-Christian traditions could compare with China in terms of the richness of philosophical, theological, cosmological, and psychological teachings. But Muslims never had to express themselves in the languages of any of those traditions. Wherever they went, they took their own languages with them – first Arabic, then Persian. Although Persia did have a pre-existing intellectual heritage, by the time Muslims began writing in Persian, the language had been totally transformed by Arabic. The other languages that were used to express Islamic learning, like Turkish and Urdu, were also in effect new creations of Islamic civilization itself. What the Chinese ulama did, then, was to write about Islam in a completely non-Islamic idiom. The only similar situation that had been experienced by Islamic civilization was the Muslim adoption of Greek thought during the first three or four centuries of Islam. The grand difference, however, is that the early Muslims wrote about Greek thought in Arabic, not in Greek, so they used Islamic terminology to make their points and they did not have to worry about responses by the Greek philosophers. In contrast, the Chinese ulama wrote in Chinese, so they had to use Neo-Confucian terminology. Their books were immediately printed and distributed, so they could not ignore the possible reactions of other Chinese intellectuals."

[4] "I began to explore nature and principle and the annalistic accounts and on the side turned to the various philosophers. As I came to some understanding of the general meaning, I felt that their argumentation was perverse and their way erroneous and mutually contradictory in places. Compared to Islam, they seemed as night and day. Though not wanting to speculate, I absurdly wished to leave worthy writings for posterity, to clarify [this matter] and arrive at correct [understanding]. So I met with the various thinkers and initiated much debate; though they persevered, they could not compete [with me], and I left them always in the wrong. Of those superior men who willingly submitted, every one regretted that there existed no complete guidebook to the Correct Teaching [Islam]." Jonathan N. Lipman, *Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp. 77-78.

Changes in the Correlates of Dietary Behaviors among Second-Generation Muslim Youth in France:

Re-Islamization or Demographic Changes?

✍ *Hiroshi Kojima*

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Objectives

- This study analyzes the two French data sets (MGIS 1992 and TeO 2008) to see if there are changing effects of the variation in ethnic composition and in sibling configuration on religious dietary restrictions among second-generation Muslims, in relation to the "Third Demographic Transition (TDT).

- This is an extension of Kojima (2017b) for the effects of media use and Kojima (2017a) for the effects of "Sibling Configuration Transition" on religious dietary restrictions among second-generation Muslims in West European societies.

3

Introduction -1

- "Third Demographic Transition (TDT) was proposed by Coleman (2006), originally indicating the changes in ethnic composition of population by the influx of immigrants and their higher fertility and intermarriage and more recently including the changes in the ethnic spatial distribution.

- The presenter would argue TDT also occurs among immigrant population as a whole and in each ethnic population: changes in population composition and spatial distribution as well as fertility transition, which accelerates intergenerational changes in social attitudes and behaviors by "sibship transition" through the effects suggested by Preston (1976).[4]

Introduction -2

- In postwar France Southern European and Algerian immigrants had a large share and the proportion of Muslims among the first- and second-generations was relatively low and the majority of them was Algerians: Fertility transition and subsequent "sibship transition" occurred among them earlier.

- After the oil crisis the share of Moroccans, Tunisian and Turkish population and their descendants increased among Muslim population and the ethnic composition and spatial distribution of Muslim population changed further.

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Introduction - 3

- Since the timing and speed of fertility transition differs by ethnic group and the spatial distribution also differs by ethnic group, TDT occurs inside French Muslim population.

- In relation to the "assimilationist" integration policy, deriving from the French Republican ideal, the difficulties in the integration of Muslim migrants and descendants have been politicized, but it may be caused by not only by the changes in ethnic composition and distribution but also by the "sibship transition" or "sibling configuration transition" among descendants.

6

Literature Review - 1

- Tribalat (2013) suggested that the changes in Islamic dietary practices among Muslim youth in the tabulation of MGIS and TeO survey data in France is the sign of "re-islamization" among more recent cohort, which may be accelerated by TDT and "sibship transition."

- But the changes may be caused the "islamization" of global food market (Bergeaud-Blackler 2012), increasing the supply of halal food and diversifying the demand.

7

Literature Review - 2

- Boubekeur (2016) suggests that "a young Islam-conscious population living in Europe seeking a *halal* way of life" emerged "since the early 2000s" and that "many of those European-born Muslims experiencing re-Islamization are experiencing a re-aiming of their Islamic heritage through an engaged religious sentiment," which may suggest the effects of changes in ethnic composition and distribution.

- She also argues that the new halal products for them has helped to broaden the base of consumers and/or potential activists by appealing to them on the levels of basic consumption and clear display of political opinion, suggesting the diversification of use.

8

Literature Review - 3

- Actually, Rodier (2014) found the diversification of halal food consumption among the Muslim youth in France and her table suggests that the second and younger sons in the secondary school are more likely to be "protest" halal food eaters and less likely to be "consumer" or "ascetic" eaters.

- The author's analysis of microdata from the Muslim International Student Survey in Japan indicated that having brothers has negative effects on halal food consumption (Kojima 2015b, Kojima et al. 2015).

- Since both draw on cross-section data, they cannot directly show the effects of "sibshjp transition." [9]

Literature Review - 4

- There do not seem to be any studies on the effects of sibling configuration on dietary practices among the second-generation Muslim youth in Europe.

- Kojima's (2017) recent analysis of TIES (The Integration of European Second-generation) data on the effects of Koran lessons suggested that the ethnic composition in the neighborhood has larger effects than the ethnic composition in schools.

- In France the second-generation Muslims are concentrated in some immediate suburbs of Paris and distant suburbs (New Towns) have different ethnic composition, suggesting the changes in ethnic spatial distribution. [10]

Literature Review - 5

- The multivariate analysis of French data by (Mathe et al. 2011) reveals that those who uses the shops in the neighborhood more frequently are more likely to consume halal food, which may suggest the effects of density of ethnic population in the neighborhood.

- Actually, past analyses of MGIS and TeO data sets reveal that there have been changes in the ethnic composition of respondents, in religious practices by ethnic group and religious, socio-economic and cultural characteristics of the same ethnic group.

- Therefore, it is likely that Islamic dietary restrictions were affected by TDT including ethnic composition, distribution and "sibship transition."

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Data -1

- Both MGIS (Mobilite Georgaphique et Insertion Sociale, 1992) and TeO (Trajectoires et Origines, 2008) were national surveys conducted jointly by INED (Institut National d'Etudes Demographiques) and INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques).

- MGIS included surveys of "immigrants," "natives of France" and "control group," but only the microdata for the "natives of France" (of Algerian/Moroccan origin in their twenties with religion) are used.

- For TeO (Trajectoires et Origines, 2008) the analysis is restricted to second-generation (self-self identified) Muslims in their twenties.

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Data -2

- For details on MGIS, please refer to Tribalat (1996). https://www.ined.fr/fr/publications/coeditions/de-l-immigration-a-l-assimilation/
- For details on Teo, please refer to Beauchemin et alii (2016) . https://www.ined.fr/fr/publications/grandes-enquetes/trajectoires-et-origines/

13

Methods - 1

- **Binary Logit Model by Sex:** Dependent Variables
- <u>MGIS</u>
- "Always Keep Religious Dietary Restrictions" (T1)
- "Always Fast during Ramadan" (Table 1)
- "Always Keep Religious Food Restrictions" (T2)
- "Always Keep Religious Drink Restrictions" (T2)
- <u>TeO</u>
- "Always Follow Religious Dietary Restrictions (T1)
- "Always Wear Religious Symbols" (Table 1)
- "Wearing Religious Jewelry" (Table 2)
- "Wearing Religious Clothing" (Table 2)

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Methods - 2

- **Independent Variables** (Dummies): 1) Living in Ile-de-France, 2) Born in Paris/suburbs, 3) Immigrant-majority neighborhood, 4) Age 20-24, 5) Higher education, 6) No work, 7) Ethnic homogamy, 8) Not Living with father, 9) Living with mother, 10) Native parent, 11) Mother tongue only at home, 12) Mother tongue and French at home, 13) Mother tongue school, 14) Religious school (TeO: Religious socialization), 15) # of Siblings: 0-1, 2, 3, 16) # of Older siblings: 0, 1, 2

- **Additional Ones** (Dummies): 1) Born in mosque-building prefecture, Turkish-origin, Moroccan-origin, Tunisian-origin **(Frequencies in Table 1)** [15]

Results - 1

- **Table 1.** MGIS "Religious Dietary Restrictions"
- <u>Positive Effects:</u>
- Males: Immigrant-majority neighborhood
- Females: Born in mosque-building prefecture, Ethnic homogamy, Living with mother, Mother tongue lessons
- <u>Negative Effects:</u>
- Males: Moroccan-origin, Not living with father, Native parent, Religious lessons, 0-1 Older sibling
- Females: Native parent, Religious lessons, 0-3 Siblings, 2 Older siblings

[16]

Results - 2

- Table 1. TeO "Religious Dietary Restrictions"
- Positive Effects:
- Males: Moroccan-origin, No work, Mother tongue lessons, Religious socialization, 2 Siblings
- Females: Immigrant-majority neighborhood, No work, Ethnic homogamy, Religious socialization
- Negative Effects:
- Males: Turkish-origin
- Females: Turkish-origin, Mother tongue only at home, Mother tongue and French at home, 0-2 Siblings

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Results - 3

- Table 1. MGIS "Fasting During Ramadan"
- Positive Effects:
- Males: Living in Ile-de-France, Immigrant-majority neighborhood, Living with mother, Mother tongue only at home
- Females: Born in mosque-building prefecture, No work, Ethnic homogamy, Living with mother, Mother tongue and French at home, Mother tongue lessons
- Negative Effects:
- Males: Born in Paris/suburbs, Native parent, 0-3 Siblings
- Females: Native parent, 2 Siblings, 2 Older siblings

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Results - 4

- Table 1. TeO "Wearing Religious Symbols"
- <u>Positive Effects:</u>
- Males: Native parent, 2 Siblings
- Females: Born in mosque-building prefecture, Immigrant-majority Neighborhood, Moroccan-origin, No work
- <u>Negative Effects:</u>
- Males: Higher education, No work
- Females: Living with mother

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Results - 5

- Table 2. MGIS "Religious Food Restrictions"
- <u>Positive Effects:</u>
- Males: Immigrant-majority neighborhood
- Females: Born in mosque-building prefecture, Higher education, Ethnic homogamy, Living with mother, Mother tongue only at home, Mother tongue lessons
- <u>Negative Effects:</u>
- Males: Moroccan-origin, Native parent, Religious lessons, 0-1 Sibling, 0-1 Older sibling
- Females: Native Parent, 2-3 Siblings, 2 Older siblings

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Results - 6

- Table 2. MGIS "Religious Drink Restrictions"
- Positive Effects:
- Males: Living in Ile-de-France, Immigrant-majority neighborhood, Higher education, Living with mother
- Females: No work, Ethnic homogamy, Living with mother, Mother tongue and French at home
- Negative Effects:
- Males: Not living with father, Native parent
- Female: Native parent, 2-3 Siblings

21

Results - 7

- Table 2. TeO "Wearing Religious Jewelry"
- Positive Effects:
- Males: Native parent, Religious socialization
- Females: Tunisian-origin, Not living with father, Native parent, Religious socialization
- Negative Effects:
- Males:
- Females: Living in Ile-de-France, Born in mosque-building prefecture, Ethnic homogamy

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Results - 8

- Table 2. TeO "Wearing Religious Clothing"
- Positive Effects:
- Males: No work, Ethnic homogamy, Native parent
- Females: Born in mosque-building prefecture, Immigrant-majority neighborhood, Moroccan-origin, No work, Ethnic homogamy, Religious socialization
- Negative Effects:
- Males: Turkish-origin
- Females: 0-1 Sibling

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Conclusion - 1

- It is difficult to directly ascertain the existence of "re-islamization" from this study alone, but there has been changes in Islamic dietary practices and their correlates between the early 1990s (MGIS) and the late 2000s (TeO).
- Some of the correlates may represent the demand factors which tend to reflect ethnic composition and sibling configuration, while others may reflect the supply factors which tend to reflect spatial distribution of population.
- The changes in population composition and its spatial distribution are parts of "Third Demographic Transition."

Conclusion - 2

- The results for MGIS show relatively large effects of region and sibling configuration, but they do not indicate significant effects of ethnicity possibly because of smaller sample size.

- The effects of region may reflect supply factors.

- But the results for TeO exhibit only few effects of region or sibling configuration and the effects of ethnicity are more evident.

- The results for TeO indicate that Moroccans are more diligent in religious practices than Algerians, which is different from the situation of immigrants indicated by MGIS, but it may be because former immigrants included higher percentage of *harki*.

Conclusion - 3

- Gender differences suggest that women are more heavily affected by socio-economic and family-related characteristics.

- Since social integration processes are multi-dimensional, there are differences in the correlates of dietary restrictions, fasting and wearing of symbols, which may be true for other aspects of social integration of the second-generation Muslim youth.

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Conclusion - 4

- Thus, the results of this study, showing the effects of ethnic composition, spatial distribution and sibling configuration, may have implications for the relationship between "Third Demographic Transition," "sibship transition" and "re-islamization" among the second-generation Muslim youth.

- In addition, the situation indicated by MGIS has implications for Japan where Muslim immigrants came in a relatively large number about three decades ago.

27

Turkish Interests
in the New Conditions of Middle East

✎ *Ganpurev Enkhbold*

National Intelligence Academy, Mongolia

Eurasia has long remained below the focus of international hard core politics during the Cold War. In the aftermath of the Cold War, however, it has become a leveling field both for the countries in the region and global actors such as USA, the EU, Russia, and China. These are followed by medium range regional powers Iran and Turkey as well.

The region of Middle East is witnessing a lot of critical events in the recent few years. Arab Spring, Syrian crisis and the rise of Islamic state were the main challenges in the region, furthermore, to the whole world. In these circumstances, Turkey played an important role for the events as a main regional power.

Since the beginning of the Syrian crisis in March 2011, Turkey has received largest amount of refugees (over 3 million people) comparing to other countries. Turkish government has also been actively cooperating with UNHCR and UNHCR provides policy and technical advice to the government of Turkey, including in the areas of protection such as registration, access to territory, documentation and legal counseling.

Besides the terrorist group of PKK (Kurdish Worker's Party), ISIS is threatening the people of Turkey and its government in the homeland. So Turkey has automatically chosen the way to combat against ISIS to secure its people and ensure the stability and security of the region.

Not so long ago, Turkey seemed to have found the elusive formula for foreign policy success. Its newly-adopted philosophy, "zero problems with neighbors," won praise both at home and abroad as Ankara reengaged with the Middle East following a half century of estrangement. It expanded business and trade links with Arab states, as well as Iran, lifted visa restrictions with neighboring countries, and even helped mediate some of the region's toughest disputes.

New conditions in the Middle East

Syrian crisis:

Syria constitutes an important case study of the recent Turkish foreign policy in action. Arguably, Turkey has been more actively engaged in Syria than any other Arab country in the context of the ongoing Arab revolutions. The policy towards Syria clearly highlights some of the broader generalizations made concerning the limits and contradictions of the grand strategy and regional leadership ambitions on the one hand, and adaptability and pragmatism in line with changing circumstances on the other. Two important limitations of Turkey's policy towards Syria should be identified from the outset, however. First, Turkey's efforts to play a leading role in terms of instigating regime change in Syria have hitherto failed to generate the desired impact. Secondly, Turkey, as a consequence of its over-activism in Syria and over-involvement in Syrian domestic politics, has been drawn, perhaps quite unintentio ally, into sectarian conflicts. This, in turn, has aggravated its relations with key regional powers like Iran and the central government in Iraq, whilst at the same time undermining its positive image in the region.

With the extending presence of Syrian refugees on Turkish soil, perspectives has shifted from short term protection and humanitarian assistance to longer term presence and social and economic integration of Syrian refugees in Turkey. However, on the other hand, from Turkey's perspective, it will be more challenging and risky, if internal conflict of Islamic world turns into terrorist activities and causes more critical issues in regional stability and collaboration.

Russia and Turkey took different paths in the beginning of the Syrian crisis. Despite their differences in Syrian issue, cooperation on security and energy sector continued. Turkey's point of view in the crisis started to change due to the waves of terrorist attacks by ISIS. They need to secure own country. In order to do this, Turkey has to supple the conflicts around them and ensure stability in the region. Turkey was aware of the fact that it needed to be effective in Syria to be successful against terrorism.

In the Northern Syria, the US's acts were conflicting with the Turkey's interest. Turkey expects to cooperate with Russia in order to solve the problem between them. Furthermore, Russian and Turkish officials claimed that they could launch joint and coordinated operations against ISIS.[1]

Recently, Russia, Turkey and Iran agreed to create four de-escalation zones in Syria, in the latest effort to resolve that country's six-year conflict. All three countries are sponsors of the latest round of ceasefire talks underway in Astana, Kazakhstan, and a largely ignored ceasefire that was signed late last year. Russia and Iran are both key backers of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, while Turkey supports Syrian opposition forces.

Threat of the Islamic state:

Turkey has witnessed a number of attacks against its security forces, especially in the border zone with Syria. These were claimed by ISIS and Kurdish forces opposing the Turkish government's intervention in the Syrian conflict. Terrorist activity in Turkey is escalating, as the country becomes more involved in the Syrian conflict.

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[1] Kh. Selenge, "Russian New Triangle Policy in the Middle East", World Affairs, 2016

Turkey is seen as key country to any fight against ISIS or Assad; it bears the brunt of Syrian migration, controlling the flow of Syrians into Europe, and Turkey's agreement allowing the US to use its bases for airstrikes against ISIS bolstered US capabilities significantly. Turkey has been active in its own air campaign against targets inside Iraq and Syria, but seemingly with more of an emphasis on striking Kurdish targets than ISIS

Turkish interests

Middleman policy:

The accelerated geopolitical focus on Eurasia as the leveling field for multilateral global politics has put forth several challenges as well as windows of opportunity on part of Turkey as well. The geopolitical position of Turkey poses window of opportunity which Turkey has not been able to fully exploit yet in a multidimensional way such as energy politics, security, political and economic issues. Next, another window of opportunity has been the economic and political potential Turkey in its bilateral relations with the individual countries concerned in Eurasia region. However, the challenge in this context has been mainly twofold. The first one relates to existence of the powerful actors in the region and Turkey's inability to strategically interact in this environment as such. Second relates to misperceptions of Turkey regarding its power in international relations while seeking a normative standing simultaneously with reference to underlined emphasis of its history and long standing civilizational aspects in its foreign policy.

Finally, Turkey has become involved in mediating several conflicts in the region. It was accepted in this role by the regional countries as well as international actors. Most significantly Turkey was a mediator between Israel and Syria; Hamas and Fatah as well as among different factions in Iraq and Lebanon. The TESEV survey in 2010 demonstrated that 78 percent in the Arab world thinks that Turkey should play a mediatory role in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The implementation of these policies is not without complexities. There are significant challenges Turkey has been facing in its foreign policy in the Middle East. The region itself is in flux once again after the Arab Spring.[2]

Ankara sits at the center of a vast web of geopolitical relationships, most of which interact with each other as well as with it, but all of which can be seriously perturbed by changes in Turkish policy. Turkey's multi-faceted geopolitical position gives it considerable leverage over the major European powers as well as Russia, the United States, and even China. Sooner or later, all great powers learn that they cannot hope to conduct a successful policy toward a very long list of countries and organizations without Turkish cooperation or acquiescence.

Future trends:

Not long ago, Turkey was hailed as an example of "moderate Islam," spreading its positive influence throughout the region. Western countries appreciated the fact that Turkey was using its strategic depth in the East, whereas Arab countries appreciated Turkey's strategic depth in the West. Turkey's bid for EU membership was very closely followed by the freedom and democracy-seeking masses of the Arab countries. Thus, the AKP

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2 Meliha B. Altunisik & Lenore G. Martin, "Making Sense of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East under AKP", 2014

built upon the legacy of the republic, taking steps to improve the political as well as economic climate - only to reverse these steps after 2011.

But a series of developments, including Israel's renewed savaging of Gaza, the overthrow of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and the destabilization of Syria by the final stage of the Arab uprisings of 2011 have utterly transformed this image. Turkey now has no neighbors with which it does not have major problems. And, long before the failed putsch of July 2016, President Erdoğan was engaged in rooting out Gülenist influence at home and abroad. Turkey has come to be seen as an atavistic autocracy that has badly lost its way. It is on the warpath against its own Kurds as well as those in Syria, who have been US allies in the fight to degrade Daesh - the so-called Islamic Caliphate. And it has taken sides in many intra-Arab quarrels.

Many of the shared purposes and all of the warmth have disappeared from US-Turkish relations. Turkey and America are on opposite sides of an increasing number of issues. These include how to handle Russia in the wake of its annexation of Crimea and intervention in Syria; how to deal with Iran, Israel, the Palestinians and the Kurds; what priority to assign to regime change in Syria; and whether to exploit or combat Salafi Jihadism there and elsewhere. In recent months, Turkey has tried to repair its international isolation by reaching out to U.S. adversaries like Iran and Russia as well as to Israel (which has become estranged from the United States)

America now needs Turkey much more than Turkey needs America to conduct its wars and carry out diplomacy in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Iran, Israel-Palestine, Egypt, and Afghanistan, not to mention the EU, NATO, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. This gives Turkey a bargaining position and freedom of maneuver in the current regional order that it lacked in the Cold War, when the Soviet Union was a menace that overhung everything else Turkey can now afford to adopt foreign policy positions independent of or even antagonistic to those of the United States.

In the case of Turkish foreign policy which is still in search of its soul regarding Eurasia and its region building processes, it is important to note that perception power does not meet its reality all the time and there is the need to reform and restructure policy options with the relative power concept in mind instead of clashing with power bases of the Eurasian region building, be it Russia, or the US or the EU.[3]

Conclusion

Turkey has become increasingly active, some may even say, assertive in its policies in the Middle East. At the same time, Turkey has claimed to develop a comprehensive foreign policy towards the region. Within this context, Turkey began to emphasize improving its relations with the regional countries, demonstrated an eagerness to play the role of a mediator, promoted its soft power, and engaged in increasing economic relations with the region. This is a change from Turkey's traditional foreign policy that looked West more than East or South. Turkey's involvement in the Middle East has also led to discussions as to its implications for Turkey's relations with the USA and the EU, its traditional allies.

With a view to seek and sustain stability and peace, Turkey approaches the regional challenges with a long-

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[3] Esra Lagro, "The Significance and Impact of Relative Power on Region-Building in Eurasia: the Case of Turkey", World Affairs, 2016

term perspective. In this regard, instead of seeking and supporting short-term and tentative solutions, Turkey proactively pursues sustainable solutions that are in line with the realities on the ground and that are in line with the expectations of the people of the region.

Up to the present time, Turkey's main priority with regard to Syria was to collapse the government of President Bashar Assad, but Ankara has been changing its tone on the issue as of late. The issue of fighting against terrorism and containing insecurity in Syria has apparently become a more important concern for Turkey, and it had turned into a common figure for Turkey's cooperation with Russia and Iran, which are strongly supporting Assad's government in the face of the opposition.

Turkey has to find a way out, not only to thwart the threats directed at its peace and order, but also to lay the groundwork for peace and tranquility in the region. International efforts are underway to stop the carnage of ISIL. Turkey should give every support to this coalition, short of sending ground troops into Syria or Iraq. ❀

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3rd Session   Economy

13:30 - 15:30
Minerva Complex, International Conference Room (B2 F)

Chairman :   Kwon Hyung LEE
(Korea Institute for International Economy Policy)

1

Effect of Higher Education and R&D on Economic Growth of Resource Rich Countries

Sung Hyun SON (KIEP, Korea)

Discussant : Moamen GOUDA (HUFS, Korea)

2

Fund Capitalism in the Middle East since the Global Financial Crisis in 2008

Manabu SHIMIZU (Eurasian Consultant Ltd., Japan)

Discussant : Jae Wook JUNG (KIEP, Korea)

3

An Analysis of Construction of Economical Relationship between Asia and Middle East: As Case Study of Development from RCD to ECO

Soichiro TANAKA (Hitotsubashi University, Japan)

Discussant : Chanyong PARK (Andong National University, Korea)

4

Sectoral Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: Evidence from Egypt Governorates

Shimaa HANAFY (HUFS, Korea)

Discussant : Byeong Ho KIM (HUFS, Korea)

The Effect of Fixed Exchange Rates on Macroeconomic Policy of Oil Exporting Countries

✍ Sung Hyun Son

Korea Institute for International Economy Policy

This paper examines economic growth effect of higher education, R&D as well as resources in resources rich countries (RRCs) from 1996 to 2015 using system GMM. The empirical results show that resources are positive factors for economic growth of upper middle and high income RRCs, whereas they are negative factors for economic growth of lower middle and low income RRCs. Moreover, the empirical results suggest that R&D is a determinant factor for economic growth of upper middle and high income countries. This analysis confirms the outcome of previous researches emphasizing importance of R&D for economic catch-up. However, the results do not find a significant causal relationship between R&D, higher education and the economic growth in RRCs. This does not mean that R&D and higher education cannot be economic growth factors for RRCs. But it might be interpreted in a way that the absolute quantity of investment on R&D and human resources of RRCs have not been secured enough. In this regard, it is necessary that RRCs improve policies and increase investment on technology and human resources to go over the critical point where R&D and higher education affect economic growth.

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Introduction and Literature Review

Introduction

- **There is agreement among economists and policy makers that technological innovation is a fundamental factor in economic growth.**

- **Lee & Kim(2009) argued that secondary education and institution are important variables for economic development of lower income countries.**

- **On the other hand, technology and tertiary education matter as determinants of long-run economic growth of upper middle or high income countries.**

- **Research Question**

  - **Whether the outcomes of the analysis are applicable for resource rich countries(RRC) including oil rich economies in the Middle Eastern region?**

  - **Also, can natural resources be a driving force of growth for RRCs?**

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Introduction and Literature Review

Literature Review

- **According to previous studies, R&D expenditure and education have a causal relationship with economic growth.**

Researcher	D.V.	I.V	Result
Mankiw, Romer and Weil(1992)	GDP per capita(log)	Investment to GDP	+
		Secondary School Enrollment Ratio	+
Ulku(2004)	GDP per capita(log)	R&D Expenditure	+
Lee & Kim(2009)	GDP per capita(log)	Tertiary School Enrollment Ratio	+
		R&D Expenditure	+
Ari, Tingvall, Videnord(2015)	GDP per capita(log)	R&D Expenditure(EU)	?
		R&D Expenditure(USA)	+

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Empirical Approach

Estimation Methodology:

- **Fixed effect model**
  - Time-varying country effects are not controlled.
  - Endogeneity may be present.

- **System GMM(Generalized Method of Moment)**
  - GMM corrects for unobserved country heterogeniety, omitted variable bias, measurement error, and potential endogeneity which are likely to affect the variable.

$$y_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 y_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 INST_{i,t} + \beta_3 POL_{i,t} + \beta_4 PGROW_{i,t} + \beta_5 RESO_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

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Empirical Approach

Data

- **Period: 1996~2015**

  - The dependent variable is the average of the log of GDP per capita for the three
    year periods starting from 1995-1997, except the years 2014-2015.

- **Number of Countries: 112**

  - Income classification: World Bank country classification by income level

  - Resource classification: IMF(2012)

GNI Classification(USD)		Non-resource Rich Countries	Resource Rich Countries
Low income	low-income (less than 1,005)	4	2
	Lower-middle income (1,006~3,955)	18	9
High income	Upper-middle-income (3,956~12,235)	22	14
	high-income (12,236 or more)	36	7

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Empirical Approach

Variables

Variables Name	Period	No. of Countries	Source
GDP per capita(log)	1996-2015	112	World Bank
population growth rate	1996-2015	112	World Bank
Executive constraints	1996-2015	112	Polity IV Dataset
Enrollment rate of secondary education	1996-2015	112	World Bank
Enrollment rate of tertiary education	1996-2015	112	World Bank
Number of patents per million	1996-2015	112	WIPO
R&D(% of GDP)	1996-2015	112	World Bank
Resources(% of GDP)	1996-2015	112	World Bank
Trade (% of GDP)	1996-2015	112	UNESCO

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Empirical Approach

Descriptive Statistics

Variables Name	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
GDP per capita(log)	780	8.858	1.425	5.428	11.592
Population growth rate	784	1.157	1.469	-1.784	14.986
Executive constraints	757	3.917	10.434	-88	7
Enrollment rate of secondary education	672	87.052	24.678	5.995	165.810
Enrollment rate of tertiary education	668	40.450	25.090	0.337	113.872
Number of patents per million	784	140.205	370.980	0	3279.500
R&D(% of GDP)	602	0.956	0.942	0.009	4.277
Resources(% of GDP)	779	5.519	8.955	0	63.307
Trade (% of GDP)	776	87.404	52.553	16.217	417.262

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Analysis Result

Determinants of Economic Growth

Variables	Fixed Effect	System GMM
GDP per capita of previous period	0.0273*** (0.9149)	0.0423*** (0.9658)
Population growth	0.1516*** (0.0230)	0.3060 (.6183)
Executive constraints	0.0001 (0.0015)	0.0563* (0.0290)
Enrollment rate of secondary education	0.0077*** (0.0010)	0.0646*** (0.0075)
Enrollment rate of tertiary education	0.0083*** (0.0008)	-0.0239* (.0126)
Number of patents per million	.0001** (0.0000)	0.0031* (0.0017)
R&D(% of GDP)	0.0290 (0.0391)	1.1551* (0.5917)
Trade(% of GDP)	0.0006 (0.0005)	0.0154** (0.0051)
Resources(% of GDP)	0.0060 (0.0037)	0.0939** (0.0331)
Number of Observations	485	485
R2	0.642	-
Sargan	-	-0.49[0.309]
AR(2)	-	14.97[0.624]

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Analysis Result

Income Level and Determinants of Economic Growth

Variables	High Income Countries		Low Income Countries	
	Fixed Effect	System GMM	Fixed Effect	System GMM
GDP per capita of previous period	0.0483***	0.0212***	0.0088***	0.0075***
	(0.0336)	(0.0363)	(0.0668)	(0.0649)
Population growth	0.1246***	1.6415***	0.1908***	0.7869
	(0.0223)	(0.5616)	(0.0619)	(0.5449)
Executive constraints	0.0023	0.0585	-0.0003	-0.0020
	(0.0032)	(0.0510)	(0.0020)	(0.0092)
Enrollment rate of secondary education	0.0049***	0.0639***	0.0202***	0.0367*
	(0.0009)	(0.0080)	(0.0030)	(0.0213)
Enrollment rate of tertiary education	0.0080***	-0.0094	0.0132***	0.0190
	(0..0007)	(0.0129)	(0.0034)	(0.0282)
Number of patents per million	0.0002**	0.0027*	-0.0017	0.0605
	(0.0001)	(0.0015)	(0.0017)	(0.0508)
R&D(% of GDP)	0.0677*	1.1473**	-0.0782	0.3790
	(0.0349)	(0.5655)	(0.1889)	(1.1854)
Trade(% of GDP)	0.0008	0.0043	0.0001	0.0246**
	(0.0006)	(0.0039)	(0.0015)	(0.0106)
Resources(% of GDP)	0.0059	0.0367	-0.0101	0.0008
	(0.0048)	(0.0286)	(0.0069)	(0.0212)
Number of Observations	369	369	116	116
R2	0.606	-	0.622	-
Sargan	-	23.41[0.037]	-	6.59[0.922]
AR(2)	-	-0.49[0.626]	-	0.95[0.342]

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Analysis Result

Resources and Determinants of Economic Growth

| Variables	Resource Rich Countries	
	Fixed Effect	System GMM
GDP per capita of previous period	0.2499***	0.0117***
	(0.0865)	(0.0355)
Population growth	0.2029***	0.1037
	(0.0517)	(0.2686)
Executive constraints	-.0010	0.0174
	(0.0043)	(0.0151)
Enrollment rate of secondary education	0.0114***	0.0815***
	(0.0033)	(0.0123)
Enrollment rate of tertiary education	0.0097***	-0.0080
	(0.0031)	(0.0144)
Number of patents per million	0.0004	0.0049
	(0.0009)	(0.0046)
R&D(% of GDP)	-0.4145**	0.0167
	(0.2064)	(0.9185)
Trade(% of GDP)	-0.0021	0.0171**
	(0.0022)	(0.0071)
Resources(% of GDP)	-0.0002	0.0240**
	(0.0057)	(0.0097)
Number of Observations	93	93
R2	0.640	-
Sargan	-	13.36[0.421]
AR(2)	-	0.14[0.892]

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Analysis Result

Resources, Income Level and Determinants of Economic Growth

Variables	High Income Resource Rich Countries		Low Income Resource Rich Countries	
	Fixed Effect	System GMM	Fixed Effect	System GMM
GDP per capita of previous period	0.0042***	0.0368***	0.4227***	0.0240***
	(0.1013)	0.0457	(0.1937)	(0.2307)
Population growth	0.1504***	0.0967	0.3298*	0.5913**
	(0.0332)	(0.3688)	(0.1643)	(0.2525)
Executive constraints	.0036	0.0110	-0.0098	0.0028
	(0.0032)	(0.0302)	(0.0079)	(0.0110)
Enrollment rate of secondary education	0.0056**	0.0845***	0.0253***	0.0733***
	(0.0023)	(0.0158)	(0.0080)	(0.0128)
Enrollment rate of tertiary education	0.0080***	0.0003	0.0057	-0.0331
	(0.0008)	(0.0129)	(0.0083)	(0.0243)
Number of patents per million	0.0008	0.0039	-0.0029	0.0227
	(0.0005)	(0.0041)	(0.0044)	(0.0286)
R&D(% of GDP)	-0.1095	-0.5661	-0.7639	3.2059
	0.1170	(0.9175)	(0.7974)	(1.5053)
Trade(% of GDP)	-0.0086**	0.0179	-0.0018	0.0139
	(0.0032)	(0.0156)	(0.0033)	(0.0084)
Resources(% of GDP)	0.0153**	0.0271**	-0.0174	-0.0300**
	(0.0061)	(0.0114)	(0.0103)	(0.0141)
Number of Observations	55	55	38	38
R2	0.872	-		
Sargan	-	15.19[0.231]		4.82[0.682]
AR(2)	-	-0.04[0.967]		0.68[0.498]

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Analysis Result

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Conclusion

▪ **The empirical results show that resources are positive factors for economic growth of upper middle and high income RRCs, whereas they are negative factors for economic growth of lower middle and low income RRCs.**

▪ **Moreover, the empirical results suggest that R&D is a determinant factor for economic growth of upper middle and high income countries.**

▪ **This analysis confirms the outcome of previous researches emphasizing importance of R&D for economic catch-up.**

▪ **However, the results do not find a significant causal relationship between R&D, higher education and the economic growth in RRCs.**

▪ **This does not mean that R&D and higher education cannot be economic growth factors for RRCs. But it might be interpreted in a way that the absolute quantity of investment on R&D and human resources of RRCs have not been secured enough.**

▪ **It is necessary that RRCs improve policies and increase investment on technology and human resources to go over the critical point where R&D and higher education affect economic growth.**

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Fund Capitalism in the Middle East since the Global Financial Crisis in 2008

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Resume

The financial crisis in 2008 originated in the US and expanded to the whole world exposed the potential explosive danger of the present financial system.   The major characteristics was that the crisis in the financial sector itself played "independently" and caused the economic crisis in the "real" sector. It is usually normal that any economic crisis manifests itself in the form of financial crisis. However, the apparent "independence" of the financial sector could be a new implication of the world economy at present. This is a result of economic globalization accompanied by the finacialization. The financialization expanded horizontally and deepened vertically in the world including the developing countries. One aspect of Islamic finance is a deepening of financialization. Another characteristic in the financial sector is an increasing guiding role of various investment funds in managing the financial market making use of financial commodities of derivatives such as future trades, options, and swaps.

   It is necessary therefore to understand and analyze the economic transformation in the Middle East taking into account the above mentioned features. My presentation tries to approach to the issue by taking up the following topics which are mutually related .

   1. The characteristics of the financial crisis in 2008 from a historical point of view and new potent orientations of economic policies under the Trump administration。

   2. Major topics to be discussed with special reference to the Middle East

   ① Reorganization of asset funds and gigantic volume of assets under them.
   ② The expansion of SWFs (Sovereign Wealth Funds) of the Gulf countries and their active investment in the developed economies.
   ③ The planned IPO (Initial Public Offering) of the nationalized oil company Saudi Aramco and its

economic and political implication.

④ Deepening of interrelations among various industries through the development of ICT. A typical business model of "Soft Bank" Group Corporation and its M&A activities combining AI and finance

SoftBank is sitting on a massive cash pile thanks to a nearly $100 Billion technology fund it started with the Saudi Arabian government.

⑤ Development of virtual currency (bitcoin etc.) and its implications

Tentative conclusion

Tentative preliminary memos related to the presentation

(1) Reorganization of asset funds and gigantic volume of assets under them.

Through the crisis in 2008 and since then, global investment banking industry, asset management industry, private equity/venture capital industry and hedge fund industry were reorganized.

(2) The expansion of SWFs (Sovereign Wealth Funds) of the Gulf countries and their active investment in the developed economies since 2008. The representative SWFs are ADIA(Abu Dhabi), DIC (Dubai), KIA (Kuwait) , QIA (Qatar) and SAMA(Saudi Arabia).

(3) The planned IPO of the Saudi Aramco and its implication

In the beginning of 1916 Saudi Arabia announced its plan to offer to the public a part of the shares of the state oil company, Saudi Aramco, in order to invest the revenue in various programs, particularly related to the Vision in 2030. The IPO could be the biggest one even if its 5 percent of shares goes to the public. Saudi Arabia expects the market value of total shares of the company could be 2 trillion US which is equivalent to almost half of GDP of Germany. In order to make Aramco more attractive to the investors corporate income was lowered from 85% to 50%. However the IPO will give to these share holders potential right to have their say in the management of the company The Aramco IPO will be an important test case for any state companies in the Middle East to be privatized in the global financial market.

(4) Deepening of interrelations among various industries through the development of ICT. Establishment of an investment fund with Saudi Arabia. Japan's Soft Bank Group Corporation is expected to contribute 25 bil.US$ while Saudi Arabia promises to contribute 45bil.US$ to the fund.   The business model of "Soft Bank" Group Corporation and its M&A activities combining AI and finance

Soft Bank is one of the leading venture company in Japan which tried to combine ICT industry with other related industries including mobiles, IoT, and AI through M&A in the global arena supported by finances from various sources. At present AI and IoT are expected to contribute to the rapid economic development free

from the legacies inherited from the past. The Gulf oil exporting countries are more serious than before in taking up projects which turn their oil dependent economies to less oil dependent economic and industrial structure. Now venture capital, finance, industry and computer industry are mutually interrelated and

(5) Development of virtual currency and its implications

The rapid development of virtual money such as bit-coin and so on is a new phenomenon. The virtual money system exists on the computer platform and used as transaction medium in trade and remittance domestically as well as trans-nationally. Sometimes refugees depend upon the system to transmit their assets in order to avoid troubles on dangerous routes. The fundamental characteristic of virtual money is run by the participants autonomously and there is no authority who control and manage the system. Any national currency is under the control of central bank which usually issues the national currency and executes monetary policies. In other words the virtual money challenges the economic and monetary sovereignty of nation states. It is to be noted in the politically turbulent areas including the Middle East the international transactions could be promoted through the medium of virtual money

Appendix: Additional Reference

1. <u>Financial Crisis in 2008 and its implications</u>

About nine years have passed since the financial crisis which broke out and expanded globally in September 2009 in the US. At that time the crisis was characterized as the most serious economic and financial crisis in the last hundred years as the most damaging one after the world recession in 1929. Many countries struggled to come out from the damaging impact on the economies. On the surface the global economic system apparently managed to overcome the most critical moment and at present the world economy enjoys a certain level of recovery. However, we have to take into account the characteristics and causes of the economic and financial crisis in 2008 in order to face another probable outbreak of similar ones in the future.

The crisis in 2008 seems to be an inevitable result of economic globalization accompanied by financialization since 1971 when President Nixon announced the termination of convertibility of US Dollars with the Gold which led to the "floating" of major currencies. In due time we observed a tendency of excessive supply of money over the rates of actual economic growth, which promoted various arenas of "money games" where investors engage in getting revenues through transactions in financial market instead of investment in the real economy. The tendency was an accelerator of financial globalization. The Trump administration is sometimes criticized as anti-globalization. However, in spite of the slogan of "America First", it is to be noted that there is no programs to introducing any restrictive measures against liberalization of globalizing financial system.

2. <u>Fund Capitalism in the Middle East</u>

The Middle East was involved in the globalization and financialization of world economy since the

beginning of 1970s. In the first place the predominant weight of oil in the global trade the US put a special emphasis on the importance of dollar-denomination of oil exported from the Middle East mainly from the Gulf in order to stabilize the value of US dollar. In the second place, the so-called oil money accumulated in the Gulf began to play an important role in supplying credit to the world economy including the developing countries since the first oil crisis in 1973 and the second oil crisis in 1979.

The new stage of oil money manifested itself since the beginning of this century in the voluminous rise of financial assets under the control of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) owned by the Gulf countries.

The new feature in this century is that the SWFs take more independent decisions in their investment policies than in the period of 1970s and 1980s when the guiding role of the multinational huge western banks was more pronounced.

3. The Unconventional Policy Tools to come out of the Crisis

The seriousness and huge influence of the Lehman shock are reflected in the monetary and economic policies which were implemented after the crisis in order to find ways to come out of the wide and deep recession. Monetary and financial authorities in the developed economies took recourse to the so-called unprecedented and unconventional policy tools such as "minus" rate of interest to encourage investment and consumption. The FRB, Central Bank of Europe and Bank of Japan took various measures for monetary quantitative expansion. For example, Bank of Japan set a target of annual rise of 2 percent of price index in 2014 expecting the inflation would play an encouraging role for economic growth out of the "lost two decades." This concept of "inflation target" is opposite the traditional one in the sense that the latter was formulated to control the inflation and not to encourage the inflation. The policy tool for Bank of Japan designed for the achievement of the target has been to purchase state bonds, ETFs and other securities according to the pre-planned schedule in an unprecedented pace and scale. However the result was a big failure from a viewpoint of the realization of inflation target without indicating any useful alternatives for the recovery of economic stagnation..

4. The US Dollar and Oil

In the world economic system since 1970s it is necessary to take into account the role of oil to stabilize the US dollar taking the place of gold. The price of oil traded between the US and the oil exporting countries in the Middle East was nominated in the US Dollar, which reflected the mutual economic and strategical interests of the US and the Gulf..The dollar-nominated trade interactions of oil was set firmly as the international standard. Oil occupies about half of the international trade in value. Therefore the dollar-based international trade of oil was an alternative measure to support the value of US Dollar instead of gold. This strategic alliance between the US and the oil exporting countries mainly in the Gulf played a very important role from a viewpoint of international currency system in the period of Post-Bretton Woods. The stability and strength of the US Dollar supports the strategic superiority of the US in the world politics. It should be noticed that the Middle East played an important role in the international economic and financial world through the pricing standard as well as the well-known major oil supplier to the world commodity market. ✻

An Analysis of Construction of Economic Relationship between Asia and Middle East: As Case Study of Development From RCD to ECO

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Abstract

From perspective of "Regionalism", there are various regional organizations such as EU, ASEAN. At the same time, mega-regional economic cooperation could be also constructed across the regions. In this paper I discussed how the economic cooperation between Middle East and Asia had been developed.

I focused on the transition from Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) to Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) as case study. RCD was formed by "Northern Tier" which was composed of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan in 1964. After that, RCD was rebuilt institution and renamed as ECO in 1985. Through the comparison of two organizations about formation, activities, structure and performance, it could be clear that ECO had accomplished to develop interests of regional market more than RCD and expand membership with Central Asia. Especially, new Central Asian members would contribute to open economic cooperation with Asian region. Now ECO has been one of inevitable parts of Eurasian mega-regional cooperation like One Belt, One Road (OBOR).

Finally, I concluded "Détente", "Islamic revival" and the existences of pro-Islamic leaders could be three main factors which assisted the formation and development of two regional organizations.

Keyword

Regionalism, Regional cooperation, RCD, ECO, "Northern Tier", Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Muslim, Middle East, Central Asia, China, "Détente", "Islamic revival"

1. Introduction

Recently, the importance of "region" and "regionalism[16]" has been increased. In the world, some considerably regional organizations like EU or ASEAN, and regional cooperation projects have been developed. Of course, "region" is not equal with "regional organization" or such projects. "Region" is kind of deliberate elements and outcomes of "regionalism", and the latter should be more specific existence which has role and structure. Recently, the economic dimensions would be preceded in these movements, and mega (trans) -regional cooperation have been progressed[17]. One Belt, One Road (OBOR) which China has declared is one of the biggest mega-regional cooperation projects. This project has been shaped one belt economies (land) and one road economies (maritime) from mainland China, and included many regions[18].

Middle East is considered the place where is not only the material supply like oil or natural gas for development, but also the inevitable connection between Asia and Europe. Muslim populations in Central Asia would assist the cooperation with Middle East to develop their markets and variously economic cooperation[19].

In this paper, I have focused on the two regional organizations, Regional Cooperation for

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[16] We should consider the difference between "regionalism" and "regionalization". The former will mean kind of bodies of idea and concept, and the latter will be active elements, phenomenon, and outcomes of such idea. So I categorize alliance and economic cooperation in latter definition in this paper. (Source) Schulz, M., Söderbaum, F. and Öjendal, J. (2001) "Introduction: A Framework for Understanding Regionalization", in Schulz, Söderbaum and Öjendal Eds., *Regionalization in a Globalizaing World: A Comprative Perspective on Forms, Actors and Processes*, London: ZED Books, pp. 5-6.

[17] Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP) is one of them. This Mega-EPA has included through the region, Asia, Oceania, North and South America.

[18] Some media identified OBOR as "New Silk Road". This project will include almost 70 countries from East Europe to East Asia. (Source) CNN News "Just what is this One Belt, One Road thing anyway?", *12 May, 2017* (http://edition.cnn.com/2017/05/11/asia/china-one-belt-one-road-explainer/index.html)

[19] In near future, Asia-Pacific region will have the biggest Muslim population. These states will contain emergent markets. (Source) Pew Research Center "The Future of the Global Muslim Population", *15 January, 2017* (http://www.pewforum.org/interactives/muslim-population-graphic/)

Development (RCD) and Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) which expand the member between Middle East and Central Asia about activities and developed process from the former to the later. Through the analysis, I will discuss how Middle East and Asia had constructed economic relationship and will have promoted the cooperation in the future.

2. Issues

Historically Middle East region is one of the critical regions in the world politics where there were a lot of conflicts and wars among Europe, Russia, Africa and Asia. Such all of main regions were also connected at Middle East[20]. Since 18th century European imperialism had been advancing Middle East[21]. From late 19th to early 20th centuries, Middle East were divided into short states and oil supply made the situation more complicatedly[22]. After World War 2 was ended, Middle East was also involved into Cold War and shaped one of strategies of "containment" policy.

Especially, such as Turkey and Iran and Pakistan called "Northern Tier" had been emphasized the importance after modern era[23]. "Northern Tier" was kind of outside defense line to the western Arab region. At Cold War era, this frame was used by America and Great Britain to secure the Middle Eastern oil against Soviet invasion. "Northern Tier" had been regional core members of Western Alliance[24], Baghdad Pact and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

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[20] Kamp, G. and Harkavy, R. E. (1997) *Strategic Geography and Changing Middle East*, Washington: Booking Institution Press.

[21] At modern era, this area had been critical for Russia to secure warm naval. Great Britain thought Middle East could be essential to protect the way to India, "the jewel in the Crown In this case, Persia (Iran) was the main place for two powers. (Source) Pollack, K. M. (2004) *The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict between Iran and America*, New York: Bandon House Trade Paperbacks, Chapter 1.

[22] The origin of conflict between Palestine and Israel was made by immoral promise such as Hussain-MacMahn Correspondence (1915), Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), and Balfour Declaration (1917) while World War 1

[23] There are some variations of definitions about "Northern Tier". For example, Kuniholm, B. R. included Turkey, Iran, and Greece in that. On the other hands, U.S. Department of States had defined Turkey, Syria, and Iraq, and Iran and Pakistan were added afterward. This time, I emphasized whether the states were joined in Western Alliances or not. (Source) Kuniholm, B, R. (1994) *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great power conflict and diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press; U.S. Department of States, Foreign Relations of United States (FRUS), 1952-1954, Vol. 5, Part 2, pp.1638-1640.

[24] Baghdad Pact was established by Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, and U.K. at 1955. But Iraq seceded from Pact after revolution. Pact was reorganized and succeeded as CENTO by other four states. It could be considerable that America had never been proper member of these organizations, but preferred to assist them as observer. (Source) Göktepe, C. (2000) "The 'Forgotten Alliance'? Anglo-Turkish Relations and CENTO 1959-65", in Kedourie, S. Eds. *Seventy-Five Years of the Turkish Republic,* London: Frank Cass, pp.103-129.

RCD was established by only "Northern Tier" in 1964. The object of this organization was declared to cooperate at economic and cultural dimensions in regional members. So that RCD had coexisted with CENTO until Iranian revolution at 1979. After that, RCD was once dormant but 6 years later, recovered and reorganized as new organization, ECO at 1985. Three core members decided to expand membership toward Central Asia where were newly independent after collapse of Soviet Union (Picture 1). Until recently, ECO has accomplished more economic and cultural cooperation than RCD. Additionally expansion to Central Asia and Afghanistan has been important connection toward Asian regions for the future.

Accordingly for the analysis about economic cooperation between Middle East and Asia regions, I will emphasize the development from RCD to ECO as case study, and search the policy transition of regional members. Additionally, in this paper I will mainly apply the primary resources about RCD and ECO.

3. Previous Studies

In this chapter, I would like to discuss previous studies about "Northern Tier" and Arab region at post-war period. The origins of RCD and ECO would be in this era. Those will declare the relationships with the Western side and how they were included the containment policies in international politics as front line against Eastern side, serious influences of Soviet Union.

The main previous studies had analyzed the processes of constructions about alliances or competitions of initiative between America and Great Britain. In these discussions, they had emphasized how American hegemony was developed in Middle East running parallel with decolonization[25]. And it would be discussible the transition of defense line from Egypt (the Suez Canal) to "Northern Tier" showed the presence of Great Britain was transited to America gradually at Middle East[26].

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[25] Ashton, N. J. (1993) "The Hijacking of a Pact: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955-1958", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 19, (2), pp. 123-137; Jalal, A. (1989) "Toward the Baghdad Pact: South Asia and Middle East Defence in the Cold War, 1947-1955, *The International History Review*, Vol.XI, (3), pp.409-433; Jasse, R. L. (1991) "The Baghdad Pact: Cold war or colonialism", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.27, (1), pp.140-156.

[26] Freiberger, S. Z. (1992) *Dawn over Suez: The Rise of American Power in the Middle East 1953-1957*, Chicago: Ivan R, Dee; Hahn, P. L. (1991) *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Caroline Press; Reid, B. H. (1988) "The 'Northern Tier' and Baghdad Pact", in Young, J. W. Eds. *The Foreign Policy of Churchill`s Peacetime Administration 1951-1955*, London: Leicester University Press, pp.159-179;

Second approach had been focusing on the security policy around the Suez Crisis. In these discussions, comparing with first approach, they especially attached importance on 1950s when Great Britain withdrawal from Suez, and the Baghdad Pact was founded. From strategic importance, Great Britain had put the defensive line on the Suez Canal firstly. But Nasser, Egyptian president rose up Arab Nationalism and escalated to the Sues Canal Crisis[27]. For both America and Greta Britain, it would be the critical to take countermeasures against decreasing of Britain influences and increasing of regional nationalism because these were recognized as joint problem linked to constrain Soviet influences at region[28].

From above, generally main approach of previous studies tended to focus on withdrawal of Great Britain and decolonization, expansion of American initiative and collision with rising Arab Nationalism at post-war period in 1950s. Then "Northern Tier" had been treated beside establishing Baghdad Pact. The discussions had been concentrated on the pact from western perspective.

So That the investigations which included succeeding organizations, RCD (and ECO)had been limited[29]. About RCD, Asopa, S. K. and Chopra, S. had focused geopolitical importance especially for Pakistan toward conflict against India. Yeşilbursa, B. K. invesigated detail processes about formation of RCD using primary resouces. Wymar, B. considered non-economic dimension which boosted RCD[30]. About ECO, there are the analysises which focused on the activities and policies which mentioned "Silk

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Toru Onozawa (2016) *Illusory Alliance: American Regional Policy for the Middle East in the Early Cold War*, Nagoya: The University of Nagoya Press.

[27] The formation of Baghdad Pact could be one of main reasons to the confrontation with Nasser. (Source) Heikal, M. H. (1988) *Cutting the Lion's Tail: Suez through Egyptian Eyes*, Great Britain: Corgi Books; Sever, A. (2008) "The Reluctant Partner of the US over Suez? : Turkey and the Suez Crisis", in Smith, S. C. Eds. *Reassessing Suez 1956: New perspective on the crisis and its aftermath*, , Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, pp.123-132.

[28] For example, Yaqub discussed containment of Arab Nationalism through the Eisenhower Doctrine. (Source) Podeh, E. (1995) *The Quest for Hegemony in the Arab World: The Struggle over the Baghdad Pact*, Leiden: E. J. Brill; Seale, P. (1965) *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of post-war Arab politics 1945-1958*, New Haven: Yale University Press; Yaqub, S. (2004) *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Caroline Press.

[29] The analysis about CENTO is also underdeveloped. Cohen, M. J. and Göktepe, C. applied historical approach and discussed the diplomacy and structural transition from Baghdad Pact to CENTO. Cohen analyzed why America demanded the alliance by "Northern Tier" focusing on not only Suez but also defense of Britain oil interests at Kuwait. (Source) Cohen, M. J. (2005) *Strategy and Politics in the Middle East 1954-1960: Defending the Northern Tier*, New York: Frank Cass, Chapter 12; Göktepe, C. (2003) *British Foreign Policy toward Turkey 1959-1965*, London: Frank Cass.

[30] Asopa, S. K. (1971) *Military Alliance and Regional Cooperation in West Asia*, New Delhi: Meenakshi Prakashan; Chopra, S. (1992) *Pakistan's Thrust in the Muslim World: India as a Factor*, New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publication; Wymar, B. (1973) *Regional Cooperation for Development: Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey*, Phd Paper: The Graduate College in the University of Nebraska; Yeşilbursa, B. K. (2009) "The Formation of RCD: Regional Cooperation for development", *Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 45, (4), pp.637-660.

Road" behind the development[31].

RCD and ECO were formed by only regional members to assist economic and cultural cooperation. We should distinguished two organizations from Baghdad Pact and CENTO in this points. The importances of regional actors will have been rising in the international direction to regionalism. We will need non-western perspectives to investigate mega-regional behaviors, such as between Middle East and Asia, and RCD and ECO could be useful examples.

4. Analysis

I will analyze historical processes of formation, structure, activities and performances of both RCD and ECO. And to compare two institutions, we could be clear how they developed the institutions and contributed thier memvership toward Central Asian states. It must be considerabel that three regional states never abolish RCD, even though they experienced dynamic system transformations. This would mean regional members had put importance on the concept of regional organization and taken advantage of mega-regional cooperation in thier policies.

4-1. The historical processes about RCD

❏ **Formation**

RCD was decided to eatsbloshed at the Ministerial Conference (Firest Summit of RCD) hold at Istanbul from 20 to 21, July By Heads of States of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. Member states mentioned as the motivations of formation of RCD essentiality of regional cooperation to contribute national development, peace and stability[32].

On the first Joint Statement, the Heads of three regional states also indicate principle of cooperation of RCD and the general framework of organizational structure. Member states elected 10 principles (objects) of cooperation in the fields of trade, postal services, communication, tourism, education, health, agricultural, mineral resources, industry, technical assistance and cultural activities showing at Exhibit Table1.

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[31] I will use these researches at discussion of Chapter 4 as reference. (Source) Cordier, B. (1996) "The Economic Cooperation Organization: Towards a New Silk Road on the Ruins of the Cold War?", *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 15, (1), pp.47-57; Pomfret, R. (1997)"The Economic Cooperation Organization: Current Status and Future Prospects", *European-Asian Studies*, Vol. 45, (4), pp657-667.
[32] Joint Research Department Regional Cooperation for Development: Pakistan/ Turkey/ Iran #1114, July 21, 1964, in DO196/327; Regional Cooperation for Development (1965) *RCD Anniversary Publication*, pp.83-84.

In fact, America and Great Britain welcomed RCD movements apparently, but they had already paid attention to this movement whether three regional states tended to "neutralism" or demolishing CENTO before establishing RCD[33]. It had been clear that regional states felt dissatisfaction against CENTO framework because of getting no assistances to conflicts which they had faced at that time[34]. Additionally, RCD coexisted with CENTO, and these activities were overlapped mostly while the capitals had been so different between two organizations[35]. They would include no political intentions in the Principle of RCD to avoid serious conflict and suspicion toward Western Alliances.

❑   **Activities**

They also welcomed participation of other regional countries. Afghanistan and Indonesia were considered as candidate of new member of RCD. Pakistan had promoted expansion of RCD mainly. But Indonesia had been interested in association with Southeastern Asian states which resulted in ASEAN in 1967, more than RCD. Afghanistan would like to take care of relationship between Soviet and India. Turkey and Iran had little economic interests between Indonesia[36]. Then, from 1964 to 1979, RCD Membership had remained only original three states. About international relationship, since 1967, RCD decided to send Secretary General to some conferences on United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to make relationship and benefit from international activities[37].

❑   **Structure**

As organizational structure, they had set Ministerial Council as the highest decision-making body which was composed of the foreign ministers and other ministers if necessary, Regional Planning Council which was composed of the Heads of planning organization put at each member states, and The Working Committees which included 19 committees and the Secretariat which had responsibilities of activities of

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[33] Meeting of CENTO Regional Heads of States, 15 July, in FO371/175608/EB1014/14.

[34] In 1960s, Reginal members had faced some serious conflicts. Turkey competed with Greece about Cyprus, Iran countered to Nasserist ambitions and Pakistan had crashed into India at Kashmir. These must be one of origins regional policies were demanded. (Source) Meeting of CENTO Regional Foreign Ministers, July 7, in FO371/175608/EB1014/13.

[35] RCD was regarded as political ambition from Western side. CENTO was remained useful framework for regional members to cooperate to America and Britain. (Source) Meeting of CENTO Regional Foreign Ministers, 7 July, in FO371/175608/EB1014/13.

[36] Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan once had signed defense treaty, called Saadabad Pact, so Iran also approved to add Afghanistan into RCD. (Source) Joint Research Department Memorandum Regional Co-operation Memorandum: Pakistan/Turkey/Iran, 19 December, 1967, in FCO51/38/LR6/15.

[37] Shaida, H. (1967) *RCD: An Historical Necessity, Tehran*: A Management Services Publication, pp.135-136.

RCD[38].

Exhibit Figure1 will show the detailed roles of each departments and structures. These structures had been gradually but quickly constructed in first year. The lower parts assisted the upper parts and discussed actual projects. Headquarters of Secretariat was planned to be placed at members by rotations annually, but once putting on Tehran, never moved to other cities[39]. The Subsidiary Agencies which should assist specific economic activities of RCD were constructed from 1965 to 1967, except RCD joint airline[40]. And other Agencies also faced low capitals for performance.

❑   **Performance**

From 1964 to 1979, RCD accomplished various performances. In the first one year, RCD made some important agreements that they reached to reduce communicational rate (postal, telegraph, and telephone), bilateral trade agreement, tripartite agreement on tourism and bilateral agreement on the abolition of visas[41].

As actual economic activities, 19 Joint Purpose Enterprises were planned by each member states, and aluminum industry (Iran), chemical industries (Turkey) and banknote paper (Pakistan) were decided to aid. Finally, banknote paper project was activated as RCD joint enterprise[42]. Finally, only banknote paper project in Pakistan was adopted as Joint Purpose Enterprises of RCD. Other some Joint Projects was planned but those were developed by part of members or individual states.

The most considerable achievement of RCD could be regional movement of member states people.

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[38] About management of RCD, Heads of member states had decided detail agreements at Ministerial Pre-Summit held in Ankara from 18 to 19 July, 1964. Hasan-Ali Mansour, the Prime Minister of Iran, Ayub Khan, the President of Pakistan and İsmet İnönü, the Prime Minister of Turkey made agreements which included the Council of Ministers should held once in four months naturally, and the Council would be assited by "Regional Planing Committee", and the Committee would be assited by "Working Group". On the Communique of "Regional Planing Committee" held in Theran on 9 September, 1964, "Regional Planing Committee" had been charged responsibility to manege "Working Group" which had been renewed permanent committees. With this process, "Regional Planing Committee" was renamed Regional Planning Council. (Source) Decisions and Observations of the Summit Conference of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey Held at Istanbul on 21 July, 1964, #1114, July 21, 1964, in DO196/327; RCD Anniversary Publication, pp.85-88.

[39] Ibid.

[40] These were Insurance Centre, Joint Chamber of Commerce, Cultural Institute, Shipping Service, Reinsurance Pools and RCD Payment Union showing Figure 1. (Source) FCO51/38/LR6/15.

[41] Ibid.

[42] The Joint Purpose Enterprises were studied by Iran: electronics, aluminum, basic drugs and pharmaceuticals, dye stuffs, chemicals and lubricating oils; by Pakistan: motor vehicles, electrical machinery and equipment, heavy engineering goods, machine tools, banknotes, agricultural machinery and equipment; by Turkey: cement, locomotives, sugar, shipbuilding, iron and steel and coal. (Source) Ibid.

In 16 years of activities of RCD, by abolition of visas, a lot of students, journalists, researchers ware exchanged and various cultural exhibitions, seminars and symposiums had been held in regional cities. Government authorities were also assisted to visit each state in RCD cooperation framework.

4-2. The historical processes about ECO

❏ **Formation**

After Iranina revolution in 1979, CENTO was collapsed and RCD was stopped that activities. But in 1985, same original members decided to rebuild the regional institutions called ECO. The origin of ECO would be back to Treaty of Izmir in 1977[43]. Since early 1984, establishment of ECO would be started by Iraninan initiative[44]. Although the objects to assist revival of RCD had been different, member states share common opinions that RCD had been only dormant and renewed framework of RCD could be useful for development of regional economy[45].

As rebuilding the cooperation, ECO indicated the clear roles. ECO decided from general directions to concrete objects. Exhibit Table2 will indicate the detail of those. Although basic objects ware succeed from RCD, New institution identified the objects as promoting economic cooperation both regionally and internatinally[46].

The most considerale descision was expansion of ECO Membership toward Central Asia. At Tehran Summit, the First ECO Summit in 1992, representatives of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were attended the meeting, and original members, Turkey, Iran and Pakisitan had welcomed and approved Their pariciption[47]. After additional participation of Kazakhstan and

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[43] In 1977, Treaty was called "Protocol". The objective of Treaty of Izmir was reforming RCD activities. This became the basic line of ECO activities and expansion of ECO to Central Asia. (Source) Economic Cooperation Organization HP (http://www.eco.int/ftproot/Documents/Basics/Treaty_of_Izmir.doc).

[44] From the first, original members focused on the possibilities of new members. The candidate of new name of revival RCD was ASWAN (Association of South-West Asian Nations in that time. (Source) Revival of RCD, 17 January, 1984, in FCO9/4871/WST095/1/1.

[45] Reginal isolation after revolution would be critical issues for Iran. And both Turkey and Pakistan thought renewal of RCD should be useful opportunity to make various economic relations with Middle East. (Source) Ibid.

[46] Koolaee, E. (2010) *The Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) Achievement and Prospects*, Tehran: University of Tehran Press, pp.12-13, 145.

[47] Kyrgyzstan had attended ECO meeting since Tehran Summit. (Source) "1st Summit Communique" 16-17 Feburuary, 1992, ECO HP
(http://www.eco.int/ftproot/High_Level_Meetings/Summits/1st_Summit/TEHRAN%20COMMUNIQUE_first_summit.doc)

Afghanistan at Ashgabat Summit in 1996, full members of ECO signed New Izmir Treaty and developed objects of ECO to progress thier economic Coopreation in various fields[48].

❏ **Activities**

Member states dicsided as institutional objects, ECO developed economic relationships between other international or regional organization actively. From 1990s to 2000s, ECO had constructed Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with a lot of organizations, showing Exhibit Table3. We could focused on relationship with Asian region. New participations of Central Asian states after collapse of Soviet Union would open the door to Asia. At Ashgabat Summit in 1996, members confirmed not only close cooperation like natural gus and oil transport or connections of railroad, but also developed cooperations between ASEAN[49].

In 1996, China, Russia, and some Central Asian states formed "Shanghai Five" and developed that to The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001[50]. Recently almost Asian states have relationships with SCO. Then part of founding members of SCO, Central Asian states could be important intermediary for ECO to cooperate with Asian regions especially China[51]. In 2007, ECO and SCO reached MoU[52]. Generally, ECO accomplished to develpe the institution to take advantage of making relationship with other regional organization like SCO.

❏ **Structure**

Organizational Structure of ECO has developed structure more than RCD. ECO prepared more elaborate strcutures including Regional Institution and Specialized Agencies, showing at Exhibit Figure2.

The general structures had been decided in Treaty of Izmir[53]. The role of Council of Ministers (COM) is almost same as RCD. Council of Permanent Representatives (CPR) is charactristic section set up newly

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[48] Koolaee, *op.cit.*, p.12.

[49] ASEAN would provide some useful model how developing region succeeded economic cooperation. (Source) Pomfret, *op.cit.*; Koolaee, *op.cit.,* p.35-36.

[50] Shanghai Cooperation Organization HP (http://eng.sectsco.org/about_sc)

[51] "Shanghai Five" was started for regional security. SCO now has assited the collaborations about multiform fields. (Source) Clark, M. E. (2011) *Xinjiang and China`s Rise in Central Asia: A History*, London: Routledge, Chapter 6.

[52] Two organizations will cooperate in many fields like Economy and Trade, Transportation and Energy. Now almost ECO Members have kept relationship with SCO, Pakistan as Member, Iran as Observer, Turkey as Dialogue partenr. (Source) "Memorandum of Understanding between the Secrrtarat of Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Secretariat of Economic Cooperation Organization", 11 December, 2007, ECO HP. (http://www.eco.int/ftproot/Documents/MOUs/sco.htm)

[53] At ECO HP, there are also detail roles of each parts of structure.

from ECO. CPR is composed by representative or Ambassadors who accredited to ECO. On behalf of COM, CRP has obtain strong authorities and resposibilities to accomplish ECO policirs when COM is closed. Regional Planning Council (RPC) and The Secretariat was strengthen their functions. RPC entrusted priority to held annual meeting from COM and proposed the establishment of additional institutions and ad-hoc committees. The Secretariat was prepared specialized agents and increased staffs more than RCD. They would monitor the implementation of ECO and coordinate events such as meeting[54].

Trough founding new module called CPR, and stregthening the role of RPC and The Secretariat, ECO accomplished the independent activities from the influeneces by regional states. And in Treaty of Izmir, staffs of The Secretariat were considered as "full-time international civil servant", and ensured the budget for activities from COM. These will make ECO`s institutional activities more smoothly and strongly. The Regional Institutions and Specialized Agencies will be anticipated to assist regionally complicated activities[55].

❏   **Performance**

Since 1992, expanding menberships to Central Asia, ECO could secure the scale of regional market and polulation. After that, ECO had tried to boost regional cooperations. One on the effective results of ECO would be establishment of ECO Trade Agreement (ECOTA) in 2003. At agreement, ECO Membes decided to reduce tariffs to maximum 15%, and eliminate non-tariff barrier for regional prosperity and stability[56]. Furthermore, ECO had boosted to make auxiliary agencies, represented by ECO Trade and Debelopment Bank[57]. Then, we could say that partially ECO contributed to facilitate basic infrastructures of regions.

But most of ECO projects should be succeeded from RCD`s one, for examaple Joint Chamber of Commerce, Insurance and Cultual Center. Especially, Transportation is one of them. "Gül Train" which connect Turkey, Iran and Pakistan has started trial run since 2009[58]. This project went up to RCD railway link. From that, we could find out ECO is not completely different from RCD, and modified former

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[54] It could be said that COM, CPR and RPC compose trilateral relationship.
[55] ECO`s budget was centralization and independent for professional and specialized activities of ECO staffs. (Source) Koolaee, op.cit., p.12.
[56] About import, in Article 4, members had to accomplish in 8 years, except Afghanistan where was allowed to 15 years. (Source) World Bank HP (wits.worldbank.org/GPTAD/PDF/archive/ECO.pdf)
[57] On the other hand, according to ECO HP, some of agencies have confirmed no functional activities. (Source) Pomfret, *op. cit.*, pp. 658-659.
[58] "Gül Train" has continued construction partly. (Source) "Pakistan-Turkey rail trial starts". *BBC News*. 14 August, 2009. (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8201934.stm)

projects basicly[59].

In 2017, ECO published "ECO Vision 2025 and Implementation Framework". In this book, ECO Secreatriat presented future projects for next 8 years, through 6 activities[60].

4-3. Summary

From the analysis, it would be clear that development from RCD to ECO was a series of process by regional members. "Northern Tier" had continued the core of two organizations, and some projects was succeeded from RCD.

ECO developed the structure and expand regional relationships to Central Asia, based on experiences of RCD. In the case of RCD, Chairman of Ministerial Council was took by Head of States where hosted the meeting. Then RCD was influenced by the purposes of each members[61]. Compared with RCD, ECO could construct better organizational structures to keep moderate distances from political influences. For example, CPR as new module entrusted strong authority and strengthened traditional module could make independent actions by ECO. Accordingly, ECO could promote the detail objects of economic and cultual cooperation.

To achieve expansion of membership to Central Asia, ECO has gotten opportunities to mega-regional cooperation[62]. This was a important decision, because in Eurasian Continet there are huge population and ~~huge~~ market potentials[63]. Firstly, expansion of membership to Central Asia made interests of regional economy[64]. Secondly, more important, Central Asian States, who is member of SCO, promoted to make close relationship with China which is the biggest states in Eurasia. OBOR would have

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[59] RCD plans also overlapped with CENTO. So, ECO would succeed the original projects from CENTO, the Western Alliance at Cold War. (Source) Along the Plan of a CENTO Railway, 7 May, 1963, in FO371/170248/EB1371/6; RCD Anniversary Publication, p. 77.

[60] These are Trade, Transport and Connectivity, Energy, Tourism, Economic Growth and Productivity and Social Welfare and Environment. (Source) Economic Cooperation Organization (2017) *ECO Vision 2025 and Implementation Framework*, Tehran: ECO Secretariat.

[61] FCO51/38/LR6/15.

[62] At founding of ECO, Turkey thought new member would be some Arabian states. (Source) Regional Cooperation and Development (RCD), 30 January, 1984, in FCO9/4871/WST095/1/2.

[63] South-East Asia, and India show considerable economic development after 1990s. (Source) The World Bank HP (www.worldbank.org/)

[64] One of the most critical problems of RCD could be member states failed to make interests of regional markets. Foreign Commonwealth Office (FCO) analyzed unification of regional markets was underdeveloped, and Turkey and Iran had prioritized on association with EEC. (Source) FCO51/38/LR6/15.

big influences to world economies.

From above discussions, it would be said, through the development from RCD to ECO, "Northern Tier", as part of Middle East had accomplished to construct effective opportunities to cooperate with Asian region.

5. Conclusion

The trends of regionalism have been common in the world wide. The development of ECO is one of those. Finally, I would like to discuss about critical factors which assited the formation of RCD and development of ECO.

Firstly, the transition of international condition would affect the policies of "Northern Tier". Kennedy administration emphasized regional dimension and tried to assite modernaiztion and democratization of developing countries. Through Cuban Missile Crisis and Vietnam war, reduction of assitance made suspicions against Western Alliance[65]. Additionally "non-alliance" movements would also cause the effects[66]. In fact, disappointment to CENTO was one of main reasons to boost forming new regional institution. But RCD projects had been low actuality and resembled CENTO`s one[67].

Under the Cold War, it was difficult for regional members to be independent from Western Alliance. From above, The "Detente" was big opportunities for them to construct their own institution. So the expansion of ECO toward Central Asia was promoted rapidly after the collapse of Soviet Union.

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[65] Kennedy tried not to regard Cold War strategies in the same light as regional one. And he put emphasis on democratization more than former administrations. As I noted Chapter 4, three regional states had conflict between neighbors and shared the Soviet threats. Then, reduction of assistance and tactical changes without advance notice caused serious suspicions by "Northern Tier". (Source) Cohen, S. H. (2004) *The Idea of Pakistan*, Washington: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 8-9; Pollack, *op. cit.*, pp.80-82; Zürcher, E. J. (2004) *Turkey: A Modern History*, London: I. B. Tauris, pp.274-275.

[66] America and Great Britain had paid attention to RCD which could be "non-alliance" movement and weak the CENTO frame works. (Source) Meeting of CENTO Regional Foreign Ministers, 7 July, 1964, in FO371/175608/EB1014/13; British High Commission Karachi, 26 February, 1965, in FO371/180701/EB1061/1.

[67] In early 1960s, Iran had appointed the Secretary Generals for both RCD and CENTO. Mr. Rouhani, the Secretary General of RCD had hoped mutual understanding of region and good relationship with CENTO. In opposition, Dr. Khalatbary, the Secretary General of CENTO had regards RCD movements critically. He considered RCD projects would copy the project by CENTO. (Source) CENTO Secretary-General`s Call on Sir Geoffrey Harrison, 5 January, 1965, in FO371/180718/EB1631/7; Mr. Rouhani`s Views on RCD, 28 July, 1965, in FO371/180699/EB10114/15.

Secondly, I will focus on "Islamic revival" movement from end of 1970s. "Islamic revival" include widespread fields, like politics, economy and culture. It would be important for revivalists, "independent thought" or "personalized religion". They have tried to emphasize Islamic value and integrate Islam into modern societies[68].

In RCD members where the governments declared the modernization formerly, there were also revivalism movements[69]. At revivalism, Islamic economy such as "Islamic finance" or trading with Muslim states had been recommended. Transition from RCD to ECO would be promoted under this direction. In 1990s, they also welcomed Central Asian states where huge Muslim populations were included.

In connection with above, the existences of the leaders who have sympathy to regionalism. For example, Turgut Özal who was the Prime Minister of Turkey had directed pro-Islamic policies from 1980s to 90s. He was a bright economist and religious man, One of his contributions would be establishment of relationship Muslim states economicly and politically[70].

In Özal administration, construction of ECO and expansion to Central Asia were accomplished. Then His strrong initiatives toward Islamic world would assist the rapid development of regional cooperaton. Not only Özal`s policies, we shoul also observe the governance by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, or Zia ul-Haq in this direction.

Only each one of factors I discussed would not make dimension of regional cooperation. Those three factors would be mixed and interacted, and huge movement of regionalism was constituted.

In this paper, I have analyzed the historical process about economic cooperation between Middle East and Asia through the case study of development from RCD to ECO. Generally, it could be said that RCD had constructed basis for regional cooperation. ECO had succeeded RCD, and accomplished mega-regional cooperation with Asia finally.

Although ECO has continued to prepare the organizational infrastructures, the share of intra-regional

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[68] Revivalists put premium on rationality, human right, freedom and democracy. (Source) Lapidus, I. M. (2012) A History of Islamic Societies, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 822-824.
[69] After Iranian revolution, Islamic government was constructed. In Turkey, "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis (TİS)" was recommended by military junta. Under Zia ul-Haq administration, Islamization had been pursued. (Source) Cohen, op. cit., pp.112-113; Pollack, op. cit., Chapter 5; Yabuz, M. H. (2003) Islamic Political Identities in Turkey, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.70-75.
[70] Özal was as Prime Minister from 1983 to 1989, as President from 1989 to 1993. As to priority, He expected oil money flow from wealthy Gulf state. (Source) Eligür, B. (2010) The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

trade in the world have been low[71]. This would be one of the problem ECO should improve. We will need to search how mega-regional cooperation affect the ECO activities. In the future, ECO could have be important region as connector of other regions continuously. ❀

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[71] Ali, M. and Mujahid, N. (2015) "An Analytical Study of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO): Challenges and perspectives", *European Academic Research*, Vol. 2, (11), pp. 14039-14040.

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Internet

ECO HP

Pew Research Center HP

Shanghai Cooperation Organization HP

The World Bank HP

News

BBC News.

CNN News

■ Exhibit Document

Picture 1: Membership of RCD and ECO

Core members of both RCD and ECO
Additional members from ECO since 1992
Territories where were belong to or claimed by member states

(↑ correction type replace please)

(Source) Prepared by Anniversary Paper of RCD and ECO HP

Table1: The Principle of Cooperation of RCD

1: To a Free or Freer movement of goods through all practical means such as the conclusion of trade agreements.	6: To investigate the possibilities of securing a close co-operation in the field of shipping including the establishment of a joint maritime line of "conference" arrangement.
2: To establish closer collaboration amongst existing Chambers of Commerce and eventually a joint Chamber of Commerce.	7: To undertake necessary studies for construction and improvement of rail and road links.
3: To the formulation and implementation of joint proposed projects.	8: To sign at an early date an agreement with a view to promoting tourism.
4: To reduce the postal rates between the three countries to the level of internal rates.	9: To abolish visa formalities among the three countries for travel purposes.
5: To improve the air transport services within the region and the eventual establishment of a strong and competitive international air line among the three countries.	10: To provide technical assistance to each other in the form of experts and training facilities.

(Source) Prepared by RCD Anniversary Publication (1965).

Table2: The Role and Object of ECO

| ❏The Three Specific Grouping |
| --- |
| 1: Liberalization of trade
2: Measures and plans for facilitating trade
3: Cooperation with other international organizations |
| ❏The Anticipated Goal |
| 1: Expanding intra-regional trade by rendering access to each other`s markets.
2: Encouraging the creation of the required condition for sustainable economic development in order to achieve unremitting improvement of the standard of living of population of the region.
3: Strengthening the cultural, spiritual and brotherly bonds exiting among the peoples of these countries, which constituted the foundation stones of the solidarity among them.
4: Promoting commercial activities at global level and endeavoring to eradicate the unjust trade systems, which had hitherto created unfavorable conditions for developing countries. |
| ❏The Objects |
| 1: Sustainable economic development of Member States.
2: Progressive removal of trade barriers and promotion of intra- regional trade.
3: Greater role of ECO region in the growth of world trade.
4: Gradual integration of the economies of the Member States with the world economy.
5: Development of transport and communications infrastructure linking the Member States with each other and with the outside world.
6: Economic liberalization and privatization.
7: Mobilization and utilization of ECO region's material resources.
8: Effective utilization of the agricultural and industrial potentials of ECO region.
9: Regional cooperation for drug abuse control, ecological and environmental protection and strengthening of historical and cultural ties among the peoples of the ECO region.
10: Mutually beneficial cooperation with regional and international organizations. |

(Source) Prepared by Koolaee (2010), pp. 13-14, 145, and ECO HP.

Table3 : Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) between ECO

| ❑International Organization and Specialized Agencies or Program |
| --- |
| The United Nations (UN) |
| The United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) |
| The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) |
| The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) |
| The United Nations Children`s Funds (UNICEF) |
| The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) |
| The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) |
| The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) |
| The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) |
| The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) |
| The International Trade Center (ITC) |
| The World Trade Organization (WTO) |
| The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) |
| The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) |
| The United Nations International Strategy for Disasters Reduction (UNISDR) |
| ❑Other International Organization |
| The International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) |
| The International Union of Railways (UIC) |
| The organization for Cooperation of Railways (OSJD) |
| The World Customs Organization (WCO) |
| The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) |
| ❑Regional International Organization |
| The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) |
| The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) |
| The Colombo Plan (CP) |
| The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) |
| The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) |
| The European Union (EU) |

(Source) Prepared by ECO HP and Koolaee, E. (2010), Chapter 3.

Figure1 : Institutional Structure of RCD

Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD)

Ministerial Council

The Secretariat
・Secretary General
・2 Directors
・Staffs
・Headquarters at Tehran

① ②

Regional Planning Council

Iranian Branch
Turkish Branch
Pakistani Branch

The Subsidiary Agency

③ ④ ⑤

The Working Committees

RCD Insurance Centre
RCD Joint Chamber of Commerce
RCD Cultural Institute
RCD Shipping Service
RCD Reinsurance Pools
RCD Payment Union
(RCD joint airline)

1. Joint purpose enterprises
2. Petro chemistry
3. Petroleum
4. Trade
5. Banking and insurance
6. Technical co-operation and public administration
7. Culture
8. Correspondence
9. Tourism
10. Transportation
11. Post and telecommunication
12. Road and railway
13. Air transport
14. Shipping
15. Budget and administration
16. Health
17. Agriculture
18. Women`s co-operation
19. Information

①	To decide the regional cooperation and implement their decisions folloeing common interests.
②	To submit Reports and recommendations about reginal collaboration and harmonisation of national development plans.
③	To govern The Working Committees and coordinate relationship between upper and lower modules.
④	To explore and report the regional collaboration fields and their findings.
⑤	To administer the activities of RCD and enforce plans entrusted from RCD.

(Source) Prepared by FCO51/38 and RCD Anniversary Publication

Figure2 : Institutional Structure of ECO

Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)

The Summit Conference

Council of Ministers (COM)

The Secretariat

- Secretary General
- 3 Assistant Director
- 6 Managers
  - Tarde and Investment
  - Transport and Communications
  - Energy, Minerals and Environment
  - Agriculture, Industry and Tourism
  - Economic Research, Statistics and Design
  - Sustainable Development, Human resources
- 3 Assitant-Managers
  - Management of Administrative Affairs
  - Coordination
  - International Relations
- Aroud 60 Staffs
- Headquarters at Tehran

③ ④ ② ①

⑥

Regional Planning Council (RPC)

Council of Permanent Representatives (CPR)

⑦

⑤

The Working Committee

1: Economic and Trade Committee
2: Transport and Communications Committee
3: Agricultural Committee
4: Scientific, Educational and Cultural Committee
5: Energy Committee
6: Infrastructure Committee in Relation to Public Affairs
7: Health and Environment Committee
8: Committee for Fighting against Abuse of Norcotic Drugs

Regional Institutions

ECO Trade and Development Bank
ECO Chamber of Commerce and Industry
ECO Consultancy and Engineering Company
ECO College of Insurance
ECO Supreme Audit Institution (ECOSAI)
ECO Reinsurance Company

Specialized Agencies

ECO Cultual Institute
ECO Science Foundation
ECO Educational Institute
ECO Shipping Company *
ECO Smuggling and Custom Offence Data Bank *
ECO Regional Institute on Standardization Conformity, Assesment and Metrology (RISCAM) *
ECO Airline Company *
ECO News Agency (ECONA) *
ECO Regional Natural Disaster Risk Management Centre *

*: To be in process for establishing and functioning in near future

①	To review the work, adopt the reports and entrust authority to CPR during COM is closed.
②	To report all policies, consider ECO budget, and prepare the draft agenda for COM.
③	To review the work, adopt the reports and give priotity to RPC annual meeting.
④	To submit annual report and review of program, formulate and propose the establishmant of regional institution.
⑤	To advice and monitor to RPC on economic function and expedite arrangement for other units.
⑥	COM elected The Secretaly-General , and The Secretariat monitor the ECO activities and arrange the events.
⑦	Dissolved and United into RPC.

(Source) Prepared by ECO HP, Documents of "Treaty of Izmir" and Koolaee (2010)

Sectoral Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: Evidence from Egypt Governorates

✍ *Shimaa Hanafy*

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea

Extended abstract

FDI is expected to have a long-run growth effect from a theoretical perspective (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). In addition to capital formation, the presence of foreign firms is expected to generate knowledge and technology spillovers that enhance aggregate productivity and growth (De Mello, 1997; Castellani and Zanfei, 2006). Yet, growth impacts of FDI remain more evident in growth theories than in empirical studies. Despite the large number of empirical studies on the effect of FDI on economic growth, findings are still inconclusive. In a recent meta-regression analysis, Iamsiraroj and Ulubasoglu (2015) find that only 43% of surveyed regression estimates show a significantly positive FDI-induced growth effect, whereas 17% show a significantly negative effect and 40% an insignificant effect.

One possible reason for the ambiguous empirical findings on the impact of FDI on economic growth is the use of highly aggregated FDI data, as similarly argued by Alfaro (2003) and Alfaro and Charlton (2013). Empirical research mostly uses aggregate FDI data, whereas the growth effects of FDI likely depend on the sector that receives FDI. This is because the potential for technology transfer, linkages, and spillover effects between foreign and domestic firms differs across sectors. Linkages are much stronger in manufacturing, for example, than in the agriculture and services sectors. Moreover, FDI-related transfers of technology and know-how and introduction of new processes primarily occur in the manufacturing sector.

This paper investigates the effect of aggregate as well as sectoral FDI on economic growth in Egypt, using a novel panel dataset of 26 Egyptian governorates for the period 1992–2007. The dataset focuses on 'non-petroleum Greenfield FDI', as described in Hanafy (2015a, 2015b).[1] Our dataset has several advantages. First,

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[1] In a manner similar to domestic private investment (DPI), non-petroleum greenfield FDI inflows in Egypt mainly target the manufacturing and services sectors. In 1992–2007, an annual average of 41% of FDI targeted the manufacturing sector, 56% was directed to the service sector and only 3% went to the agricultural sector. For a thorough description of non-petroleum greenfield FDI in Egypt and its sectoral and geographical distribution, see Hanafy (2015a).

the growth literature is robust with benefits of using within-country datasets (Ford et al., 2008). These benefits include the similarity of governorates in terms of culture, language, legal framework and institutional characteristics as well as the consistency of data collection process across governorates. Moreover, spillovers tend to typically occur more locally than nationally and only disperse slowly over time into neighbouring regions. Thus, our dataset that is regionally disaggregated at the governorate level, seems more appropriate than national data for capturing FDI growth effects.

Second, our dataset allows us to treat FDI as a heterogeneous group, by differentiating between the sectors that receive FDI. In our analysis, we differentiate between the effects of manufacturing, agricultural and services FDI on economic growth in Egypt. Our approach allows for spillovers to occur within as well as between industries and sectors, as we investigate the effect of sectoral FDI on aggregate economic growth in the hosting region.

Third, we are able to construct a stock measure of FDI that allows us to better estimate the long-term growth effect of FDI, compared to using FDI flows. Using FDI stock is more consistent with growth theory and FDI related theories (Nunnenkamp and Spatz, 2004; Ford et al., 2008). This is because growth enhancing spillovers are not only restricted to recent FDI inflows but should also result from FDI received in previous periods. In addition, the use of FDI stock considerably reduces possible endogeneity problems (Cipollina et al., 2012).

Fourth, the country of analysis, Egypt, has recently experienced an uprising, not only due to political but also economic reasons (Malik and Awadallah, 2013) and is currently undergoing several economic reforms. Attracting FDI is one of the highest priorities of the current Egyptian government, as indicated by the government-launched 'Egypt Economic Development Conference' in Sharm El Sheikh in March 2015, which presented key investment opportunities to international investors to increase the country's economic growth.[2] Our novel dataset allows us to investigate whether, and in which sectors, FDI is a source of economic growth in Egypt. In fact, we are not aware of any econometric study that investigates the determinants of economic growth on the level of Egyptian governorates.

Our panel data estimation models for FDI-induced growth at the governorate level in Egypt are derived from an endogenous growth model, building on the cross-country analysis by Borensztein et al. (1998) and on Ford et al. (2008), who investigate the growth effects of FDI in US states. Our empirical strategy is straightforward. In a first step, we estimate the effect of total FDI across all sectors on economic growth. In a second step, we investigate the impact of sectoral FDI on economic growth. In addition to the FDI variable(s), our panel data regression model of 26 Egyptian governorates over the period 1992–2007 includes the standard growth explanatory variables domestic investment, human capital and initial per capita GDP. Moreover, we control for governorate-fixed effects, which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity due to time-invariant governorate characteristics such as their geographical location. We also control for time-fixed effects that equally affect economic growth in all governorates.

Our findings support our hypothesis that sectoral FDI should not be treated as a homogenous group in terms of its impact on economic growth. We find no significant effect of aggregate FDI stock on economic growth in Egyptian governorates. However, when FDI stock is disaggregated by sector, we find a positive effect of manufacturing FDI, a negative effect of agricultural FDI and no significant effect of services FDI on

Hanafy (2015b) uses the same panel dataset to investigate determinants of FDI location in Egypt.
[2]   http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/high-hopes-egypts-economy-conference-bombs-rock-cairo-1705596510 (Accessed 2 November 2015).

economic growth. This is in line with propositions and cross-country findings by Alfaro (2003). Our results are robust to several robustness checks.[3]

Thus, our results suggest that differences in growth effects of FDI at the sectoral level, which could be even opposite-signed, might be one explanation for the ambiguous effect of aggregate FDI on economic growth in several macroeconomic studies. Our results show that in line with theoretical expectations, the presence of foreign firms in the manufacturing sector seems to enhance aggregate productivity and growth, for example, through generating knowledge and technology transfer and spillovers to local firms. These productivity spillovers by manufacturing FDI could be within the manufacturing sector, as well as through linkages to other sectors. Our results suggest that Egypt could benefit more from FDI if more FDI is attracted to the manufacturing sector. Encouraging more FDI in Egypt's manufacturing sector would promote economic growth.

Our results on the effect of investment in agriculture on economic growth seem to be in line with opponents of agricultural-led growth. Agricultural FDI in Egypt seems to slowdown economic growth. However, one should be cautious about recommending limiting agricultural FDI based on this finding alone. Further studies need to assess the impact of agricultural FDI on further factors, such as food security, employment creation and poverty. Given the low investments in the Egyptian agricultural sector, agricultural FDI might be contributing by filling the investment gap in this sector (FAO, 2011; Hanafy, 2015a). Moreover, linkages to investments in food processing, food services and other agriculture-related industries, which are not part of agriculture investment data, need to be further analyzed. ❈

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[3] We also test the hypothesis by Borensztein et al. (1998) that the effect of FDI on economic growth is conditional on local human capital. Our findings, however, do not support this hypothesis, neither for aggregate nor for sectoral FDI.

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4th Session   Politics (2)

13:30 - 15:30
Room No. 329, Main Building (3 F)

Chairman :   Chan Ki PARK
(Myongji University, Korea)

1

An Israeli-Palestanian Confederation as a New Framework to the Two States Solution

Joseph BEILIN (Beilink-Business Foreign Affairs, Israel)

Discussant : Sung Hun AHN (Gachon University, Korea)

2

The Long Fuse of the First Palestinian Intifada (1987-1993): How the Uprising Was Realized in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

Hiroyuki SUZUKI (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Japan)

Discussant : Il Kwang SUNG (Konkuk University, Korea)

3

Analysis on the Trump Government's Policy on Iran

Joong Kwan KIM (Dongguk University, Korea)

Discussant : Engseng HO (MEI, University of Singapore)

4

Zimbabwe, the Middle East and South Korea

Donald CHIMANIKIRE (Zimbabwe University, Zimbabwe)

Discussant : Sang Hwa LEE (HUFS, Korea)

Research Proposal
for IPC (Israel-Palestine Confederation)

✍ *Joseph Beilin*

Beilink-Business Foreign Affairs, Israel

As Israel and Palestine approach the 24th anniversary of The Oslo Accords' implementation, both parties remain deeply entangled within a treaty unsuited to serve as a permanent status agreement between the parties. The provisional governments and geographic regions of Palestinian sovereignty set out in Oslo – both created as stepping stones along a future path toward a permanent solution – have nonsensically chained both peoples to the purgatory of an unrealized peace. Mainstream political thought in Israel, Palestine, and the international community remains united: Two states for two peoples coexisting in peace and cooperation from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River. Although all three parties seek the same fundamental principles in a comprehensive arrangement for permanent status, such an agreement has paradoxically slipped from the world's fingers. Time and time again, the three parties have sat at the negotiating table to finish the work started in 1993; each time the world has failed.

Although U.S. sponsored negotiations have failed the region's people, the parties will inevitably speak again in an attempt to broker a permanent peace. When the time comes, Israel and Palestine must be ready to explore not alternatives to the two-state solution, but alternatives to the way in which such a solution can be actualized. This proposal suggests that an Israel-Palestine confederation (IPC) – an effective bureaucracy created to represent the joint interests of two *sovereign* states– should be heavily examined as the required alternative. Presented in this proposal are detailed and researchable questions regarding the benefits and risks of such a confederation: borders, security, Jerusalem, settlements, refugees and economics are all examined. Questions regarding the impact of an IPC on a theoretical interim agreement are also examined. The international community should forge a new path forward if Israel and Palestine are to achieve a lasting peace.

I. Borders

A consensus decision on borders between Israel and Palestine is necessary for both Palestinian sovereignty and confederation legitimacy as a whole. A number of questions arise when dealing with borders under an Israel-Palestine confederation:

1) Are land swaps necessary under a confederation? Would an international broker be needed to aid the process? If so, who could best play this role? How do land swaps (or lack thereof) affect settlements and the potential evacuation of settlers?

2) Could the confederation safely grant special privileges (freedom of movement, work access) for each population in its counterpart's territory? What transportation and labor rights would a citizen of state A have while traveling or residing in state B?

3) To what extent would borders between Israel and Palestine under a confederation be open? How will laborers be able to move back and forth between countries? Will the Israel-Palestine border become more open over time? How could a secure transition to a more open border be implemented?

4) Would temporary borders of an interim agreement differ from the permanent borders of Israel and Palestine under a confederation?

II. Security

Security is of the utmost importance for both Palestine and Israel. Without mutual security, there cannot be a lasting peace. A number of questions arise when dealing with security under an Israel-Palestine confederation:

1) Would checkpoints between the two states remain in place? If so, who would command such checkpoints? Could Israeli security be ensured without them? If so, how?

2) Would the security barrier remain in place for a period of time after an agreement is implemented? If so, for how long? What forms of security could compensate for the removal of the barrier?

3) How are intra-terrorist threats - both by person and by state - handled by the confederation? What are the rules of engagement? When a citizen of state A commits an act of terror against a citizen of state B, how can the affected party respond? Are there any circumstances in which state A can act unilaterally against an act of terror from state B?

4) How will the confederation handle militaristic escalation from Hamas in the Gaza strip? How will this policy change if the Gaza strip partakes in the confederation?

5) If the Gaza strip partakes in the confederation, would the IDF continue to blockade Palestinian waters in the Mediterranean Sea for a period of time? Could a confederation naval fleet effectively resolve security concerns?

6) With an open border policy, how can import vehicles be properly screened for illegal goods (i.e. illegal substances, weapons, etc.) How can confederation citizens and tourists move quickly and safely between the states?

7) Would there be any restrictions on public transportation between the states? How much access would

each state's citizens have to public transportation in the other state's territory? Would public transportation be under control of the confederation or remain a sovereign entity?

8) How could the confederation ensure safe access to holy sites? Would the confederation have any other responsibilities in regards to religious affairs? Which religious responsibilities would remain sovereign to each state?

9) How will the confederation's borders be guarded? Will the Palestinians accept an Israeli role in assuring the security along the Jordan River against threats like ISIS?

III. Jerusalem

As a city of tremendous religious and political significance, the management of Jerusalem is an essential component to a permanent solution for peace. A number of questions arise when dealing with Jerusalem under an Israel-Palestine confederation:

1) What security measures could be taken to keep Jerusalem safe? What could be done to control sectarian violence? Is a joint police force for the city feasible? How would it be structured?

2) How could a joint militaristic force secure disputed areas between Israel and Palestine outside of Jerusalem? How would it be structured?

3) Could Jerusalem serve as the capital for both nations? If so, how would both capitals function in the same city? Assuming the city remains undivided, how would sovereignty be divided between Israel, Palestine and the confederation?

4) Could both nations be sovereign rulers over the same geographic area? Is joint sovereignty in disputed locations possible? How could joint sovereignty collectively govern Jerusalem? Could a separate confederation committee be established to govern parts or all of Jerusalem? What would the joint governmental body look like?

IV. Settlements

The expanding Israeli settler population has a central role in peace negotiations. A number of questions arise when dealing with settlements under an Israel-Palestine confederation:

1) Would settlers have to be evacuated from Palestine under an IPC? If so, how many? Could the confederation provide any sort of assistance in the evacuatory process?

2) If settlers are allowed to remain in Palestine for an extended period of time before their evacuation, how would the law be administered to those settlers? Could those settlers who only intend to remain in the land temporarily live under Israeli law until their evacuation from Palestine? Could a confederation force protect settlers until their evacuation?

3) If settlers are allowed to remain in Palestine permanently in a final agreement, how would the law be administered to those settlers? How could the confederation assist settlers in the transition from Israeli to Palestinian law? Could separate confederal laws be implemented for the remaining settlers? What would this legal code look like? Could a confederation properly administer such laws?

4) What steps could the confederation take to hinder/stop illegal settlement construction in the West Bank post-agreement? How could the confederation respond to acts of violence committed either towards or by Israeli settlers?

5) How would the confederation handle settlements in East Jerusalem? Would Jewish settlements in the eastern portion of the city need to be evacuated, or could they remain in their current location under a united city?

V. Economy

A permanent peace between Israel and Palestine requires economic cooperation. A number of questions arise when dealing with economic policy under an Israel-Palestine confederation:

1) How could the confederation establish a free trade zone? How would this improve trade between Israel and Palestine and with other countries? What would be the implications of a confederation tariff? Would it be preferable to the current customs union system?

2) What kind of confederal body could best assist in joint economic cooperation? How could such an institution structure itself? How would the body's representatives be chosen? How would the body reach consensuses on various issues?

3) Given the inequality between Israel and Palestine's respective economies, what kinds of costs would Israel endure in exchange for various levels of economic unification? At what point would economic unification be too costly for Israel to pursue?

4) Is it possible to avoid or reduce the costs associated with economic unification? What economic functions should stay separate? What economic burdens will Israel bear through various collective economic policies?

5) Should the confederation establish an exclusive common currency? How would this affect inflation rates, international trade, and trade between the two nations?

6) Would the confederation have a joint central bank? How would the bank affect the economies of both nations? Could it function without a common currency? How would the bank operate? Would board members be appointed or elected, and by whom? What responsibilities would the bank have? To what extent would the central bank be privately or publicly owned?

7) How would an economic union impact internal and external trade? Will it help facilitate trade between Israel and Palestine? How effective could a confederation be in opening both nations to Middle Eastern markets and encouraging international investment both Israel and Palestine?

8) Could the confederation establish Palestinian ports in the Mediterranean Sea without cooperation from Gaza? Which nation would remain sovereign over the port? How would such an arrangement affect Palestinian trade with both Israel and the outside world?

9) Could natural resources be effectively allocated under the jurisdiction of the confederation? How could the confederation assist in properly distributing, conversing and locating water, oil, and natural gas?

10) How and from what parties will the Palestinian government receive economic stimulus? Would the confederation be responsible for any industrial investment in Palestine?

11) Could the confederation create and administer confederal corporate law? How could the confederation utilize such laws to regulate the environment, utilization of natural resources, etc.

VI. Refugees

The refugee crisis in both states has been an ongoing issue since the Israel-Arab war of 1948. A number of questions arise when dealing with refugees under an Israel-Palestine confederation:

1) Could a properly sized reparations fund be established for displaced refugees? How could the confederation raise the funds to establish a compensation program? Could a confederate council manage administrative issues such as fundraising, refugee eligibility, and specific payment amounts?

2) Could the confederation guarantee legal status to Palestinian refugees outside of the confederation while providing them with jobs and other necessary amenities? How could these refugees be absorbed into Palestine? What roles would Palestine, Israel and the confederation respectively play in this absorption?

3) How many (if any) Palestinians would be offered Israeli citizenship? Could the confederation assist a set number of Palestinian refugees in receiving citizenship from surrounding Arab nations? Which and how many refugees would be offered these external citizenships? Which Arab nations could participate in such a program?

4) Will it be possible that citizens of Palestine, whose number will be the same as the one Israeli citizens who will choose to live as residents of the Palestinian State, will be invited to live in Israel, and have the parallel status?

5) How would the confederation handle refugees and asylum seekers from neighboring nations? Would absorption or deportation of these individuals be a confederal or state responsibility?

VII. Confederal Responsibilities

While issues of borders, settlements, Jerusalem, security, and economy are often explored throughout the decades of ongoing negotiations, an IPC will bring new and unique questions to the negotiating table. A number of questions arise when dealing with confederal responsibilities under an Israel-Palestine confederation:

1) If a citizen of state A commits a crime in state B, how would this citizen be processed? Would the laws of state A or state B reign supreme? Could there be separate confederal laws that pertain to such circumstances?

2) Could confederal law rule over both territories? Would confederal law trump state law? Could a joint confederal court rule over issues pertaining to such laws? How would such a court be structured? How could confederal laws be enforced?

3) How can the confederation promote social cohabitation and cultural reconciliation between the Palestinian and Israeli peoples? What sorts of coexistence initiatives could the confederation establish?

4) What governmental responsibilities must each state yield to the confederation for the confederation to be an effective governmental body? What responsibilities must remain sovereign to each state for both parties to remain autonomous?

5) Would the international community be granted any power within confederation councils? If so, how would the international community be included in the confederation's various institutions?

6) How can state A effectively share governmental resources (police, medical equipment, etc.) with state B? Can the confederation play a role in the allocation of these resources in a time of strife?

7) Could a truth and reconciliation commission be established to instill restorative justice in the region? Would this include a court to conduct trials and distribute reparations? ❀

The Long Fuse of the First Palestinian Intifada (1987-1993):

How the Uprising Was Realized in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

✍ *Hiroyuki Suzuki*

Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

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I. Introduction

Thirty years have passed since the first Palestinian Intifada erupted. This mass uprising was carried out by Palestinian people who had lived under Israeli occupation for 20 years, and they succeeded in turning the world's eyes toward the Israeli occupation of the territories. Many studies have been dedicated to understanding this uprising, and many facts have been pointed out. However, as the author later points out, previous studies tend to ignore long-term causes, and emphasize the direct and short-term causes like the incident at Rafah crossing and the Israeli army's harsh response to the mass demonstration. However, as far as the first Intifada is concerned, it is the first instance of mass political activity against the Israeli occupation, it is necessary to start a discussion from the starting point of the occupation, in 1967. This paper attempts to discuss the long-term causes of the first Palestinian Intifada, and shows the "long fuse" of the uprising.

II. Literature Review

On the first Palestinian Intifada, previous studies have attempted to understand this uprising from three perspectives. The first perspective considers the changing Palestinian society during the uprising.[1] The role played by women and children is the most interesting aspect in this viewpoint. It is true that there were radical changes in the Palestinian society during the first Intifada. Since the political repression tightened, Palestinians

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[1] Zachary Lockman, and Joel Beinin, eds. *Intifada: the Palestinian Uprising against Israeli Occupation.* (Boston: MERIP Books, 1989); Jamal R. Nassar, and Roger Heacock, eds. *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1990).

in the territories faced many hardships in their daily life. For example, they had to open unofficial schools for their own kids because Israeli authorities closed the Palestinian schools for months. These studies are very useful for understanding the effects of the uprising on the society, but do not provide answers regarding the causes of the uprising. The second perspective shows Israeli occupation as the main cause of the Intifada.[2] Palestinians themselves blame the Israeli authorities and their occupation as the main cause for their anger and action; therefore, many studies show Israeli occupation as the prime background for the Intifada. However, this description sometimes fails to mention the causal mechanism of the eruption. The occupation started in 1967; therefore, it is also necessary to answer the question, "why did the first Intifada occur in 1987, after 20 years of the occupation." The third perspective is assumed to solve this problem, because it focuses on a developing process for the occurrence of the first Intifada.[3] There were phased changes in Palestinian society before the first Intifada. For example, the mobilization among the people by political factions was started in the late 1970s, and the radical students' movement appeared in the early 1980s.

By relying on these achievements, the author tries to add another viewpoint. The first Intifada was not merely a mass uprising inside the territories, but also a political campaign on the international level. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) took on the responsibility of representing Palestinians inside the territories, and initiated the promotion of the Palestinians' right to self-determination and independence. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the first Intifada from a dual viewpoint: developing political activities inside the territories and a changing political strategy outside of the territories. By referring to historical documents, another fact on the first Intifada will be revealed.

III. "Intifadas" before the First Intifada

The Arabic word "intifāḍa" means "uprising" in general. However, since the first Palestinian Intifada occurred, this word is used in the definite form, "al-intifāḍa," to refer to the Palestinians' uprising, especially the first Intifada from 1987 to 1993. The author would like to begin his analysis by focusing on this term, because if one were to open any Arabic newspaper issued inside the territories, one would easily notice that there were many "intifadas" inside the territories before the first Intifada. For example, in his book, Palestinian researcher Muhammad al-Az'ar mentions five to six "intifāḍāt (intifadas)" that occurred before the first Intifada.[4] By analyzing these former uprisings, the developing process of the first Intifada appears.

As can be easily imagined, there were some protest activities immediately after the occupation in June 1967. The strongest protest was observed in east Jerusalem, because Israeli authorities radically changed local institutions and rules to give the impression that Jerusalem was already annexed to Israel. The municipality of east Jerusalem was dissolved and the educational curriculum was replaced by a new one. Local Palestinian

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[2] Geoffrey Aronson. Israel, Palestinians and the Intifada: Creating Facts on the West Bank (London: Kegan Paul International, 1990)., Ruth Margolies Beitler. The Path to Mass Rebellion: An Analysis of Two Intifadas (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004).

[3] Joost R. Hiltermann. Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Eitan Y. Alimi. Israeli Politics and the First Palestinian Intifada: Political Opportunities, Framing Processes and Contentious Politics (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2007).

[4] Muḥammad Khālid al-Az'ar. *al-Muqāwama al-Filasṭīnīya bayna Ghazw Lubnān wa al-Intifāḍa* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabīya, 1991).

residents considered this action by Israeli authorities as one leading to the annexation of east Jerusalem, and started their first political activity against the authorities. At this time, the chief judge of the Sharia appellate court in Jerusalem, Abd al-Hamid al-Sa'ih ('Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Sā'iḥ, 1907–2001), become the representative of the political action. al-Sa'ih and his colleagues established the Islamic Higher Commission (Hay'a al-Islāmīya al-'Ulyā), and he became its first representative. This organization became the political body leading the first Palestinian political campaign against Israeli policy on east Jerusalem. In July 1967, it issued a political appeal as follows.[5]

> To the Military Commander in the West Bank
>
> No country should gain ownership (milkīya) of the occupying territories, when it occupies the areas from another country. It also should not acquire sovereignty over the territories, but follow the law and give due consideration to the areas and protect its residents' lives, rights, and properties. In addition, the liberty of faith and religious practice should be allowed.
> On these bases and for the following reasons, we declare that the decision of Israeli juridical and administrative authorities on the annexation of "Jerusalem of Arabs" and its surrounding areas to Israel is totally unacceptable.
> 1. Jerusalem of the Arabs is the part that cannot be separated from Jordan. Israel is prohibited to threaten the peace and political independence of Jordanian land by the United Nations' charter article 2 clause 4.[6] It is prohibited to annex any areas of Jordanian land to Israel.

al-Sa'ih was deported by Israeli authorities in September 1967 to Jordan. Political activity generally needs its leader(s). However, in the occupied territories, once leader(s) appear(s), they are targeted by Israeli authorities.

It is still hard to term the incident of 1967 as an "intifada (uprising)"; however, it was the first time that Palestinians inside the territories experienced political repression by Israeli authorities. In 1974, there was a small "intifada (uprising)" in the territories. The Israeli government decided to devalue their currency (Lira) in November 1974, and it caused great economic damage in the territories. The Palestinian residents in the territories used the Jordanian Dinar in their daily lives, but there were an increasing number of Palestinians who earned their salary in Israeli Lira. Therefore, the devaluation of the Lira caused a price shock inside the territories, and the prices of almost all daily necessities shot up [Photo 1]. For example, the price of a kilogram of bread increased from 0.55 Lira to 1 Lira, and that of a kilogram of sugar increased from 2 Lira to 6 Lira. The chamber of commerce was the main initiator of action at this point in time. They issued some political statements to the Israeli authorities, and the Palestinian people organized demonstrations in populated cities such as Jerusalem, Nablus, and Hebron. However, this uprising did not succeed in winning any political concessions from the Israeli authorities.

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[5] PAD1967-no.374 (*al-Wathā'iq al-Filasṭ īnīya al-'Arabīya li-'Ām 1967*. Beirut: Mu'assasa al-Dirāsāt al-Filasṭ īnīya, 1973).
[6] "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

Photo1 The Price of Almost All Daily Necessities Shot Up, 1974

(Source）*al-Quds*, 11 Nov. 1974

It is also the same as the uprising in 1976. When the Israeli court permitted Jewish groups to visit and pray at al-Haram al-Sharif (the holy site in the old city), huge political opposition erupted. At this time, more than half of the Palestinian mayors of local municipalities resigned in protest. This uprising lasted from February to April 1976. It is also noteworthy that Palestinian residents inside the Israeli territory also carried out their own "uprising" in Galilee, which came to be later known as Land Day (Yawm al-Arḍ).

In addition to all the "intifadas" mentioned above, there were other short "intifadas" in the early 1980s. These short uprisings were caused by the change in the Israeli policy toward the occupied territories since 1977, when the Likud party formed the government in Israel, and its leader Menachem Begin (1913–1992) was himself deeply involved in the policy on the occupied territories. He appointed Ariel Sharon (1928–2014) as minister of defense, who took responsibility for the occupied territories. Sharon applied a very harsh policy of political repression to the Palestinians, including the dismissal of almost all the Palestinian mayors, closure of the cities, and house searches in the middle of the night. Palestinians came to hide their leaders, and act in the name of organizations such as trade unions, women's organizations, and other welfare organizations. There were some attempts at resistance; however, the first Intifada did not occur until 1987, because for the uprising to be successful, it had to be accompanied by the PLO's political strategy.

IV. Changing Political Strategy of the PLO

The PLO's political strategy was characterized by its realism. Of course, the PLO itself set its goal as the "liberation of (historical) Palestine" in its charter, but in fact the organization adjusted its strategy to the reality

on the ground. PLO chairman Yasser Arafat (Yāsir 'Arafāt, 1929–2004) made his first speech in the general assembly of the United Nations in 1974, and mentioned "independent national authority (sulṭat-hu al-waṭanīya al-mustaqilla)" in the last part of his address.[7]

> I would like to request all of you to enable our people to establish an independent national authority (sulṭat-hu al-waṭanīya al-mustaqilla), and to build a national entity (kiyān-hi al-waṭanī) in our own land.
> Dear leaders of all countries, today I have come bearing an olive branch in one hand and the freedom-fighter's gun in the other. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.
> War flares up in Palestine, and yet it is in Palestine that peace will be born.

Before this speech, Arafat held a meeting of the Palestine National Council (PNC, general congress of the PLO) and proposed a "14 Points Political Program," which was criticized by opponent groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) who doubted that the program could pave the way for a two-state solution. Despite the criticism, Arafat placed priority on the adoption of the 14 Points Political Program because he recognized its benefits in promoting the PLO's political status on the international level. As he intended, the PLO was recognized as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" at the Arab League summit, and allowed to attend the general assembly of the United Nations in 1974. From this moment onward, Arafat and his followers engaged in political attempts to develop Palestinian sovereignty in a certain part of the historical Palestine.

Drastic changes did not occur until 1982, when PLO was expelled from their base in Beirut after the Israeli invasion on this city. After being evacuated from Beirut, Arafat and some other members sought to promote their state-building plan through a confederation plan with Jordan. This was a crucial strategy for the weakened PLO, because Jordan was supposed to be invited to attend any peace conference hosted by the United States or the Soviet Union. On this point, Arafat appointed al-Sa'ih as the chairman of the PNC, and held its meeting in Jordan's capital Amman in 1984. This PNC meeting was to be a strong message for the Jordanian government and its leader King Hussein. As already mentioned, al-Sa'ih was the local Palestinian leader who had shown his loyalty to Jordanian authorities over the West Bank. Arafat sent his most trusted colleague (Abu Jihad) to Amman and requested al-Sa'ih to become the chairman of PNC.[8] In early 1985, Arafat gained Jordan's official approval of the confederation plan as the "Amman agreement (Ittifāq 'Ammān)," which was signed by both the PLO and the Jordanian government. However, this attempt did not last long because factional disputes inside the PLO arose, and the US government put pressure on the Jordanian government.

In early 1987, Arafat again made a crucial decision. He realized that the confederation plan with Jordan would not bring any political outcome to the PLO, but just harm the PLO's inter-relationships between political factions, and decided to cancel the Amman agreement. The PNC meeting was held in Algiers, and the PLO realized a factional reconciliation. However, at that time, the PLO leadership and Arafat still sought to find another way to realize their state-building plan but did not have any options. It was in these circumstances that the first Intifada erupted. However, from the viewpoint of the PLO's changing political strategy, more appropriate words would be "an intifada inside the territories was seen by the PLO as an opportunity." As already mentioned, there had been some "intifadas" inside the territories before the first Intifada, but these only

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[7] PAD1974-no. 385 (*al-Wathā'iq al-Filasṭīnīya al-'Arabīya li-'Ām 1974*. Beirut: Mu'assasa al-Dirāsāt al-Filasṭīnīya, 1976.).
[8] 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Sā'iḥ. *Filasṭīn Lā Ṣalāt taḥta al-Ḥirāb: Mudhakkirāt al-Shaykh 'Abd al-Ḥamīd al-Sā'iḥ* (Beirut: Mu'assasa al-Dirāsāt al-Filasṭīnīya, 1994), p.116.

lasted a short while, and did not attract international attention. On the other hand, the first Intifada lasted five years and succeeded in gaining a certain influence. The PLO's changing political strategy effected this change, and helped to "make an intifada the first Intifada."

V. Political Strategy of the PLO and the Uprising

Referring to the political leaflets of the first Intifada's leadership, it is clear that the first Intifada needed the PLO's political backing, especially on the diplomatic front. The PLO-affiliated local Palestinian leadership, the United National Leadership for the Uprising (al-Qiyāda al-Waṭanīya al-Muwaḥḥada li-l-Intifāḍa, UNLU), named the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians even though it was located far from the territories.[9] On the other hand, the PLO itself tried to enhance the influence of the first Intifada by promoting this uprising in international politics. The first achievement was realized when Jordan declared that it was abandoning its territorial claim to the West Bank in late July 1988. The PLO leadership prepared for a declaration of independence of the Palestinian state, and held a meeting of the PNC in November. Hamas (a newly formed political organization, al-Ḥaraka al-Muqāwama al-Islāmīya) showed disagreement on the declaration of independence; however, at that time, it still remained less than influential.

The final statement of the PNC, which also published a declaration of independence, mentioned that the PLO was willing to accept UN Security Council resolution 242, which demanded that Israel withdraw from the West Bank and the Gaza strip. In addition, Arafat himself gave the following speech in English to the UN general assembly.[10]

> Yesterday… I made a reference to our acceptance of resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiation with Israel within the framework of the international conference… In my speech also yesterday, it was clear that we mean… the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security and, as I have mentioned, including the state of Palestine, Israel, and other neighbors according to the resolution 242 and 338.
> As for terrorism, I renounced it yesterday in no uncertain terms, and yet I repeat for the record that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group, and state terrorism.

Arafat himself and his followers believed that the first Intifada was an opportunity to promote their state-building plan. Therefore, they promoted the influence of the uprising on the international level. On the other hand, while the PLO's diplomatic efforts continued, the UNLU kept issuing political statements (leaflets) to sustain the uprising. The author has collated the dates that were assigned as the days for general strikes in UNLU's leaflets and the actual occurrence of the strikes, and points out that the first Intifada was arranged using

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9 Shaul Mishal, and Reuben Aharoni. *Speaking Stones: Communiqués from the Intifada Underground* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1994); Jean François Legrain. *Aṣ wāt al-Intifāḍ a al-Filasṭ īnīya, 1987/1989* (French title, Les voix du soulèvement palestinien. N.p.: CEDEJ, 1991).

10 William B. Quandt. *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict since 1967* 3rd edition. (Washington D.C., Berkeley and Los Angeles: Brookings Institution Press and University of California Press, 2005), pp.284–285.

political leaflets within two months of its eruption.[11] After that, it can be said that the first Intifada was sustained inside the territories by Palestinians, who believed that their uprising would provide an opportunity for the PLO to negotiate their fate in international politics. As actual demonstration of this research, the UNLU stopped issuing leaflets after the Oslo accords were revealed in 1993.

IV. Conclusion

The first Palestinian Intifada was not only an uprising, but also a political campaign carried out by Palestinian residents inside the territories and by the PLO leadership. Past analyses on the Intifada through the historical development inside the territories tend to ignore this dual perspective on the eruption of the first Intifada. As already mentioned, the small uprisings were recognized inside the territories before the Intifada, but they only lasted for weeks or months. Therefore, the structures contributing to the uprising had already existed inside the territories in the early 1980s. Nevertheless, it was necessary to wait until 1987 for the occurrence of the first Intifada. The first Intifada needed the PLO as its promoter on the international level. However, the PLO itself suffered from factional disputes because some groups inside the PLO sought to cooperate with Jordan. It is not until 1987 that they were able to solve this political dispute. Once the factional conflict was solved, the PLO could act as one body to promote the influence of the first Intifada, and they tried to make use of it in their political strategy, which led to the uprising becoming "the first Intifada." Therefore, this article would like to conclude that the first Palestinian Intifada had two "long fuses," namely, the experience of the uprising inside the territories, and the development of political strategy by the PLO outside. ❈

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[11] Hiroyuki Suzuki. "Understanding the Palestinian Intifada of 1987: Historical Development of the Political Activities in the Occupied Territories." *Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies* 29 (2), 2014: 171–197.

Analysis on the Trump Government's Policy on Iran

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This research is to analyze the political conflicts and the economic sanctions between the U.S. and Iran after 2016. The concept of a new order in the Middle East has become more important now than ever before, as they may imply strategic visions as far as the Middle East is concerned. Recently, the Trump administration listed several individuals and organizations as sanctioned entities for financial work on behalf of Iran's nuclear weapons program.

Trump goverment has repeatedly condemned the deal brokered by President Barack Obama as a dangerous capitulation to Iran and U.S. administration certified Iran's compliance, and Trump had told his security team that he would not keep doing so indefinitely. They intended to toughen enforcement of the deal, apply new sanctions on Iran for its support of terrorism and other destabilizing activities, and negotiate with European partners to craft a broader strategy to increase pressure on Tehran.

Trump had insisted on such actions before agreeing to the consensus recommendation of his national security team. After the U.S. led successful negotiations for a nuclear deal intended to dismantle Iran's nuclear weapons capabilities in 2015, sanctions on Iran were lifted when Iran complied in 2016. Understandably, political relations tend to improve when two countries have overlapping goals, such as that of repelling Sunni militants, or so called Islamic States.

However, after the inauguration of President Trump in January 2017, Iran has been in the vanguard of countries actively challenging the US-led world order. This may lead to instability in the Middle East and Iran's interference on Middle Eastern affairs in Yemen and Syria. However, if Iran and the U.S. come to a deal to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough, geopolitical tensions in the region could decline sharply. This may lead Iran becoming perceived as a promising emerging market.

This research concludes that the conflicts or cooperation between Iran and the U.S. will lead to a new world order that will lead to turmoil or prosperity in the region, as well as influence the international political balance. ❀

Zimbabwe-South Korea Relations and the Middle East

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The African Union Commission has highly commended the initiative taken by the Government of Korea to support the human resources development of the continent and appreciated the Korean support for the peacekeeping process in Africa, which was announced by former President Park at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2015 and hope that this support will continue in the years to come.

 Africa has now decided to take its destiny into its own hands by embarking on the implementation of the Africa Union Agenda 2063, adopted by African leaders during the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the OAU/AU, with a view to accelerating efforts towards attaining an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena and therefore urged that all strategies be directed towards encouraging the private sector of the two sides to play more substantive role in the partnership.

 Africa wants this partnership with South Korea to focus on value addition and beneficiation and on promoting the sharing of Korea's remarkable experience in creating enabling environment for the growth and development of the manufacturing sector in Africa, including blue economy and marine transport, science and technology, capacity building and linkage of small, medium and micro enterprises into the national, regional, continental and global value chains.

Zimbabwe and other African countries note that over the last five to six decades the Republic of Korea has gone through massive Economic, social and political transformation and has become one of the industrial powerhouses of the world.

South Korea is one major pole and anchor of the global economy and contributes a significant share to the world trade and economy. This growing economy is making a rapid entry into Africa, including Zimbabwe. Its expanding engagements in the field of development co-operation, trade and investment are seen as a vehicle for booking Africa's growth. The drivers being, the high demand for minerals and oil and investment from South Korea and markets for manufactured goods. However, these relationships are not only limited to economic sphere but encompass different sectors like political, social and security spheres.

Zimbabwe and other African Countries have confidence that the Africa-Korea forum will come up with a meaningful way forward for the future of the Africa-Korea Partnership drawing on practices and adapting to the objective circumstances of Africa which would bring about t value addition and beneficiation to our abundant natural resources.

Mr. Simbarashe S. Mumbengegwi in his capacity as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Zimbabwe and the Co- Chair of the 4th Forum for Africa- Korea Cooperation in his opening remarks expressed the enthusiasm of the African side as the 4th ministerial forum provides an opportunity to work on modalities of a cooperation that draws on the common will to achieve mutually beneficial objectives in a true spirit of partnership. He further expressed the need for Africa to benefit from the Korean experience, particularly its expertise in shipbuilding, information technology and communication, innovation and entrepreneurship which will be of great benefit to the African private sector as a mean of integration into the global value chain.

This paper will attempt to highlight the various relations that exist between Zimbabwe and South Korea and their common interests in the Middle East.

Introduction cntd

- Korea's economic transformation better known as the 'Miracle on the Han River' was founded on the basis of 'development first democracy later' philosophy, a model that appeals to many authoritarian regimes in Africa

- As such policy makers believe that the country's development route is ideal for eliciting interests and establishing relations of mutual trust with Africa

- The South Korea-Africa partnership is a win-win partnership that ensures the former's commitment to the socio-economic development of the latter through sharing its experience, since it too was once colonised(by Japan)

- South Korean policy makers have pointed the necessity of gaining foothold in africa before other global competitors in what they see as the new 'scramble for Africa'

Evolution of Korea-Africa Relations

- The first Korea-Africa Forum which was aimed at strengthening cooperation between Korea and African countries was held in November 2006

- The visit by the then President Roh Moo-hyun to Egypt, Algeria and Nigeria in 2006 paved way for Korea-Africa relations

- The conference was attended by 15 delegates from African countries and in 2012, 35 countries were represented

- The Korea-Africa Forum, the Korea-Africa Economic Cooperation and the Korea-Africa Industry Cooperation Forum underpin the partnership

- Korea's engagement with Africa is driven by the pursuit of food and energy security, demand for oil and minerals, establishment of new markets for manufactured goods and enhancement of its credentials as a global power

Evolution cont'd

- The Export-Import Bank of Korea and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance played a key role and the African Development Bank participated as co-organiser hoping that African countries' needs would be reflected.

- In September 2015 at the United Nations General Assembly, the Government of Korea announced its support of human resources development and peacekeeping processes in Africa.

- Africa seeks to benefit from the Korean experience particularly, its expertise in shipbuilding, information technology and communication, innovation and entrepreneurship which will be of great benefit to Africa.

- Korea's expanding engagements in the field of cooperation, trade and investment are seen as a vehicle for Africa's growth

Korea-Africa Relations

- South Korean exports to Africa rose fivefold between 2000 and 2011. due to the saturation of its domestic market, the country's manufacturing has become export oriented

- The heavy industry sector is vital to the growth of the Korean economy and Africa is perceived as a frontier market for South Korean exports because of its need for major infrastructural development

- The Korea Trade Investment Promotion Agency(KOTRA), a MOTIE agency mandated to support Korean companies' foreign ventures now maintains 10 overseas trade centres in Africa

- Through the organization of business forums, exhibitions and trade delegations, South Korean companies are introduced to potential African clients and partners

- Africa's engagement with South Korea has seen the continent benefiting from the Official Development Assistance(ODA

- Of the total $1.3 billion of total bilateral ODA allocated in 2013, $800 million took the form of grants, africa is seeing a great proportion of South Korean ODA receiving 26 per cent of Korean aid in 2012, up from 18.5 percent in 2007 and 12 percent in 2002

- Africa represents an increasingly lucrative market for South Korea's heavy industrial enterprises, with new contracts worth some 4.2 billion obtained in 2010- leading to Africa accounting 6.4 per cent of the sector's total revenues that year

- South Korea is responsible for a number of valuable knowledge and skills transfer that have been beneficial to African countries

- These programmes focus on a number of priority sectors such as ICT and agriculture

- The Saemaul Undong movement which sees rural development and modernization as key to breaking the poverty cycle has been exported to numerous African countries including DRC, Rwanda and Uganda

- The Knowledge Sharing Program(KSP) launched in 2004 encourages partner countries in Africa to adopt the same methods that Korea used for its development miracle has been adopted by most African countries

- South Korea is at the forefront of the global ICT sector and this has been imported to Africa

Zimbabwe's Look East Policy

- It was launched in 2003 after the country suffered a loss of Western investment after the 2000 Fast Track Land Reform Programme
- This policy followed President Mugabe's visit to the Far East in 2001
- Zimbabwe sort to capitalize on the rise of the Asian economic powers which have the requisite financial capital and technical expertise to replace the lost Western investment
- Under this new initiative the Government of Zimbabwe is placing more emphasis on Asia for mutually beneficial trade, investment and tourism that is mutually beneficial development cooperation

Look East Policy contd

- The Look East Policy also took Zimbabwe to the Korean Peninsula and ensure adequate information dissemination on Zimbabwe to promote tourism, trade and investment
- Agriculture and tourism are some of the key sectors both Zimbabwe and the Korean market can enjoy mutual benefits
- As a result of the policy Zimbabwe enjoys cordial relations with South Asian and Far Eastern countries
- This has given birth to a number of agreements with the various countries

Zimbabwe- Korea relations

- South Korea and Zimbabwe established diplomatic ties in 1994 and since then the two countries have had cordial relations
- Assistance in various sectors has been rendered to Zimbabwe, these include agriculture, health, energy, technical training as well as water and sanitation
- South Korean International Cooperation Agency(SKOICA) has been instrumental in assisting Zimbabweans in getting access to higher and tertiary education
- An alumni of Zimbabweans who benefited from the generosity of the South Korean government and people in the field of human resource development was launched by the South Korean government

Cont'd

- The South Korean government through the South Korea/Africa Food and Agricultural Cooperation Initiative(SKAFACI) benefited Zimbabwe's agricultural sector and played a pivotal role in the country's economic development
- The South Korean Programme on International Agriculture(SKOPIA) opened a centre in Harare in 2015, further extending cooperation in the agricultural sector and hoping Zimbabwe will retain its status as the breadbasket of Africa
- In 2016 the two countries concluded the Ease of Doing Business policy which opened up for South Korean investors to open up shops in Zimbabwe
- Although bilateral trading relations between the two countries is still lagging behind, South Korea and Zimbabwe have been able to foster viable political and economic relations

- According to Zimbabwe's Ministry of Tourism and Hospitality, South Korea is ranked third on the list of Asian countries that have the most tourists in Zimbabwe
- South Korea is compassionate towards Zimbabwe because the two countries share sad history of colonisation and civil war
- South Korea is home to the global electronic giant, Samsung which has a plant in Zimbabwe
- In May of 2015, telecoms manufacturing giant Samsung — an affiliate of Samsung Construction and Trade — signed a $10 million deal with a local firm, Cranbal Investments that saw the Korean giant setting up a television and refrigerator assembly plant in Zimbabwe.

- In 2015 a South Korean business delegation consisting of both public and private sector players visited the country to seek investment opportunities in the areas of power generation and road construction.
- The delegation made up of representatives from conglomerates Samsung Construction and Trade, DAEWOO International, Hyundai Corporation, and parastatals including the Korean Trade Agency (KOTRA) and Korea Electric Power,met up with several Government officials and representatives from the Zimbabwe Investment Authority, Zimbabwe Energy Regulatory Authority, Zimbabwe Power Company and several local private firms.
-

Middle East-Africa Relations

- Africa is home to a third of the world's mineral reserves and a tenth of the oil and the falling prices have dented economic outlook.
- Africa's trade with Asia is growing particularly fast, with Asia expected to overtake Europe as the continent's largest trading partner, according to Thomson Reuters' Datastream.
- Middle East countries continue to invest in Africa, an increasing number of businesses based in the Gulf Cooperation Council are seeking business and investment opportunities in African nations
- The Middle East is also playing a more integral role in world trade, with Dubai providing a conduit for some of the fastest growing trade routes.

Middle East and North Africa

- The Middle East and North Africa region is considered one of the most politically unstable regions in the world, yet the region has always had extreme significance in foreign affairs as a result of its great economic potential.
- Trade and investment in the Middle East and North Africa region have been major contributors to stability, particularly as a result of the many conflicting interests within the region and the international community.
- This region has always had a high potential value in terms of U.S. commercial and foreign policy interests, especially as economic development, supported through enhanced trade and investment ties, have consistently been viewed as an effective means of advancing American goals of peace and stability in the region
- In order to enhance these trade and investment ties, the U.S. employs multiple tools of economic diplomacy: Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs), Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs), and Federal Trade Agreements (FTAs

Zimbabwe- Middle East Relations

- Zimbabwe is a country rich in resources, due to this it has partnerships with countries from all over the globe
- Trade and investment are vital for the Zimbabwean economy, through the agricultural and mining sector the government of Zimbabwe has managed to have cordial relations with several countries in the Middle East
- In August of this year, President Mugabe met his Iranian counterpart President Hassan Rouhani to discuss ways of increasing cooperation in energy, agriculture and science and technology between the two countries
- Four Iranian leaders have visited Zimbabwe over the past three decades and President Mugabe has visited the Middle Eastern oil and gas giant five times

Cont'd

- At a meeting in Tel Aviv in June 2010, Israel declared its support for Zimbabwe's inclusion in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, stating that Zimbabwe is capable of supplying nearly a quarter of the global demand for diamonds.
- In 2015, Israel's exports to Zimbabwe totalled US $7.14 million, while Zimbabwe exported almost exclusively diamonds to Israel for US $13.8 million in the same year.
- In 2008, a Zimbabwean business delegation visited Israel for a week to explore new trade opportunities in the spheres of agriculture, telecommunications, cosmetics and solar energy. The tour was organized by the Christian Friends of Israel Zimbabwe.
- The UAE is Zimbabwe's biggest export market outside southern Africa, its main export to the UAE is diamonds
- Goods such as livestock animals, raw hides, iron and steel, pipes and ferrochromium, were an important component of Zimbabwe's US$148 million worth of exports to the UAE in 2015

- A significant number of Zimbabwean students are receiving quality tertiary education at universities in Dubai, with some on full scholarships.

- Through these studies, Zimbabwean students are trained for their country's sectors in critical need of manpower such as medicine, engineering, architecture, quantity surveying, computer sciences and actuarial sciences among others.

5th Session   Culture & Society (2)

13:30 - 15:30
Room No. 328, Main Building (3 F)

Chairman :   Hee Soo LEE
(Hanyang University, Korea)

1

**Muslim Minorities' Problem in Mongolia:
Kazakh and Khoton Communities**

Sukhee BATTULGA (National University of Mongolia, Mongolia)

Discussant : Sang Cheol KIM (HUFS, Korea)

2

**The Reason for ISIS's Enlarged Influence in 2015:
The View of Sociology of Religion**

Soo Jeong YI (Korea Army Academy at Yeong-Cheon, Korea)

Discussant : Sung Ok LEE (HUFS, Korea)

3

**Rediscovering Gender as a Strong Analytical Tool for Resisting
the Stereotypes of the Middle East**

Hiroko MINESAKI / Junko TORIYAMA
(Aichi Univ. of Education / Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Japan)

Discussant : Eun Kyung OH (Dongduk Women's University, Korea)

4

**Motahhari and Velayat-e Faqih: the Ideology
that led to absolute centralization of Power**

Qolamreza NASSR (Hiroshima University, Japan)

Discussant : Satoshi KATSUNUMA (Keio University, Japan)

Muslim minorities' problem in Mongolia: Kazakh and Khoton communities

✍ *Sukhee Battulga*

National University of Mongolia

This paper discusses Muslim minorities of Mongolia, namely Kazakh and Khoton communities. Kazakh people live predominantly in Western Mongolia in Bayan-Ulgii aimag. Khoton community is mainly concentrated in Uvs province. By emphasizing Kazakh and Khoton communities we aim to reveal relations between the two communities, influence of this relations on the Islamic revival since 1990s.

Most of Mongolian population practice Buddhism. Muslim Kazakh and Khoton people make up minority group. In socialist Mongolia the government implemented policies against religion and belief and encouraged atheism. Many lamas, monks, religious leaders were suppressed and executed. In times of aggressive attack on religion, a number of Muslims refused from their religious tradition, tried to hide their Islamic origin and became atheists. In connection with this literacy rate in Arabic among Islamic population has declined to zero level and assimilation to Mongolian intensified. This process has impacted Khoton community more.

Collapse of communism created favorable conditions for Islamic tradition to restore. In line with revival of Buddhist and Islamic traditions many different religions entered and attempted to strengthen their position in Mongolia. As if confronting such phenomenon Mongolian traditional shamanism has restored. This led religious leaders to compete for political power.

Meanwhile in Kazakh community in western part of Mongolia the Islamic tradition has resurged. In times socialist regime Kazakh and Khoton communities have not maintained active relations. However since 1990s the two communities' religious relations have activated. Perior to 1990s Khoton minorities have been intensively affected by assimilation to Mongolian process. As a result of this Kazakh and Khoton communities did not maintain active cooperation. However since 1990s the two communities have resumed their relations in religious field. Accordingly the assimilation process based on Islamic religion has intensified. Kazakh community pursues to improve relations with Khoton community in order to encourage Islamic revival in Mongolia. For Khoton community restoring Islamic religious tradition at the same time keeping their position as one part of Western Mongolia are both equal priority directions. ❁

The Reason for ISIS's Enlarged Influence in 2015: The View of Sociology of Religion

✍ *Soo Jeong Yi*

Korea Army Academy, Korea

1. Purpose of Research (1/1)

• Examining ISIS in the frame of five prerequisites;
   Recruit, Socialization, Economic Secure and Redistribution,
   Social Order, and Sense of Purpose

➢Re-categorizing ISIS by applying prerequisites of religious sociology theory and identified some characteristics it has unlike other terrorist groups

➢Strength to achieve its goal of 'Remain and Expand'

2. Theoretical Background (1/2)

Ronald L. Johnston

➤Five prerequisites of religious groups to maintain strength and countinuity

(based on nine prerequisites to form a society organized by Aberle, Cohen, Davis, Levy Jr., and Sutton)

2. Theoretical Background (2/2)

3. Brief History of ISIS (1/3)

1999	2004	2006.10
• Organization of Monotheism and Jihad	• Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)	• Islamic State in Iraq(ISI) • 2006.6.7 al-Zarqawi died

3. Brief History of ISIS (2/3)

2013	2014
• Islamic State in Iraq and Levant(ISIL)	• Islamic State • ISIS / IS

"the changes in the name of the group occurred to reflect the group's "[higher level of] development and nobility of aspiration"

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi

3. Brief History of ISIS (3/3)

"the eatablishment of a governing authority... does not depend on force alone. Indeed, it's imperative that, in addition to force, there be an appeasement of Muslim and a sharing with them in governance..."

in the letter between Ayman al-Zawaghiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

" Remain and Expand"

4. Five Functional Prerequisites of ISIS(1/6)

1) Recruitment/Reproduction

4. Five Functional Prerequisites of ISIS(2/6)

1) Recruitment/Reproduction

- Dabiq and Rumiyya

- Social Media

- Different approach methods

4. Five Functional Prerequisites of ISIS(3/6)

2) Socialization

- Fighter, Suicide bomber, administrative officer for recruiting educates new member

4. Five Functional Prerequisites of ISIS(4/6)

3) Producing Satisfactory Level of Financial Resources

- Oil and Natural Gas
- Antiquities
- Taxes, Extortion and Asset Seizure
- Kidnapping for Ransom
- External Support
- Agriculture

4. Five Functional Prerequisites of ISIS(5/6)

4) Preserving Order
- social, political and lawful order

4. Five Functional Prerequisites of ISIS(6/6)

5) Maintaining a Sense of Purpose

Local Muslim who follow Islamic extremism

Local Muslim who need the economic stability

Foreign Muslim who converted after joined ISIS

Foreign Muslim who follow Islamic Extremism

Foreign fighters to fulfill violence fantasy

5. Conclusion

Five prerequisites are closely intertwined.

Like two cogwheels that need each other to run-all factors function together affecting one another.

"Remains and Expands"

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Rediscovering gender as a strong analytical tool for resisting the stereotypes of the Middle East

✑ *Hiroko Minesaki & Junko Toriyama*

Aichi Univ. of Education / JSPS

Introduction

In 2013, Anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod published a book titled *Do Muslim Woman Need Saving?* (Cambridge MA and London: Harvard University Press) in which she drew attention to the way in which the image of Muslim woman had been used in Western media.   With rich analysis of self-claimed documentaries, NGO reports, and newspaper articles, she illustrated that, especially after the turn-of-the-century, the call to save Muslim woman became a common social interest that concurrently criminalized Muslim men or Muslim culture as backward, violent, and different.   Although the book deals with arguments regarding Muslims and the Middle East, it is also a strong social critique on the current Western societies where Islamophobia prevails. Presently, we are in the midst of translating the book into Japanese, not because we liked the book, but because we felt compelled to introduce its argument to Japanese readers.   Therefore, in this presentation, by taking this book as an example, we will argue that gender has been deployed as a strong tool for spreading misleading images of the Middle East, and for this same reason, it can be a strong tool in fighting against the overly negative, twisted image of the Middle East that has become dominant in contemporary media discourses.

To begin the discussion, we will first briefly introduce the book, then its implications, and then discuss how it is relevant to the contemporary Japanese situation.

Implications of *Do Muslim Women Need Saving?*

Since the beginning of my graduate studies, I have been an admirer of works of Lila Abu-Lughod.   I even considered her a mentor as she is a brilliant ethnographer with a sharp analytical mind.   I was also very excited about the book because it was her first after 10 years.   However, my first impression of the book was governed by disappointment and confusion.   She was not presenting a new account on Egypt, though she was well

known for her sharp analysis as well as her vividly detailed firsthand field data that only she could gather.   The book is printed in a relatively large font, so one immediately knows that the volume of the content is limited. However, after I started exchanging comments about and reactions to the book with Dr. Minesaki, my impression completely reversed, and we started to think that the book needed be translated.

Although the book addresses well-known sentiments among her readers, such as pointing out Western biases or false stereotypes concerning the Middle East, it is new in the sense that this topic is its primary concern. It was clear that Abu-Lughod needed to write a book addressing this message rather than an academic article because the general attitude of American society goes against her message.   She especially problematized the idea of the need to save Muslim women from their male relatives, which she called "the new common sense," and draws attention to the current movement in which the idea is increasingly politicized in debates regarding human rights as well as foreign military intervention by the US.

Here, we would like to point out three major implications of the book.

First of all, the book succeeded in providing an overall picture of the problems concerning the image of Muslim women.   It may be true that none of these accounts are new.   However, Abu-Lughod did not stop at introducing problems.   She went one step further and provided a frame of reference based on her original discourse analyses of novels, documentaries, NGO reports, pamphlets, and so on to frame the problem in a different way.   She illustrated the patterns of the problems that one might find even in pro-Muslim discourses on an analytical level.   By doing so, Abu-Lughod successfully shows us how we can overcome the anti-Muslim/pro-Muslim dichotomy and start a discussion on new grounds.

Secondly, she denounced stereotypical images of Muslim woman, not because they included offensive values but because simply they are far from the reality or they prevent people from facing that reality.   In doing so, Abu-Lughod deployed data she had personally collected in the field over the last three decades.   For the well-circulated supporting evidence regarding the claim that Muslim women are subordinated by men, such as the inegalitarian inheritance laws believed to be rooted in Islam, her data claims that reality is often much more complicated and that one cannot judge the level of equality based on a single norm.   Each norm is embedded in complex human relations, legal ties, or other social obligations, or even in ongoing economic or political processes that are mostly led by the states.   In front of the reality that Abu-Lughod illustrates, evaluating one's subordination seems nothing more than impossible or irrelevant.   After all, we are all subordinated by society while in turn depending on it to conduct our way of life.   Although much of her data had already been used in previous works, and most of her arguments are not new, by tackling bigger problems such as the argument of subordination and oppression based on her vast personal empirical experiences and accounts, her claims become very persuasive and real.

Thirdly, the book is mostly about the western account of Muslim women, mainly in the Middle East, and her criticism is targeted at the discourses circulated throughout the Western world.   Since *Orientalism* by Edward Said, intellectuals, especially those specialized in the Middle East, are no longer allowed to face the "other" with a positivistic attitude.   It became apparent that the "other" has also been "our" creation. However, after the almost 35 years that have passed since *Orientalism* was published, the gap between "other" and "self" has never been more apparent, and the importance of a reflexive mode of analysis is often overly minimized and made periphery by being labeled as "postcolonial theory" or "third world feminism."   In western academic discourses, scholars from the developing world who write in English, such as Talal Asad and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, are sometimes consumed by intellectuals as a tool to openly exhibit their sensitivity in public view.

The book effectively breaks down the boundaries between the other and the self or the developing and developed world by illustrating the direct link between those that take the form of humanitarian missions or even military invasions.   The book asserts that there are no longer them and us, or there and here, but that we are all connected and influencing one another.   In this way, the book redirects our attention to the aspect of power played out behind these dichotomic discourses.

Cases from Japan

From the cases Abu-Lughod discusses, it is clear that the book was primarily written for a United States audience, though that may include some other European nations, especially France.   However, it holds great significance for the Japanese audience, as well.   To consume information that is originally from the United States or Europe, it is important to know the context in which the information has been produced and to not leave the audience unequipped because we are no longer living in seclusion, especially information-wise.   In addition, even though Japan is said to not yet face significant Islamophobia, we can observe some signs of its emergence.

Here, I would like to introduce a few numbers.   This is data that was collected from Dr. Toriyama's "Middle Eastern Studies" class at a well-known private university this spring.   As you can see, more than 80% of the students considered the "Middle East" area to be particularly dangerous, and 80% of them agreed that the area is the potential enemy of the United States.   However, as they themselves admitted, such images are not backed up by any evidence.   To support the interpretation, here we can see that less than 10% kept the same opinion after 14 class sessions.   We can also see that their image of the Middle East had improved significantly throughout the course.   To sum up, we can see that most of the students had shared negative images of the Middle East without any supporting information.   We cannot identify the source or cause from these data, but we can assume that the students' negative attitudes toward the Middle East in general reflect the attitude of the general audience in Japan, where we can only find articles on terrorism, civil war, or forced migration in the media coverage of the Middle East.

Nonetheless, the problem does not only involve negative or oppositional sentiments toward the Middle East. After an open lecture on women in the Middle East in Nagoya in June of 2014, I had a woman who was well dressed and seemingly intelligent approach me and express that she was impressed by the lecture.   She then continued that she is a Christian and that she prayed at the World Day of Prayer in 2014 for Egyptian women and other women in Middle Eastern countries such as Iraq and Syria who suffered because of their men and their legal system that allows polygamy.   She along with her Christian friends are always praying for the suffering of women in the Middle East to come to the end.   It was obvious that they considered themselves to be in a superior position because they believed women in the Middle East to be oppressed and subordinated while they themselves enjoyed the luxury of freedom.   This incident reveals the existence of the problematic conception of the Middle East in Japan as well as elsewhere; even many well-meaning people who are intelligent enough to understand that the Middle East is not a place that is only occupied by terrorists still believe that women in the area are victimized by their religion, culture, and mostly their own men.

Such a gendered understanding of other cultures has become increasingly apparent in Japan.   "Because I am a Girl" is an NGO that is organized to support projects for women in developing countries.   In Japan, we started to see their massive advertising campaign sometime around 2015.   We see their advertisements on trains, on the internet, or in the form of flyers distributed in the street.   One of their advertising lines in 2015

said, "I am 15 and a mother of two, and I still don't know what romance is." Another line in 2016 said, "Do you know that more women lose their lives in delivery than in wars or natural disasters?" Both lines are meant to direct our attention to problems that only women suffer, or young girls, to be more precise. Their advertisements feature photos of a young girl or two, ages 12 to 14, who look innocent and vulnerable. The advertisements are very sophisticated, cleverly made, and easily evoke personal sympathies beyond political conflicts or social affairs. However, we cannot ignore the problems inherent in such lines. They portray women's suffering as a religious or cultural matter apart from political, social, or economic suffering, even though both religion and culture are shaped within the specific political, social, or economic environments. In addition, we cannot ignore the familiar obsession with the concept of love or romance in depicting girls' suffering, though it is not clear how much significance this has in their suffering.

Conclusion:
Gender is an important tool in revealing our self-righteous assumptions

As we have shown, the discussion of gender[1] plays an important role in portraying human suffering, especially in the case of women in the Middle East. It is usually deployed to suggest that the suffering is culturally or religiously formulated rather than being caused by the social, political, or economic conditions that are directly influenced by international politics. One of the popular motifs used in illustrating women's subordinated position in the Middle East is their lack of freedom in choosing sexual partners and autonomy. According to Abu-Lughod in her book, this is falsely treated as the symbol or signifier of gender equality by the Western world, even though it only represents their version of gender equality, which has actually never existed in the West. By pointing this out, we have no intention to argue that women in the Middle East are free from suffering or that no women have suffered from their lack of freedom in choosing sexual partners or autonomy. Instead, we would like to assert that these are aspects that are being considered important based not on the actual problems women in the Middle East face but on the discussion of Western identity that separates them from the rest of the world, especially the Middle East.

Moreover, women's suffering is formed within the specific political, social, economic, and even environmental condition that forms and results from the ongoing global flow of people, things, and information. Thus, we can never treat women's sufferings as "their" problem separate from our own patterns of behavior or recognition. Instead, we need to start talking about "their" suffering as our "own" problems in relation to our own existence, and as intellectuals, we are obliged to provide an efficient framework for such discussion.

Gender, as a socially constructed concept, is strongly interwoven in culture. As part of owning to that fact, cultural relativism has been welcomed in the discussion of gender in the Middle East. However, for the exact same reason, cultural relativism has been used to argue that the Middle East is inferior, using the suffering of women as proof. In a way, once again, we find gender in the middle of the cross-section of Western centralism and cultural relativism. This new cross-section is formed in such a sophisticated manner that even people who are trying to be sensitive to culture diversity and women's suffering believe the call to rescue oppressed women from their male relatives. In order to avoid such a pitfall, perhaps it is important to revise the problems of cultural relativism. Both the book and Japanese cases have revealed cultural relativism cannot adequately

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[1] The concept of gender to which we refer means an accumulation of knowledge that makes the distinction between male and female, that makes the distinction particularly important or meaningful to others, and that creates power inequality based on that distinction.

respond to the need to discuss (1) the internal differences and power relations within, (2) the changes, and (3) the division of self and other; all are related to gender issues.   Needless to say, these are all important aspects to the discussion of this contemporary phenomenon.   With the philosophy of gender, we no longer have the luxury of discussing problems in the Middle East as "theirs" because these problems are formed in relation to the global repositioning of power in which we, ourselves, are playing a large part.

Motahhari and Velayat-e Faqih: The Ideology that led to absolute centralization of Power

✍ Qolamreza Nassr

Hiroshima University, Japan

Motahhari, a dear son who was a part of my body. (Ayatollah Khomeini)

Introduction:

Ayatollah Morteza Motahhari (1920-1979) has generally been referred to as a martyr teacher (mo'allem-e shahid) in Iran's post-revolution literature. Needless to say, he was among the most outstanding religious figures such as Ayatollah Montazeri and Ayatollah Beheshti who accentuated the concept of velayat-e faqih (the guardianship of the jurists), particularly after the Islamic Revoultion of 1979. Considering the fact that different researchers have done splendid works on Motahhari's role in the process of the Islamic Revolution, this presentation aims to look at his role and ideology from a different angle in order to achieve a clear understanding of his stance toward velayat-e faqih and Islamic democracy.

Political Activities:

- Motahhari's socio-political activities in anti-despotism movements, compared to prominent revolutionary figures can be shown in this manner.

- However, his remarkable role in following cases is undeniable.

Political Activities:

- In spite of the fact that Motahhari was mainly considered a religious figure, in awakening people, particularly the youth, he, like Ayatollah Taleqani, was head and shoulders above his fellow ulama.

Marxism   Capitulations

Shah's Deceptive plans

Threat of Mojahedin-e Khalq

Political Activities:

Organizing the Up-Rise of Panzdah-e Khordad (in Tehran)

Establishing Tehran Militant Clergy Association

Leading Delegations Coalition

Supporting the Oppressed Palestinians

Combating Distortions and Deviations

Motahhari, a Philosopher with a Novel Worldview: His Ideology

- In a unique way, referring to particular features and specifications of human:

Man and Faith → Monotheistic World → Revelation and Prophecy → Man's Status in Quran → Society & History → Eternal Life → Ideology

1979 Revolution: From Motahhari's View

- "It's the content of the revolution that determines its outcome." (Motahhari, Piramun-e Enqelab-e Eslami)

Ideology | Economy | Liberty

Motahhari: Islam and Nationalism

General Idea of Natonalism:
National Identity
Culture
History
Religion (Muslim and non-Muslim)
Language
Traditins

National   Islamic

Identity   Quran
Culture   Shari'a
                Islamic Culture

Unlike Bazargan and Taleqani, Motahhari put much more emphasis on Islam as Khomeini did, and castigated Iranians traditions and customs in several occasions. Once he even went far enough to call the Iranians' ancestors stupid.

Motahhari and Government

- Regarding the post-revolution government, Motahhari seems to have shared opinion with Khomeini, Beheshti, and Montazeri, whereas he claimed as an Islamic Democracy advocate.

Velayat-e Faqih ???

Velayat-e Faqih
Vesayat-e Faqih
Islamic Democratic Republic
Islamc Democracy

According to their Significance

Islamic Democracy ?

- Motaharri, like Khomeini believed that having Islam means having everything. Thus, he said, "Chon ke sad aamad navad ham pishe mast." (Once you have **hundred**, it means you already have **ninty**.)

Vali-ye Faqih: Motahhri's point of view

- "Vali-ye Faqih (the supreme leader) is elected by people and this is actual democracy." (Ayatollah Motahhari)

Conclusion:

- Taking all the above factors into consideration it can be inferred that:
- Although Motahhari appeared to be advocating democracy, he could not thoroughly approve that because,
a) As a Muslim he could not accept the law legislated by other than God
b) Islam is the perfect religion with answer to all economic and socio-political matters. In addition, it comprises democratic concepts
c) Like Khomeini, he believed it was people's mind that counted, and what they wanted was the Islamic government
d) After all, having an Islamic government with a vali-ye faqih elected by people to supervise the government was an actual form of democracy, and not against it

Chronology:

- 1920
- On Feb. 2, Morteza Motahhari was born to a pious family in Fariman-a small city near Mashhad.
- 1921
- The Coup of Reza Khan and the end of Qajar Dynasty (1925)
- 1932
- Motahhari went to Mashhad Theology School.
- 1937
- Death of Great Ayatollah Ha'eri Yazdi (the founder of Qom Theology School)
- 1938
- Motahhari went to Qom to continue his Islamic Studies; there he became Khomeini's (1902-1989) disciple in fiqh (jurisprudence) and Osul (principles)
- 1941
- Reza Shah's abdication, and the beginning of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's Reign
- 1941
- Foundation of Tudeh Party (a pro-communist party)
- 1942
- The Engineer's Association of Iran was founded (Kanun-e Mohandesin-e Iran)
- 1951
- Iran's Oil Nationalization Movement won the victory

- 1952
- He moved to Tehran and in the same year started teaching at Marvi School
- 1953
- The Coup D'état that brought Mosaddeq's government to its end
- 1953
- National Resistance Movement founded by a group of mainly religiously oriented Mosaddeqists (Had no more public activity after 1957)
- 1955
- He started teaching at Tehran University, Faculty of Theology
- 1955
- The exegesis class in the Islamic Association of Students was founded and Motahhari was the first lecturer
- 1957
- SAVAK (The secret police, domestic security and intelligence service) was established
- 1958
- Islamic Association of the Physicians was founded and Motahhari was one of its main lectures, and from 1961 to 1972, he was its unique speaker
- 1960
- Second National Front (formed by people such as Karim Sanjabi, Mehdi Bazrargan, Allahyar Saleh, Shapour Bakhtiar and the others)
- 1961
- Freedom Movement of Iran (formed by Mehdi Bazargan, Ayatollah Taleqani and Yadollah Sahabi)

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6th Session — Language & Literature

16:00 - 17:20

Minerva Complex, International Conference Room (B2 F)

Chairman : Young Tae LEE

(Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea)

1

Study of Maqāmāt of al- Hamadhānī – Focused on Its Prosimetric Style and Literary Significance

Jeong A KIM (HUFS, Korea)

Discussant : Fumihiko KOBAYASHI (Independent Scholar, Japan)

2

Portrait of a Human Rights Champion and Writer: Revealing the Philosophy of Khaled Hosseini

Mohamed ELASKARY & Hesham KHADAWARDI

(HUFS, Korea / King Abdulaziz Univ., Saudi Arabia)

Discussant : Salaheldin ELGEBILY (HUFS, Korea)

Study of *Maqāmāt* of al- Hamadhānī

– focused on its prosimetric style and literary significance

✍ **Jeong A Kim**

Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea

The aim of this paper is to analyze *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī(967-1007) as a literary work written in prosimetric style and to shed new light on its literary significance. First, the interplay between the two major modes of literary language – prose and verse – which appear in *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī will be investigated as well as the characteristics and significance of prosimetric style. The types of verse in *Maqāmāt* can be categorized into poems, proverbs and *Saj'*.

1. Classification of verse in *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī

Al-Hamadhānī is acknowledged as the foremost among his contemporaries to have practiced an entirely new genre of writing. *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī, a collection of anecdotal short narrative of the 11th century, was acknowledged in the history of Arabic literature as a sophisticated new literary genre and carries great significance in the history of world literature as well for the following reasons.

First, most of the segments in *Maqāmah* are identified as prose, yet an extensive use of verse was also adopted. Rhymed prose known as *Saj'* is integrated in *Maqāmah* to preserve poetic qualities. *Maqāmāt* has been used as a textbook for teaching Arabic language due to its prosimetric style, which not only embodies rhetorical excellence but also captures the beauty of language. Secondly, *Maqāmāt* is a collection of fictitious anecdotes featuring two imaginary characters – the narrator and the protagonist. This narrative structure in *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī is said to have allowed for the birth of the genre of fiction, namely novel. Thirdly, it can be logically inferred that *Maqāmāt* exerted much influence in European literature by being imported to al-Andalus. Pertinent to this issue, the topic of 'picareque novel' is being studied by the Spanish literature academia. The fact that *Maqāmāt* is written in prosimetric style is a decisive factor in shaping the work's literary identity. Although *Maqāmāh* is mostly composed of segments written in prose, it also incorporates *Saj'* with intervals of poetry through which rhetorical excellence becomes prominent. In the pre-Islamic Arabia, Arabic poetry enjoyed its prestige; however with the coming of Islam in the Arabic Peninsula, Arabic poetry experienced a period of decline in quality and quantity. That Quran was written in prose and that works written in prose were considered

more appropriate for serving the sacred mission of propagating Islam were what caused the dwindling of Arabic poetry. Moreover, as the revelations of the Prophet Muhammad began to be associated with the prophetic utterances of the pre-Islamic Arabian poets which were considered threats to the newly emerging faith of Islam, creation of Arabic poetry was deliberately suppressed in the early Islamic era. However, this did not stop the Arab Bedouin from expressing their inherent yearnings to create 'rhymes'. Eventually, this gave birth to prosimetric-styled works such as *Maqāmāt* during the Abbasid period. *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī carries fifty-two anecdotal short narratives, featuring a protagonist, Iskandari, and a narrator, Isa ibn Hisham, with major cities appearing as settings of these tales. In all *Maqāmāh*, segments written in verse are expressed in either poems or *Saj'*. The interplay between prose and verse in each of the fifty-two individual *Maqāmāh* will be examined first. The literary style of *Maqāmāh* is identified as either prose or verse since the use of verse differs depending on the *Maqāmāh*. For instance, among the twenty-four lines of *al-Maqāmah al-'Ajādhiyyah*, eleven lines are written in poems and five lines among the rest of the thirteen lines are written in *Saj'*. On the contrary, in *al-Maqāmah al-'Ajādhiyyah*,   no poem can be found among the entire 134 lines, only several *Saj'* phrases and sentences in the narrative. Moreover, in the five *Maqamah*, *al-Maqāmah al-Sijistaniyyah; al-Maqāmah al-Nahidiyyah; al-Maqāmah al-Waṣiyyah;   al-Maqāmah al-Saimariyyah; al-Maqāmah al-Dinariyyah*,   not   one single line was written in verse. Therefore, the connection between prose and verse, the presence and absence of verse, and the proportion of quantity and position of verses in the form of poem or *Saj'* will be analyzed in this study. The purpose of this study lies in determining the characteristics and significance of verse based on the analysis of connection between prose and verse.

2. Literary significance of *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī as a work of prosimetrum

The words of the protagonist, Abu al-Fatḥ in *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī, are narrated in the form of *Saj'* or Arabic poems and proverbs. Most of the 11th century works written in prose had employed verses; however, most works written in such form were charged with religious or political perspectives for the purpose of recording history. However, Hamadhānī made use of poems or *Saj'* in the newly invented literary frame of 'fictitious story' to have successfully achieved rhetorical feat with elements of humor and irony woven into the tales. The use of verse in *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī proved to be all the more efficient in delivering the message of the writer. Considering that the origin of Arabic literature is deeply rooted in Arabic poetry, rhetorical and satirical influence of prosimetrum is powerful. Therefore, it is fair to say that use of verse in *Maqāmāt* contributed much to augmenting the dramatic effect by demonstrating excellent rhetorical devices and conveying satirical messages.

The academic motive that drove me to delve deeper in this topic was the lack of insight in this issue in the existing studies despite the great importance of *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī as a work of prosimetrum and its literary significance. The only two studies which analyzed *Maqāmāt* as a literary work with verse segments are Heinrich's *Prosimetrical Genres in Classical Arabic Literature*, and Ailin Qian's *The Maqamah as Prosimetrum: A Comparative Investigation of its Origin, Form and Function.* Heinrich limited the subject of the study to the poems featured in the *Maqāmāt* of *al-Ḥarīrī* while Ailin Qian limited the subject of the study to *Saj'* in *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī to conduct a comparative study on the origin, form and function between *Maqāmāt* and Asian literature. Ailin Qian also conducted a study comparing the origin of *Maqāmāt* with prosimetric- styled works from India and China. This study will conduct a more detailed and comprehensive analysis on the use of verse within *Maqāmāt* by including poems and *Saj'* in the study to examine the significance and influence of verse segments. Moreover, this study will include a comparative analysis between

Arabic *Maqāmat* and Korean genre of musical storytelling, *Pansori*. The following are brief descriptions outlining the preceding studies on *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī.

1. Shawqī Ḍaif claimed that al-Hamadhānī was influenced by Ibn Duraid(837-933) regarding the stylistic form of *Maqāmāt*, and by *al-Jāḥiẓ*(-868) in terms of a narrative structure featuring a miser character.

2. Abd al-Fattāḥ Kīlīṭū analyzed *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī through the keywords of travel, laughter, center and periphery and a miser poet. Abd al-Fattāḥ Kīlīṭū specifically focused on how the tales of *Maqāmāt* correspond to the Arabic cultural elements.

3. Fedwa Douglas lauded *Maqāmāt* to be one of the masterpieces in classical Arabic literature. Douglas claimed that as a literary text, *Maqāmāt* is a collection of anecdotes highlighting the adventures of the rogue protagonist Abu al-Fatḥ.

4. According to Adetunji Izzudeen's evaluation of *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī, *Maqāmāt* contains references to all the historical events of Arab. The insertion of verse mitigated the boredom of didactic lessons by providing elements of entertainment for the readers. Moreover, Adetunji Izzudeen regarded highly of the fraudulent and humorous nature of the intellectual miser Abu al-Fatḥ and the invention of such character to bring satirical elements of the tales to light.

5. Jareer Abu-Haidar claimed that the fundamental elements of the Spanish picaresque novels were motivated by *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī.

3. Comparative analysis between *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī and *Pansori*

The characteristics of prosimetric style presented in *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī will be compared with the Korean genre of musical storytelling, *Pansori*. *Pansori*, as a genre of narrative song, first emerged during the 18th century. Also known as Korean folk opera, *Pansori* addresses a variety of topics such as love and adventure and uses a combination of songs and narrations to deliver a story to the audience. The significance of comparative analysis between *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī[1] and *Pansori* lies in that both actively incorporate the use of verses within the prosimetric-styled work. In addition, both *Maqāmāt* and *Pansori* emerged as groundbreaking genres for their times; featuring commoners as protagonists, both *Maqāmāt* and *Pansori* freely engaged in mockery of the existing social conventions. The study will illustrate the number of lines written in the form of prose and verse appearing in each *Maqāmat* and *Pansori* in a chart. This chart will form the basis through which *Maqāmāt* and *Pansori* can be compared on many levels including comparison on the word counts of prose and verse, texts spoken by the narrator, texts spoken by the main characters and the songs featured by the main characters. Through this analytical process, this study will determine *Maqāmāt*'s dramatic elements created through the combination of prose and verse and their satirical functions as well as the work's literary significance. Furthermore, the study will delineate the similarities and differences between *Maqāmāt* and *Pansori*, focusing specifically on the works' combination of prose and verse. The issue regarding direct influence one work had on the creation of another between *Maqāmāt* and *Pansori* will be left to be further examined in follow up studies in the future. ❃

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[1] The comparative analysis between *Maqāmāt* and Pansori involves comparison between *Maqāmāt* of al-Hamadhānī and Pansori. (hereafter referred to as *Maqāmāt*)

Portrait of a Human Rights Champion and Writer: Revealing the Philosophy of Khaled Hosseini

✍ *Mohamed Elaskary & Hesham Khadawardi*

HUFS, Korea / King Abdulazia Univ., Saudi Arabia

Abstract

This paper is a study in contemporary thinking about human rights issues, dealing with both the hopes and the fears expressed by Khaled Hosseini's novel *The Kite Runner*.[1] The aim of this paper is not to discuss human rights in Islam nor in Afghani culture. Rather, this paper concerns itself with human rights issues as exemplified by Hosseini in his novels. In other words, our main aim is to examine how Hosseini championed and defended human rights through his novels.

In *The Kite Runner*, *A Thousand Splendid Suns* and *And The Mountains Echoed*, Hosseini exposes the abuses from which his countrymen, men and women, suffer from. In these three novels, it is clear that women and minorities than anyone else suffer the most. There are many such gross violations of human rights competing against morality. Unfortunately, the Muslim world has witnessed countless numbers of human rights abuses during the last few decades. Yet, to be objective if the Muslim world is in decline now (economically and democratically) it was ahead of Europe and the rest of the world centuries ago. In other words, when the non-Muslim world was going through its dark ages during the medieval period the Muslim world was in its heyday. Muslims, in this concern, believe (based on the teaching of the Quran) that nations have lifespans, i.e. each nation will have its heyday in leading the world one day or the other and after reaching its zenith it may start to deteriorate and eventually collapse.

Keywords: *Afghan*, *Freedom*, *Hazara*, *Human rights*, *Taliban*, *women rights*.

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[1] This is because *The Kite Runner* has attracted much more attention premised on its plot that is tightly knit and the way the trope elements in the narrative are epitomised by current world trends especially in the context of Islamic ideologues.

Introduction

Westmarland (2005, 16) observes that the question "what are human rights?" is one that has been the subject of much theorizing. At this point, perhaps it will be useful to succinctly bring to our attention an important tenet in the Islamic cosmos about human rights. A number of scholars have deeply discussed the human rights issues in Islam. Among these is Schirrmacher (2008, 14) who states that "Muslim organizations have emphasized repeatedly that Islam not only respects human rights, but even has formulated more extensive catalogues of human rights than the West and is really the "author" of all human rights.

The question "is Islam compatible with human rights?" has been answered by Shahram Akbarzadeh and Benjamin MacQueen (2008), who emphasised this fact when they state:

The question of compatibility between Islam and human rights in Muslim majority states is an urgent and topical issue, partly because most such states in the Middle East suffer under the yoke of authoritarian rule while the United States has made democracy promotion and protection of human rights its top mission in this oil-rich region. The most immediate beneficiaries of any move towards greater freedoms tend to be Islamist groups in opposition, which might explain why the latter has adopted a conciliatory (sometimes enthusiastic) position towards human rights, freedom and democracy" (5).

The emphasis from the aforementioned quote affirms the fact that human rights is enshrined within Islamic cosmos. However, it appears that within its borders, there are certain authorities that go against this spirit of human rights. Essentially, this exposes the ruling elite to be subjected to constant threats by Islamic groups in opposition. In her article "Do Muslim Women Need Saving?" and in her other books, Abu-Lughod touches on the issues of human rights, women and gender rights in the Muslim world. Abu-Lughod (2002, 788) agrees that there are many grievances from which women suffer in the Muslim world but she argues that stereotyping such problems is not the answer. She maintains that we should be "aware of differences, respectful of other paths toward social change that might give women better lives. Can there be a liberation that is Islamic? And, beyond this, is liberation even a goal for which all women or people strive? Are emancipation, equality, and rights part of a universal language we must use?" (Ibid). She explains:

I have done fieldwork in Egypt over more than 20 years and I cannot think of a single woman I know, from the poorest rural to the most educated cosmopolitan, who has ever expressed envy of U.S. women, women they tend to perceive as bereft of community, vulnerable to sexual violence and social anomie, driven by individual success rather than morality, or strangely disrespectful of God" (788).

Abu Lughod's observation is more of an oxymoron in the context of perception. Whereas the Egyptian woman has some sort of curtailed freedom in comparison to the US women, the former still perceives the latter to be subjected to some tangible dangers like sexual violence. Our postulation is that the Egyptian woman still finds some comfort in her lifestyle despite limited freedom compared to that of a US woman. Regarding the problems Muslim women suffer in Afghanistan and elsewhere, Abu-Lughod (2002, 789) suggests that:

A more productive approach, it seems to me, is to ask how we might contribute to making the world a more just place. A world not organized around strategic military and economic demands; a place where certain kinds of forces and values that we may still consider important could have an appeal and

where there is the peace necessary for discussions, debates, and transformations to occur within communities.

In similar vein, Lina Abirafeh (2010, 79) contends that there were efforts in Afghanistan in the 1970s to reform the country, including women and minority rights but all went in vain.

Discussing the same idea later in 2013, Abu-Lughod argues that the West wanted to use the issue of women oppression on the Muslim world as a pretext for waging wars against Afghanistan and other Muslim countries. She asked an Egyptian woman (whom Abu-Lughod has known for 20 years by 2010 when she was working on her anthropological field research in Egypt) about who to blame for women oppression in the Egypt: Islam or the government, and the woman answered that its "the government [….] The government oppresses women. The government doesn't care about the people. It doesn't care that they don't have work or jobs, that prices are so high that no one can afford anything. Poverty is hard. Men suffer from this too" (ibid, 1). Abu-Lughod adds that Western media publish unsubstantiated stories about the condition of women in the Muslim world. In similar vein, in the introduction to their book on women rights in the Muslims world Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Kari Vogt, Lena Larsen and Christian Moe (2013) argue:

> In Islam, as in other religious traditions, the idea of equality between men and women was neither relevant to notions of justice nor part of the juristic landscape. To use an idiom from Islamic juristic tradition, gender equality is among the 'newly created issues' [….], that is, one of those issues for which there is no previous ruling. It is an issue that Muslim jurists have not had to address until the twentieth century" (1).

Writing on this concept of equality between men and women, it seems clearly from above that there is an inner struggle about the term "human rights". Much as the writers attempt to bring forth their argument, so many connotations for the educated Muslim, not the least of which is an inner struggle of striving against one's own weaknesses in living up to what human rights really are. The reasons for looking down upon women is simplistic if not narcissistic. It borders on egotistical tendencies. The decision to discriminate against women is founded on a fulcrum of political treachery and intrigue, compounded by male chauvinism. Historically, the struggle for women' rights began in the 18th century during the period of intense intellectual activity known as the Age of Enlightenment. In many parts of the world, the woman is an object of constant scorn, degradation and physical torture. In the past, women did not exist as individuals with personalities to defend. They rather existed as mere docile and exotic accompaniments to the males. Throughout that period, women lacked a voice to articulate their dilemma and their points of view. They, thus, accepted their fate without so much resistance. Such passive stance results from societal conditioning through questionable cultural practices.

> In our discussion of human rights in Hosseini's *The Kite Runner*, we strongly hold the viewpoint that Islam and human rights go hand in hand. They are compatible and you cannot separate one from another; they are conjoined. The researchers are aware of the gross human rights violations all over the Muslim world. The forthright answer we can give here is I that these violations contradict the basic teachings of Islam and they maybe compared to the abuses committed in Europe and elsewhere in the past. In other words, it is not Islam which forbids women from driving cars in Saudi Arabia but rather it is Bedouin, tribal or cultural considerations which resulted in denying women some/many of their human rights in some Muslim countries. The authors of this paper stress that regardless of social echelons, marginalization and oppression of Muslim is condemned in the strongest terms possible. In our analysis, excerpts demonstrate that human rights abuses in *The Kite Runner* (and its sisters) could have been motivated by traditions. These traditions are pedestals upon which human because practices are solidified and an explanation given.

1. What are human rights?

Westmarland (2005, 17) says some well-known rights theorists, such as Hohfeld (1919) wrote exclusively about legal rights, and Bentham famously dismissed moral rights as "conceptual nonsense" (Bentham, 1792; cited by Westmarland, 2005, 17), arguing that rights are created through law and hence that there could be no such thing as 'moral' or 'natural' rights. Human rights as an issue emerge in Hosseini's novels in general, as we will demonstrate in the preceding sections. This phenomenon is the clear consequence certain configuration of factors such as ethnicity and ethnic identity, religious identity, massive poverty. In order to understand the position of an individual in compliance with human rights violations, it is necessary to consider customary division of international law (Kijanen 2008, 11). According to Martin (2013, 1), the view of human rights is that they are moral rights. He states that one of the "leading ideas about human rights so understood is that human rights as moral rights do not presuppose social recognition or enforcement." He adds that natural rights are the ancestor of contemporary human rights. In addition, the natural rights tradition established the importance of two main kinds of rights: rights to certain determine liberties of conduct and rights to the proscribing of particular injuries at the hands of others. One fundamental argument of Martin (2013, 3) is that "human rights are moral rights that are held to exist prior to, or independently of, any legal or institutional rules."

2. Hosseini as a human rights activist

Hosseini is a high calibre novelist who writes not only to the local and ethnic community in which he was born but he writes to the whole world. As an author of such calibre, he would not allow his ethnic or religious beliefs to be manifested subjectively in his works. He is not biased towards/against any ethnic group but rather in his works, he defends the rights of minorities and women. This is what we clearly see in Hosseini's novels. He defends the Hazaras, women and the oppressed in his society. Rebecca Stur (2011), in this concern, states that "Hosseini is an American and considers himself to have assimilated into U.S. culture. But his novels are centered on his ancestral and natal home and illuminate that home country, by providing a broader picture of Afghanistan, to readers in his new home (20–21). She goes on to add that through the details of his plots novels [in *The Kite Runner* and *A Thousand Splendid Suns*] and the interactions of his characters, Hosseini presents problems of racism and ethnocentrism, as well as exile and immigration. Hosseini explores issues of gender equality, gender stereotypes, and domestic abuse" (65). She adds that the "issues of gender and ethnic discrimination are strong themes in both of Hosseini's novels [*The Kite Runner* and *A Thousand Splendid Suns*]" (73). Similarly, Silima Nanda and Nalo Shokeen (2014) reiterated that Hosseini has been concerned about what they described as the "wretched conditions of the people in general and women in particular who have been doubly marginalized –one by the society and the other within the four walls of their homes" (10). For Lindsay Shapiro (2010, 24–25), Hosseini's novels "generate knowledge because they impart a sense of reality through their depictions of fictional characters dealing with real-life issues. This knowledge, in turn, can be imparted on the journalistic plane and on American society as a whole".

Human rights activism is closely related to the rights of the woman. And indeed in many parts of the world, gender disparity is very profound and this has elicited debate on gender balance issues. When the Taliban took power in Afghanistan from 1996–2001, women faced discrimination on a whole new scale. They were forced to

wear a burqa covering the entire body. They said it was for a woman's honour and safeguard. They also had travel restrictions placed upon them. McIntosh (2012)[2] in her article *The Kite Runner: Human Rights* states:

> For years the country of Afghanistan has proven a strong line of injustice and discrimination to women. Present day Afghanistan is not much different from 30 years ago (in relation to women's rights). Day to day women suffer from abuse, isolation, and a magnitude of double standards. A woman's husband has the right of life or death, but ultimately an angry mob has the power to stone a woman for exposing herself one bit.

Hosseini's novels have a lot to do with women and minorities afflictions and rights. Hosseini has been concerned with the dilemmas from which his people have been suffering for the last 50 years: the "plight" of women, the injustices from which religious and ethnic minorities suffer from and others. In this regard, Stuhr (2011) argues:

> Hosseini's women, much like the country of Afghanistan itself, appear to be propelled by the whims of outside forces, familial and societal, with little chance of influencing their own lives and futures Yet Laila and Mariam are neither passive nor helpless as they make choices and accept consequences to affect desired ends, both hopeful and tragic. In interviews and talks, Hosseini claims to write simple love stories, but his portrayal of Laila and Mariam and their dreams, trials, and challenges presents a complex view of women in Afghanistan that goes beyond oppression and the stereotype of the veil" (53).

The same idea has been expressed by Stuhr (2011, 69) who argues that the "powerlessness or status of women in Afghanistan has been of great concern to Americans, and Hosseini addresses this directly, especially in *The Kite Runner* and *A Thousand Splendid Suns*. According to Faegheh Shirazi (2010), women and children make up 80% refugees worldwide and that they suffer from enormous problems due to the Russian invasion in the 1970s and the post-Taliban complications (2). Shirazi argues:

> In times of civil war or strife when male family members are drafted into the military, arrested by government or occupying forces, or killed in combat, women assume primary responsibility for their households and carry the burden of ensuring the immediate survival of family members. At these critical times, women and girls face continued threats to their safety and security, not only during the conflict, but also in the postconflict [sic] phase" (2).

To conclude on this point, it is safe to say that Hosseini pinpoints the problems from which women, and minorities, have been suffering from for ages and showing the prevailing prejudice against them, and how the Afghan society fails to respect their rights. The writer uses narration to defend their human rights. Thus, Amir, in *The Kite Runner*, speaks of the injustices Hazaras had to endure at the hands of their Pashtun fellow countrymen. Stuhr, quoting Mousavi, argues that "Hazara slavery was officially ended by decree in 1921 and by the Afghan constitution in 1923. This had only a marginal effect on the wellbeing of the Hazara in Afghanistan, however, because at the same time, there was an effort to unite the country and move away from tribalism" (2011,75). There is a proverb in Hazara language which says ''even a Pashtun dog has a protector, but not a Hazara'' (Mousavi, 160, cited in Stuhr 2011, 76). The matrix of ethnic conflict is explored by Hosseini through the experiences and memories of his childhood. Although we do not discuss it, ethnic interaction and conflicts are

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[2]   See Marissa McIntosh (2012)*The Kite Runner: Human Rights*, accessed from https://prezi.com/m/8za5mhytsw6a/the-kte-runner-human-rights/. (accessed on 25/7/2016).

normally seen in the dimensions of psychological, social and economic perspective. The woman has to fight against an oppressive culture and its attendant discrimination against their sex in order to survive. The society needs to secure rights and opportunities for women equal to those of men, or a commitment to securing these as enshrined in their constitutions. Women have a natural right to the same opportunities and freedoms as men. The approach they adopt is to campaign to gain for women rights which are previously men's exclusive preserve; they campaign against laws which discriminate against women but are claimed to be for their protection. The root of the problem of gender inequality as the socialization process arises from the difference between the sexes in their capabilities, aptitudes and aspirations acquired of learned.

In *The Kite Runner*, emerging motifs are human rights and many forms of injustices. We see women treatment, Hazaras versus the Pashtuns and general freedom in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Amelia Hill (2003) states that, "Over the last three decades, Afghanistan has been ceaselessly battered by communist rule, Soviet occupation, the Mujahideen and democracy that became a rule of terror."[3] In all of Hossein's novels, *The Kite Runner*, *A Thousand Splendid Suns* and *When the Mountains Echoed*, he is clearly defending human rights, women rights and minority rights. In *The Kite Runner*, Hosseini paints the Hazara minority in a favourable tone, and he defends their human rights and at the same time he did not coward from criticizing his own Pashtun fellow countrymen and culture. Hosseini refers to the crimes and discrimination his Pashtun clan has had against the Hazara minority. Again, he points out to the prejudice against the Hazaras in Afghani school textbooks.

Hosseini fights for the rights of the oppressed, for example Hassan. He portrays Hassan in a very lofty way and certainly makes the reader want to associate with him [Hassan]. Amir's characterization is that of a selfish lad. At the age of eight, one day his Baba planned to take Amir to the Ghargha Lake and asked him to bring Hassan along with him but Amir lied to his Baba by saying to him that Hassan was not there. "I lied and told him that Hassan had their runs. I wanted Baba all to myself" (*KR*, 13). In another incident, Amir manages to get Sohrab back to Pakistan, after a bloody battle with Assef. Amir thinks of adopting Sohrab and taking him with him to America. They go to American Embassy in Islamabad. While there, the Ambassador tells Amir the difficulty of taking Sohrab with him (to America) as an orphan. He advises him to seek the advice of a lawyer; Amir goes to see the lawyer recommended by the American Ambassador in Pakistan. In the hotel from where he was expected to leave with Amir to the USA, Sohrab tried to commit suicide by cutting his hands with a razor, but he is miraculously saved. Amir prayed to God to save Sohrab vowing: "I will do *namaz* [prayers], I will do zakat … I will fast" (*KR*, 348).

In fact, before Baba and Amir depart to go to California, traces of discrimination emerge. They are discriminated by the Pashtun majority and we see Assef's hatred and sodomy of Hassan. The presence of the Russians also is pivotal in the analysis of this discrimination especially to those who were wealthy and the educated lot. Even before that, Sturges Fiona (2013) observes how "overwhelmed by his own cowardice, Amir frames his erstwhile playmate for theft, forcing Hassan and his father to leave Kabul in disgrace".[4]

In spite of the fact that they were close friends, there was a barrier between Amir and Hassan; one that had been built by outdated local culture and traditions. Amir says: "In the eighteen years that I lived in that house, I stepped into Hassan and Ali's quarters only a handful of times" (*KR*, 6). While Amir lived in a huge house, Hassan lived "in tree shadows of a loquat tree, was the servants' home, a modest little hut where Hassan lived with his father" (*KR*, 6). As kids, Amir and Hassan went one day to watch a movie in the cinema. They opted to

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[3] See Amelia Hill (2003) "An Afghan hounded by his past", https://www.theguardian.com/books/2003/sep/07/fiction.features1, accessed on 13/2/2017.
[4] Fiona Sturges (2013) in *The Independent* accessed from http://search.proquest.com/pqcentralbasic/docview/1355766788/fulltext/894B8E/470E144fddpq/254?accontid=16028 (accessed on 13/2/2017).

take a shortcut and they had to hop a fence that surrounded military barracks. They were stopped by two soldiers one of whom taunted Hassan:

> Hey, you! ... I know you … [When Amir asked just to keep walking and ignore the soldier] You! The Hazara! Look at me I'm talking to you! ... I know your mother, did you know that? I know here real good. I took her from behind by that creek over there … what a tight little sugary cunt she had!" (*KR*, 7).

Ali and his friend were Shi'a Hazaras. Sophie Xiong (2005) emphasizes about how the Hazaras were viewed within the ethnic lens and she puts it clearly. She argues that "Hassan, who is both Amir's best friend and servant, is of the looked-down-upon Hazara minority".[5] As a little boy, Amir mocked Ali (Hassan's father) at least on one occasion. Because he had polio, Ali was not able to walk in a normal way, he limped. One time, Amir joined him in buying bread. Childish Amir tried to imitate the way Ali was walking but he "almost fell in the gutter. That got me giggling. Ali turned around, caught me aping him. He did not say anything. Not they not ever. He just kept walking" (*KR*, 8).

On another occasion, when they finished playing together and went back home, Amir and Hassan parted ways and each went to his home:

> Hassan and I parted ways. I went past the rosebushes to Baba's mansion, Hassan to the mud shack where he had been born, where he'd lived his entire life. I remember it was spare, clean, dimly lit by a pair of kerosene lamps. There were two mattresses on opposite sides of the room, a worn Herati rug with frayed edges in between, a three-legged stool and a wooden table in the corner where Hassan did his drawings." (*KR*, 6)

Hazaras were treated like slaves in their own country. In *The Kite Runner*, the Pashtuns were treated like the superior race and gifted people. Hosseini writes on Hassan, a Hazara "Did all the cooking, all the cleaning. Hassan tended to the flowers in his garden, soaked the roots, picked off yellowing leaves, and planted rosebushes" (*KR*, 219). Hosseini adds "They called him "flat-nosed" because of Ali and Hassan's characteristic Hazara Mongoloid features" (*KR*, 9).

3. Taliban

In this section, we deal with the Taliban because the narrative and the motifs in this novel are solely derived from them. The first mention of Taliban in Hosseini's novels appears in the second half of the novel, *The Kite Runner*. Rahim Khan makes a telephone call to Amir in which he asked him to come to see him in Peshawar, Pakistan. Amir asks Khan "Is it [The Taliban] as bad as I heard?" and the latter answers "Nay, it's worse. Much worse… They don't let you be human" (*KR*, 198). Taliban, according to the novel, came to be the dominantly faction in Afghanistan in 1996, after defeating The Alliance of Shah Masoud. People rejoiced for a while, thinking that this was to be the end of the war. In 1996, Taliban banned kite-running and in 1998 they massacred the Hazaras in Mazar-i-Sharif (*KR*, 213).

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[5] Sophie Xiong (2005) "*The Kite Runner* will open eyes to Tyranny", http://search.proquest.com/pqcentralbasic/docview/375236637/fulltext/894B8E/470E144fddpq/136?accontid=16028. (accessed on 13/2/2017).

Among the many themes, *The Kite Runner* deals with the theme of a Taliban problem, the Sunni-Shia issue, minority problems in Afghanistan, women rights, and many other themes. The latter stages of *The Kite Runner* depict the repressions and atrocities of the Taliban. Amir came face to face with Taliban in Kabul ("Beard Patrol") when he went to Kabul to bring Sohrab. Amir dared to look Talibs in the face and this could have led to his death. Soon after they left, Farid (the driver) advised him never to stare at Talibs anymore, otherwise he would be risking his life. Farid told him "Keep your eyes on your feet when the Talibs are near" (*KR*, 298).

For many years, Hassan (and his family) were living with Rahim Khan in Amir's house, in the backyard hut not in the main house on their insistence. Rahim Khan, however, had to leave to Peshawar for treatment because he was so ill. Only a month after Rahim's departure, some locals reported to Taliban that a Hazara family is living alone in a big house in Wazir Akbar Khan. So, two Taliban officials came to the house and interrogated Hassan. When they told them that they were living in this house with Rahim Khan, they accused them of being liars and ordered them to leave the house by early morning. Hassan protested and they took him to the street. They ordered Hassan "to kneel" down and they shot him and when his wife "came screaming and attacked them [they] shot her too" (219). One day Hassan and his wife, Farzana, went to the bazar to buy potatoes and bread. Farzana asked the seller how much the potatoes cost. He did not hear her. She raised her voice up to make sure that he hears what she was saying but she was beaten by a Taliban officer from the ministry of vice and virtue for speaking loudly; something illegal from a Taliban perspective (*KR*, 216).

The repressions by the Taliban take the form of summary executions during the halftime of a soccer match at Ghazi Stadium. Two blindfolded adulterers are executed after the cleric gave a scary sermon about sinning. It will be worthwhile to quote a narrative:

> The two adulterers have been placed in two holes in the ground. The cleric starts to stone them. Every so often, a Talib man with a stethoscope checks the heartbeat of the adulterers. Once the adulterers (a man and a woman) are stoned to death and killed, the Talib guards load them up in a truck and fill the holes. The soccer game resumes." (79)

4. Afghan tradition/culture narrative

Although raised and educated in Europe and America, Hosseini's novels are abundant with Afghan motifs and themes. The Pashtuns are said to be very stubborn and egotistic people who have firm belief in their culture and to a great extent abide by its codes of conduct even if they live thousands of miles far away from their homeland. All the characters in *The Kite Runner* follow the Afghan code of conduct. This is clear in the way Baba and General Taheri are portrayed by Hosseini. Baba did not tell anybody (other than his friend Rahim Khan) that he was actually Hassan's father. He did this for the benefit of Hassan otherwise the poor boy would have suffered much more has he been known to be an illegitimate child worn outside marriage lock. Being a Hazara servant was much better (from an Afghan point of view) than being illegitimate. In the same way, when Soraya (whom will later Amir's wife) eloped with an Afghan man in her father had to look for her for weeks until he finds her in her boyfriend's flat. He threatens to kill himself if she does not come back with him. When she arrives home she finds that her mother has become severely ill due to the fact that all the Afghan community in their area would taunt and scold them for the "horrible" mistake their daughter had committed.

It will be sufficient to argue here that in most cases, a group of people are likely to resent authorities who undermine their tradition and cultural practices. The ethos of a people is often so close to them to an extent that

there is a direct relationship between infringing on a peoples' human rights and an attempt to erode their culture. The very time human rights activism as a philosophy becomes solidified in the psyche of a people, usually their cultural practices have been trumped upon.   People pay a lot of attention to what other people think of them or gossip about them. They always try to appear strong and others (friends or even family members) should see you weak, ill and should not know about or see your personal problem/ maladies (Baba and General Sahib, for example). When Amir's father was ill and was diagnosed as having cancer, he did not tell any of his friends or local Afghans living in the US; even he was suffering a lot from fits he used to close his door and never allowed Amir or (later) his wife to enter his room. It's customary to respect others' prospect, especially who they are your guests. When Amir was with Farid (the driver who would later take him to Kabul), the latter spoke rudely to Amir but his brother (Walid) rebuked him "Have you forgotten your manners? This is *my* house! Amir agha is my guest tonight and I will not allow you to dishonour me like this!" (*KR*, 236).

Amir's father was a stubborn guy who used to pay lots of attention, not to religious laws, to his old Pashtun traditions. Thus, he felt ashamed of Amir's boyish acts or car-sickness. One day, on their excursion, when they took the car, and followed by some other family members or on their journey to Peshawar (from where they went to America) Baba was ashamed when Amir vomited due to his car sickness, as if it the boy's fault. In spite the fact that Amir's father told him that lying is the most heinous sin, he kept it secret from him that Hassan was actually his son, Amir's brother:

> How could he have lied to me all those years? To Hassan? He had sat me on his lap when I was little, looked me straight in the face and *said,* there is only *one sin. And that is theft ... When you tell a lie, you steal someone's right to the truth* … Now fifteen years after I'd buried him, I was learning that Baba had been a thief. And a thief of me worst kind, because the things he's stolen had been sacred from me the night to know I had a brother, from Hassan his identity, and from Ali his honor. His *nang*. It is *namoos* (*KR*, 225, italics original).

If we compare Amir to his father, the former will fare pretty well. While his father was ashamed of him when (as a child) he vomited in the car on their way to Peshawar (due to car-sickness), Amir, on the other hand, was not ashamed of his father when he soaked his cushions with blood he coughed due to his illness; he had cancer. On another occasion, Amir was not ashamed of his father when, due to severe illness, wetted himself. Although Baba was diagnosed with cancer, he insisted on continuing his work as usual and never stopped going to sell his stuff in the flea market. One Sunday, when they were in the market, Baba had a fit and fell down.   Unlike his father, again, he was not ashamed of helping his father when he wet himself in the flea market; Amir came to the rescue of his father weeping "Baba' bladder let go. Shhh, Baba jan, I'm here. Your son is right here" (*KR*, 159).

Conclusion

This paper attempted to show the level of discrimination, human rights abuse and maladministration by the Taliban in *The Kite Runner*. In this regard, it served to portray Khaled Hosseini as a champion of human rights. At a time of such tension in Afghanistan, he still could write heroically and capture the atrocities committed by the Taliban. He did not abrogate his duty as a human rights campaigner through his artistic work. He showed that the Afghan people and in particular the Hazaras displayed much resilience, patience and dignity during the process of persecution and gross violation of their fundamental human rights. He has made an attempt to show that they deserved better treatment than they got from the Pashtuns. The depiction by Hosseini of these violations of human rights, intimidation and all manner of discrimination represented a serious breach of

responsibility by the Taliban rulers. The problems and violations faced by the Hazaras in the hands of the Pashtuns serve to bring into question the whole notion of respecting human rights as enshrined in the UNHR. ❈

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7th Session | Industry-Academy Cluster

16:00 - 17:20
Room No. 329, Main Building (3 F)

Chairman :   Engseng HO
                 (Singapore University, Singapore)

1

Medical Korea Cooperation with The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Vision

Jae Hyun SEOL (Digital Nomad Healthcare, Korea)

Discussant : Soo Jin LEE (HUFS, Korea)

2

How to Make Better Tour Services for Muslim Tourist in Korea

Sang Won PARK (Yalla Korea, Korea)

Discussant : Sae Hee PARK (HUFS, Korea)

3

Discuss the Possibility of Cooperation between Academia and Business: The Case of an Arabic Education and Media Platform

Sang Kyu KIM & Ah Reum YU (Markaz Arabic, Korea)

Discussant : Mi Soon JUNG (HUFS, Korea)

Medical Korea Cooperation with The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Vision

✍ *Jae Hyun Seol*

Digital Nomad Healthcare, Korea

Nomad Life

Self Introduction

. Korea University, Literature de Española

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  - Public Market Sales
  - Internal Venture CEO

. KTDS (KT Subsidiary Company SI/SM)

. Digital Nomad Healthcare, CEO

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
Company Introduction

. Foundation: Nov/03/2014

. Vision: **Medical Korea 2030(Nasdaq in 2023)**

. Nomadism   **Think Global**
                Start Small
                Move Fast

. DNA   **Be Global**
                Be Nomad
                Be Digital
                Be Adaptive
                Be Brave

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

- Location: Saudi Arabia Peninsula
- GDP: $ 640 Billion
- FDI Inward Stock: $224 Billion
- Population: 31.7 million
  - Foreigner: 6 million
  - Population Growth Rate: 2.5%
- Yearly Umrah Visitors: 8 million
- Percentage of Youth(Under 25): 50%

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030

. April 25, 2016 Announced

My primary goal is to be an exemplary and leading nation in all aspects, and I will work with you in achieving this endeavour...

Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques
King Salman Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud

Our Vision: Saudi Arabia..the heart of the Arab and Islamic worlds, the investment powerhouse, and the hub connecting three continents

Vision 2030, Pillar

- **SAUDI ARABIA** The Heart of the Arab and Muslim World

  . Umarh Visitors (8 million -> 30 million)

- **An Investment** Powerhouse

  . PIF Assets ($160 Billion -> $2 Trillion)

- **A HUB** Connecting 3 Continents

  . Logistics Performance Index (49 -> 25)

Vision 2030, Theme

- **A Vibrant Society**

  . Life Expectancy (74 -> 80 years)
  . Disposable Income on Entertainment & Leisure (3% -> 6%)
  . OECD Social Capital Index (26 -> 10)

- **A Thriving Economy**

  . FDI Contribution to GDP (3.8% -? 5.7%)
  . Private Sector Contribution to GDP (40% -> 65%)
  . SME Contribution to GDP (20% -> 35%

- **An Ambitious Nation**

  . E-Government Survey Index Ranking (36 -> 5)
  . Government Effectiveness Index Ranking (80 -> 20)

Vision 2030 Cooperation, G2G

Vision 2030 Cooperation Sector

SAUDI ARABIA The Heart of the Arab and Muslim World

. Umarh Visitors (8 million -> 30 million)

An Investment Powerhouse

. PIF Assets ($160 Billion -> $2 Trillion)

A HUB Connecting 3 Continents

. Logistics Performance Index (49 -> 25)

A Vibrant Society

. Life Expectancy (74 -> 80 years)

. Disposable Income on Entertainment & Leisure (3% -> 6%)

. OECD Social Capital Index (26 -> 10)

A Thriving Economy

. FDI Contribution to GDP (3.8% -> 5.7%)

. Private Sector Contribution to GDP (40% -> 65%)

. SME Contribution to GDP (20% -> 35%)

An Ambitious Nation

. E-Government Survey Index Ranking (36 -> 5)

. Government Effectiveness Index Ranking (80 -> 20)

Medical

Education

Medical Tourism

Pharmacy

ICT

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Core Cooperation in Healthcare

. Life Expectancy (74 -> 80 years)
. Private Sector Contribution to GDP (40% -> 65%)
. PIF Assets ($160 Billion -> $2 Trillion)

. OECD Social Capital Index (26 -> 10)

Medical/ Pharmacy

Tourism

Body Checkup Center

Education

ICT

. Umarh Visitors (8 million -> 30 million)

. E-Government Survey Index Ranking (36 -> 5)
. Government Effectiveness Index Ranking (80 -> 20)

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Vision 2030 Cooperation, Action Plan

Medical	. Life Expectancy (74 -> 80 years) . Private Sector Contribution to GDP (40% -> 65%) . PIF Assets ($160 Billion -> $2 Trillion)	. Body Checkup Center for Preventive System (200 Sites) . Operation Outsourcing: JV(Korea-Saudi Arabia) . Employment: Saudi Arabian HR over 80%
Pharmacy	. Private Sector Contribution to GDP (40% -> 65%) . PIF Assets ($160 Billion -> $2 Trillion)	. JV Pharmaceutical Company . Export to GCC & MENA . Employment
Education	. OECD Social Capital Index (26 -> 10)	. Exchange Student Program for Collage of Medical & Pharmacy
Medical Tourism	. Umrah Visitors (8 million -> 30 million) . Private Sector Contribution to GDP (40% -> 65%)	. Body Checkup Center Business for Umarh Visitor . Medical Service Business
ICT	. E-Government Survey Index Ranking (36 -> 5) . Government Effectiveness Index Ranking (80 -> 20) . Umarh Visitors (8 million -> 30 million) . Private Sector Contribution to GDP (40% -> 65%)	. Body Checkup Center Business for Umarh Visitor . Medical Service Business

Fleet-type Medical Export

Body Checkup Center & HR Plan

년도	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Body Check up Center	3	27	170			
Accumulate Body Check up Center	3	30	200	200	200	200
Dispatch Medical HR	60	600	4,000	4,000	4,000	4,000
Accumulated Medical Tourism Patient (천명)	915	9,150	61,000	61,000	61,000	61,000
New HR in Korea (명)	30	300	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000

How to Make Better Tour Services for Muslim Tourist in Korea

✍ **Sang Won Park**

Yalla Korea

WHY YallaKOREA ?

1) **Arabic & English**
2) Halal
3) Private & Customize
4) Understanding Culture

WHY YallaKOREA ?

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WHY YallaKOREA ?

1) Arabic & English
2) Halal
3) Private & Customize
4) **Understanding Culture**

Fast growing Muslim Tourist

최신기사

[무슬림 관광객 잡아라] 작년 100만명 육박…유커 빈자리 메운다

송고시간 | 2017/08/21 06:59

국내에 입국한 무슬림 관광객 수
(단위: 명)
※ 출처: 한국관광공사

38만5000 (2010년)
54만2000 (2012년)
75만3000 (2014년)
98만6000 (2016년)

무슬림 관광객 증가 관련 활성화 대책 마[
[제작 조혜인] 일러스트, 합성사진

(서울=연합뉴스) 이도연 기자 = 한 중국인 관광객(유커·遊客)이 줄어들 있다.

HALAL

What else ?

NATURE

NATURE

CULTURE

CULTURE

ACTIVITY

ACTIVITY

Discuss the Possibility of Cooperation between Academia and Business:

The Case of an Arabic Education and Media Platform

✍ Sang Kyu Kim & Ah Reum Yu

Markaz Arabic, Korea

Possibility of Academic−Industrial Cooperation in
the Fields of Education & Media and in search for the improvement

Kim Sang Kyu
Yoo Ah Ruem

Where We Are?

The age of transition : Perspective on technologies and knowledge

13th century, 1455-1517
City guild, Johannes Gutenberg
Renaissance

1776-1815
James Watt, Adam Smith
Capitalism, Industrial Revolution

Today
2nd, 3rd Industrial Revolution
Transition to Post-Capitalist Society

Unpredictable future
4th Industrial Revolution
Industrial Internet of Things
Smart Automation

Rediscovery of knowledge   Rediscovery of Technology   Knowledge society   Age of Artificial Intelligence?

Possibility of Academic-Industrial Cooperation in the Fields of Education and Media and Ways for Improvement

2

Where We Go

The age of uncertainty : an accountant's future

Negative?   Positive?

Possibility of Academic-Industrial Cooperation in the Fields of Education and Media and Ways for Improvement

3

Possibility of Academic-Industrial Cooperation in
the Fields of Education and Ways for Improvement

Feb
201
3
**We start our company
With only 2 persons and 2
Students**

Aug
201
3

**Regular Arabic
curriculum launching
: ALL THAT ARABIC**

Make them **know**
Arabic Language and
Arabs **easier** and **better**

We passionately believe that Communication skill is one of
the most important things to global business success.

MarkazArabic is a start-up company
established in 2013 with an aim to
make more people to understand
and get closer to the Arab World and
their Language

Possibility of Academic–Industrial Cooperation in
the Fields of Media and Ways for Improvement

AL-ARAB IN SEOUL

We started to broadcast the podcast service, called 'Al arab in Seoul' (or under the title of 'Alarab in Seoul) in April 2014, and it led to 5,137 podcast listeners. In addition, we had organised and supported the various online and offline events including the Iftar event which promote cultural exchange between the Arab countries and Korea as well as a charity fundraising event for Syrian refuge

What We do

ARAB in Seoul as a knowledge sharing platform

The operation of "Arab in Seoul" business was suspended due to an unexpected accident in 2015. But it was resumed in July 2017 with the aim of establishing a deeper understanding of the Middle East's relations with South Korea and the world and of creating a variety of business opportunities.

Arab in Seoul still remains in the pilot stage as a new platform, but around 2,000 users are utilizing the services every day.

Providing
Information

Networking
Events

En / ظ

Arabic / English Platform
for mutual understanding

Possibility of Academic-Industrial Cooperation in the Fields of Education and Media and Ways for Improvement

How to cooperate with educational institution

People
Decision makers, Business people, Overseas salespeople, NGO people, Tourists, Artists

Knowledge sharing platform
Staff members, reporters, writers and partners

University
researchers / students -
studying economics, sociology
and regional studies

Arab in Seoul aims at extending business opportunities as creating the integrated public space between various users via the communication medium; company, university and people. It cover various actors who engaged in the Middle East related industries, academia and etc.

Possibility of Academic-Industrial Cooperation in the Fields of Education and Media and Ways for Improvement

13

www.eaerweb.org

Call for Papers for the
East Asian Economic Review

With great pleasure, the *East Asian Economic Review* is welcoming submissions.

AIMS and SCOPE

The *East Asian Economic Review* is an economic journal, for the promotion of interdisciplinary research on international economics. Published as a quarterly by the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a Korean government-funded economic think-tank, the Journal is global in perspective and covers both theory and empirical research.

The Journal aims to facilitate greater understanding of all issues pertinent to diverse economies of East Asia through publication of rigorous analyses by renowned experts in the field. The EAER connects policy and theory, providing empirical analyses and practical policy suggestions for the economies in the region.

TOPICS COVERED

The *East Asian Economic Review* brings together articles from many different realms of economics at both regional and global levels. Issues relevant to Esat Asia's diverse economy are the major focuses. Specific areas of interest include, but are not limited to:
• Trade and Investment Issues • Economic Integration • APEC • ASEAN • ASEM • International Finance • Liberalization of Financial Services and Capital • International Cooperation for Korean Unification

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SUBMISSION DEADLINE:
The Journal is published every March, June, September and December of each year and submissions are accepted for review on an ongoing basis (No specific deadline).

REVIEW PROCESS:
We have introduced a "fast-track" system, which takes four to five weeks on average from submission to the first round review in order to provide quick and authoritative decisions to the authors. In general, the Journal's manuscript decision process includes submission, editorial decision on whether the paper should be reviewed, peer review, decisions after review, revision, acceptance in principle, final submission and acceptance, proofs, advance online publication, and print publication.

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